Bava Batra 133a (קלג.) — the Talmud in English

Rav Kahana said to him: If he subsequently acquired [other property], would she not collect [her ketuba from it]

[If he acquired property after giving her the gift, would she not collect from that property] ?!

Certainly she would collect from that property, since she waived only the lien she had on his property at that time, and not on property that he would acquire in the future.

And

if so,

since, if he subsequently acquired

other property,

she would collect,

[she would have collected her ketuba from it]

now too,

in the case where the husband subsequently acquired the property of his deceased wife,

she would collect

[she collects her ketuba from that property].

Further in this matter:

A certain

terminally ill man

divided his property between his wife and his sons.

He divided his property between his wife and his sons, meaning that he “made her a partner among the sons.”

However,

he left

some property

one date palm

without specifying to whom it belonged.

And the matter is uncertain to us: Can she collect the remainder of her ketuba from the orphans’ property, or only from that date palm? Or perhaps, since she too received a share in the inheritance and did not protest the sons’ share, she waived the remainder, and cannot collect it even from that date palm?

Ravina thought to say:

She cannot collect the remainder of her ketuba from the orphans’ property, since she waived the lien she had on their property,

and she has only one date palm.

Rav Yeimar said to Ravina: If she has nothing,

that is, if she cannot collect from the orphans’ property,

she does not even have one date palm.

For she knew about that date palm and waived her claim to all the property currently in the father’s possession, since he made her a partner among the sons.

Rather,

if you say that she did not waive her lien on that date palm, since she said to herself, “He has left me a small place from which to collect the remainder of my ketuba,” then

by virtue of her descending upon the date palm, she also descends upon all the property.

And she will collect the remainder of her ketuba even from the orphans’ share.

And now there is no proof at all from her silence that she waived her claim to the sons. For the reason that she remained silent and did not protest was that he had left her a place from which to collect—the date palm—and she said to herself, “Why should I protest now? I will wait until the court appraises the date palm, and afterward I will protest concerning everything and collect my ketuba even from the orphans’ property.”

Conclusion of the discussion:

If a terminally ill man wrote over all his property, or divided it among his sons before his wife and also gave her any amount of land, and she remained silent, they acquire it. For she waived the lien she had on this property.

The same applies if he gave all his property to others and also gave his wife any amount of land. Since he made her a partner in the property like them, they acquire it.

And this applies only when he divided all his property. But if he left even one date palm, since she collects from this date palm, she then returns and collects from all the remaining property.

And this applies specifically when he gave her a gift of land. But if he gave her a gift of movable property, she did not waive her ketuba.

And this applies specifically to property currently in his possession, with regard to which she waived her lien. But with regard to property that will come to him afterward, she did not waive it.

And this applies specifically to a terminally ill man who wrote over his property. But in the case of a healthy person, it is uncertain whether she waived her lien, and the woman must bring proof in order to extract the money from the heirs.

The Gemara returns to discuss matters related to the law of “the inheritance of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka”:

Rav Huna said: If a terminally ill man wrote over all his property to another,

who was not his son, without specifying whether he intended to give it as a gift or as an inheritance,

we examine the matter: If

that recipient

is fit to inherit from him,

such as one son among other sons,

he takes it by virtue of inheritance.

In accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka.

And if not,

if he is not fit to inherit from him,

he takes it by virtue of a gift.

Since a person does not utter words in vain, he certainly intended to give him the property as a gift.

The difference between acquiring the property as a gift and acquiring it as an inheritance will be explained below.

Rav Naḥman said to him: Why are you stealing statements?!

Why did you state your ruling in a manner that makes it appear to be accepted by everyone?

If you hold like Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, say: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka,

for your teaching

[for your statement]

proceeds in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, does it not?

Perhaps this is what you said,

perhaps you did not intend to innovate for us a ruling that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka. Rather, a case came before you involving someone who divided his property without specifying, as follows, and you intended to teach us the distinction between taking by virtue of inheritance and taking by virtue of a gift. Incidentally, we learned that you hold like Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka.

And this was the incident:

There was a certain man who was dying,

[he became ill and was close to death],

and they said to him: To whom should his property go? Perhaps to so-and-so?

And he said to them: To whom else?

Certainly to that so-and-so! It is as though he had said, “My property is given to so-and-so.”

And you told us concerning it,

[that is, in this case Rav Huna spoke], that

if he is fit to inherit from him, he takes it by virtue of inheritance, and if not, he takes it by virtue of a gift.

He said to him,

Rav Huna to Rav Naḥman:

Yes. That is what I said.

[Indeed, that was the incident.]

The Gemara explains:

For what halakhic purpose?

What difference does it make whether he takes the property as an inheritance or as a gift?

Rav Adda bar Ahava thought to say before Rava:

The practical difference is:

If

the recipient of the gift

is fit to inherit from him,

and he takes the property as an inheritance, then

his widow

of the deceased

is sustained from his property.

As in the law that “a widow is sustained from the property of orphans,” meaning from the property of the heirs.

And if not,

if he is not fit to inherit from him and took the property as a gift,

his widow is not sustained from his property.

Rava said to him:

But because he gave him the property as a gift of a terminally ill person, which takes effect only by rabbinic ordinance,

is her status diminished?!

That is, is the widow’s power diminished on account of this?!

Now, in the case of a Torah inheritance, you say that his widow is sustained from his property; with regard to a rabbinic gift, is it not all the more so

that she should be sustained from that property ?!

Rather, Rava said:

This is the difference between a gift and an inheritance:

As

in the ruling

that Rav Aḥa bar Rav Avya sent: According to Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka,

one who says,

“My property is yours, and after you, it is given to so-and-so,”

we examine the matter:

If

the first recipient of the gift

was fit to inherit from him,

he takes the property as an inheritance, and

the second has nothing in place of the first,

since

there is no

language of a gift

here, but rather the language of inheritance, and inheritance does not terminate.

But if he is not fit to inherit from him and takes it as a gift, his statement stands, and the second will take the property after the first.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman:

Why, if he is fit to inherit from him, does the second have nothing in place of the first?

But he interrupted it!

That is, he bequeathed it to him on the condition that after his death he give the property to the second.

Rava said to him:

He thought that inheritance can terminate, but the Torah said that it cannot terminate.

That is, since he stipulated contrary to what is written in the Torah, the act takes effect but the condition is void.

Another incident in this matter: