Bava Batra 130b — the Talmud in English

What

does the verse come to teach by saying, “He shall not be able to give the firstborn status

to the son of the beloved before the son of the hated, the firstborn”?

Is it not already stated, “For he shall acknowledge the firstborn, the son of the hated, to give him a double portion,” and for what purpose did the verse return and say, “He shall not be able to give the firstborn status”?

Rather,

since it is stated, “And it shall be on the day that he causes his sons to inherit,”

and it implies

that he is able

to give each of his sons whatever he wishes,

there would be room to derive this by a kal va-chomer:

Is this not an a fortiori inference: If with regard to the simple son, whose power is superior, since he takes what is fit to come as he takes what is already possessed, the Torah gave the father permission to cause inheritance to anyone he wishes, then with regard to the firstborn, whose power is impaired, since he does not take what is fit to come as he takes what is already possessed, is it not all the more so?

The verse therefore teaches, “He shall not be able to give the firstborn status” .

And the Gemara raises an objection:

Let it say, “He shall not be able to give the firstborn status,”

and let us learn from this verse that only with regard to the firstborn is he unable to transfer the inheritance, but he is able to transfer the inheritance to the other brothers, as Abaye’s objection; and for

what purpose does the verse teach, “And it shall be on the day that he causes his sons to inherit”?

And the Gemara answers:

That

if “And it shall be on the day that he causes his sons to inherit” had not been written,

one could

learn from the firstborn by a kal va-chomer:

Is this not an a fortiori inference: If with regard to the firstborn, whose power is impaired, since he does not take what is fit to come as he takes what is already possessed, the Torah said, “He shall not be able to give the firstborn status,” then with regard to the simple son, whose power is superior, since he takes what is fit to come as he takes what is already possessed, is it not all the more so?!

The verse therefore teaches, “And it shall be on the day that he causes his sons to inherit,”

and we learn from this verse that

the Torah gave the father permission to cause inheritance to anyone he wishes.

Rav Zerika said in the name of Rav Ami, who said in the name of Rav Hanina, who said in the name of Rabbi: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka.

Rabbi Abba said to him, “He ruled

in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka”

was stated.

That is, we did not hear in Rabbi’s name that he said the words, “The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka”; rather, it is accepted by us that he ruled in practice in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka.

With regard to what do they disagree?

One Master holds: A ruling is preferable.

But if we had not heard that Rabbi said this, one cannot learn from a practical act of a great man, for perhaps the one who showed it to him did not examine all the details of the act so carefully, and perhaps Rabbi granted the property on account of other claims, and not because he ruled the halakha in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka.

And one Master holds: A practical act of a great man

is preferable. But if we had not seen that he ruled this way in practice, one cannot rely on what he said, “The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka,” for perhaps he did not intend to rule this way in practice; rather, this is what emerged for him by way of study.

And concerning this matter,

the Sages taught

in a beraita:

One does not derive a halakhic ruling neither from study, [that is, if his teacher said to him during his study, “The halakha is in accordance with the words of so-and-so,” one does not learn from his words, for perhaps when a practical case comes before him he will examine it more carefully and find that the halakha is not so].

that is, if one’s teacher said to him during study, “The halakha is in accordance with the words of so-and-so,” one may not learn from this statement that this is the practical halakha, because perhaps when an actual case comes before him, he will examine it more carefully and determine that the halakha is not so.

nor from a practical act, [if he saw his teacher performing an act in accordance with the words of so-and-so, he should not learn from this that this is the halakha, for perhaps he did so for another reason unknown to him] ,

if he saw his teacher perform an act in accordance with the words of a particular Sage, he should not learn from this that this is the halakha, because perhaps his teacher acted this way for another reason unknown to him,

until they say to him, “The halakha is for practical application” .

If he asked, and they said to him, “The halakha is for practical application,” he should go and perform the act. But only provided that he does not compare

one matter with another in order to decide one matter from another. This concludes the beraita.

And we raise a question concerning it:

What does “but only provided that he does not compare” mean? Yet we compare and compare the entire Torah ?

Rav Ashi said: This is what it means: But only provided that he does not compare cases of animal defects.

To learn one from another, such as a defect of the liver from a defect of the lung. Since the vitality of the organs is not equal, there are organs which, if cut, cause death, and there are organs through which it will live.

For it was taught: We do not say, with regard to animal defects, that one resembles another. And do not be surprised, for if he cuts it here, it dies; if he cuts it there, it lives.

Rav Asi said to Rabbi Yohanan,

his teacher:

When the Master tells us, “The halakha is thus,”

in the course of our study, are we to

perform an act

in accordance with this ruling?

He said

to him:

You shall not perform the act until I say, “The halakha is for practical application.”

As above.

Rava said to Rav Pappa and to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua: When a legal ruling of mine comes before you and you see an objection in it, do not tear it up until you come before me. [When my legal ruling comes before you and you see an objection in it, do not tear it up until you come before me].

When one of my rulings comes before you and you find a difficulty in it, do not tear it up until you come before me.

If I have a reason, I shall tell it to you. And if not, I shall retract.

After his death, you shall neither tear it up completely, nor shall you derive completely from it.

Do not tear it up completely, for if I had been there, perhaps I would have told you the reason.

And perhaps you, too, will in the future find an answer to your difficulty.