Avodah Zarah 51a — the Talmud in English

Granted,

if he poured before it

a vessel of urine,

it is properly fitting that he is liable, because

there is

here

a breaking throw.

But feces—

what breaking throw is there?!

For it does not break apart, and in what way is it different from throwing a stick?

And the Gemara answers: This beraita is speaking

of moist feces,

which breaks apart when thrown.

And now the Gemara discusses the first law that Rav innovated, that for breaking a stick one is liable as for slaughtering, even though it resembles it only partially.

Let us say,

shall we say that Rav’s innovation is

[the subject of] a dispute between tannaim,

that it depends upon a dispute between tannaim, and is not agreed upon according to the view of all the tannaim?!

We learned a beraita:

If one slaughtered a locust before it

for any idolatry, whether its practice is with slaughtering or whether its practice is not with slaughtering—

Rabbi Yehuda renders him liable, and the Sages exempt him.

The one who raises the objection understands that the reason of the Sages, who exempt him, is that slaughtering does not apply to a locust—

Is it not so

that we should explain that

in this they disagree,

that they dispute this law:

that one master,

Rabbi Yehuda,

holds: we say “

resembling slaughtering,”

even though it does not actually resemble the slaughtering of sacrifices, nevertheless he is liable, because it has a resemblance to slaughtering in that he breaks it—

just as Rav said that breaking a stick resembles slaughtering [And it follows that Rav stated his law only according to Rabbi Yehuda]—

And one master holds

and the Sages hold:

we do not say “

resembling slaughtering,”

and not every thing that resembles slaughtering partially makes one liable to death—

rather,

we say

“resembling the Temple service.”

Actual slaughtering of an animal, beast, or bird, for which slaughtering applies, even though they are not fit as sacrifices—that is what makes one liable to death for all idolatry, but not a locust, for which slaughtering is not applicable at all.

And according to their view, even if one broke a stick, he is exempt. Did Rav state his law as [the subject of] a dispute between tannaim? And we conclude:

No,

Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages did not dispute this matter; rather—

Everyone,

all the tannaim of this beraita holds:

we do not say “

resembling slaughtering,”

and according to their view, one who breaks a stick before it is exempt—

Rather,

in order to render one liable,

we require resembling the Temple service,

a thing resembling slaughtering, such as an animal or bird; even though they are not actually fit to be offered, nevertheless they are fit for slaughtering, and their resemblance is very close to the Temple service—

and for all other breakings one is exempt; therefore the Sages exempted him in the case of a locust—

And

the reason that Rabbi Yehuda renders him liable is because

a locust is different: since its neck resembles the neck of an animal,

its slaughtering is considered resembling the slaughtering of the Temple service .

The Gemara cites a similar statement that Rav said.

However, according to Rashi, this idol differs in that its service is with the “throwing” of a stick, and not with mere shaking.

And in this statement Rav also addresses the law of the stick: whether it is forbidden for benefit as the offering of idolatry.

Rav Naḥman said that Rabbah bar Avuha said that Rav said: An idolatry that they worship with a stick—

if he

broke a stick before it—

he is liable

to death, as explained above, that breaking is considered resembling slaughtering. Therefore, he is liable whether its service is with breaking or whether its service is not with breaking, since in any event its service is with a stick—

and it becomes forbidden

to benefit from the stick, under the law of an offering of idolatry, for the same reason and on account of the same cause: because he performed with it an act resembling slaughtering.

But if he

threw a stick before it—

he is liable

to death, since its service is performed in this way, by throwing—

And

the stick

does not become forbidden

because an offering of idolatry is forbidden for benefit only if it is resembling the Temple service, as explained above [51a]. And this is learned from what is stated, “One who slaughters to gods [idols] shall be put to death, except to the Lord alone,” and we interpret: “shall be put to death” and become forbidden for benefit only when one performs a service distinctive to the service of the Almighty; but this stick—its service is not a Temple service, as will be explained.

And the innovation in Rav’s statement is: That same service, namely throwing a stick, with regard to the person who worships—is a service for which he becomes liable, whereas the object worshipped does not become forbidden under the law of an offering of idolatry.

And we raise an objection against Rav’s statement:

Rava said to Rav Na

ḥman:

What is different about breaking

a stick, that the stick is forbidden for benefit, because

it is

that the breaking is

resembling slaughtering—

Throwing also—

the stick should become forbidden, for

is it not resembling throwing?

That is to say: There is no deficiency in the stick itself because it does not enter into the Temple service; the proof is that if he broke it before it, it becomes forbidden. And there is also no deficiency on the part of the worshipper, for he is indeed liable to death. If so, then why is it not forbidden for benefit?

And the Gemara answers:

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman to Rava: In order to forbid it for benefit,

we require

that it be

a breaking throw,

resembling the Temple service—and

there is none,

and this throw is not a breaking throw.

That is to say: The person who worships is indeed liable for the throwing because its service is performed in this way, and not because it is an act of the Temple service. But the stick does not become forbidden because of the Temple service, since it is not an act of throwing resembling the throwing of the Temple service .

This is not so when he broke a stick: The act of breaking, which resembles the slaughtering of the Temple service, is the act that forbids the stick.

And Rava raises an objection to Rav Naḥman:

Rather,

according to your words, that the stick does not become forbidden because we require a breaking throw, even though its service is with throwing a stick —

From now,

it is difficult:

the stones of Mercury—

by what

will they become forbidden, for these stones were not thrown in a breaking throw?

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman to Rava:

This is difficult to me as well,

I too was troubled by this difficulty,

and I asked it

and raised it

to Rabbah bar Avuha, and Rabbah bar Avuha

raised it

to Ḥiyya bar Rav, and Ḥiyya bar Rav

raised it

to Rav—

And he said to him,

Rav to his son Ḥiyya: The stone that was added to Mercury—

becomes like a tower of idolatry,

that is, like a large Mercury formed from every stone, and they are not forbidden on account of an offering—

but a stick does not become part of the idolatry, since it is not made of sticks upon sticks.

And Rava raises an objection to Rav Naḥman

That works

this reasoning is fitting

according to the one who says: An idolatry

an idol

of a gentile

a non-Jew—

is forbidden immediately,

when he performs an act with it for the sake of idolatry. Therefore, these stones are forbidden, since in all of them an act of throwing to the place of Mercury was performed for the sake of idolatry—

But according to the one who says

who holds that it does not become forbidden

until it is worshipped,

it is difficult:

let them be permitted,

let these stones be permitted,

for it was not worshipped,

for they did not worship them; rather, each and every stone was thrown to the place of Mercury for the purpose of enlarging and adding to it—

and why are they forbidden? After all, they have not yet been worshipped.

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman to Rava: Indeed,

each and every one becomes an idolatry, and

also becomes

an offering for its fellow,

for the stones that preceded it; and all the stones that preceded it were worshipped through the throwing of the stone that followed them.

And Rava raised an objection to him:

If so—

the last

one,

at least should be permitted,

for it was not worshipped.

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman to Rava: Indeed, it is not forbidden;

if you recognize it,

if you can identify it—

go and take it.

Take it! That is to say: Since it is not recognized, therefore all of them are forbidden.

Summary: When we discuss “the stones,” what law applies to them, whether as an offering or as the idolatry itself—

certainly they have the law of one large idolatry.

Therefore, they have the law of nullification, just as idolatry has nullification. And therefore the Sages, headed by Rabbi Menaḥem ben Simai, walked upon them.

It is impossible to give them the law of an offering, which cannot be nullified, because it is not a breaking throw.

But when we discuss “the act of throwing,” the throwing is an act of worship—for this is its practice, and that is the service that forbids it according to the one who says “until it is worshipped.”

Rav Ashi said:

Even this last one becomes forbidden, because since Mercury has no other service, and throwing it is its service, therefore

each and every one becomes an offering for itself

and this is the service that forbids it [even according to the one who says “until it is worshipped”]

and

becomes

an offering for its fellow .

The Gemara cites a Mishna to raise a difficulty against the Gemara’s conclusion that only something thrown in a breaking throw is forbidden for benefit.

We learned

in the following Mishna:

One who finds on its head

of Mercury

garments, money, or utensils—

these are permitted

for benefit, and the reason will be explained there.

And if he finds

clusters of grapes, crowns of ears of grain, and wines, oils, and flour, and anything similar that is offered upon the altar—

it is forbidden

for benefit, on account of an offering of idolatry.

And it is difficult:

Granted, wines, oils, and flour—

there is resembling the Temple service

there is such a service in the Temple

and there is resembling a breaking throw,

for these things are thrown drop by drop—

But clusters of grapes and crowns of ears of grain

why are they forbidden? After all,

there is no resembling the Temple service

for it is not their practice to bring them in the Temple,

and there is no resembling a breaking throw

for they do not break apart?

And the Gemara answers:

Rava said that Ulla said: For example, when he harvested them initially for this purpose

for the purpose of Mercury; and the harvesting resembles slaughtering, just as breaking a stick resembles slaughtering.

And since through the act of harvesting he performed an act resembling slaughtering, they became forbidden for benefit .

Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: From where

do we learn

the

law that

one who slaughters a blemished animal for idolatry

whose practice is not with any service involving animals —

that he is exempt?

As it is stated [Exodus 22], “

One who slaughters to gods

[idols]

shall be put to death, except to the Lord alone.”

And we interpret: A thing fit for the Lord alone is forbidden to slaughter for idols; therefore

the Torah forbade only something resembling the Temple service,

a thing fit for the Temple service. And since it is blemished, it is not fit for the Temple service.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

It was

difficult

to Rava: In what

blemish did Rabbi Yoḥanan say that he is exempt?

If you say

if we say:

in spots

[a mark]

in the eye

of the animal, and likewise other blemishes that disqualify animals from being brought as sacrifices to the Lord—

it is difficult: How is it possible to say this?

Now,

if even

for the descendants of Noah

[gentiles, and likewise Israelites before the giving of the Torah]

it is fit

this animal

for the Most High,

to offer it as a sacrifice to the Lord

on their altar

on altars upon which they were permitted to offer sacrifices—and gentiles who bring sacrifices on altars are permitted to bring blemished animals—

that same animal, when he brought it

for idolatry

[another version:

for this accursed one]—

is it necessary to say it?!

Certainly he is liable, for this animal is fit to be offered as a sacrifice to the Lord.

And we conclude:

Rather,

Rabbi Yoḥanan, who exempts, exempted him

in the case of one lacking a limb,

an animal that is whole, but is not fit for a sacrifice on an altar even for the descendants of Noah.

And

the words of

Rabbi Elazar—

For Rabbi Elazar said: From where

do we learn

that one lacking a limb is forbidden to the descendants of Noah ?

As it is stated [Genesis 6]: The Holy One, blessed is He, said to Noah, “

And of every living thing, of all flesh, two of each you shall bring into the ark, to keep alive with you.”

“And of every living thing, of all flesh, two of each shall you bring into the ark, to keep them alive with you.”

And we interpret “of every living thing”:

The Torah said, “

Bring an animal whose principal limbs are alive,”

for Noah was destined to offer sacrifices from the animals that he brought into the ark, as it is stated [there, chapter 8], after he left the ark: “And he took from every pure animal ... and he brought up burnt offerings on the altar.”

And the Gemara raises a difficulty: How is it possible to learn from this verse? After all,

this “

of every living thing”

is needed to him

for another teaching. Namely:

to exclude an animal with a fatal defect,

for the Holy One, blessed is He, commanded Noah not to bring into the ark animals with a fatal defect, such as one whose brain membrane was punctured [and it is not considered blemished on account of this].

And the Gemara answers: What was forbidden for him to bring into the ark—an animal with a fatal defect—is derived from another exposition, namely from what is stated there, “

to keep seed alive”:

it emerges

it is learned, that is: Bring in animals from which offspring will be born, whereas an animal with a fatal defect does not give birth.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

That works

this teaching is fitting

according to

the words of

the one who says: An animal with a fatal defect does not give birth,

and it can be excluded through “to keep seed alive”—

But according to

the words of

the one who says: An animal with a fatal defect does give birth—

what can be said?

According to him, it is impossible to exclude an animal with a fatal defect from “to keep seed alive,” for it “keeps seed alive” and gives birth; if so, the animal with a fatal defect is excluded from the verse “of every living thing”—

and the question returns: From where is it learned that one lacking a limb is forbidden to the descendants of Noah?

And the Gemara answers:

The verse states, “to keep alive

with

you,”

and we interpret

“with you”—

like those similar to you,

and just as Noah did not have a fatal defect [as will be explained below], so he should not bring in an animal with a fatal defect—

and from here we derive an animal with a fatal defect, while “of every living thing” is expounded to exclude “one lacking a limb.”

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

Perhaps

it is possible to say that

Noah himself

personally

was an animal with a fatal defect?

And the Gemara answers:

“Whole” is written about him,

the Torah testified concerning him that he was “a righteous man, whole,” so he was not a tereifa.

And the Gemara objects: Why was it said that “whole” means whole in his body?

Perhaps

it is possible to say:

“Whole” in his ways,

humble and lowly in spirit?

And the Gemara answers: Also,

“righteous” is written about him,

and from it we learn that he was righteous in his ways, while from “whole” we learn that he was whole in his body—and not a tereifa.

And the Gemara objects: We still do not learn that he was whole in his body, for

perhaps

it is possible to say that

“whole”

means

in his ways, while “righteous”

means

in his deeds,

and he did not perform violent deeds like the people of his generation?

Rather, this is not learned from what is stated, “whole,” but it is learned from what is stated, “with you”—

And it is not difficult: “Perhaps Noah himself was a tereifa,” for—

You cannot say,

it is not reasonable

that Noah himself was a tereifa.

For if it enters your mind that Noah was a tereifa—

Is it possible that

the Merciful One said to him: ‘Those like you,’

those resembling you, “a tereifa”—

enter,

enter the ark,

but complete ones you shall not bring in,

do not bring them in?! From here there is proof that he did not bring a tereifa into the ark.

And the Gemara discusses:

Now

after we have concluded

that it emerges

that it is expounded that he did not bring in a tereifa

from

what is stated

“with you”—

there is a difficulty: What do I need

“to preserve living offspring”

for? Why did the Holy One, blessed be He, say this to him, since a tereifa has already been excluded by “with you”?!

And the Gemara answers: Even if he would not bring in tereifot, it would still be possible that he would bring in animals that are not fit to reproduce; and the Holy One, blessed be He, desired that there be survival for all living things. Therefore He said to him, “to preserve living offspring,” that he should bring in animals that are fit to reproduce.

If [we derive it] from “with you,”

if He had commanded him only “with you,”

I would have said

that he should bring in complete animals

merely for companionship,

to remain with him in the ark for twelve months, and therefore he would not bring in tereifot, which do not live for twelve months, and the “companionship” would be nullified—

and indeed he could bring in

even an old one and even a eunuch,

which are not fit to reproduce—

therefore

it teaches us “to preserve living offspring,”

to teach him that he should bring in with him only animals that are fit to reproduce.

The Gemara continues with the law of Markulis.

Rabbi Elazar said: From where

do we learn

that

this law applies to one who

slaughters an animal for Markulis—

that he is liable ,

even though its worship is not by slaughtering animals?

As it is stated [Leviticus 17], in the passage concerning slaughter outside [the Temple]:

“And they shall no longer slaughter their sacrifices to the goat-demons.”

[Goat-demons are demons, and the gentiles slaughtered to them, as to idols.]

If

this verse

does not concern

one who worships idolatry

in its customary manner,

that is, an idolatry to which the gentiles slaughter, for “in its customary manner” is learned from another verse,

as it is written [Deuteronomy 12],

“How do these nations serve their gods?”—

apply it to [worship] not in its customary manner.

There is a principle in the Torah: A verse that does not concern it—that is, since it has already been stated elsewhere—is superfluous for another exposition similar to it.

And the Gemara objects:

And the Gemara objects:

And

what if

this

verse

came for this purpose

—is it superfluous for this exposition?

This one is needed for it,

for it is expounded

for

another exposition,

as

for example,

as it was taught

we learned a beraita concerning “slaughtering outside.”