Bava Batra 128a (קכח.) — the Talmud in English

He said to him:

“You sold him to me,”

“You gave him to me as a gift. If that is your wish, swear and take him.”

And he swore; he cannot retract

and say, “I was merely leading you on,” since he was exempt, as a person does not swear and collect; for the one who seeks to extract something from another bears the burden of proof , and one does not swear concerning slaves.

Rather, since he swore at the other party’s direction, he must give him the slave, for he accepted his oath as trustworthy .

The Gemara raises an objection:

What is this coming to teach us?

It has already been taught:

“If he said to him: ‘My father is trusted by me; your father is trusted by me; three cattle herders are trusted by me,’

who are not expert in law,

Rabbi Meir says: He may retract.”

Since these are merely words, without an act of acquisition.

And the Sages say: He may not retract.

The Gemara answers:

This comes to teach us that the dispute applies to the case of “I will give it to you.”

That is, they disagree even when he said, “If my father says so, I will give you this object,” in which case the claimant is not in possession of it.

And the halakha is in accordance with the words of the Sages.

But if the claimant said, “This person is trusted by me; if he says as you say, I will release you from my claim,” even Rabbi Meir concedes that he may not retract. For he is already in possession, and no act of acquisition is necessary for this relinquishment.

Further,

Rabbi Abba sent the following ruling to Rav Yosef bar Hama: The halakha is that one collects from slaves.

That is, if a debtor dies, the creditor collects his debt from the orphans’ slaves.

And although “the movable property of orphans is not mortgaged to a creditor,” nevertheless, slaves are like land, since they are equated with land, as it is written: “And you shall give them as an inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit as a possession”; therefore, one collects from them.

And Rav Naḥman said: One does not collect from them.

Since a creditor does not rely on them, as the debtor can hide them or cause them to be lost . And the halakha is in accordance with Rav Naḥman, as will be explained below.

Further,

Rabbi Abba sent the following ruling to Rav Yosef bar Hama: The halakha is that a third-degree relative

who comes to testify

about a second-degree relative [for example,

the grandson of Reuben who comes to testify about the son of Simeon],

is fit

to testify, and is not disqualified on account of kinship.

However, a second-degree relative testifying about another second-degree relative is disqualified from testimony. For it is written: “Fathers shall not be put to death for sons,” and we derive: Just as the fathers are disqualified from testifying, one concerning his brother, so too their sons are disqualified from testifying, one concerning his fellow, his first cousin.

Rava said:

A third-degree relative is fit to testify

even about a first-degree relative.

And so is the halakha.

Mar bar Rav Ashi deemed testimony by a grandson concerning his grandfather fit.

That is, the grandson may testify concerning his grandfather .

But the halakha is not in accordance with Mar bar Rav Ashi.

For grandchildren are considered like sons, and even after a thousand generations they may not testify concerning their ancestors, since a son is regarded as the thigh of his father .

Further,

Rabbi Abba sent the following ruling to Rav Yosef bar Hama: If he knew testimony concerning land [

as to where his land extended and from where they encroached upon its boundary],

before he became blind [

he became blind],

and then became blind, he is disqualified.

Since now he cannot assess and determine how far a certain person’s boundary extends, his testimony is not taken into consideration .

And Shmuel said: He is fit. It is possible that he can determine the boundaries. But

with regard to

a garment, no.

Since many garments have the same measurements, he cannot accurately specify the subject of his testimony.

And Rav Sheshet said: Even in the case of a garment, it is possible that he can determine its length and width. But a niskha

a piece of silver or gold

—no.

And Rav Pappa said: Even in the case of a niskha, it is possible that he can determine its weight.

The Gemara raises an objection:

It was taught in a baraita: If he knew testimony concerning him before he became his son-in-law, and then he became his son-in-law,

and he is disqualified from this testimony because of their relationship,

or if he was

sound of hearing and then became deaf ,

sighted and then became blind, of sound mind and then became insane, he is disqualified.

But if he knew testimony concerning him before he became his son-in-law, and then he became his son-in-law, and his daughter died,

or

if he was sound of hearing and became deaf and then regained his hearing, sighted and became blind and then regained his sight, of sound mind and became insane and then regained his sanity, he is fit.

This is the general rule: Whenever his beginning or his end was in a state of disqualification, he is disqualified. If his beginning and his end were in a state of fitness, he is fit .

.

It is thus clear that this is not in accordance with the words of the amoraim above, who deemed a blind person fit to testify concerning land, but rather in accordance with the words of Rabbi Abba, who disqualified him.