Avodah Zarah 52a (נב.) — the Talmud in English

Therefore,

apply it to the utensils

, and the Torah commands that the utensils be destroyed; and concerning those utensils Rabbi Yishmael expounded that they do not become prohibited until “the nations worshiped there.”

We learned in the continuation of the beraita:

From here they said: An object of idolatry belonging to a gentile—

is not prohibited until it is worshiped, but one belonging to a Jew

is

immediately.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

But did we not establish that it refers to “utensils”?

After all, Rabbi Yishmael expounded that “places” refers to utensils that were used for idolatrous purposes, and not to the idols themselves?

And the Gemara answers:

The verse states: “You shall utterly destroy all the places where the nations whom you are dispossessing worshiped their gods

” — and we expound:

It juxtaposes

: The Torah compares

their gods

, mentioned at the end of the verse, with

the utensils

, mentioned at the beginning of the verse, “places”—

to teach you:

Just as utensils

are not prohibited

until they are worshiped—

so too their gods [

which are not the mountains themselves, but idols made by human beings

]

are not prohibited

until they are worshiped.

And the Gemara analyzes:

But Rabbi Akiva, who does not juxtapose

utensils with their gods, and maintains that their gods become prohibited as soon as they make them, whereas utensils do not become prohibited immediately—what will he answer concerning the juxtaposition expounded by Rabbi Yishmael? After all, the Torah compared them to one another.

And the Gemara answers:

Rabbi Akiva can say

: The Torah states, “

the

ir gods”—

the word interrupts the matter

, meaning that the word “the” creates a break between the utensils and the idols, teaching that they should not be compared as Rabbi Yishmael compared them .

And the Gemara analyzes:

And

according to

Rabbi Yishmael, we find

—we learn from this verse that

an object of idolatry belonging to a gentile

is not prohibited until it is worshiped—

whereas an object of idolatry

belonging to a Jew is prohibited immediately—

from where does he derive this

? From where does he know it?

And the Gemara answers: This is not learned from an exposition of the verses; rather,

it is a logical inference: F

rom what we find,

that a gentile’s is not prohibited until it is worshiped—

it follows logically

t

hat one

belonging to a Jew is prohibited immediately .

And the Gemara raises a difficulty: From where can this be said?

Say

—it is possible to say

t

hat one

belonging to a Jew is not prohibited at all

for benefit ?

The Gemara is astonished: How could one say that it is not prohibited for benefit?

Now

, even

if it requires concealment

—the Torah requires that it be hidden away, as will be explained later—

is it not prohibited

? Would it not certainly be prohibited for benefit?! And the Gemara raises a further difficulty: What is the basis for the assumption that if one belonging to a gentile is prohibited only once it is worshiped, one belonging to a Jew is prohibited immediately?

And say

—it is possible to say that one belonging to a Jew has the same law

a

s one

belonging to a gentile ?

And the Gemara answers:

The verse states [

Deuteronomy 9

]: “And your sin that you committed, the calf,”

and we expound “that you committed” to teach you:

From the time of its making, he stands in a state of sin

—it is already in a state of sin, meaning that it is prohibited.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty: From where do we derive that it is prohibited for benefit?

And say

—it is possible to say:

This applies

only

to placing the person in a state of sin

—the Jew who makes it has committed an act of “sin,” but nevertheless,

it is not prohibited

: the object of idolatry itself is still not prohibited for benefit until it is worshiped. And this verse does not prove that it is prohibited for benefit from the time it is made. And the Gemara answers: Indeed, this is not learned from that verse; rather,

the verse states [

Deuteronomy 27

]: “Cursed is the man who makes a graven or molten image,”

and we expound “who makes” to teach us:

From the time of its making, he stands under a curse

—he violated the covenant that Israel made with the Holy One, blessed be He, and his punishment is explicitly stated: “Cursed is the man.”

And the Gemara raises a difficulty: This verse still does not prove that it is prohibited for benefit, because

say

—it is possible to say:

This applies

only

to placing the person

—the Jew who makes a graven or molten image will be

“under a curse”

, but nevertheless,

it is not prohibited

—the image itself is still not prohibited for benefit until it is worshiped?

And we conclude:

“An abomination of the Lord” is written

in this verse, and this teaches that it is an abomination and is prohibited for benefit.

After Rabbi Yishmael proved from this verse that an object of idolatry belonging to a Jew is prohibited immediately, we raise a difficulty:

And Rabbi Akiva

, who maintains that it is not prohibited immediately, but only once it is worshiped—what will he answer concerning this exposition?

And the Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva maintains that the Torah does not mean that the image is already an abomination from the time it is made. Rather, the person who makes it is now under a curse because he made

something that brings

him

to an abomination

—that he will worship it.

And according to Rabbi Akiva, this verse does not prove that an object of idolatry belonging to a Jew is prohibited for benefit from the time it is made.

We learned in a beraita: Rabbi Akiva says: The reverse is the case: an object of idolatry belonging to a gentile is prohibited immediately, whereas one belonging to a Jew is prohibited only once it is worshiped.

And the Gemara analyzes:

And Rabbi Akiva—an object of idolatry belonging to a gentile, which is prohibited immediately

, from the time it is made—

from where does he derive this

? From where does he know it?

Ulla said: The verse states [

Deuteronomy 7, concerning the idols of the nations

]:

“You shall burn the graven images of their gods in fire,” and we expound:

Once he has carved it

—and fashioned its form—

it becomes a god

, even before it is worshiped. Therefore it is prohibited for benefit.

And the Gemara analyzes:

And the other one

—what will Rabbi Yishmael answer concerning this exposition?

That verse

is needed for him

to be expounded

f

or another exposition,

a

s

Rav Yosef taught—

Rav Yosef taught: From where

do we learn

t

his law:

A gentile who disqualifies his god

—meaning that he can nullify it, and when he nullifies it, it is nullified?

As it is stated: “You shall burn the graven images of their gods in fire,”

and we expound “graven images” in the sense of “disqualified,” that is, nullified.

And the Gemara analyzes:

And the other one

—from where does Rabbi Akiva know that a gentile can nullify his god, since in his view “the graven images of their gods” is needed for another exposition?

He derives it

—Rabbi Akiva learns it—

f

rom the exposition

t

aught by

Shmuel—

Shmuel raised a contradiction

between the verses:

It is written: “You shall burn the graven images of their gods in fire;”

“you shall not covet the silver and gold that is on them,”

a

nd subsequently

it is written:

:

“And you shall take it for yourself”—how is this possible

? If it is forbidden to covet it, why should one take it for himself ?

Therefore we expound: If the gentile

disqualified it

—

to

make it

a god

—the Torah commands concerning it:

“You shall not covet”!

But if he

disqualified it f

rom being

a god

, meaning that he rendered it refuse, the Torah permits:

“And you shall take it for yourself,”

since he has nullified it.

And from this exposition of Shmuel, Rabbi Akiva learns that a gentile can nullify an idol, and not from the expression “graven images,” which is expounded to mean that the gentile “disqualifies” it, that is, nullifies it. The expression “graven images” is also expounded to mean “he disqualified it as a god,” that is, he fashioned its form; and concerning this the Torah says that it is already his god and is prohibited for benefit.

And the Gemara analyzes:

And

according to the view of

Rabbi Akiva—

we find

an exposition teaching that

an object of idolatry belonging to a gentile i

s

prohibited immediately—

but an object of idolatry

belonging to a Jew

is not prohibited

until it is worshiped—

from where

does he derive this?

Rav Yehuda said: The verse states [

Deuteronomy 27

]: “Cursed is the man who makes a graven or molten image

and places it in secret,”

and we expound:

Until he performs acts for it in secret

—that is, until he worships it. He does so in secret, out of fear that the matter might become known to the court and they would stone him.

And the Gemara analyzes:

And the other one

—what will Rabbi Yishmael answer concerning this exposition, whose implication is that it is not prohibited immediately, but only once he worships it?

That verse

is needed for him

for another exposition,

a

s

Rabbi Yitzḥak

expounded—

As Rabbi Yitzḥak said: From where

do we learn

t

his law:

An object of idolatry belonging to a Jew requires concealment

—when it is intact, it must be hidden in the ground —

as it is stated:

:

“And places it in secret,”

and we expound: “And they shall place it in secret.”

And the Gemara analyzes:

And the other one

—Rabbi Akiva, who derives from this verse “until he performs acts for it in secret,” from where does he learn the law that it requires concealment?

Rabbi Akiva

derives it f

rom the exposition

t

aught by

Rav Ḥisda in the name of Rav—

As Rav Ḥisda said in the name of Rav: From where

do we learn

t

his law:

An object of idolatry belonging to a Jew requires concealment?

As it is stated [

Deuteronomy 16

]: “You shall not plant for yourself an asherah, any tree, beside the altar of the Lord your God,”

and this is apparently difficult: What connection is there between an asherah and the altar? The prohibition against planting an asherah applies everywhere. Rather, the verse comes to teach us to compare an asherah to an altar:

Just as an altar requires concealment

, since it is prohibited for benefit —

so too

an asherah

and other objects of idolatry

require concealment.

And the Gemara analyzes:

And the other one

—Rabbi Yishmael, who derives that an object of idolatry requires concealment from the verse “and places it in secret”—for what exposition did the Torah compare an asherah to an altar?

That juxtaposition

is needed for him

to be expounded

f

or another exposition,

a

s

Rish Lakish

expounded [

and Rav Ashi added

]—

As Rish Lakish said: Whoever appoints

in Israel

an unfit judge—

it is as though he planted an asherah in Israel!

As it is stated

there:

“You shall appoint judges and officers for yourself in all your gates,”

and adjacent to it

it says:

“You shall not plant for yourself an asherah, any tree,”

and “tree” alludes to a person, as it is stated: “For man is a tree of the field”; the reference is to an unfit Torah scholar.

And concerning this exposition,

Rav Ashi said: And in a place

where there are

other Torah scholars

who are fit, if one appoints an unfit judge,

it is as though he planted it

—the asherah—

beside the altar

of the Lord.

As it is stated:

“You shall not plant for yourself an asherah,” which alludes to an unfit judge,

beside the altar

, which alludes to the Torah scholars .

We have learned that Rabbi Yishmael expounds the verse in which “places” is mentioned as referring to utensils that the nations used for idolatry, and maintains that implements of idolatry are not prohibited until they are used. Rabbi Akiva also does not disagree with him concerning implements; their disagreement concerns the idols themselves.

The Gemara discusses the law of implements.

Rav Hamnuna raised a dilemma: If one welded a utensil

, meaning a utensil that had broken, and struck it with a hammer [an ironworking tool] until it was straightened and restored to the form of a utensil, and he did so for the purpose that the utensil serve

for idolatry—

what is

its law? Is the utensil prohibited for benefit?

The Gemara understood that the dilemma concerns a utensil prepared for use in idolatry, which had not yet been used for idolatry, and the question is whether it became prohibited merely through welding. Therefore we raise a difficulty:

Idolatry belonging to whom

—that is, the utensil about which Rav Hamnuna raised his dilemma: to whom does it belong?

If you say

:

idolatry belonging to a gentile

—

the utensil belongs to a gentile—

what is the dilemma?

After all,

both according to Rabbi Yishmael and according to Rabbi Akiva

, their dispute concerns only idolatry itself, whereas this utensil is not an idol,

but is an implement of idolatry, and

both according to Rabbi Yishmael and according to Rabbi Akiva,

implements of idolatry are not prohibited

merely through their being made

until they are used.

So what is the dilemma?

Rather

, Rav Hamnuna’s dilemma concerns implements of

idolatry belonging t

o

a Jew—

According to whose view

is Rav Hamnuna uncertain?

If you say

:

according to Rabbi Akiva

, who maintains that an object of idolatry belonging to a Jew is not prohibited until it is worshiped—

this is difficult: What is the dilemma?

Now

, even

it itself

, the object of idolatry itself [the idol],

is not prohibited

until it is worshiped—

is there a question concerning its implements?!

Is there really a doubt concerning the implements? How could one entertain the possibility that the implements, which are secondary, should be more stringent than the primary prohibition itself?!

Rather

, the dilemma is

according to Rabbi Yishmael, who says

that an object of idolatry belonging to a Jew is

prohibited immediately.

And now Rav Hamnuna is uncertain:

What

is the law of the implements? The sides of the dilemma are as follows: Do we

derive the implements

of a Jew

from the implements

of gentiles?

What is the case there

? Just as the implements of gentiles are not prohibited until

they are

used, so too here

they are not prohibited

until they are used

, even though the object of idolatry itself is prohibited immediately; nevertheless, its implements are less stringent than it.

Or perhaps

it is possible to say:

it is derived from it

that the accessories are learned from it, and their status is equivalent to that of the idolatry itself—

just as it

as it is

forbidden immediately, so too its accessories are forbidden immediately.

And this is Rav Hamnuna’s unresolved question.

The Gemara asks: If this is the question,

why specifically does he raise the question

what is the reason that Rav Hamnuna was uncertain specifically regarding a vessel that was

“repaired”—

after all,

he should raise the question regarding a vessel that was “made”

as a vessel from the outset in order to use it for idolatry—

he could have been uncertain regarding that same question, and those same possible sides of the uncertainty, even in the case of a vessel that was “made”?

The Gemara explains: Rather,

Rav Hamnuna raises the question because of “old impurity”;

his uncertainty concerned a different law, namely, the law of “old impurity.”

That is: It has already been explained that a vessel used for idolatry contracts ritual impurity by rabbinic decree, in addition to the prohibition against deriving benefit from it.

And we learned the following concerning the ritual impurity of vessels:

a. Vessels that contracted ritual impurity require immersion, and their purification is completed at sunset, meaning after the day of their immersion has passed. [Some also require the sprinkling of the ashes of the red heifer on the third and seventh days after contracting their impurity].

b. If a vessel that contracted ritual impurity broke, its impurity is nullified by Torah law, since it is no longer a vessel.

c. The Sages decreed that if a vessel contracted ritual impurity, broke, and was subsequently repaired, it returns to its “old impurity.” That is, it remains impure until it is purified through immersion, with all the laws of immersion and purification applying to it: each vessel according to its purification, and each impurity according to its law—even though by Torah law its impurity was nullified.

And the reason is: because of the appearance of impropriety in the eyes of ammei ha-aretz who see that it was not immersed or purified, and use it on the same day before sunset—and they will say: It is sufficient for a vessel to undergo immersion on the same day. They will not know that it had broken and was subsequently repaired.

Rav Hamnuna’s question concerns a vessel that was used for idolatry, contracted the impurity of “idolatry,” broke, and was repaired for the sake of idolatry [and it has been explained why he did not raise the question regarding a vessel that was “made”]—did the Sages impose the law of “old impurity” upon this impurity?

The Gemara will explain the possible sides of the uncertainty.

For we learned

in a Mishna in tractate Kelim:

Metal vessels—

their flat components and their receptacles,

whether they are vessels with a receptacle, or even if they do not have a receptacle, are

susceptible to ritual impurity,

meaning that they can contract ritual impurity. [Unlike wooden vessels, whose flat components are not susceptible to ritual impurity].

If they broke,

the vessels,

they became pure

as their impurity was nullified, even though they had already contracted impurity.

If he subsequently made them into vessels again,

they return [

the version of the Bach:

they returned]

to the old impurity

that they had contracted.

And

now,

this is what he raises as his question:

this is Rav Hamnuna’s uncertainty:

When the impurity returns,

when the impurity returns, do we say:

this applies

this decree that the Sages issued applies

to Torah impurity,

when the vessel contracted impurity by Torah law.

But,

a vessel used for idolatry, whose impurity is

rabbinic impurity—

they did not

have the Sages decree that it return to its old impurity; and since its impurity was nullified, the vessel is pure—

Or perhaps

it is possible to say:

it makes no difference

the Sages did not distinguish between Torah impurity and rabbinic impurity, and in any event its old impurity returned, so that the vessel is impure with the impurity of idolatry?

And this is Rav Hamnuna’s unresolved question.

The Gemara asks: If so, why was he uncertain specifically about the impurity of idolatry—

and he should raise the question

he should have raised the question concerning

other impurities

whose impurity is

rabbinic,

such as vessels that contracted impurity through liquid and the like.

And we conclude: Indeed, his uncertainty also concerned other rabbinic impurities—

and

one within another—

one question within the other, meaning: one unresolved question emerged from another—

he raises as his question.

It is as follows. His first question is:

impurity

that is only

rabbinic—

does it return

did the Sages decree that its old impurity return, just as they decreed with regard to Torah impurity,

or—

does it not return

the Sages did not decree that a vessel that contracted impurity that is only rabbinic should have its impurity return.

And the second question is:

if you wish to say

if we resolve from a Mishna or a beraita that other rabbinic impurity

does not return—

there is still room for uncertainty:

the impurity of idolatry—

does it return?

The possible sides of the uncertainty are:

because of the stringency of idolatry,

since it is a grave prohibition,

did the Sages equate it with Torah impurity—did the Sages grant it the stringency of Torah impurity, so that just as Torah impurity returns, so too the severe impurity of idolatry—

or not

did they not impose this stringency, so that its law is like that of other rabbinic impurities and it does not return.

Teyku

the question remains unresolved.

The Gemara cites another question concerning the impurity of idolatry.

Rabbi Yoḥanan asked Rabbi Yannai: What is the law with regard to the food used as an offering to idolatry

food that was offered before it and became forbidden to derive benefit from, and contracted impurity—

what is it

what is its law?—

Does nullification benefit it

will nullification help it when the gentile nullifies it, so as

to purify it from ritual impurity, or not

will nullification not help it?

The possible sides of the uncertainty will be explained below, as will the reason that he raised the question specifically concerning food and specifically concerning an offering.

And the Gemara discusses: He should raise the question concerning vessels

Rabbi Yoḥanan could have raised the same question concerning vessels used for idolatry , and the gentile nullified them: Does their impurity depart from them just as their prohibition against deriving benefit from them departs?

The Gemara answers:

Vessels—

he does not raise the question

because the law was clear to him.

Since they have purification through a ritual bath,

meaning: Just as vessels that contracted other impurities are purified through immersion in a ritual bath, so too these vessels, the accessories of idolatry, once their prohibition against deriving benefit from them has been nullified through the gentile’s nullification—

the impurity

within them

is also nullified,

and their nullification constitutes their purification. Once their prohibition departs from them, certainly their impurity departs from them as well—

When he raises the question

what Rabbi Yoḥanan was in fact uncertain about—

concerning food,

which has no purification at all: food that contracted other impurities has no purification through a ritual bath, and there is no means of removing its impurity—

therefore, he was uncertain whether likewise the impurity of idolatry would not depart from it. [The possible sides of the uncertainty will be explained below].

And the Gemara discusses:

Why was he uncertain concerning food when it was an offering to idolatry—

he should raise the question

he could have raised the same question concerning

the

idolatry itself,

for example, if a gentile bowed to food and accepted it as a deity; the uncertainty would be whether its impurity departs when he nullifies it, since it has no purification?