Bava Batra 131a — the Talmud in English

You should not derive from it either,

to judge similarly, since

a judge has no authority

to judge

except

according to

what his eyes see.

That is, according to his reasoning at the present time, and he should not be concerned lest he find in the future an answer to his difficulty and judge in another manner.

The Gemara returns to discuss the parameters of “the bequeathing of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka”:

Rava raised a question: In the case of a healthy person, what is the law?

A healthy person who said, “So-and-so shall inherit such-and-such a field among my property”—did Rabbi Yohanan also say in this case that he acquires it, if he is fit to inherit?

And the sides of the doubt are: Perhaps

when Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka stated his ruling concerning a person dangerously ill, it is because he is fit to bequeath

[to be fit to bequeath immediately]

and

we apply to him, “On the day that he causes his sons to inherit,”

but not in the case of a healthy person.

Or perhaps, even in the case of a healthy person as well,

he can bequeath to whomever he wishes.

Rav Mesharsheya said to Rava: Come

and

hear

what we learned in a beraita concerning this matter:

For Rabbi Natan said to Rabbi,

“You in the Land of Israel

have taught your Mishna in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka.”

For we learned

in tractate Ketubot (52b): One who marries a woman and

did not write for her

in the ketuba,

“The male children who will be yours from me shall inherit the money of your ketuba, beyond their portion that they will have with their brothers

[“The male children who will be born to me from you shall inherit the money of your ketuba, beyond their portion that they will divide with their brothers who will be born to me from another woman”; and this is what is called everywhere “the ketuba of the male children”]

,” he is obligated, for it is a stipulation of the court.

And it is demonstrated from here that the father can give some of his sons a larger portion of the inheritance .

And Rabbi Natan raised a difficulty to Rabbi: Why did he teach his Mishna according to the view of an individual, rather than teach it according to everyone?

And Rabbi said to him:

This Mishna is according to everyone, and do not read in it, “They shall inherit the money of your ketuba,” which implies that he gives it to his sons by way of inheritance, through the bequeathing of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka; rather,

“They shall take”

[the language of a gift]

we learned.

That is, the father gives his sons the money of their mother’s ketuba from now.

He reconsidered,

and Rabbi said: “There was childishness in me, and I acted brazenly toward Natan the Babylonian,”

and I gave him an incorrect answer.

For if we say, “We learned ‘They shall take,’” and the father gives his sons the money of their mother’s ketuba from now, we should likewise say that “the ketuba of the male children” can collect from property that the father sold after he married his wife.

Rather, it is an established principle

that the ketuba of

the male children does not collect from property subject to a lien.

And

if it enters your mind that “We learned ‘They shall take,’” why does it not collect from property subject to a lien?

Rather, conclude from it: “We learned ‘They shall inherit.’”

And this is in accordance with the view of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka.

Thus far is the beraita that Rav Mesharsheya brought to Rava. And Rav Mesharsheya demonstrated from this beraita:

Who is the one from whom you hear that he holds this view? Rabbi

Yohanan ben Beroka! And conclude from it: Even in the case of a healthy person

he can bequeath to one of his sons. For here the husband bequeaths to his wife’s sons while he is still healthy.

The Gemara returns to discuss Rav Natan’s statement, in which he demonstrated from “the ketuba of the male children” the law of “the bequeathing of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka.”

And the Gemara raises an objection:

Rav Pappa said to Abaye:

How did Rav Natan demonstrate from the ketuba of the male children the law of “the bequeathing of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka”? For

whether according to the one who says, “They shall take,” or according to the one who says, “They shall inherit,”

it is difficult:

Does a person have the capacity to transfer something that has not yet come into the world?

And even according to Rabbi Meir, who says, “A person can transfer something that has not yet come into the world,” this applies

when he transferred something that has not yet come into the world

to something that is in the world, but not to something that is not in the world;

and if so, how can the father transfer it to his wife’s sons, who have not yet been born?

Rather,

certainly,

a stipulation of the court is different.

If so,

here too

there is no proof that the Mishna is according to Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, since

a stipulation of the court is different.

Perhaps, with a stipulation of the court, even the Rabbis agree that he can bequeath to whomever he wishes.

He said to him:

Rabbi Natan demonstrated

because

he left the wording “They shall take,” and

expressed it in the language of “They shall inherit.”

This indicates that his inclination was toward the words of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, that a person can bequeath to whomever he wishes.

Abaye then said: What I said is not a matter,

namely, that one can demonstrate from the wording “They shall inherit” that he held like Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, since there too the Rabbis agree that he can bequeath to whomever he wishes.

For

in the latter part of that same Mishna

we learned: If he did not write for her, “The female children who will be yours from me shall sit in my house and be nourished from my property until they are taken by men

[“The daughters who will be born to me from you shall sit in my house and be nourished from my property until they marry”; and this is “the ketuba of the female children”]

,” he is obligated, for it is a stipulation of the court.

And

if so, in every ketuba,

this one would have it as a gift,

namely, “the female children,”

and this one through inheritance, “the male children,”

and anyone

who writes

to

this one in the

language of

inheritance and to this one in the

language of

a gift—even the Rabbis agree

that he can give it, as we learned above (126b): If he wrote the language of a gift, whether at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end, his words stand; and in the Gemara (129a) we established this even with two fields and two people.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

Rav Nahumi said to him—and some say

[there were those who stated this saying in the name of]

Rav Hananya bar Minyomi, to Abaye: