Avodah Zarah 51a (נא.) — the Talmud in English

Granted,

if he poured it before the idol

from a vessel used for urine—

he is properly liable, because

there is

here

a breaking-off dispersion.

But as for excrement—

what breaking-off dispersion is there?!

It does not break apart, so how is it different from throwing a stick?

The Gemara answers: This beraita is speaking

of moist excrement,

which breaks apart when thrown.

The Gemara now discusses the first law that Rav innovated: that one is liable for breaking a stick as for slaughter, although it resembles slaughter only to a limited degree.

Shall we say

that Rav’s innovation is

subject to a dispute between tanna’im,

and that it depends upon a dispute among the tanna’im and is not accepted by all of them?!

We learned in a beraita:

If one slaughtered a locust before an idol

for any idolatry, whether its regular manner of worship is by slaughter or its regular manner of worship is not by slaughter—

Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable, and the Sages exempt him.

The one who raises the objection assumes that the reason for the Sages’ exemption is that slaughter is not applicable to a locust—

Is that not

to be understood as follows:

They disagree in this matter,

that they dispute this law:

One master—

Rabbi Yehuda—

holds: We say

“something akin to slaughter,”

and although it does not actually resemble the slaughter of offerings, he is nevertheless liable because breaking it has some similarity to slaughter—

just as Rav said that breaking a stick resembles slaughter and it follows that Rav stated his law only in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda—

And the other master holds—

the Sages hold:

We do not say

“something akin to slaughter,”

and not every act that somewhat resembles slaughter renders one liable to death—

rather,

we say

“something akin to the Temple service.”

Actual slaughter of a wild animal, domesticated animal, or bird, for which slaughter is applicable—even though they are not fit to be offered as sacrifices—is what renders one liable to death for every idol; but not a locust, for which slaughter is entirely inapplicable.

And according to them, even if one broke a stick, he would be exempt. Did Rav state his law subject to a dispute between tanna’im? The Gemara concludes:

No.

Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages did not disagree about this matter; rather—

Everyone—

all the tanna’im of this beraita holds:

We do not say

“something akin to slaughter,”

and according to their view, one who breaks a stick before an idol is exempt—

Rather, in order to render one liable,

in a case of

something akin to the Temple service, we require

an object that resembles slaughter, such as a wild animal or bird. Although they are not actually fit to be offered, they are fit for slaughter, and their resemblance to the Temple service is very close—

but for all other acts of breaking one is exempt. Therefore, the Sages exempted one who slaughtered a locust—

And

the reason Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable is that

a locust is different, since its neck resembles the neck of a domesticated animal;

therefore, its slaughter is something akin to the slaughter performed in the Temple .

The Gemara cites a similar statement made by Rav.

However, according to Rashi, this idol differs in that its worship consists of “throwing” a stick before it, and not merely of shaking a stick.

In this statement Rav also addresses the law of the stick: whether it becomes forbidden to derive benefit from it as the offering of an idol.

Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha said that Rav said: An idol that is worshipped with a stick—

if one

breaks a stick before it—

he is liable

to death. As explained above, breaking is something akin to slaughter; therefore, he is liable whether its worship is by breaking or its worship is not by breaking, since in any event its worship involves a stick—

and the stick becomes forbidden

as the offering of an idol, for the same reason: he performed upon it an act akin to slaughter.

But if he

throws a stick before it—

he is liable

to death, since this is the manner of its worship, by throwing—

but

the stick

does not become forbidden

because the offering of an idol is forbidden to derive benefit from only when it is something akin to a Temple service, as explained above [51a]. This is derived from the verse: “One who slaughters for gods shall be destroyed, except to the Lord alone.” We expound it as follows: An object becomes subject to the ban and forbidden to derive benefit from only when one performs the service that is distinctive of the worship of God, whereas this stick is not a Temple service, as will be explained.

The innovation in Rav’s statement is that the same act—throwing a stick—is considered an act of worship with regard to the person who worships the idol, so that he is liable for it, whereas the object worshipped does not become forbidden as the offering of an idol.

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav’s statement:

Rava said to Rav Na

ḥman:

What is different about breaking

a stick, such that the stick becomes forbidden to derive benefit from, because

it is

the breaking

something akin to slaughter—

if one throws it also,

the stick should likewise become forbidden, since

it is something akin to throwing?

In other words: There is no deficiency in the stick itself on the grounds that it does not constitute a Temple service, as demonstrated by the fact that if one breaks it before the idol, it becomes forbidden. Nor is there any deficiency with regard to the worshipper, since he is indeed liable to death. If so, why is the stick not forbidden to derive benefit from?

The Gemara answers:

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman said to Rava: In order to render it forbidden to derive benefit from,

we require

that it be

a breaking-off dispersion,

akin to a Temple service—but

there is none;

this throwing is not a breaking-off dispersion.

In other words: The person who worships the idol is indeed liable for the throwing because that is its manner of worship, and not because the act is a Temple service. But the stick does not become forbidden on account of the Temple service, because the act of throwing is not similar to the throwing performed in the Temple .

This is not the case when one breaks a stick: the act of breaking, which resembles the slaughter performed in the Temple, is the act that renders the stick forbidden.

Rava raises an objection to Rav Naḥman:

But

according to your statement, that the stick does not become forbidden because we require a breaking-off dispersion, even though its manner of worship is by throwing a stick —

From now on,

it is difficult:

the stones of Mercurius—

by virtue of what do they become forbidden?

They were not thrown in a breaking-off dispersion.

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman said to Rava:

This difficulty also occurred to me,

I too was troubled by this question,

and I asked it—

I raised it—

to Rabba bar Avuha, and Rabba bar Avuha

raised it

to Ḥiyya bar Rav, and Ḥiyya bar Rav

raised it

to Rav—

And he said to him,

Rav said to his son Ḥiyya: A stone that is added to Mercurius

becomes like the tower of an idol,

that is, like a large Mercurius formed from every individual stone; they are not forbidden as the offering of an idol—

but a stick does not become part of the idol, since it is not made of sticks upon sticks.

Rava raises an objection to Rav Naḥman

That works well

this reasoning is appropriate

according to the one who says: An idol—

an idol

belonging to a gentile—

a non-Jew—

is forbidden immediately,

when he performs an act with it for the sake of idolatry. Therefore, these stones are forbidden, since in the case of each of them an act of throwing it to the place of Mercurius was performed for the sake of idolatry—

But according to the one who says

that it does not become forbidden

until it is worshipped,

it is difficult:

let them be permitted,

let these stones be permitted,

for they were not worshipped;

each stone was merely thrown to the place of Mercurius in order to enlarge and augment it—

so why are they forbidden? They have not yet been worshipped.

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman said to Rava: Indeed,

each and every one becomes an idol, and

it also becomes

an offering for the one preceding it,

for all the stones that preceded it were worshipped through the throwing of the stone that followed them.

Rava objected to him:

If so,

the last one

at least,

should be permitted,

since it was not worshipped.

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman said to Rava: Indeed, it is not forbidden;

if you know which one it is,

if you can identify it—

go and take it.

That is to say: Since it cannot be identified, all of them are forbidden.

Summary: When we discuss “the stones” and ask what legal status they have—whether that of an offering or that of the idol itself—

they certainly have the status of a single large idol.

Therefore, they are subject to nullification, just as an idol is subject to nullification. This is why the Sages, headed by Rabbi Menaḥem ben Simai, trod upon them.

It is impossible to assign them the status of an offering, which cannot be nullified, because they are not thrown in a breaking-off dispersion.

But when we discuss “the act of throwing,” the throwing is an act of worship—for that is its manner of worship, and it is this worship that renders it forbidden according to the one who says “until it is worshipped.”

Rav Ashi said:

The last stone is also forbidden, because since Mercurius has no other form of worship, and throwing a stone is its worship,

each and every one becomes an offering in its own right

and that is the worship that renders it forbidden [even according to the one who says “until it is worshipped”]

and

it becomes

an offering for the one preceding it .

The Gemara cites a Mishna in order to challenge the Gemara’s conclusion that only an object thrown in a breaking-off dispersion is forbidden to derive benefit from.

We learned

in the following Mishna:

If one finds on its top

of Mercurius

garments, money, or vessels—

these are permitted

to derive benefit from, and the reason will be explained there.

But if one finds

clusters of grapes, wreaths of ears of grain, wines, oils, flour, or anything similar that is offered on the altar—

it is forbidden

to derive benefit from, because it is the offering of an idol.

This is difficult:

Granted, with regard to wines, oils, and flour—

there is something akin to the Temple service —

there is such a service in the Temple—

and there is something akin to a breaking-off dispersion,

since these substances are thrown in droplets—

But as for clusters of grapes and wreaths of ears of grain,

why are they forbidden? After all,

there is no element akin to the Temple service

because it is not customary to bring them in the Temple,

and there is no element akin to a breaking-off dispersion

because they do not break apart?

The Gemara answers:

Rava said that Ulla said: This is referring, for example, to a case where he harvested them initially for that purpose

for the sake of Mercurius. The harvesting resembles slaughter, just as breaking a stick resembles slaughter.

And since, through the act of harvesting, he performed an act resembling slaughter, they become forbidden to derive benefit from .

Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: From where

do we learn

the

law that

one who slaughters a blemished animal for an idol

whose worship does not involve animals in any manner —

is exempt?

As it is stated [Exodus 22]: “

One who slaughters for gods

[idols]

shall be destroyed, except to the Lord alone.”

And we expound it: An object fit for the Lord alone may not be slaughtered for idols. Therefore,

the Torah forbade only something akin to the Temple service,

an object fit for the Temple service. Since this animal is blemished, it is not fit for the Temple service.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

Rava was

perplexed

by this: With regard to what

blemish did Rabbi Yoḥanan say that he is exempt?

If you say

that he is speaking

of growths

[a spot]

in the eye

of the animal, and likewise of the other blemishes that disqualify animals from being brought as sacrifices to the Lord—

it is difficult: How can this be said?

Now,

if even

for the descendants of Noah

[gentiles, and Israelites before the giving of the Torah]

this animal is

fit

for the Most High,

to be offered as a sacrifice to the Lord

on their altar

on altars upon which they were permitted to offer sacrifices—and gentiles who offer sacrifices on altars are permitted to bring blemished animals—

when he brings that animal

for an idol

[another version:

for this accursed one]—

is it necessary to say?! He is certainly liable, since this animal is fit to be offered as a sacrifice to the Lord.

Surely he is liable, since this animal is fit to be offered as a sacrifice to the Lord.

The Gemara concludes:

Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan, who exempts him, exempted him

Rabbi Yoḥanan, who exempts, exempted one who offers

in the case of an animal lacking a limb,

a complete limb, which is not fit to be offered on an altar even by the descendants of Noah.

And

this is similar to the statement of

Rabbi Elazar—

As Rabbi Elazar said: From where

do we learn

that an animal lacking a limb is forbidden to the descendants of Noah ?

As it is stated [Genesis 6]: The Holy One, blessed be He, said to Noah: “

And of every living thing, of all flesh, two of each you shall bring into the ark, to keep alive with you.”

And of every living thing, of all flesh, two of each shall you bring into the ark, to keep them alive with you.”

And we expound “of every living thing”:

The Torah said: “

Bring an animal whose principal limbs are alive,”

since Noah was destined to offer sacrifices from the animals that he brought into the ark, as it is stated [there, chapter 8], after he left the ark: “And he took of every pure animal … and offered burnt offerings on the altar.”

The Gemara raises a difficulty: How can this be derived from this verse? After all,

this “

of every living thing”

is needed

for another exposition, namely:

to exclude a tereifa,

an animal suffering from a fatal defect, which the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded Noah not to bring into the ark, such as an animal whose brain membrane was perforated [and which is not considered blemished on account of this].

The Gemara answers: The prohibition against bringing animals suffering from a fatal defect into the ark is derived from another exposition, namely, from what is stated there: “

to keep seed alive”;

it is derived

that he was to bring animals that would produce offspring, whereas an animal suffering from a fatal defect does not give birth.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

That works well—

this exposition is consistent

with

the view

of the one who says: An animal suffering from a fatal defect does not give birth,

and it can be excluded from “to keep seed alive”—

But according to

the view

of the one who says: An animal suffering from a fatal defect does give birth—

what can be said? According to him, it is impossible to exclude such an animal from “to keep seed alive,” since it does “keep seed alive” and gives birth. If so, the animal suffering from a fatal defect must be excluded from the verse “of every living thing”—

According to that opinion, it is impossible to exclude such an animal from “to preserve living offspring,” since it does preserve living offspring and can give birth. If so, the animal with a fatal defect must be excluded from the verse “of every living thing”—

and the question returns: From where do we learn that an animal lacking a limb is forbidden to the descendants of Noah?

The Gemara answers:

The verse says: “To keep

with

you alive,” and we expound

and we interpret

“you”—

those similar to you.

Just as Noah was not an animal suffering from a fatal defect [as will be explained below], so too he was not to bring an animal suffering from a fatal defect—

and from here we derive the law concerning an animal suffering from a fatal defect, while “of every living thing” is expounded to exclude an animal “lacking a limb.”

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

But perhaps

it is possible to say that

Noah himself

was

was an animal suffering from a fatal defect?

And the Gemara answers:

“Tamim” is written concerning him:

The Torah testified about him that he was “a righteous man, perfect,” so evidently he was not a tereifa.

And the Gemara asks: Why should it be said that “perfect” means perfect in body?

Perhaps

it may be said that

“perfect” refers to his ways:

he was humble and meek of spirit?

And the Gemara answers: Also,

“righteous” is written concerning him:

from this we learn that he was righteous in his ways, while from “perfect” we learn that he was physically perfect—and not a tereifa.

And the Gemara asks: Still, we cannot learn that he was physically perfect, because

perhaps

it may be said that

“perfect”

means

in his ways, while “righteous”

means

in his deeds:

he did not perform acts of violence like the people of his generation?

Rather, we do not learn this from the statement “perfect”; we learn it from the statement “with you”—

And there is no difficulty from the possibility that “Noah himself was a tereifa,” because—

You cannot say that

it is implausible that

Noah himself was a tereifa.

For if it should enter your mind that Noah was a tereifa—

Is it conceivable that

the Merciful One said to him: “Those like you”

—those similar to you, namely, tereifot—

enter

enter the ark,

but complete creatures you shall not bring in

—do not bring them in?! From here there is proof that he did not bring a tereifa into the ark.

And the Gemara analyzes this:

Now

after we have concluded

that it is derived

that he did not bring a tereifa into the ark

from

the statement

“with you”—

there is a difficulty: Why do I need

“to preserve living offspring”?

Why did the Holy One, blessed be He, say this to him, given that tereifa had already been excluded by “with you”?

And the Gemara answers: Even if he would not bring tereifot into the ark, it would still be possible for him to bring animals that were incapable of reproducing. Since the Holy One, blessed be He, wanted all living creatures to be preserved, He therefore said to him, “to preserve living offspring,” instructing him to bring animals capable of reproducing.

If it were derived only from “with you,”

if He had commanded him only “with you,”

I would have thought

that he should bring complete animals

merely for companionship

—to remain with him in the ark for twelve months. Therefore, he would not bring with him tereifot, which could not survive for twelve months, and the “companionship” would be nullified—

Yet he could indeed bring

even an old animal and even a sterile animal,

which are incapable of reproducing—

Therefore,

“to preserve living offspring” comes to teach us

that he should bring with him only animals capable of reproducing.

The Gemara continues with the law concerning Markulis.

Rabbi Elazar said: From where

do we learn

the

following law: One who

slaughters an animal for Markulis—

he is liable ,

even though its worship is not performed by slaughtering animals?

As it is stated in the section concerning slaughtering outside the Temple (Leviticus 17):

As it is stated [Leviticus 17] in the passage concerning slaughtering outside the Temple: “They shall no longer slaughter their sacrifices to the goat-demons.”

[Goat-demons are demons, and the gentiles slaughtered sacrifices to them as they did to idols.]

If

this verse

does not refer to

one who worships idolatry

in its customary manner,

that is, an idolatry to which gentiles slaughter sacrifices—for “in its customary manner” is learned from another verse—

as it is written [Deuteronomy 12],

“How did these nations worship their gods?”—

apply it to worship not in its customary manner.

There is a principle in Torah interpretation: When a verse is not needed for its apparent subject—that is, when the matter has already been stated elsewhere—it is available for an additional exposition similar to it.

And the Gemara asks:

And the Gemara asks:

But

why

is this

verse

needed for this purpose?

Is it superfluous for this exposition?

This verse is needed for

it is expounded

for

another teaching,

as

in

as it was taught

in a beraita concerning “slaughtering outside the Temple.”