Bava Batra 127b (קכז:) — the Talmud in English

He sent them word: They may write a power of attorney

to one another.

And the Gemara raises an objection: According to whose view did Shmuel rule?

If, on the one hand, he holds in accordance with the Rabbis, [who hold that he is not deemed credible,]

who say that he is not trusted,

let him send them word in accordance with the Rabbis; and if, on the other hand, he holds in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, [who holds that he is deemed credible,]

who says that he is trusted,

let him send them word in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda?

The dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis will be explained below.

The Gemara answers:

He was uncertain whether the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda or in accordance with the Rabbis.

And because of the uncertainty, they write a power of attorney to one another.

The Gemara explains:

What is it? [Where did Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree?]

Where did Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree?

As it is taught:

It is stated in the Torah: “For he must recognize the firstborn son of the hated wife

to give him

a double portion”,

and we derive:

He must make him known to others.

And

from here Rabbi Yehuda said: A person is deemed credible when he says, “This is my firstborn son.”

And just as a person is deemed credible when he says, “This is my firstborn son,” so too is he deemed credible when he says, “This is a son of a divorcee and a son of a halutza.”

And the Sages say: He is not deemed credible.

This concludes the beraita.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to Rava: Granted, according to Rabbi Yehuda, this is the reason it is written, “He must recognize.”

But according to the Rabbis, why do I need “he must recognize”?

The Gemara answers:

It is needed in a case where identification is necessary.

That is, in a case where we are uncertain whether he is the firstborn or not—for example, when they have recently arrived here, and we do not know which one is the firstborn and which one is the ordinary son—the father is deemed credible to say, “This is my firstborn son.”

The Gemara raises an objection: Granted, according to Rabbi Yehuda, were it not for the verse, we would not believe the father against an established presumption, and the verse teaches us that the father is deemed credible concerning his son even against an established presumption.

But according to the Rabbis, who hold that the father is deemed credible only when there is no established presumption against him,

for what halakhic purpose

did the verse teach us that the father is deemed credible

? To give him a double portion?!

There is no need for special credibility for that purpose. Even if he

were not

his son,

but another person,

he could give him a double portion, for

if he wished to give it to him as a gift, would he not be able to give it to him?!

If so, since he can give him the property as a gift, he is deemed credible when he says, “He is the firstborn.”

The Gemara answers:

It is necessary

to establish the father’s credibility

with regard to property that came into his possession afterward.

This refers to property that came into his possession after he said, “This is my firstborn son.” Since a person cannot transfer an object that does not yet exist, the migo does not apply to such property.

The Gemara raises an objection:

According to Rabbi Meir, who says, “A person can transfer an object that does not yet exist,” why do I need “he must recognize”?

After all, the father is always deemed credible by virtue of the migo that he could give the property to him as a gift?

The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference

with regard to property that came into his possession while he was goses.

That is, even according to Rabbi Meir, who says that a person can transfer an object that does not yet exist, this applies only to an object that, once it comes into existence, he has the power to transfer.

But with regard to property that came into his possession while he was goses, at a time when he was unable to speak and transfer property, he cannot transfer it beforehand. With regard to such property, he is not deemed credible to identify his son by means of the migo that “if he wished, he could give it to him”; rather, his credibility derives from “he must recognize.”

The Sages taught

in a beraita:

If he was presumed to be the firstborn, and his father said of another that he was the firstborn, he is deemed credible.

This is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

If he was presumed not to be the firstborn, and his father said, “He is the firstborn,” he is not deemed credible.

This is in accordance with the Rabbis.

That is: The

first clause

of the beraita is in accordance with

Rabbi Yehuda, and the latter clause

is in accordance with

the Rabbis.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If he said, “He is my son,” and then said

even within the time needed to greet him

“He is my slave,”

since he contradicted his first statement,

he is not deemed credible

to retract his testimony, for “once he has testified, he may no longer retract and testify otherwise.”

But if he said

“He is my slave,” and then said, “He is my son,” he is deemed credible.

Since when he said, “He is my son,” he did not contradict his initial words; rather, he explained them: His intention was to say, “He is my son,

meaning that he serves me like a slave.”

But in the first clause, we do not say that his intention was to explain that he was his slave but that he loved him like a son, since a master does not customarily refer to his slave and call him his son out of affection.

And the reverse applies at the customs house,

where it is customary to call one’s slave “his son” in order to smuggle him past the customs officials. But it is not customary to call one’s son “his slave,” since he would thereby incur customs duty for no reason. Therefore,

if he was passing through the customs house and said, “He is my son,” and then said, “He is my slave,” he is deemed credible .

If he said, “He is my slave,” and then said, “He is my son,” he is not deemed credible.

As stated above.

The Gemara raises an objection:

It was objected: If he treated him like a son and then came and said, “He is my son,” and afterward said, “He is my slave,” he is not deemed credible.

If he treated him like a slave and came and said, “He is my slave,” and afterward said, “He is my son,” he is not deemed credible.

It is apparent that we do not say, “He is my son, meaning that he serves me like a slave”; rather, we always interpret the first statement as determinative, and we do not deem him credible to retract and testify otherwise?

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: There

he is not deemed credible to retract and say, “He is my son,” because

he called him a slave worth one hundred [that is, he initially said of him, “This is my slave who is worth one hundred gold coins”]; and only a slave is referred to in such a manner. Therefore, he is not deemed credible to retract and say, “He is my son.”

meaning that he initially said about him, “He is my slave, this one worth one hundred gold coins.” With such language, one refers only to a slave. Therefore, he is not trusted to retract and say that he is his son.

The Gemara explains:

What does “worth one hundred” mean?

A slave worth one hundred zuz,

one hundred zuz are invested in him; that is, his value is one hundred zuz.

The following halakhic rulings were sent by Rav Abba to Rav Yosef and are cited here because one of them contains the law of “he must recognize”:

Rabbi Abba sent to Rav Yosef bar Ḥama: With regard to one who says to another, “You stole my slave,” and the other says, “I did not steal him.”

He said to him: If so,

“What is he doing with you?”