Bava Batra 130b (קל:) — the Talmud in English

What

is the purpose of the verse, “He may not give precedence

to the son of the beloved wife over the firstborn son of the unloved wife”?

The verse has already stated: “But he must acknowledge the firstborn, the son of the unloved wife, to give him a double portion.” Why, then, did the Torah repeat and say: “He may not give precedence”?

Rather,

since it is stated: “And it shall be, on the day that he causes his sons to inherit,”

which implies

that he can

give each of his sons whatever he wishes,

there would have been room to derive this by means of a kal va-chomer:

Is this not an a fortiori inference: If, with regard to an ordinary son, whose legal status is stronger, as he takes a portion of property that is destined to come into his father’s possession just as he takes property already in his father’s possession, the Torah granted the father permission to bequeath his property to whomever he wishes, then with regard to a firstborn, whose legal status is weaker, as he does not take a portion of property destined to come into his father’s possession as he takes property already in his father’s possession, is it not all the more so?

The verse therefore states: “He may not give precedence” .

The Gemara raises an objection:

Let it say only: “He may not give precedence,”

and let us derive from this verse that only with regard to the firstborn may he not transfer the inheritance, but that he may transfer the inheritance to the other brothers, as in Abaye’s question. And

what, then, is the purpose of the verse: “And it shall be, on the day that he causes his sons to inherit”?

The Gemara answers:

That had the verse not stated: “And it shall be, on the day that he causes his sons to inherit,”

if “And it shall be on the day that he causes his sons to inherit” had not been written,

we could

have derived the law concerning an ordinary son from the firstborn by means of a kal va-chomer:

Is this not an a fortiori inference: If, with regard to a firstborn, whose legal status is weaker, as he does not take a portion of property destined to come into his father’s possession as he takes property already in his father’s possession, the Torah said: “He may not give precedence,” then with regard to an ordinary son, whose legal status is stronger, as he takes a portion of property destined to come into his father’s possession as he takes property already in his father’s possession, is it not all the more so?!

The verse therefore states: “And it shall be, on the day that he causes his sons to inherit,”

and we learn from this verse that

the Torah granted the father permission to bequeath his property to whomever he wishes.

Rav Zerika said that Rav Ami said that Rav Ḥanina said that Rabbi said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka.

Rabbi Abba said to him, “It was stated: ‘He ruled

in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka’”

.

That is, we did not hear in Rabbi’s name that he said the words, “The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka.” Rather, it was accepted by tradition that he ruled in practice in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka.

With regard to what do they disagree?

One master holds: A statement of halakha is preferable.

Had we not heard that Rabbi said this, we could not derive the halakha from a practical act, because perhaps the person who saw the act did not examine all the details of the case carefully, or perhaps Rabbi granted them the property for other reasons, and not because he ruled in accordance with the halakha of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka.

And the other master holds: A practical act is preferable,

as an indication of the halakha. Had we not seen that he ruled this way in practice, we could not rely on what he said, “The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka.” Perhaps he did not intend to rule this way in practice; rather, this was the conclusion he reached in the course of his study.

And concerning this matter,

the Sages taught

in a beraita:

The halakha may not be learned either from a statement made in the course of study,

that is, if one’s teacher said to him in the course of study, “The halakha is in accordance with the words of so-and-so,” one may not learn from this statement that this is the practical halakha, because perhaps when a case comes before him, he will examine it more carefully and determine that the halakha is not so.

Nor may it be learned from a practical act,

if one saw his teacher perform an act in accordance with the words of a particular sage, he may not learn from this that this is the halakha, because perhaps his teacher acted that way for another reason unknown to him ,

until they say to him: “This is the halakha for practical application” .

If they ask him, and they say to him, “This is the halakha for practical application,” he should go and act accordingly. Provided that he does not draw an analogy

by deriving one matter from another. This concludes the beraita.

The Gemara examines this matter:

What does “provided that he does not draw an analogy” mean? But do we not derive analogies throughout the entire Torah ?

Rav Ashi said: This is what it means: Provided that he does not draw an analogy with regard to defects that render an animal a tereifa.

One may not learn one such defect from another, for example, a defect rendering the liver a tereifa from one rendering the lung a tereifa. Since the vitality of the organs is not equal, there are organs whose severing causes death, and others whose severing does not prevent the animal from living.

As it is taught in a beraita: One may not say that one defect rendering an animal a tereifa is analogous to another; and do not be surprised by this, for if one cuts it in this place, it dies, whereas if one cuts it in that place, it lives.

Rav Asi said to Rabbi Yoḥanan,

his teacher:

When the Master tells us, “The halakha is thus,”

in the course of our study, are we to

act

in accordance with this ruling?

He said

to him:

Do not act on the basis of it until I say, “This is the halakha for practical application.”

As above.

Rava said to Rav Pappa and to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua: When a legal ruling of mine comes before you and you find a difficulty with it, do not tear it up until you come before me.

When one of my legal rulings comes before you and you find a difficulty in it, do not tear it up until you come before me.

If I have a reason for it, I will tell you. And if not, I will retract my ruling .

After my death, do not tear it up, and likewise do not derive a ruling from it.

Do not tear it up, because if I had been there, perhaps I would have told you the reason for it.

And perhaps you, too, will in the future find an answer to your difficulty.