Avodah Zarah 46b (מו:) — the Talmud in English

Does

there exist

the status

of an object worshipped while attached to the ground, with regard to the Most High, or does no such status exist with regard to the Most High?

Now he raises another question:

if you should say

that we prove from a Mishna, a beraita, or reasoning that

an object worshipped while attached to the ground has this status with regard to the Most High,

there is still another question:

Perhaps this law was stated only with regard to the offering itself—for example, an animal to which one bowed—but concerning stones for constructing an altar, there remains room to say that they are not prohibited. The sides of the question are:

Does

the requirements of an offering,

such as constructing the altar,

have the same status as the offering itself,

and just as an object worshipped is prohibited as an offering, so too is it prohibited for the requirements of an offering,

or not

have the same status as the offering itself?

Rava resolves the questions from the law of a harlot’s fee. This is what the Torah states: “You shall not bring the fee of a harlot [the gift that a harlot received in payment for prostitution] … into the House of the Lord your God.”

The Torah did not distinguish with regard to a harlot’s fee between one detached from the ground and one attached to the ground; in either case it is prohibited to bring it into the House of the Lord.

Rava said: This is a kal va-chomer! Just as with regard to a harlot’s fee

which is the lenient case—and what is its leniency?

It is permitted when detached, for an ordinary person

That is, if she was given a detached object as her fee, it is permitted for an ordinary person to derive benefit from it; nevertheless, it is stringent in another respect. And what is its stringency?

It is prohibited when attached, with regard to the Most High

If she was given an attached object, such as a house, it is prohibited to consecrate it for the construction of the Temple, as it is written: “You shall not bring the fee of a harlot or the price of a dog into the House of the Lord your God.” The prohibition applies to every object, whether detached or attached—

An object worshipped,

which is the stringent case—and what is its stringency?

It is prohibited when detached, for an ordinary person,

as is the law with regard to idolatry, from which it is prohibited to derive benefit. Does it

not follow

that it is stringent in this respect as well,

that it should be prohibited when attached, with regard to the Most High?

Thus both questions are resolved. The first is that an object worshipped while attached to the ground has this status with regard to the Most High. The second is that even the requirements of an offering are prohibited, since the harlot’s fee from which the proof is derived is prohibited even from being brought for the construction of the Temple, and that is a requirement of an offering, as it is stated: “You shall not bring [it] into the House of the Lord your God,” implying that one may not bring a harlot’s fee for the construction of the House.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rava:

From where do you derive this? Was it not stated explicitly in the Torah that a harlot’s fee is prohibited when attached; rather, you inferred this from the fact that the Torah did not explicitly distinguish between detached and attached objects, and simply wrote “fee” without qualification—

and from this unqualified formulation you derived a kal va-chomer to prohibit it—

or the reverse

It is possible to derive a kal va-chomer in the opposite direction, to permit it:

Just as an object worshipped,

which is the stringent case—and what is its stringency?

It is prohibited when detached for an ordinary person,

nevertheless it is lenient in another respect. And what is its leniency?

It is permitted when attached, with regard to the Most High.

And from where do we learn that it is permitted when attached even with regard to the Most High?

As it is stated: “Their gods are upon the mountains,”

and we interpret this to mean:

“But the mountains are not their gods.”

The Torah did not distinguish between an ordinary person and the Most High, and the permission applies in either case,

whether for an ordinary person or with regard to the Most High—

A harlot’s fee,

which is the lenient case—and what is its leniency?

It is permitted when detached for an ordinary person.

Does it

not follow

that it is lenient in this respect as well,

that it should be permitted when attached, with regard to the Most High?

And if you would say

that it is prohibited because it is stated:

“The House of the Lord your God,”

and you said and expounded that a harlot’s fee is prohibited even when the fee itself is a “house,” and you inferred this from the fact that it says “house” rather than “for the Lord your God,” seeking to conclude from this that a harlot’s fee is prohibited even when attached—that is, if she was given a house as her fee, it is prohibited to consecrate it for the construction of the House—I say to you that the word “house” is not superfluous for this exposition; rather,

it is needed for

another exposition,

as it was taught

We learned in a beraita: The Torah states:

“House”

of the Lord your God, and we learn from this that a harlot’s fee is prohibited from being consecrated only when it is something brought into the House of the Temple,

excluding a red heifer

which

does not enter the House,

as it is slaughtered outside the Temple, on the Mount of Olives; it is permitted to bring it from a harlot’s fee.

This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer.

And the Sages

derive another exposition from “house,” and

say

that it comes

to include the golden plates,

gold sheets made as a covering for the wall of the Sanctuary, for the “House” of the Holy of Holies. The Torah prohibited bringing those sheets from a harlot’s fee, and we expound “house” to prohibit everything made for the House, even something made merely for adornment.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, asks: How can you derive a kal va-chomer to prohibit?

Rava said to him,

to Rabbi Huna, son of Rabbi Yehoshua:

I am saying,

I stated a kal va-chomer

for stringency,

to prohibit an attached object with regard to the Most High,

whereas you said,

you stated a kal va-chomer

for leniency,

to permit an attached harlot’s fee. And this is a principle in expositions of the Torah:

leniency and stringency

wherever it is possible to expound in either a lenient or a stringent direction,

we challenge toward stringency,

meaning that we judge and expound accordingly.

And my exposition is preferable to yours.

Rav Pappa, a student of Rava and of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, raises an objection to Rava.

Rav Pappa said to Rava: But

wherever

a place

where there is

an option to expound

for leniency and

an option to expound for

stringency—

do we not challenge toward leniency?!

But

with regard to the law of

the sprinkling for Pesaḥ,

over which Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree.

When the eve of Pesaḥ occurs on Shabbat, the Paschal offering is brought as on an ordinary weekday, as the Torah states: “At twilight, at its appointed time,” and we expound “at its appointed time” to include Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree concerning one who was impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, and whose seventh day arrived—the day on which he is to be sprinkled with the ashes of the red heifer to purify him from corpse impurity—on the Shabbat that occurs on the eve of Pesaḥ. Is it permitted to sprinkle him and thereby violate the rabbinic prohibition against sprinkling on Shabbat, so that he will become pure and be able to bring the Paschal offering?

Rabbi Eliezer held that the matter should be treated stringently, and required the person

to bring the Paschal offering [and if he did not bring it, he would be liable to karet].

And Rabbi Akiva

held

that the matter should be treated leniently, and exempted

him from bringing the Paschal offering, because he was impure and was prohibited from purifying himself through the sprinkling of the red-heifer ashes.

And we learned there that Rabbi Eliezer derives a kal va-chomer: If slaughter, which is stringent, as it involves a Torah prohibition against labor, overrides Shabbat, then sprinkling, which is lenient, as it involves only a rabbinic prohibition, does it not follow that it should override Shabbat?!

And Rabbi Akiva challenges,

reversing the kal va-chomer in order to derive from it

a leniency,

and prohibit sprinkling, thereby exempting him from the Paschal offering [and from karet for failing to bring it]—

as we learned,

as we learned there:

Rabbi Akiva replied: Or the reverse!

The exposition can be derived in the opposite direction:

Just as sprinkling,

the lenient act,

which involves only a rabbinic prohibition,

is stringent in that

it does not override Shabbat, then

slaughter,

the stringent act,

which

involves a prohibition

by Torah law,

should it not

all the more so

not override Shabbat?!

From this Mishna Rav Pappa proves that Rabbi Akiva derived a kal va-chomer for leniency, even though the same exposition could have been derived for stringency. This is difficult for Rava!

And we answer: This is not so. It never entered Rabbi Akiva’s mind to prohibit slaughtering the Paschal offering on Shabbat. Rather—

There, Rabbi Eliezer,

Rabbi Akiva’s teacher,

had taught him,

that sprinkling does not override Shabbat [for the Sages have the authority to prevent him from bringing the Paschal offering and to uphold their decree prohibiting sprinkling on Shabbat],

but the teaching became precious to him

and he forgot this halakha, and derived a kal va-chomer to permit it—

Rabbi Akiva did not wish to say to him explicitly, “This is what I received from you: Sprinkling does not override Shabbat,” so as not to embarrass him for having forgotten his learning—

Therefore he said to him, “Or the reverse,” so that Rabbi Eliezer would remember on his own, since it was clear to him that slaughter overrides Shabbat—

Nevertheless, this did not succeed, and he said to him: Akiva! You have uprooted what is written in the Torah, “at its appointed time,” which we expound to include even Shabbat.

Rabbi Akiva answered him: If so, bring me an exposition of “at its appointed time” to permit sprinkling as well.

Rabbi Eliezer became angry and said to him: Akiva! You answered me with slaughter—with slaughter shall be your death.

And this is what he said to him,

and therefore Rabbi Akiva replied to him:

Rabbi, do not deny me,

do not conceal your original teaching from me, that you taught me that sprinkling does not override Shabbat,

at the time of the legal debate,

when we are arguing and judging the matter together.

This is what I received from you: “Sprinkling” is a rabbinic prohibition, and it does not override Shabbat.

Thus Rabbi Akiva never entertained this kal va-chomer, and there is no proof from here that when both a lenient and a stringent exposition are possible, we challenge toward leniency.

Rami bar Ḥama asked: If one bows to a stalk of wheat

while it is attached to the ground, and afterward harvests it, performs the other agricultural processes on it, and makes flour from it—

what is [

the reading of the Bach:

what are they ]

for meal offerings

Are they permitted to be brought as a meal offering?

For an ordinary person, they are certainly permitted, because an attached object is not prohibited for an ordinary person; the question is with regard to the Most High.

Now, if we resolve the previous question and permit an object worshipped while attached to the ground with regard to the Most High, there is no question here, and the wheat is certainly permitted for a meal offering. But if you should say that an attached object is prohibited with regard to the Most High, there is still room for doubt.

The sides of the question are: Is it to be said that

there is

a law of

“change” with regard to an object worshipped,

meaning that since the wheat changed into flour and is no longer present in its original form, the change is effective in rendering it permissible ,

or is there no change with regard to an object worshipped,

and the fact that it changed does not help it?

we can resolve it:

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Naḥman, said: Come and hear

from the Mishna in tractate Temura:

All

animals

that are prohibited with regard to the altar,

such as an animal designated for idolatrous service [that was set aside for this purpose] or one worshipped as an idol—

their offspring are permitted.

And it was taught in addition to it,

as we learned in a beraita in addition to the Mishna:

Rabbi Eliezer prohibits them.

Mar Zutra thought that the Mishna and the beraita were speaking of a case in which one bowed to a pregnant animal, so that both it and its offspring became prohibited with regard to the Most High, and it then gave birth. The reason the Sages permit the offspring is that it changed from a fetus into an animal, and they hold that there is a change with regard to an object worshipped and the Most High. Rabbi Eliezer, by contrast, prohibits it because he holds that there is no such change.

The question is therefore resolved: it is a dispute between the tannaim.

And we reject this: Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages did not disagree about this law.

Was it not stated concerning it,

did we not learn an explanation of this dispute? For

Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha said: The dispute

between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages is

when they were mated and subsequently became pregnant.

The reason for their dispute is the principle of “this one and that one cause it”: the male that mated with this animal, as well as the female that was worshipped, both caused the offspring to come into the world. It follows that both a prohibited factor and a permitted factor caused and brought it into existence, as its father was permitted and its mother was prohibited—

The Sages hold: “When this one and that one cause it, it is permitted,” whereas Rabbi Eliezer prohibits it.