Avodah Zarah 47a (מז.) — the Talmud in English

But if they conceived and ultimately were worshipped -

everyone agrees that

the offspring are

forbidden with regard to the altar, because the offspring, which are part of the animal’s body, were worshipped as was the mother and were used for idolatrous worship as was the mother. Although they changed from fetuses into offspring, they remain forbidden, because the change does not remove them from their prohibition.

And the dilemma is resolved: “There is no change with regard to an object of worship in relation to the Most High,” both according to the Sages and according to Rabbi Eliezer.

There are those who say:

there is one who transmitted this report in a different formulation. According to this version, Mar Zutra himself resolved the matter as forbidden, based on the statement of Rav Naḥman, who said it in the name of Rabba bar Avuha [and not as in the first version, in which the Gemara resolves the dilemma], whereas the Gemara rejects his words. [

The version of the Bach:

And it was stated concerning this: Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha said:

The dispute

of Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages is

:

when they were worshipped and ultimately conceived,

and they disagree regarding “this and that cause” -

but if they conceived and ultimately were worshipped, everyone agrees,

even the Sages concede that they are

forbidden -

And we resolve the matter:

And these

wheat grains

also -

are comparable to those that conceived and ultimately were worshipped,

and just as those that conceived and ultimately were worshipped are forbidden, despite having changed from fetuses into animals, so too the wheat grains that changed into flour are forbidden.

And we reject this:

Can this really be compared?

Is it possible to compare them?

There

with regard to the animal, it did not change, because

originally

in its mother’s womb it was called

an animal, and now

it is called

an animal. It is only that

the

door was closed [

the version of the Bach:

held ]

in front of

it—the doors of the womb were closed before it—whereas

here

there were two changes, because

originally there were wheat grains

at first they were wheat grains,

but now there is flour

it is flour. And it is possible to say that the change renders them permitted.

And the dilemma is not resolved.

Reish Lakish was uncertain about the law of an attached object that was worshipped, with regard to “mitzvot.”

That is, assuming that one can resolve and decide the dilemma of Rami bar Ḥama—that an object attached to the ground that was worshipped is forbidden with regard to the Most High, for a sacrifice or for the requirements of a sacrifice—should we extend the prohibition to “mitzvot,” as will be explained?

Reish Lakish raised a dilemma: One who bows to a

tree, a

date palm,

which is attached to the ground—

what is the status of its lulav with regard to a mitzva

of taking it to fulfill the mitzva of lulav?

With regard to a tree that was planted initially for that purpose,

for idolatry,

you need not raise the dilemma, since it is even forbidden to an ordinary person

according to all opinions, and it is certainly forbidden to derive benefit from it, and all the more so it may not be used for a mitzva.

When you do raise the dilemma,

with regard to which tree the dilemma concerns, it is

a tree that was planted and ultimately worshipped.

And according

to the view

of Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda, you need not raise the dilemma, since according to his view

in his opinion

it is even forbidden to an ordinary person.

When you do raise the dilemma, it is according to the Sages,

who hold that it is permitted to derive benefit from it as an ordinary person, and according to them Reish Lakish was uncertain

with regard to a mitzva: What is the law?

What is the halakha—may one take it?

And the sides of the dilemma are:

Is it repulsive with regard to the Most High?

Is it repulsive for a mitzva just as it is repulsive for a sacrifice, because fulfilling a mitzva is also a need of the Most High?

Or not,

because there is a distinction between a “sacrifice” and a “mitzva.”

Rav Dimi explains Reish Lakish’s dilemma differently; the uncertainty concerns the law of “rejection.”

The basis of the law of “rejection” is stated with regard to a sacrifice: A sacrifice that became disqualified and was “rejected” from its fitness is rejected forever—it remains disqualified forever as a sacrifice, even after the cause of its disqualification has been removed.

Now Reish Lakish was uncertain whether this law also applies to “mitzvot,” as will be explained.

When

he arrived from Eretz Yisrael,

Rav Dimi said: It was an asheira

that was prohibited even to an ordinary person,

and a gentile nullified it,

in accordance with the law, as a gentile can nullify an object of idolatry,

and this is what he was asking about—

Reish Lakish was uncertain.

And what is the uncertainty? Is there

a law of

“

rejection”

with regard to mitzvot?

Since it had been prohibited to derive benefit from, it became disqualified and rejected for the mitzva of lulav, even though it is now no longer prohibited to derive benefit from, since it was nullified—

Or

should it be said: There is

no law of

“

rejection”

with regard to mitzvot?

The law of “rejection” applies only to a sacrifice. There is a distinction between a “sacrifice” and “mitzvot.”

And we raise an objection: What is the dilemma?

Let him resolve it

the dilemma can be resolved

from

an explicit Mishna concerning the law of covering the blood, in which the Torah commanded that the blood of the slaughter of a wild animal or bird be covered.

As we learned: If one

covered the blood

and it became exposed, he is exempt

again

from covering it,

since he has already fulfilled the mitzva of covering the blood.

If the wind covered it

and he did not cover it,

he is obligated to cover it.

And

why? It is now covered.

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: They taught

that when the wind covered it he is obligated to cover it

only if it subsequently became exposed

after the wind covered it; since the slaughterer has still not fulfilled the mitzva and it is now exposed, he is obligated to cover it.

But if it did not subsequently become exposed,

and it remains covered,

he is exempt from covering it.

And we considered it,

when we studied this matter, and asked:

If it subsequently became exposed—

what difference does that make?

Why is he obligated to cover it? Why do we not say:

Since it was rejected,

since while it was covered the blood was rejected from the mitzva of covering the blood,

it was rejected

entirely from the mitzva of covering it, even though it is now exposed?

And Rav Pappa said: This indicates

that from this Mishna it can be learned that

there

is no law of

rejection with regard to mitzvot,

and we do not say that once something has been rejected, it remains rejected. Rather, if the blood becomes exposed, he is obligated to cover it, since he has not yet fulfilled the mitzva.

Here, then, we have an explicit Mishna with which to resolve Reish Lakish’s dilemma. Why did Reish Lakish not resolve it from there?

And we answer: Indeed, Rav Pappa proved from there that “there is no rejection with regard to mitzvot,” and this conclusion results in a stringency, namely, that he remains obligated to cover the blood. But here, if we say “there is no rejection with regard to mitzvot,” the result will be a leniency—that the lulav is permitted—and in this respect the matter was not clear to Reish Lakish. Therefore, he did not resolve it from that Mishna.

As for Rav Pappa himself,

what was clear to Rav Pappa himself,

he raised as a dilemma—

Reish Lakish was uncertain whether

it was entirely obvious to Rav Pappa [

that is, to the tanna of that Mishna, as Rav Pappa interprets him ]

that there is no rejection with regard to mitzvot

at all,

whether as a leniency or as a stringency—

Or perhaps,

it is possible to say that

he was uncertain,

and the tanna was uncertain about this law;

with regard to a stringency

if it results in a stringency, such as in the case of covering the blood, where the law that there is “no rejection” leads to an obligation to cover it,

we say that there is no rejection. But

with regard to a leniency,

if it results in a leniency, such as when the lulav would be permitted,

we

do not say so.

Teyku

the dilemma is not resolved .

Rav Pappa raised another halakhic question concerning this matter. Rav Pappa raised a dilemma: One who bows to an animal— what is the status of its wool with regard to tekhelet?

May one make tekhelet threads from it? As will be explained.

And the Gemara discusses this:

Tekhelet for what purpose?

For what purpose does he wish to use the tekhelet?

If

Rav Pappa’s intention is:

tekhelet for the priests,

for the garments of the priests, for the service in the Temple, then, if we interpret it this way, the uncertainty is as follows: Even if you say that the requirements of a sacrifice are considered like a sacrifice—and tekhelet is included among them—there is still room for uncertainty, since it changes from wool into tekhelet when it is dyed: Does the change remove it from its prohibition, and “there is change with regard to an object of worship in relation to the Most High,” or is there “no change”—

A difficulty is raised: What does Rav Pappa teach us?

This is the very dilemma,

for these uncertainties are already included in the dilemma

of Rami bar Ḥama?!

And if

Rav Pappa’s intention is

tekhelet for

mitzvot,

of ritual fringes,

and he is uncertain whether, since it is a matter of a mitzva, it is repulsive and disqualified just as it is disqualified with regard to the Most High—

A difficulty is raised:

This is the very dilemma

that is already included in the dilemma

of Reish Lakish. What difference is there between a date palm for the mitzva of lulav and wool for the mitzva of ritual fringes?!

And we answer:

Indeed, so it is,

indeed,

he should not have raised the dilemma,

there is no novel point in this dilemma—

And the reason he raised this dilemma here

for mentioning the dilemma in the case of one who bows to an animal is

that there are other matters,

there are other parts of the animal about which one might be uncertain, namely:

What is the status of its wool with regard to tekhelet,

as above;

what is the status of its horns with regard to trumpets,

may they be used for the musical instruments accompanying a sacrifice, on which the Levites sang on the platform in the Temple; and likewise,

what is the status of its shanks with regard to flutes,

and likewise

what is the status of its intestines with regard to strings [

strings of musical instruments ]—

And the dilemma is according to the view of the one who says:

The principal element of the Levites’ song

is

with an instrument—

you need not raise the dilemma, as it is certainly forbidden.

That is, if you say that the requirements of a sacrifice are considered like a sacrifice, and if you say that there is “no change.”

When you do raise the dilemma, it is according to the view of the one who says that the principal element of the

song

is

with the mouth

of the Levites—

And the sides of the dilemma are:

Is it merely the enhancement of the sound,

do the musical instruments merely improve the sound, that is, the song,

and

therefore

we bring them—

it is permitted to make them from the limbs of an animal that was worshipped, since they are not so directly connected with the needs of the sacrifice.

Or perhaps,

it is possible to say:

Even so, it is forbidden,

because nevertheless they are repulsive with regard to the Most High.

And even if you say that the lulav of one who bows to a date palm is permitted for a mitzva, perhaps here, since they are needed for the Most High, they are forbidden.

Teyku.

The dilemma is not resolved.

Rabba raised a dilemma: One who bows to a spring,

water, whose law is like that of an attached object and which is not prohibited to an ordinary person—

what is the status of its water

with regard to libations?

May it be used for the water libation in the Temple?

And the Gemara discusses this:

What is he asking about?

If we say

that his dilemma is [the version of the Bach:

whether]

he bows to the reflection,

whether the one who bows intends to bow to the image of his face visible in the water, and does not bow to the water itself, and therefore it is permitted for libations,

or perhaps

it is possible to say:

he bows to the water,

he bows to the water, and consequently the water becomes forbidden for libations, which are a need of the Most High—

And

we raise an objection: It does not appear that this is the dilemma, for if so,

let him raise the dilemma

with regard to detached water in a

bowl,

which becomes prohibited even

to an ordinary person,

and the dilemma would be whether he bowed to the water itself or to its reflection.

Since he did not raise the question with regard to detached water in a bowl, it follows that it is obvious to him that it is forbidden to bring the water for libations, because it is certain that his intention is directed toward the water.

And we conclude:

Actually,

it is indeed obvious to Rabba that

he bows to the water,

that his bowing is directed to the water itself—

And this is the dilemma:

which water does he bow to? Does he bow to

the water that is before him,

the water now in front of him, and according to this possibility the water is permitted for libations, since

the first waters have gone away,

the water has already flowed away, as the spring constantly sends forth water, and the water that he now draws is not the water to which he bowed—

Or perhaps

it is possible to say:

he bows to the flow of the water [the version of the Bach:

of the river]

he bows,

he bows to the entire flow of water and worships the entire river and its water. And if you say that “an object attached to the ground that was worshipped is forbidden with regard to the Most High,” the water is forbidden for libations.

And the Gemara does not resolve the matter.

And we raise an objection:

And

even if he did indeed bow to the water itself, to the flow of the river—

does it become prohibited?

Does it really become prohibited? Isn’t it the case that “a person cannot prohibit something that does not belong to him”?

But Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: The water of the public

—

does not become prohibited

when it is worshipped.

And we answer: Indeed, if the water belongs to the public, it does not become prohibited at all.

It is necessary

and Rabba’s dilemma concerns

water that emerges from the ground [the version of the Mahar"ם:

from his ground]

when the water emerges from the land of the one who bowed, and it belongs to him.

Mishna:

This Mishna deals with the laws governing a house of idolatry.

a.

One whose wall was adjacent to an object of idolatry,

so that on one side the wall served as the wall of his house, while on the other side it served as the wall of a house of idolatry—if the house itself had been worshipped as idolatry,

and it fell,

the wall,

it is forbidden to rebuild it

as the wall of his house in its original place, because by doing so he would also be building a house for idolatry. Rather, he may build it only in a location distant from the area of the house of idolatry:

What should he do?—

He withdraws into his own property,

he moves into his own domain

four cubits,

and builds there the new wall of his house, four cubits away from the place where the wall originally stood.

b. And if the width of the wall was divided in a clearly defined manner, so that half of the area was his, and the other half of the area was that of idolatry,