Avodah Zarah 51b — the Talmud in English

The prohibition of slaughtering outside [the Temple precincts] is: an offering that was consecrated to the Lord, and he sacrificed it outside the Tabernacle. The one who sacrifices it is liable to karet.

At the beginning of the passage of slaughtering outside it is said [verse 3–4]: “Any man, any man of the House of Israel who slaughters

outside the camp, and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to sacrifice an offering... to the Lord before the Tabernacle of the Lord... that man shall be cut off from among his people.” From here we learn liability to karet for slaughtering outside.

Afterward [verses 5–7] it is said: “So that the Children of Israel shall bring their sacrifices that they slaughter upon the face of the field, and bring them to the Lord, to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting. And they shall no longer slaughter their sacrifices to the demons.”

The beraita deals with the repetition of the verses. For it was already stated [in verses 3–4] all the laws of slaughtering outside; what does the Torah add afterward [verses 5–7]?

The beraita expounds the passage: its first part was stated concerning the time when private altars were prohibited, and its second part concerning the time when private altars were permitted.

Private altars made for sacrificing upon them to the Lord were permitted to the Children of Israel until the establishment of the Tabernacle [and likewise at the time of its dismantling under certain conditions], and once the Temple was established, private altars were prohibited forever.

And likewise we learned:

Up to here [verses 3–4]

it is speaking of sacred offerings that he consecrated at a time when private altars were prohibited,

and sacrificed them

outside

at a time when private altars were prohibited, for their punishment is stated.

And concerning this the Torah reveals their punishment—karet, as

it is said

[there]

“And he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting... and that man shall be cut off from among his people.”

The punishment

of karet

we have heard

in this passage; but

from where is the warning,

from where do we know that they were warned concerning this?

The verse says

[Deuteronomy 12]:

“Take care for yourself, lest you bring up your burnt offerings in every place that you see. Rather, only in the place that the Lord shall choose.”

And

this verse is expounded as a warning,

as

the words of

Rabbi Avin said in the name of Rabbi Ila

[Ile’a]:

For Rabbi Avin said in the name of Rabbi Ila: Everywhere

in the Torah

that it is said

“Take care,” “lest,” or “do not,”

it is nothing other than

a warning of

“You shall not do.”

Thus we have heard both a punishment and a warning for one who sacrifices outside sacred offerings that he consecrated when private altars were prohibited and sacrificed when private altars were prohibited.

And the beraita continues:

From this point onward,

what is written in the following verses [5–7],

is speaking of sacred offerings that he consecrated at a time when private altars were permitted and sacrificed at a time when private altars were prohibited.

And the verse comes to warn and prohibit sacrificing them outside, although when he consecrated them, the consecration was for the purpose of sacrificing on a private altar,

as it is said

[there]:

“So that the Children of Israel shall bring their sacrifices that they slaughter,”

that is, those sacrifices

that I had already permitted you,

meaning, which had already been intended to be sacrificed on private altars; those they shall bring to the Tabernacle.

The continuation of the verse is:

“Upon the face of the field,”

and we expound:

It teaches

us

that anyone who sacrifices on a private altar at a time when private altars are prohibited, the verse regards him as though he were sacrificing upon the face of the field,

that is, for idolatry!

The continuation of the verse is:

“And bring them to the Lord”

this is a positive mitzva

to bring them to the Lord in the Tabernacle.

Up to here we have heard a positive mitzva to bring them to the Tabernacle.

And a prohibition,

from where,

if he sacrificed them outside, from where do we know that he transgressed a prohibition?

The verse says

[there]:

“And they shall no longer slaughter their sacrifices.”

And we expound: they shall not slaughter them outside.

And the beraita continues:

Could he be liable to karet

for them, just as one who sacrifices outside sacred offerings that he consecrated when private altars were prohibited?

The verse says

[there]:

“This shall be an eternal statute for them.”

And we expound:

This

transgression of a positive mitzva and a prohibition there is

for them,

but not another

—the punishment of karet

for them.

Now this is difficult concerning Rabbi Elazar: from where does he derive from this verse the law concerning one who slaughters an animal for Mercurius? For from this verse we expound the case of sacred offerings consecrated when private altars were permitted and sacrificed outside when private altars were prohibited.

And we conclude:

Rava said:

The two interpretations are required, for the Torah could have written, “And they shall not slaughter their sacrifices”; why is “any longer” written? And we expound:

Read in it

“And they shall not slaughter”

to teach the prohibition of slaughtering outside, as explained.

And read in it

“And not any longer”

for Rabbi Elazar’s interpretation: one who slaughters an animal for Mercurius, although this is not its usual manner of worship, is liable.

Mishna:

The Mishna continues with the laws of Mercurius—and the same applies to other idols—and the prohibition of deriving benefit from it. It was already explained in the preceding sugya that an idolatrous offering is prohibited if it resembles the “Temple service,” that is, something like it is sacrificed to the blessed God upon the altar.

If he found upon its head coins, garments, or vessels

these are permitted

for benefit, because nothing like them is sacrificed upon the altar. And the Gemara will explain why they are not prohibited as “the adornment of an idol.”

But if he found

clusters of grapes, and wreaths of grain, and wines, oils, and fine flour, and anything like them

[resembling them]

is sacrificed upon the altar

it is prohibited.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna that if he found coins, garments, or vessels upon its head, they are not prohibited for benefit. It follows that if he found gold, silver, or anything that is an “adornment” intended to beautify the idols, these are prohibited for benefit.

And the Gemara asks:

From where are these matters derived,

from where did we learn these matters—that something which is an adornment is prohibited for benefit, whereas something that is not an adornment is not prohibited?

Rabbi Hiyya bar Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya: One verse

[Deuteronomy 29]

says:

“And you saw their abominations and their detestable idols, wood and stone, silver and gold, which are with them.”

This implies two matters: first, that the gentiles would sacrifice before the idols wood and stone in addition to silver and gold; second, that they are “abominations,” meaning that the Torah prohibits them.

And

if

one verse

[Deuteronomy 7]

says:

“You shall not covet the silver and gold that is upon them,”

but it does not say “wood and stone.”

How is this [resolved]?

The verses contradict one another: one verse prohibits even wood and stone, while the other does not prohibit them.

It must be explained:

“Which are with them,”

that is, the verse that says “wood and stone, silver and gold, which are with them,”

analogous to “upon them,”

that is, similar to the wording of the verse that says “silver and gold that is upon them.”

And we expound:

Just as “upon them”

a thing that is an adornment is prohibited,

for it explicitly mentions “silver and gold,” which are things of adornment, whereas

a thing that is not an adornment

is permitted,

for it does not mention wood and stone,

so too “with them”

a thing that is an adornment is prohibited, and one that is not an adornment is permitted. And what is said there about “wood and stone” refers to wood and stone that are adornments, and they are indeed prohibited.

So too “with them”—a thing that is an adornment is prohibited, and one that is not an adornment is permitted. What is said about “wood and stone” refers to wood and stone that are adornments, and they are indeed prohibited.

And we challenge this interpretation: why should we expound it this way?

But say

that it is possible to say the opposite:

“Upon them” is analogous to “with them.”

Just as “with them”

mentions wood and stone, so as to expound:

Everything that is with them,

even things that are not adornments, since ordinary wood and stone are not adornments,

so too “upon them”

everything

that

is upon them,

and every object upon the idols would be prohibited?

And the Gemara answers:

If so,

if the Torah came to prohibit everything that is upon the idols,

it should not say “upon them”;

the entire verse would be superfluous. For if even what is with them—that is, beside them—is prohibited, and the Torah calls them “abominations,” all the more so what is actually upon them. For what purpose did the Torah write this verse? It follows that the Torah wrote this verse in order to establish an analogy to it and prohibit only something that is an adornment.

Rashi: From that which is said, “which are with them,” it comes to include wood and stone that are adornments. See Rashash, who brings support from several places in the Talmud that “which” comes to include. [And apparently this requires explanation: have we come to include something that is an adornment? On the contrary, we have come to exclude wood and stone that are not adornments. It is possible that these words of Rashi belong to the Gemara’s question. Examine Rashi’s wording carefully. But see Maharam, who understood that these words of Rashi refer to the answer. And this requires clarification.] And the Gemara wonders:

Coins?! They are a thing of adornment!

Why, then, did the Mishna say that they are permitted?

And the Gemara answers:

They said in the house of

the academy of

Rabbi Yannai:

Coins are indeed a thing of adornment, but our Mishna is speaking of a case where they found them in a manner that is not one of adornment, such as:

in a pouch

of coins

tied and hanging from its neck

of the idol.

Ritva explains: “Perhaps they placed them there to conceal them. Or perhaps they give them only as payment for the wages of its guards.” And we raise another objection:

Garments?! They are a thing of adornment!

Why, then, did the Mishna say that they are permitted?

And the Gemara answers:

They said in the house of Rabbi Yannai:

Our Mishna is speaking

of a garment folded and placed upon its head

in a manner that is not one of adornment.

And we raise another objection:

A vessel?! It is a thing of adornment!

Why, then, did the Mishna say that it is permitted?

And the Gemara answers:

Rav Pappa said: A basin was overturned over it

[something like a tub]

on its head,

being overturned upon its head, in a manner that is not one of adornment.

The idols in their times had screens spread before them, and the Gemara calls them “kalkelin,” a derogatory term for curtains.

Rav Asi bar Hiyya said: Every

thing

that

is found

and is inside the screens

of all idols,

even water and salt,

which are not things of adornment,

is prohibited

because of an idolatrous offering, since it is found actually before it.

And if it is found

outside the screens,

if it is

a thing of adornment,

it is prohibited,

as explained, that the adornments of an idol are prohibited.

And if a thing is found

that is not an adornment,

it is permitted,

even clusters of grapes and the like, “resembling the Temple service,” because an idolatrous offering is not placed outside the screens.

Rav Yosei bar Hanina said: We have accepted

as a tradition from our forefathers:

There is no

law of

screens for Pe’or or for Mercurius.

And the Gemara asks:

For what purpose

do they have no law of screens?

If you say

that it means:

that even inside

the screens

is considered like outside

with regard to other idols,

and

if he found inside something that is not an adornment,

it is permitted,

how is it possible to say this?

Now,

if even

they defecate

before it—and this is certainly not a thing of adornment—and likewise people throw stones at Mercurius, is it possible that

water and salt do not draw it near?!

And we conclude:

Rather,

the opposite:

even

if they found outside

something

that is not an adornment,

it is considered like inside

with regard to other idols,

and is prohibited and forbidden

because of an idolatrous offering. Since the interruption of screens, which are made for modesty and honor, does not apply to them, because all their worship is in a degrading manner.

And the entire distinction between outside the screens and inside them is stated only with regard to other idols, for whom a screen is made for modesty and honor.

Maharam in the opinion of Rashi. With this, the question of Tosafot is resolved. They asked: how can water and salt be prohibited outside the screens because of an idolatrous offering, when an offering is not brought outside the screens? That is, Tosafot, in Rashi’s opinion [and perhaps they had a different version], understood that even for Pe’or and Mercurius the screens separate between outside and inside, and an offering is brought only inside; it is merely that they are not particular about matters of honor, since all their worship is in a degrading manner. But Rashi holds that since their worship is in a degrading manner, there is no distinction between inside and outside even with regard to an offering, and one sacrifices before it even outside. And Tosafot themselves hold that with other idols, both outside and inside, one sacrifices before them, except that inside one sacrifices specifically something that is an adornment, whereas outside one sacrifices even something that is not an adornment. [According to Rashi, with other idols outside it is prohibited only because of adornment; according to Tosafot, outside it is prohibited because of an idolatrous offering, provided that it is an adornment.] And according to Tosafot, with Pe’or and Mercurius one sacrifices outside even things that are not adornments, and they are prohibited by the law of an idolatrous offering. Mishna:

Our Mishna comes to explain that there are objects belonging to an idol that are permitted for benefit.

An idol that had a garden or a bathhouse

Now, the garden or the bathhouse is not an idol, and it is not even an idolatrous offering; therefore they are not prohibited for benefit.

Rather, they “belong” to it, meaning that they were consecrated for the needs of the idol. This is not enough to prohibit benefit from them, because there is no consecration to an idol. Therefore: Ritva. And the Rashba and the Ritva wrote in the name of the Raavad that they are also not “the adornment” of an idol.

They may benefit

it is permitted to benefit

from them,

such as taking fruit from the garden or bathing in the bathhouse,

without [giving] a favor,

provided that they do not pay the priests of the idol,

but one may not benefit from them with [giving] a favor,

and it is prohibited to give them payment.

Rashi here, in our sugya. See Rashi on page 44b. But Rabbeinu Tam [there] disagrees, and holds that it is prohibited to show them gratitude, that is, to thank them for the benefit. According to Rabbeinu Tam, it is prohibited to give payment even to its attendants; see the Gemara. See the novellae of the Ritva, which reconcile Rashi’s method with the objections of Rabbeinu Tam. If

the bathhouse or the garden was

hers and that of others,

belonging both to the idol and to others,

one may benefit from them with [giving] a favor and without [giving] a favor.

Maharsha’s version, which reads “with a favor and without a favor.” For according to the version “both with a favor and without a favor,” the second formulation has no interpretation. Examine this carefully.

The Mishna explains that there is a difference between an idol belonging to a gentile and one belonging to a Jew.

An idol

an idol

belonging to a gentile

a non-Jew

is prohibited immediately,

when he makes it and renders it fit for the purpose of idolatry.

But

if it is

belonging to a Jew,

who made it for his own purpose, to sell it to a gentile,

it is not prohibited

when he makes it

until it is worshipped.

And the Gemara will explain the reason for the difference from expositions of the verses.

Gemara:

We learned in our Mishna: An idol that had a garden or a bathhouse—one may benefit from them without [giving] a favor, but one may not benefit from it with [giving] a favor.

Abaye said:

That which is prohibited

“with [giving] a favor”

means

with the favor of the priests,

and likewise that which is permitted

“without

[giving] a favor”

means

without the favor of the priests.

To exclude

to exclude

the favor of its attendants,

who are not priests;

it is permitted

it is permitted to give them part of the payment for the benefit of the bathhouse or garden.

There are those who teach it

as Abaye’s statement

with regard to the latter clause,

concerning the latter clause—we learned:

If it was hers and that of others

one may benefit from them with [giving] a favor and without [giving] a favor.

And concerning the latter clause

Abaye said:

What we learned,

“with [giving] a favor,”

means

with the favor of the others,

who are not priests; and what we learned:

“without [giving] a favor”

means

without the favor of the priests.

According to this formulation, it is prohibited to give payment to the priests under any circumstances, even though the garden or bathhouse does not belong solely to the priests. Therefore we clarify:

The one who teaches it with regard to the latter clause

certainly [teaches it] with regard to the first clause,

since, as they belong solely to the priests, it is prohibited to give payment to the priests [and even to others who are not the priests].

Maharam. His reason is straightforward: if it were permitted to give payment to others, what would be the difference between the first clause and the latter clause, and in what way would the first clause be more stringent than the latter? But from the words of the Ramban, the Ritva, and the Ran this apparently does not follow. See there. But

if

the one who teaches it with regard to the first clause

is lenient and holds:

but with regard to the latter clause

since there are others with it,

who benefit from the payment, therefore

even with the favor of the priests, it is also entirely acceptable

it is permitted to give payment even to the priests.

We learned in our Mishna:

An idol belonging to a gentile

is prohibited immediately, but one belonging to a Jew is not prohibited until it is worshipped.

And the Gemara asks:

Whose view is our Mishna?

Whose teaching is it?

It is Rabbi Akiva’s,

and not the view of Rabbi Ishmael.

For it was taught

we learned in a beraita: [the beraita first states the words of Rabbi Ishmael] It is written in the Torah [Deuteronomy 12]:

“You shall utterly destroy all the places where the nations served there.”

And we expound:

With regard to vessels that they used

when the gentiles entered the Land of Israel

for idolatry

the verse speaks.

The Gemara will explain: after all, the Torah says “places”; how is this expounded as referring to “vessels”? These vessels are “objects used in the service of an idol.”

I might

have said:

They made them

the vessels

but did not complete them; they completed them but did not bring them

to the idols;

they brought them but did not use them

for the purpose of idolatry—

might they be prohibited?

The verse says

“where the nations served there,”

to teach you

that they are not prohibited until they are used.

From here the Sages said

Sages:

the idolatry of a gentile is not forbidden until it is worshipped [

And the Gemara will explain: behold, we expounded the words of the verse concerning “vessels”—and from where do we know that the idols themselves likewise are not forbidden until they are worshipped?]

And

idolatry

of a Jew is forbidden immediately.

These are

the words of Rabbi Ishmael.

Rabbi Akiva says: The matters are reversed! The idolatry of a gentile is forbidden immediately, and that of a Jew only once it is worshipped. [

And the Gemara will explain his reason.]

And our Mishna was taught in accordance with the words of Rabbi Akiva.

The Gemara explains the baraita.

The Master said

the baraita stated:

The verse speaks of vessels that were used for idolatry.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

But “places” is written

and how did Rabbi Ishmael expound it as referring to vessels?

And the Gemara answers:

If it does not pertain to “places,” for

the places

are not rendered forbidden,

they were not forbidden, and the Torah does not command that they be destroyed—

and from where do we know that they were not forbidden?

For it is written

further in the verse,

“their gods upon the mountains,”

and we expound:

but not the mountains as their gods.