Bava Batra 127b — the Talmud in English

He sent word to them: Authorization documents may be written ![](pamud.bmp "

exact page location")

to one another.

And the Gemara raises an objection: According to whose view did Shmuel hold?

In any event, if he held like the Rabbis [that he is not trusted],

who say that he is not trusted,

let him send word to them according to the Rabbis; if he held like Rabbi Yehuda [that he is trusted],

who says that he is trusted,

let him send word to them according to Rabbi Yehuda?

And below it will be explained in what Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagreed.

And the Gemara answers:

It was uncertain to him whether [the halakha is] like Rabbi Yehuda or like the Rabbis.

And because of the uncertainty, they write authorization documents to one another.

The Gemara explains:

What is it? [Where did Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree?]

Where did Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree?

For it was taught:

It is stated in the Torah, “For the firstborn son of the hated one

he shall recognize,

to give him a double portion,”

and we expound:

He shall make him recognized to others.

And

from here Rabbi Yehuda said: A person is trusted to say, ‘This is my firstborn son.’

And just as a person is trusted to say, ‘This is my firstborn son,’ so a person is trusted to say, ‘This is the son of a divorced woman, and this is the son of a halutza.’

And the Sages say: He is not trusted.

This is the end of the beraita.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to Rava: Granted, according to Rabbi Yehuda, this is why “he shall recognize” is written.

But according to the Rabbis, why do I need “he shall recognize”?

And the Gemara answers:

Where recognition is needed.

That is, in a case where it is uncertain to us whether he is a firstborn or not—for example, they came here recently, and we do not know who is the firstborn and who is the ordinary son—the father is trusted to say, “This is my firstborn son.”

And the Gemara raises an objection: Granted, according to Rabbi Yehuda, were it not for the verse, we would not have believed the father against an established presumption, and the verse teaches us that the father is trusted regarding his son even against an established presumption.

But according to the Rabbis, who say that the father is trusted only when there is no established presumption against him,

for what halakhic purpose

does the verse teach us that the father is trusted

? To give him a double portion?!

For this purpose there is no need for special trustworthiness; even if he

were not

his son,

but another person,

he could give him a double portion, for

if he wanted to give it to him as a gift, would he not give it to him?!

And if so, since he can give him the property as a gift, he is trusted to say, “He is a firstborn.”

And the Gemara answers:

It is necessary

to innovate trustworthiness for the father

with property that fell to him afterward.

After he said, “This is my firstborn son”; and since a person cannot transfer something that has not yet come into the world, migo does not apply to it.

The Gemara raises an objection:

According to Rabbi Meir, who says, “A person transfers something that has not yet come into the world,” why do I need “he shall recognize”?

After all, the father is always trusted by virtue of the migo that he can give it to him as a gift?

And the Gemara answers: There is a practical difference

with property that fell to him when he was goses.

That is, even according to Rabbi Meir, who says that a person transfers something that has not yet come into the world, this applies to something that, when it comes into the world, he has the power to transfer it.

But property that fell to him when he was goses, at a time when he cannot speak or transfer it, he cannot transfer it beforehand. And regarding it he is not trusted to identify his son by means of “since, if he wanted, he could give it to him,” but by virtue of “he shall recognize.”

The Sages taught

in a beraita:

If they were holding him to be a firstborn, and his father said of another that he is the firstborn, he is trusted.

This is according to Rabbi Yehuda.

If they were holding him not to be a firstborn, and his father said, “He is a firstborn,” he is not trusted.

This is according to the Rabbis.

That is:

The first clause

of the beraita is according to

Rabbi Yehuda, and the latter clause

is according to

the Rabbis.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If he said, “He is my son,” and afterward said

even within the time required for an utterance,

“He is my slave,”

since he contradicted his first statement,

he is not trusted

to retract his testimony, for “once he has testified, he cannot again testify.”

But if he said

“He is my slave,” and afterward said, “He is my son,” he is trusted.

Since when he said, “He is my son,” he did not contradict his first words, but explained them: his intention was to say, “He is my son,

for he serves me like a slave,” he said.

But in the first clause, we do not say that his intention was to explain that he is his slave, but that he loves him like his son, since it is not customary for the master to refer to the slave and call him his son out of affection.

And its converse applies at the customs house,

at the customs house, it is customary to call one’s slave his son in order to smuggle him past the customs. But it is not customary to call one’s son his slave, since he would thereby incur customs duty on him for no reason; therefore,

if he was passing by the customs house and said, “He is my son,” and afterward said, “He is my slave,” he is trusted .

If he said, “He is my slave,” and afterward said, “He is my son,” he is not trusted.

As above.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

It raises an objection: If he served him like a son, and he came and said, “He is my son,” and afterward said, “He is my slave,” he is not trusted.

If he served him like a slave, and he came and said, “He is my slave,” and afterward said, “He is my son,” he is not trusted.

And it is explained that we do not say, “He is my son, for he serves me like a slave”; rather, we always seize upon the first wording, and do not trust him to return and testify?

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: There

he is not trusted to return and say that he is his son, since

he called him a slave worth one hundred, [that is, it concerns a case where at first he said of him, “This is my slave worth one hundred gold coins”]; and with such wording one calls only a slave. Therefore he is not trusted to return and say that he is his son.

meaning that he initially said about him, “He is my slave, this one worth one hundred gold coins.” With such language, one refers only to a slave. Therefore, he is not trusted to retract and say that he is his son.

The Gemara explains:

What is “worth one hundred”?

The slave is worth one hundred zuz.

One hundred zuz are invested in him; that is, he is worth one hundred zuz.

The rulings of halakha that were sent from Rav Abba to Rav Yosef will now be brought, and they are brought here because of the law of “he shall recognize,” which was taught in one of them:

Rabbi Abba sent to Rav Yosef bar Ḥama: One who says to his fellow, “You stole my slave,” and he says, “I did not steal

it.” He said to him: If so,

what is his business with you?