Bava Batra 131b (קלא:) — the Talmud in English

From where is it established that

these two enactments

were instituted by one court? Perhaps they were instituted by two different courts,

and the wording concerning a gift mentioned in the enactment of “the daughters,” does not support the wording concerning inheritance mentioned in “the sons who are males”? And the Gemara answers:

It cannot enter your mind

to say this.

As it is taught in the first clause: “This is the exposition that Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya expounded before the Sages in the vineyard at Yavne: The sons inherit, and the daughters are sustained. Just as the sons inherit only after the death of their father, so too the daughters are sustained only after the death of their father.”

The Gemara proves:

Granted, if you say that they were instituted by one court, this is why we derive one enactment from another. But if you say that they were instituted by two courts, how can we derive one enactment from another?

And we reject this:

From where

do you know this? Perhaps I will always say to you that they were instituted by two courts, and the later court instituted its enactment in accordance with the first court, so that one enactment would not contradict the other.

Therefore, it is possible to draw an analogy between the enactments.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: One who writes all his property to his wife

as a gift

intends only to make her an administrator.

That is, his intention is not to give her his property, but only to appoint her administrator over his property after his death, so that she will support his sons from it according to her assessment.

And he gave her his property so that his sons would honor her and heed her words.

We inquire into this:

It is obvious

to us that if he wrote all his property to

his eldest son, he intended only to make him an administrator.

So that his younger brothers would honor him.

But if he wrote all his property to

his youngest son,

who is not so concerned with honoring him,

what

is the law? Is his intention to make a complete gift, or to appoint him an administrator?

And concerning this matter

it was stated

[it was said in the beit-midrash]:

Rav Hanilai bar Idi said in the name of Shmuel: Even if he

wrote it to

his

the

young son who is lying in a cradle,

his intention is only to make him an administrator over his property.

We raised another question concerning this law:

It is obvious

to us that if he wrote all his property to

his

son who is closer to him and desires his honor,

or

he wrote all his property to

another

person who is not obligated to honor him at all,

in this case it is obvious to us that

the other

person is intended to receive it

as a gift,

for had he intended to appoint him an administrator, he would have written so explicitly,

whereas

to

his

son his intention is to make him

an administrator.

Likewise, if he wrote all his property to

his betrothed wife,

or

or

to

his

who was

divorced wife,

his intention is certainly to give it to her

as a gift.

However,

they raised a dilemma:

if he wrote all his property to

a daughter among sons,

or

or

in a case where he had no sons, and he wrote all his property to

a wife among brothers,

or

or

he wrote all his property to

a wife among her husband’s sons

[that is, his sons from another wife],

what

is the law? In all these cases, is he concerned for their honor, or is his intention to make a complete gift?

Ravina said in the name of Rava: In all of them

[a daughter among sons, a wife among brothers, and a wife among her husband’s brothers]

did not

acquire

,

and we say that his intention was to appoint her an administrator over his property,

except for his betrothed wife and his divorced wife,

in whose case his intention was certainly to make a complete gift.

However,

Rav Avira said in the name of Rava: In all of them

[his betrothed wife, his divorced wife, and a daughter among sons] his intention is not to appoint an administrator, but to make a complete gift, and she

acquires, except for a wife among brothers and a wife among her husband’s sons

in whose case his intention is to appoint her an administrator, because of their honor.