Bava Batra 131a (קלא.) — the Talmud in English

You should not derive it from the Gemara either,

to judge accordingly, since

a judge has no right

to judge

except

in accordance with

what his eyes see.

That is, according to his reasoning at present, and he need not be concerned that perhaps in the future he will find an answer to his difficulty and judge differently.

The Gemara returns to discuss the parameters of “the bequeathing of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka”:

Rava raised a dilemma: In the case of a healthy person, what is the law?

If a healthy person said, “So-and-so shall inherit such-and-such a field among my properties,” did Rabbi Yohanan also say in this case that the beneficiary acquires it if he is fit to inherit from him?

The sides of the dilemma are: Perhaps

when Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka spoke of a person on his deathbed, he was referring to one fit to bequeath immediately

[fit to bequeath immediately]

and

the verse, “On the day that he causes his sons to inherit,” applies to him,

but not in the case of a healthy person.

Or perhaps, even in the case of a healthy person as well,

he can bequeath to whomever he wishes.

Rav Mesharsheya said to Rava: Come

and

hear

what we learned in a beraita concerning this matter:

For Rabbi Natan said to Rabbi:

You in Eretz Yisrael

taught your Mishna in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka.

As we learned

in tractate Ketubot (52b), when a man marries a woman and

does not write for her

in the ketuba:

“The male children who will be yours from me shall inherit the money of your ketuba beyond their share of the portion that they will receive with their brothers,”

[“The male children who will be born to me from you shall inherit the money of your ketuba, beyond the portion that they will divide with their brothers who will be born to me from another woman,” and this is called everywhere “the ketuba of the male children”]

he is obligated, as this is a stipulation of the court.

This proves that a father can grant some of his sons a larger portion of the inheritance .

Rabbi Natan raised a difficulty against Rabbi: Why did he teach his Mishna in accordance with an individual opinion, rather than teach it according to everyone’s view?

And Rabbi said to him:

This Mishna accords with everyone’s view. Do not read in it, “They shall inherit the money of your ketuba,” which implies that he gives it to his sons by way of inheritance, through the bequeathing of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka. Rather,

“They shall take”

[the language of a gift]

is what we learned.

That is, the father gives his sons the money of their mother’s ketuba immediately.

He later retracted his statement,

and Rabbi said: “I was youthful, and I acted brazenly toward Natan the Babylonian,

and I gave him an incorrect answer.

For if we say, “ ‘They shall take’ is what we learned,” and the father gives his sons the money of their mother’s ketuba immediately, we should likewise say that “the ketuba of the male children” can seize property from assets that the father sold after marrying their mother.

Rather, we have established

that the ketuba of

the male children does not seize property from liened assets.

And

if it enters your mind that “ ‘They shall take’ is what we learned,” why does it not seize property from liened assets?

Rather, conclude from it: “ ‘They shall inherit’ is what we learned.”

And it accords with the opinion of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka.

This concludes the beraita that Rav Mesharsheya brought to Rava. And Rav Mesharsheya proved from this beraita:

Whom do you hear who holds this opinion? Rabbi

Yohanan ben Beroka! And conclude from it: even in the case of a healthy person

he can bequeath to one of his sons. For here, the husband bequeaths to his wife’s sons while he is still healthy.

The Gemara returns to discuss Rabbi Natan’s statement, in which he proved from “the ketuba of the male children” the law of “the bequeathing of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka.”

And the Gemara raises an objection:

Rav Pappa said to Abaye:

How did Rabbi Natan prove from the ketuba of the male children the law of “the bequeathing of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka”? For

whether according to the one who says, “They shall take,” or according to the one who says, “They shall inherit,”

there is a difficulty:

Is it not the case that a person cannot transfer something that has not yet come into the world?

And even according to Rabbi Meir, who says that a person can transfer something that has not yet come into the world, this applies

when he transfers something that has not yet come into the world

to something that is in the world, but not to something that is not in the world;

and if so, how can the father transfer the property to his wife’s sons who have not yet been born?

Rather,

certainly,

a stipulation of the court is different.

If so,

here too

there is no proof that the Mishna accords with Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, since

a stipulation of the court is different.

Perhaps with a stipulation of the court, even the Rabbis agree that he can bequeath to whomever he wishes.

He said to him:

Rabbi Natan proved it

because

he left aside the wording “They shall take,” and

expressed it in the language of “They shall inherit.”

This indicates that his inclination was toward the position of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, that a person can bequeath to whomever he wishes.

Abaye then said: “What I said is not a valid statement,”

that one can prove from the wording “They shall inherit” that he held like Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, since even the Rabbis agree there that he can bequeath to whomever he wishes.

For

in the latter clause of that same Mishna

we learned: If he did not write for her, “The female children who will be yours from me shall reside in my house and be sustained from my property until they are taken by men in marriage,”

[“The daughters who will be born to me from you shall reside in my house and be sustained from my property until they marry,” and this is “the ketuba of the female children”]

he is obligated, as this is a stipulation of the court.

And

if so, in every ketuba

this one receives it as a gift,

namely, “the female children,”

and that one receives it by inheritance,

“the male children,”

and everyone

who writes

for one of them in the language of

inheritance and

for the other in the language of

a

gift—even the Rabbis agree

that he can give it, as we learned above (126b): If he wrote the language of a gift, whether at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end, his words stand; and in the Gemara (129a) we established that this applies even to two fields and two people.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

Rav Naḥumi said to him—and some say

[there are those who attributed this statement to]

Rav Ḥananya bar Minyomi, to Abaye: