Avodah Zarah 46a — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Akiva said to him: But it has already been stated, “You shall utterly destroy”

to teach that one must uproot it completely,

if so, what does the verse teach by stating, “And you shall obliterate their name from that place”?

It comes to teach us that one must

give it a name.

One might have thought

that we could say

to praise—

And before Rabbi Akiva concludes his exposition, we ask:

To praise—is that conceivable?

Would it enter your mind that the Torah commands one to give it a name as praise?! And we explain:

Rather,

Rabbi Akiva’s intention is:

One might have thought

that we could say that one should give it a name

neither as praise nor as condemnation,

and the essential matter is to obliterate their name—

The verse teaches

in another passage [Deuteronomy 7]:

“You shall utterly abominate it! You shall utterly detest it! For it is proscribed.”

How is this so? When

the gentiles

called it “House of Exaltation,”

“house of the elevated one”—one gives it a name

and calls it “House of the Pit,”

a dug and lowly pit; when they called it

“Eye of All,”

one gives it a name and calls it

“Eye of a Thorn.”

From now we have: Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda holds like Rabbi Eliezer, who expounds from the verse “And you shall obliterate their name” that one must uproot it completely, whereas the Rabbis hold like Rabbi Akiva, who expounds from this verse that one must give it a name.

We have learned a dispute among tannaim concerning a tree that one planted and only afterward worshipped, whether it is forbidden for benefit. The Gemara cites a beraita that deals with this matter.

A tanna taught

a beraita—

before

before

Rav Sheshet:

The gentiles

gentiles

who worship the mountains and the hills—

they

the mountains and hills

are permitted

for benefit,

but their worshippers

the gentiles are judged

by the sword,

which is the death imposed by a court upon gentiles for all the transgressions concerning which they were commanded, including idolatry.

And

if they worship

the seeds and the vegetables—

they

the seeds and vegetables

are forbidden

for benefit, as will be explained.

And their worshippers are judged by the sword.

He said to him

Rav Sheshet to the “tanna”:

Who is the one who taught this to you?

Who taught that beraita?

It is Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi

Yehuda, who said: A tree that one planted and only afterward worshipped—

is forbidden.

They worshipped these seeds after they had grown in the ground, and therefore they are forbidden.

And we object: From where did Rav Sheshet have grounds to explain the beraita in this manner,

and let him establish it

he could have established that it is speaking

of a tree [the version of the Bach:

reading

of seeds]

that they planted

them

initially for that purpose,

for the sake of idols,

and

in this manner the beraita also holds like

the Rabbis

who forbid?

And we answer:

That cannot enter your mind.

It cannot be entertained that the beraita is explained in this manner—and why?

For it teaches

that the beraita teaches the law of seeds

in the likeness of a mountain,

that is, in the same way that a mountain is permitted, the seeds are forbidden, because the tanna intends to emphasize the difference between mountains and hills on the one hand and seeds and vegetables on the other—

Just as a mountain,

the case discussed

is one that was not planted initially for that purpose, so too this one

the seeds and vegetables are discussed

as not having been planted initially for that purpose.

And why are they forbidden for benefit? We are compelled to say that it is the teaching of Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda, who forbids a thing planted and afterward worshipped.

We learned in the Mishna that mountains and hills which gentiles worshipped are not rendered forbidden.

The Gemara discusses stones that became detached from the mountains by themselves and are now not attached, and the gentiles worshipped them. The grounds for prohibition and permission are these: they do not entirely resemble mountains, since they are detached; yet they have no human involvement, that is, they are in their natural state, resembling mountains.

It was stated:

we learned:

Stones of a mountain that became detached,

became uprooted from their place by themselves, and a gentile bowed to them—

Rav Yehuda and Hezekiah

the sons of Rabbi Hiyya, and Rabbi Yohanan disputed this matter.

One

one of them

said: They are forbidden, and one said: They are permitted.

And we explain:

What is the reason

what is the reason

of the one who says: They are permitted?

For he compares these stones

to a mountain: Just as a mountain, which has no human involvement,—

and is permitted, so too these, which have no human involvement—

are permitted.

And we object: They do not entirely resemble a mountain, because

just as a mountain is attached,

whereas these stones are detached.

And we answer: The reason for the permission of a mountain is not that it is attached, and

an animal proves it,

which is not attached, and nevertheless the Torah permitted it for benefit if one bowed to it—

This proves that the reason for the permission is not that it is attached, but rather that it is in its natural form and has no human involvement.

One who bows to an animal does not render it forbidden for benefit, and this is learned from what the Torah wrote concerning an offering [Leviticus 1], “from the cattle”—and we expound: “from the cattle,” but not all cattle; this excludes an animal that was worshipped, an animal that they worshipped as an idol. It is unfit as an offering—

It follows that for the needs of an ordinary person it is fit, since if it were forbidden for benefit, no teaching would be needed to disqualify it as an offering, because an offering is fit only if it is “from the sustenance of Israel” [Ezekiel 45], that is, suitable for consumption by an ordinary person—as non-sacred produce.

And we object: No proof can be brought from an animal, because

what is distinctive about an animal

that is why the Torah permitted it,

for it is a living creature,

and this has importance; can you say the same concerning these stones, to permit them?! They are not living creatures.

And we answer: The reason for the permission of an animal is not that it is a living creature, and

a mountain proves it,

which is not a living creature, and nevertheless the Torah permitted it—

And the matter returns

and when we refute: What is distinctive about a mountain, that it is attached, we prove from an animal—

This one is not seen as this one is seen:

the leniency of a mountain is not like the leniency of an animal,

and this one is not seen as this one is seen,

and the leniency of an animal is not like the leniency of a mountain—that is, the permission depends neither on being attached nor on being a living creature—

The common element between them,

and in what are they both equal, and what is the reason for their permission? It is

that they have no human involvement—

and

therefore

it is permitted;

the Torah permitted them—and we compare to this

even every

thing

that has no human involvement—

is permitted.

Therefore these stones that became detached from their place are permitted, since they too have no human involvement.

And we object: It can still be said:

What is distinctive about the common element between them,

why did the Torah permit both of them, the mountain and the animal?

For they were not changed from their original creation,

and they have remained in their natural state since their creation, and therefore the Torah permitted them; can you say the same concerning these stones, since they were changed from their original creation and became uprooted from their place?

And we answer:

Rather, it comes

the law of these stones is learned

from a blemished animal

which was changed from its original creation, and nevertheless the Torah permitted it, and one cannot attribute the reason for its permission to its being a living creature,

and from a mountain,

for a mountain is also permitted and is not a living creature, and one cannot attribute the reason for its permission to its not having been changed from its original creation, since it was changed through its blemish.

Alternatively,

or the law of the stones may be learned

from an unblemished animal

which has no blemish

and from a dry tree,

which was changed from its original creation.

A tree is permitted—according to the Rabbis, when it was planted and afterward worshipped, and according to Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda, in the case of a tree that grew by itself, found in a forest from the six days of Creation.

In any event, concerning these trees there is no practical difference whether they are dry or not, and in every case they are permitted, even if they were changed from their original creation and dried up.

From now, the common element of a mountain and an animal is this: they have no human involvement and are permitted, even if they were changed from their original creation, and the reason for their permission is neither that they are attached nor that they are living creatures—so too I will bring to permit stones of a mountain that became detached.

This is the reasoning of the one who says: They are permitted.

But the one who forbids

holds:

For this reason it is written,

therefore the Torah wrote:

“You shall utterly abominate it and utterly detest it”—

for even though, by logical derivation, it comes out to permission,

since it could be learned from a “common element” to permit it, nevertheless the Torah commanded:

Do not derive permission from it;

it is proscribed, and the Torah abominates and detests it, and you have no permission to permit in its case except what Scripture explicitly permitted to you.

In this dispute it was not clarified who is the one who forbids and who is the one who permits. The Gemara comes to prove from another statement who is the one who forbids and who is the one who permits.

It can be concluded—

that the sons of Rabbi Hiyya—

are the ones who permit.

They are the ones who permit.

For Hezekiah asked:

the son of Rabbi Hiyya was uncertain: If one

stood upright

set upright

an egg in order to bow to it—

what is the law?

Is it permitted or forbidden?

It might enter your mind

that the author of the statement, who wished to prove the “conclusion,” thought to say that the question concerns a case in which one set up the egg in order

to bow to it, and

indeed

bowed to it—

and he was asking

and the sides of the question are:

This setting upright

this setting upright

is it an act,

an important act of human involvement,

or is it not an act,

and is it not included in human involvement—

This implies that

but

if

he did not set it upright

and bowed to it as it was—

it is not rendered forbidden,

because it has no human involvement, even though it is detached—

learn from this: The sons of Rabbi Hiyya

are the ones who hold

that they permit,

permitting detached stones of a mountain because they have no human involvement.

And we reject this:

No!

There is no necessity to conclude from here the position of the sons of Rabbi Hiyya—

For

I can say to you in any event:

it is possible to say:

The sons of Rabbi Hiyya forbid;

they hold that it is forbidden even without human involvement, if it is detached and is not a living creature, and if he already

bowed to it, even though he did not set it upright

and it has no human involvement—

it is forbidden.

And Hezekiah’s question concerns another matter, namely:

What are we dealing with here? For example, one set upright an egg in order to bow to it, and

finally

did not

bow to it; and the Gemara will explain the sides of the question—

And first we clarify:

According to whom

according to which tanna is Hezekiah uncertain?

If according to the one who says

in the following chapter:

An Israelite’s idolatry

which an Israelite erected with the intention of worshipping it

is forbidden immediately—

even before he worships it, what is the uncertainty? For if he set up an egg in order to worship it,

it is forbidden

immediately, since he designated it for idolatry—even without human involvement [for now, according to this rejection, human involvement is unnecessary], and even without an act, from the moment that he designated it for idolatry?

If according to the one who says,

an Israelite’s idolatry is not forbidden immediately, but rather

until it is worshipped—

what is the uncertainty?

It has not been worshipped;

it has not yet been worshipped, and obviously it is permitted?

And we conclude:

No

not as the objector understood, but rather

it is necessary.

The question is:

For example, one set upright an egg in order to bow to it, but did not bow to it,

and indeed according to the one who holds that it is not forbidden until it is worshipped, it is not yet forbidden.

And

afterward

a gentile came

a gentile

and bowed to it—

And the question is whether it became forbidden through the gentile’s bowing.

And apparently, what is the question here? How could the gentile render an egg belonging to an Israelite forbidden, since “a person cannot render forbidden something that is not his”?

The answer: Indeed, “a person cannot render forbidden something that is not his”; however, since the Israelite “revealed his intention” that he was pleased to make it into an idol, in such a case it is certainly possible to render something that is not his forbidden—

For it is like this,

and as

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: An Israelite who set upright a brick in order to bow to it

and did not bow to it,

and a gentile came

a gentile

and bowed to it—

it is forbidden.

Now,

he was asking

Hezekiah: This law of Shmuel, that through the mere revelation of intention one person renders it forbidden even when it is not his—is it said likewise concerning an egg, or only concerning a brick and something similar?

And what is the reason to distinguish between a brick and an egg?

A brick is—

for its being set upright is recognizable:

at first it lay on its broad side, and now, when it is set upright, it appears tall;

but an egg,

whose being set upright is not recognizable and in this there is no “revelation of intention”—

no,

this law of Shmuel was not said.

Or perhaps

it is possible to say:

It makes no difference,

and an egg too becomes forbidden through this setting upright.

And the act of “setting upright” which Hezekiah needed to mention in the question is so that the setting upright should be a “revelation of intention” that he wants the egg to be an idol, and through this the gentile renders it forbidden by bowing to it—

And it is not an act of “human involvement,” without which it is called “attached,” because—according to this rejection—Hezekiah holds that it is called detached because it is not attached, and since it is not attached and is not a living creature it is forbidden.]

The matter remains unresolved.

The question was not resolved.

We learned in our Mishna that something attached which was worshipped as an idol is not rendered forbidden for benefit,

and we also learned earlier in the discussion that a living creature which was worshipped as an idol is not rendered forbidden for benefit; we learned this from the fact that the Torah forbade a worshipped thing with regard to the Most High, that is, to bring it as an offering, proving that for an ordinary person it is permitted.

Rami bar Hama is uncertain whether something attached which was worshipped as an idol is forbidden with regard to the Most High, such as using stones hewn from a mountain that they worshipped as an idol—for the purpose of building an altar—

just as a living creature is forbidden with regard to the Most High, although it is not forbidden for an ordinary person.

The sides of the uncertainty are these: Has the designation “worshipped” taken effect upon something attached, but the Torah permitted it; and if so, it is forbidden with regard to the Most High. Or perhaps the designation “worshipped” did not take effect upon it at all, and it is not forbidden with regard to the Most High.

Rami bar Hama asked: One who bows to a mountain

for the sake of idolatry—

its stones,

which were hewn from it—

what is the law?

Is it permitted

to

build from them

an altar?