Avodah Zarah 46b — the Talmud in English

Does

there exist

there

an object worshipped while attached that is [therefore] forbidden for the Most High, or is there no object worshipped while attached that is [therefore] forbidden for the Most High?

Now he raises another question,

if you should say

if we establish from a Mishna, a beraita, or reasoning:

there is an object worshipped while attached that is forbidden for the Most High,

there is still another question here—

For it is possible that this law was said only with regard to the offering itself—for example, an animal to which they bowed—but as for stones for building an altar, one must doubt and say that they are not forbidden. And the sides of the doubt are:

Is

the requirements of an offering,

such as building the altar,

considered like the offering itself,

and just as an object worshipped is forbidden for an offering, so too for the “requirements of an offering,”

or not

considered like the offering itself?

Rava resolves the questions from the law of “the fee of a prostitute.” This is what the Torah said [Deuteronomy 23]: “You shall not bring the fee of a prostitute [the gift that a prostitute received for prostitution] … into the House of Hashem your God.”

And the Torah did not distinguish regarding the fee of a prostitute between a detached fee and an attached fee, and in any event it is forbidden to bring it into the House of Hashem.

Rava said: A kal va-chomer! And what is the leniency of “the fee of a prostitute”?

The lenient one—and what is its leniency?

That it is permitted when detached for an ordinary person:

for if they gave her a detached object as her fee, it is permitted for an ordinary person to derive benefit from it; nevertheless, it is stringent. And what is its stringency? That it

is forbidden when attached for the Most High.

If they gave her an attached object, such as a house, it is forbidden to consecrate it for the purpose of building the Temple, as it is written: “You shall not bring the fee of a prostitute or the price of a dog into the House of Hashem your God.” And the prohibition applies to everything, whether detached or attached—

an object worshipped,

the stringent one—and what is its stringency?

That it is forbidden when detached for an ordinary person,

as is the law of an object of idolatry, which is forbidden to derive benefit from; is it not

an inference

that it is stringent in this respect,

that it is forbidden when attached for the Most High?!

And the two questions are resolved: the first, that there is an object worshipped while attached that is forbidden for the Most High; and the second, that even the requirements of an offering are forbidden, for the fee of a prostitute from which we learn is forbidden even to bring it for the purpose of building the Temple, and that is a requirement of an offering, as it is stated: “You shall not bring [it into] the House of Hashem your God,” which implies that he may not bring the fee of a prostitute for the purpose of building the “House.”

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rava:

From where do you derive this? It was not stated explicitly in the Torah to forbid the fee of a prostitute when it is attached; rather, you inferred this from the fact that the Torah did not explicitly distinguish between detached and attached, and wrote the fee of a prostitute without qualification—

and from an unqualified assumption you learned a kal va-chomer to forbid—

or the reverse:

it is possible to learn a kal va-chomer in the opposite direction, to permit:

And what of “an object worshipped,”

the stringent one—and what is its stringency?

That it is forbidden when detached for an ordinary person,

nevertheless it is lenient. And what is its leniency? That it

is permitted when attached for the Most High.

And from where do we learn that it is permitted when attached even for the Most High?

For it is stated: “Their gods are upon the mountains,”

and we expound:

but the mountains are not their gods.

And the Torah did not distinguish between an ordinary person and the Most High, and the permission applies in every case:

whether for an ordinary person or whether for the Most High—

“The fee of a prostitute,”

the lenient one—and what is its leniency?

That it is permitted when detached for an ordinary person;

is it not

an inference

that it is lenient in this respect,

that it is permitted when attached for the Most High?!

And if it is because of

what is stated

“the House of Hashem your God,”

and what you said and expounded—that the fee of a prostitute is forbidden even when the fee itself is a “house,” and you inferred this from the fact that “house” is stated, and “for Hashem your God” was not stated, and you wished to conclude from this that the fee of a prostitute is forbidden even when attached—that is, if he gave her a house as her fee, it is forbidden to consecrate it for building the House—I say to you that this “house” is not superfluous for an exposition, but rather

is needed for

another exposition,

as it was taught in a beraita—

we learned in a beraita: It is stated in the Torah

“house”

of Hashem your God, and we learn from this that the fee of a prostitute is forbidden to consecrate only an object brought to the “House” of the Temple,

excluding the cow

that is red,

which does not come to the House,

and its slaughter is outside the Temple, on the Mount of Olives, and it is permitted to bring it from the fee of a prostitute,

the words of Rabbi Eliezer.

And the Sages

derive another exposition from “house,” and

say

that it comes

to include the gold plates,

gold plates that are made as a covering for the wall of the Sanctuary, for the “House” of the Holy of Holies. Those plates the Torah forbade bringing from the fee of a prostitute, and we expound “house” to forbid everything made for the “House,” even something made merely for adornment.

And Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, asks: How did you expound a kal va-chomer to forbid?

Rava said to

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua:

I said

I stated a kal va-chomer

for stringency,

to forbid an attached object for the Most High,

whereas you said,

while you stated a kal va-chomer

for leniency,

to permit the fee of a prostitute when attached. And it is a rule in the expositions of the Torah:

leniency and stringency—

wherever it is possible to expound either for leniency or for stringency,

we challenge for stringency,

that is, we judge and expound.

And my exposition is preferable to your exposition.

Rav Pappa, the student of Rava and of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, raises an objection to Rava.

Rav Pappa said to Rava: And

разве

everywhere

a place

where there is

a possibility to expound

for leniency and

there is a possibility to expound for

stringency—

do we not challenge for leniency?!

But

in the law of

the sprinkling for Passover—

concerning which Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree.

When the eve of Passover occurs on Shabbat, they offer the Passover offering as on an ordinary weekday. As the Torah said [Numbers 9], “Between the evenings, at its appointed time,” and we expound “at its appointed time,” even on Shabbat. And Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree regarding one who was impure through contact with a corpse, and his seventh day arrived, which is the day of sprinkling him with the ashes of the cow to purify him from corpse impurity, on Shabbat that occurs on the eve of Passover: Is it permitted to sprinkle upon him and violate the rabbinic prohibition of shevut that the Sages prohibited, namely, sprinkling on Shabbat, and thereby he will become pure and be able to bring the Passover offering?

For Rabbi Akiva held stringently and obligated the man

to bring the Passover offering [and if he does not bring it, he becomes liable for karet].]

And Rabbi Akiva

held

leniently and exempted

him from bringing the Passover offering, because he is impure, and it is forbidden for him to purify himself through the sprinkling of the ashes of the cow.

And we learned there that Rabbi Eliezer derives a kal va-chomer: If slaughtering, which is stringent, since it involves a prohibition of labor from the Torah, overrides Shabbat, then sprinkling, which is lenient, since it involves only a prohibition of shevut, is it not an inference that it should override Shabbat?!

And Rabbi Akiva challenges,

reversing the kal va-chomer in order to derive from it

for leniency,

and to forbid sprinkling, and to exempt him from the Passover offering [and from karet for failing to offer it]—

as we learned,

as we learned there,

Rabbi Akiva replied: Or the reverse!

It is possible to expound the exposition in the opposite direction:

And what of “sprinkling,”

the lenient,

which is because of shevut,

it is stringent in that it

does not override Shabbat.

Slaughtering

the stringent,

which is

a prohibition

from the Torah,

is it not

all the more so

that it should not override Shabbat?!

And from this Mishna Rav Pappa proves that Rabbi Akiva expounded a kal va-chomer for leniency, even though that exposition could be expounded for stringency. And this is difficult for Rava!

And we answer: This is not so. Rabbi Akiva never entertained the thought of forbidding the slaughter of the Passover offering on Shabbat. Rather—

There, Rabbi Eliezer,

the teacher of Rabbi Akiva,

his received teaching,

taught him that sprinkling does not override Shabbat [for the Sages have the power to prevent him from bringing the Passover offering and to uphold their words, by which they prohibited sprinkling on Shabbat],

but his learning became uprooted from him,

and this halakha was forgotten by him, and he expounded a kal va-chomer to permit.

And Rabbi Akiva did not wish to say to him explicitly, “Thus have I received from you: sprinkling does not override Shabbat,” in order not to embarrass him that he had forgotten his learning.

Therefore he said to him, “Or the reverse,” so that Rabbi Eliezer would remember on his own, since it was clear to him that slaughtering overrides Shabbat.

And despite all this, the matter did not succeed, and he said to him: Akiva! You have uprooted what is written in the Torah, “at its appointed time,” and we expound, even on Shabbat.

And Rabbi Akiva answered him: If so, bring me the exposition of “at its appointed time” to permit also the “sprinkling.”

And Rabbi Eliezer became angry and said to him: Akiva! With slaughtering you answered me—with slaughtering shall be your death.

And this is what he said to him,

and therefore Rabbi Akiva replied to him:

My master! Do not deny me,

do not conceal your earlier words by which you taught me that sprinkling does not override Shabbat,

at the time of the legal debate,

when we are arguing and discussing with one another.

Thus have I received from you: “Sprinkling” is shevut, and it does not override Shabbat.

It follows that Rabbi Akiva never entertained this kal va-chomer, and there is no proof from this that where there are stringency and leniency, we challenge for leniency.

Rami bar Hama asks: One who bowed to a standing crop of wheat

that was attached, and afterward harvested it and processed it with the other labors and made wheat from it—

what is the law [the version of the Bach:

the reading of the Bach:

what are they]

for meal-offerings

—are they permitted to bring them as a meal-offering?

For an ordinary person they are certainly permitted, because an attached object is not forbidden for an ordinary person; and the question is for the Most High.

Now, if we resolve the previous question and permit an attached object that was worshipped for the Most High, there is no question here, and the wheat is certainly permitted for a meal-offering. But if you should say that an attached object is forbidden for the Most High, there is still room for doubt.

And the sides of the doubt are: Shall we say

there is

a law of

“change” with an object worshipped,

that is, since the wheat changed into flour, and is no longer present in its original form, the change is effective to permit it ,

or there is no change with an object worshipped,

the fact that they changed is not effective for them.

And we resolve it:

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Nahman, said: Come and hear

from the Mishna in tractate Temura:

All

the animals

that are forbidden with regard to the altar,

such as an animal set aside [which he designated for idolatry] and an animal worshipped for idolatry—

their offspring are permitted.

And it was taught about it,

we learned in a beraita an addition to the Mishna:

Rabbi Eliezer forbids.

Mar Zutra held that the Mishna and the beraita are speaking of a case in which he bowed to a pregnant animal, and it and its offspring became forbidden for the Most High, and it gave birth. The reason the Sages permit is that the offspring changed from a fetus into an animal, and they hold that there is change with an object worshipped for the Most High. But Rabbi Eliezer forbids, because he holds that there is no change.

And the question is resolved: it is a dispute between the tannaim.

And we reject this: Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages did not disagree regarding this law.

And was it not stated concerning it,

did we not learn an explanation of this dispute?! For

Rav Nahman said in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha: The dispute

between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages is:

When they were violated and afterward became pregnant.

And the reason for their dispute is that it is a case of “this and that cause”: the male that came upon this animal, and also the female that was worshipped, both caused the offspring to come into the world. It follows that they caused it and brought it into the world through a combination of prohibition and permission, for its father is permitted and its mother is forbidden—

The Sages hold, “This and that cause—it is permitted,” whereas Rabbi Eliezer forbids.