Avodah Zarah 47a — the Talmud in English

But they conceived and were ultimately worshipped -

everyone agrees:

the offspring are

forbidden for the altar, because the offspring, which are part of its body, were worshipped like it and served like it. And although they changed from a fetus into offspring, they are forbidden, because the change does not remove them from their prohibition.

And the dilemma is resolved: “There is no change with regard to an object of worship in relation to the Most High,” both according to the Sages and according to Rabbi Eliezer.

And the question was resolved: “There is no change with regard to something worshipped when it is for the Most High,” both according to the Sages and according to Rabbi Eliezer.

Some say:

There are those who transmitted this tradition in another version. According to this version, Mar Zutra himself resolved the question as forbidden, from the statement of Rav Naḥman citing Rabba bar Avuha [and not as in the first formulation, in which the Gemara resolves the question], whereas the Gemara rejects his words. [

The version of the Baḥ:]

And it was stated concerning this: Rav Naḥman said in the name of Rabba bar Avuha:

The dispute

of Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages is

when they were worshipped and ultimately conceived,

and they dispute the principle of “this and that cause” -

but when they conceived and were ultimately worshipped, everyone agrees,

even the Sages agree that it is

forbidden -

And we resolve:

And these

these wheat grains

also -

are comparable to when they conceived and were ultimately worshipped,

and just as when they conceived and were ultimately worshipped they are forbidden, despite having changed from a fetus into an animal, so too the wheat that changed into flour is forbidden.

And we reject this:

Is it so?

Can they be compared?

There

with regard to the animal it did not change, because

at first

in its mother’s womb it was called

an animal, and now

it is called

an animal,

except that

the door was what grasped it [

the version of the Baḥ:

grasped]

at its face,

the doors of the womb were closed before it - whereas

here

it underwent change and change, because

at first, wheat

at the beginning it was wheat

and now, flour

it is flour. And it is possible to say that the change makes it permitted.

And the question was not resolved.

Reish Lakish was uncertain about the law of something attached that was worshipped with regard to “mitzvot.”

That is, if you can say and resolve the question of Rami bar Ḥama that there is something attached that was worshipped with regard to the Most High, for a sacrifice or for the requirements of a sacrifice - should we extend the prohibition also to “mitzvot,” as will be explained?

Reish Lakish raised a question: One who bows to a

tree, a

palm tree

that is attached -

what is the status of its lulav for a mitzva,

to take it for fulfilling the mitzva of lulav?

With regard to a tree that was planted initially for that purpose,

for idolatry,

you need not ask, since it is forbidden even for an ordinary person as well,

according to all opinions, and certainly it is forbidden to derive benefit from it, and all the more so for a mitzva.

When you should ask

with regard to which tree the question is,

it is with regard to a tree that was planted and ultimately worshipped.

And according to

his view,

Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda, you need not ask, since

in his view

it is forbidden even for an ordinary person as well.

When you should ask is according to the Sages,

who hold that it is permitted to derive benefit from it for an ordinary person, and according to them Reish Lakish was uncertain

with regard to a mitzva: what is

the law? Is it permitted to take it?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Is it repulsive with regard to the Most High,

is it repulsive for a mitzva just as it is repulsive for a sacrifice, because fulfillment of a mitzva too is a need of the Most High?

Or not,

because there is a difference between “sacrifice” and “mitzva.”

Rav Dimi explains Reish Lakish’s question differently, and the uncertainty concerns the law of “rejection.”

The foundation of the law of “rejection” was stated with regard to a sacrifice: a sacrifice that became unfit and was “rejected” from its fitness is rejected forever; it is forever unfit as a sacrifice, even after its disqualifying factor has departed from it.

And now Reish Lakish is uncertain whether this law was stated also with regard to “mitzvot,” as will be explained.

When

Rav Dimi arrived from the Land of Israel,

he said: With regard to an asheira

that was forbidden even to an ordinary person

and a gentile nullified it,

in accordance with the law and properly, as a gentile nullifies idolatry,

he was asking

Reish Lakish was uncertain.

And what is the uncertainty? Is there

a

law of

“rejection”

with regard to mitzvot,

and since it had been forbidden for benefit, it became unfit and rejected for the mitzva of lulav, even though now it is not forbidden for benefit, since it was nullified -

Or

it may be said: There is

no

law of

“rejection”

with regard to mitzvot,

and the law of “rejection” was stated only with regard to a sacrifice. And there is a difference between “sacrifice” and “mitzvot.”

And we raise an objection: What is the question?

Resolve it

for him; it is possible to resolve the question

from a

well-explicit Mishna concerning the law of covering the blood, in which the Torah commanded that the blood of the slaughter of a wild animal and bird be covered.

As we learned: If one covered it,

the blood,

and it became exposed, he is exempt

again

from covering it,

since he has already fulfilled the mitzva of covering the blood.

If the wind covered it

and he did not cover it,

he is obligated to cover it.

And

why? It is now covered.

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: They taught

that when the wind covered it he is obligated to cover it

only if it became exposed again,

after the wind covered it; and since the slaughterer has still not fulfilled the mitzva, and now it is exposed, he is obligated to cover it.

But if it did not become exposed again,

and now it is covered,

he is exempt from covering it.

And we examined it,

when we studied this matter we asked:

When it became exposed again -

what has happened,

why is he obligated to cover it? And why do we not say:

Since it was rejected,

since when it was covered the blood was rejected from the mitzva of covering the blood,

it was rejected

entirely from the mitzva of covering, even though now it is exposed?

And Rav Pappa said: This indicates,

from this Mishna it is possible to learn that there is

no

law of

rejection with regard to mitzvot,

and we do not say, “Since it was rejected, it is rejected.” Rather, if the blood became exposed, he is obligated to cover it, since he has still not fulfilled the mitzva.

Here, then, we have an explicit Mishna with which to resolve Reish Lakish’s question; why did Reish Lakish not resolve it from there?

And we answer: Indeed, Rav Pappa proved from there that “there is no rejection with regard to mitzvot,” and from this conclusion there emerges a “stringency,” that he is still obligated to cover it. But here, if we say “there is no rejection with regard to mitzvot,” a “leniency” would emerge from this, that the lulav is permitted; and in this manner the matter was not clear to Reish Lakish. Therefore he did not resolve it from that Mishna.

For Rav Pappa himself,

what was clear to Rav Pappa himself,

was a question for him;

Reish Lakish was uncertain whether

it was certainly clear to Rav Pappa [

that is, to the tanna of that Mishna, which Rav Pappa explains ]

that there is no rejection with regard to mitzvot

at all,

whether for a leniency or whether for a stringency -

Or perhaps,

it is possible to say that

it was uncertain to him,

the tanna was uncertain about this law,

and for a stringency

if a stringency results from it, such as with covering the blood, where the law of “no rejection” brings him to an obligation to cover

we say there is no rejection. But

for a leniency,

if a leniency results from it, such as that the lulav will be permitted,

we do not say so.

We do not say so.

The question remains unresolved.

The question was not resolved .

Rav Pappa was uncertain about another halakha concerning this matter.

Rav Pappa raised a question: One who bows to an animal -

what is the status of its wool for tekhelet,

is it permitted to make tekhelet threads from it? And this will be explained.

And the Gemara discusses:

Tekhelet for what purpose?

For what purpose does he wish to use the tekhelet?

If

Rav Pappa’s intention is

tekhelet for the priests,

of priestly garments for the Temple service, and if we explain it this way, the uncertainty is: If you can say that the requirements of a sacrifice are considered like a sacrifice - and tekhelet is included - there is still room for uncertainty, since it changed from wool into tekhelet when it is dyed: does the change remove it from its prohibition, and “there is a change with regard to something worshipped when it is for the Most High,” or “there is no change” -

This is difficult: What is Rav Pappa teaching anew? Is this not

the very question,

are these uncertainties not already included in the question

of Rami bar Ḥama?!

And if

Rav Pappa’s intention is

tekhelet for

the

mitzva of tzitzit,

and he is uncertain, since it is a mitzva object, whether it is repulsive and unfit just as it is unfit for the Most High -

This is difficult:

It is the very question

This uncertainty is already included in the question

of Reish Lakish,

and what difference is there between a palm tree for the mitzva of lulav and wool for the mitzva of tzitzit?!

And we answer:

Indeed so,

indeed

he should not have asked it,

there is no novelty in this question -

And the reason he asks it here is this,

and the reason that he stated the question with regard to one who bows to an animal is

because there are other matters,

there are other things concerning an animal about which it is possible to be uncertain, and they are:

What is the status of its wool for tekhelet,

as above,

what is the status of its horns for trumpets,

is it permitted to use them for the sacrificial musical instruments on which the Levites sang upon the platform in the Temple, and likewise

what is the status of its legs for flutes,

and likewise

what is the status of its intestines for strings [

strings of musical instruments] -

And the question is:

According to the one who says that the principal form of song

of the Levites is

with an instrument -

you need not ask; it is certainly forbidden.

That is, if you can say that the requirements of a sacrifice are considered like a sacrifice, and if you can say, “there is no change.”

When you should ask is according to the one who says that the principal

form of song

is

with the mouth

of the Levites -

And the sides of the question are:

It is merely the sweetening of the sound,

do the musical instruments merely improve the sound, that is, the song,

and

therefore

we bring them,

it is permitted to make them from the limbs of an animal to which one bowed, since they are not so closely connected with the needs of the sacrifice?

Or perhaps

it is possible to say,

even so it is forbidden,

because nevertheless they are repulsive with regard to the Most High.

And even if you can say that the one who bows to a palm tree, its lulav is permitted for a mitzva, perhaps here, since they are needed for the Most High, they are forbidden.

The question remains unresolved.

The question was not resolved.

Rabba raised a question: One who bows to a spring,

water, whose law is like that of something attached and which is not forbidden to an ordinary person -

what is the status of its waters

the water of the spring

for libations?

Is it permitted to use them for the water libation in the Temple?

And the Gemara discusses:

What is he asking?

If you say

that he is asking [the version of the Baḥ

whether]

he bows to the reflection,

whether the one who bows intends to bow to the image of his face visible in the water, and is not bowing to the water itself, and therefore they are permitted for libations,

or perhaps

it is possible to say:

he bows to the water,

he bows to the water, and therefore the water will be forbidden for libations, which are a need of the Most High -

And

we raise an objection: It does not appear that this is the question, for if so,

he should ask it

with regard to detached water in a

basin,

which is forbidden even

to an ordinary person,

and the question would be whether he bowed to the water itself or to his image.

And since he was not uncertain about detached water in a basin, it follows that it was obvious to him that it is forbidden to bring the water for libations, because certainly his intention is for the water -

And we conclude:

Actually,

it is obvious to Rabba that

he bows to the water,

that his bowing is to the water itself -

And this is the question,

and this is the question: To which water is he bowing? Is it

to the water before him,

which is now before him, and according to this side the water is permitted for libations, since

the first ones, first, have gone away,

the water has already gone away, since the spring continually sends out water, and the water that he now draws is not the water to which he bowed -

Or perhaps

it is possible to say:

he bows to the flow of water [

the version of the Baḥ:

of the river]

he bows,

he bows to the entire flow of water, and has worshipped the entire river and its waters. And if you can say, “there is something attached that was worshipped when it is for the Most High,” \-

the water is forbidden for libations.

And the Gemara does not resolve the question.

And we raise an objection:

And

even if he indeed bowed to the water itself, to the flow of the river -

are they forbidden

and do they become forbidden?! After all, “a person cannot prohibit something that is not his.”

But Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: Water belonging to the public -

does not become forbidden

when it is worshipped.

And we answer: Indeed, if the water belongs to the public, it does not become forbidden at all;

it is necessary

and Rabba’s question is:

that it emerges from his land [

the version of the Maharam:

from his land]

when the water emerges from the land of the one who bows, and it belongs to him.

Mishna:

This Mishna deals with the laws of the house of idolatry.

a.

One whose wall was adjacent to idolatry,

such that on one side the wall served as the wall of his house, and on its other side it served as the wall of the house of idolatry, then, if the house itself was worshipped as idolatry,

and it fell,

the wall,

it is forbidden to rebuild it

as the wall of his house anew in the place where it had stood, because by doing so he is also building a house for idolatry. Rather, he may build it only in a place distant from the area of the house of idolatry:

What should he do? -

He withdraws within his own property,

he enters into his own domain

four cubits,

and builds there the new wall of his house, at a distance of four cubits from the place where the wall had initially stood.

b. And if the thickness of the wall’s place was divided in a defined manner, such that half of the area was

his, and

if the other half of the area was

that of idolatry,