Avodah Zarah 46a (מו.) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Akiva said to him: But it has already been stated: “You shall utterly destroy them”

to teach that one must uproot them completely.

If so, what is the meaning of the verse: “And you shall obliterate their names from that place”?

It comes to teach us that one must

give it a derogatory name.

One might have thought

that we could say

to praise it—

Before Rabbi Akiva finished his exposition, we raise the following objection:

To praise it, does this enter your mind?

Could it possibly have entered your mind that the Torah commands one to give it a name of praise? And we explain:

Rather,

Rabbi Akiva’s intention is:

One might have thought

that we could say that one should give it a name

neither of praise nor of denigration,

and the essential requirement is merely to obliterate its name—

The verse therefore states

in another passage [Deuteronomy 7]: “

You shall utterly detest it, and you shall utterly abhor it, for it is proscribed!”

How is this applied? When

the gentiles

called it “Beit Galyā,”

meaning “the house of the exalted one,” one gives it a derogatory name and

calls it “Beit Karyā,”

meaning a dug and lowly pit. If they called it

“the Eye of All,”

one gives it a derogatory name and calls it

“the Eye of a Thorn.”

From this it follows that Rabbi Yosei ben Rabbi Yehuda holds in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer, who derives from the verse “And you shall obliterate their names” that one must uproot them completely, whereas the Rabbis hold in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, who derives from this verse that one must give it a derogatory name.

We have learned of a dispute between tannaim concerning a tree that was planted and only afterward worshipped, whether it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. The Gemara cites a beraita dealing with this matter.

A tanna taught

a beraita

before

before

Rav Sheshet:

Gentiles who worship

the gentiles

the mountains and the hills—

they

the mountains and hills

are permitted

to derive benefit from them,

but those who worship them

the gentiles are judged

by the sword,

which is the form of execution imposed by a court upon gentiles for all the transgressions commanded to them, including idol worship.

And

if they worship

the seeds and the vegetables—

they

the seeds and vegetables

are prohibited

to derive benefit from them, as will be explained.

And those who worship them are judged by the sword.

He said to him:

Rav Sheshet said to the tanna:

Who is the one who taught this to you?

Who taught that beraita?

It is Rabbi Yosei ben Rabbi

Yehuda, who said: A tree that was planted and only afterward worshipped—

is prohibited.

These seeds were worshipped after they had sprouted in the ground, and therefore they are prohibited.

And we challenge this: From where did Rav Sheshet derive that this is the interpretation of the beraita?

Let him establish it

as referring

to a tree [the reading of the Bach:

to seeds]

that were planted

initially for that purpose,

those items

having been planted from the outset for that purpose,

for idol worship,

and

in this manner the beraita would also accord with

the Rabbis,

who prohibit such items?

And we answer:

This cannot enter your mind.

It is impossible to interpret the beraita in this manner—and why?

For it teaches

the law of seeds

analogously to that of a mountain,

meaning that just as a mountain is permitted, the seeds are prohibited, because the tanna intends to emphasize the difference between mountains and hills on the one hand and seeds and vegetables on the other—

Just as a mountain

is referring

to one that was not planted initially for that purpose, so too this

case of seeds and vegetables is referring

to ones that were not planted initially for that purpose.

And why, then, are they prohibited to derive benefit from? We are compelled to say that it follows the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben Rabbi Yehuda, who prohibits an item that was planted and only afterward worshipped.

We learned in the Mishna that mountains and hills that gentiles worshipped are not rendered prohibited.

The Gemara discusses stones that detached themselves from the mountains and are now no longer attached, and that the gentiles worshipped. The factors underlying the question of prohibition or permission are that they do not entirely resemble mountains, since they are detached, while, on the other hand, they lack human intervention, meaning that they remain in their natural state, and in this respect resemble mountains.

It was stated:

We learned:

Stones of a mountain that detached themselves,

that detached themselves from their place on their own, and a gentile prostrated himself before them—

Rav Yehuda and Hezekiah,

the sons of Rabbi Hiyya, and Rabbi Yohanan,

one

of the two

said: They are prohibited, and one said: They are permitted.

And we explain:

What is the reason

for

the one who says: They are permitted?

He compares these stones

to a mountain: Just as a mountain, which lacks human intervention,

is permitted, so too these, which lack human intervention,

are permitted.

And we challenge this: They do not entirely resemble a mountain, because

just as a mountain is attached,

whereas these stones are detached.

And we answer: The reason a mountain is permitted is not that it is attached, and

an animal proves this,

as it is not attached, yet the Torah permits deriving benefit from it if one prostrates himself before it—

This proves that the reason for the permission is not that it is attached, but that it exists in its natural form and lacks human intervention.

An animal before which one prostrates himself is not rendered prohibited to derive benefit from, as is derived from what the Torah wrote concerning an offering [Leviticus 1]: “From the cattle.” And we expound: “From the cattle”—but not all cattle are fit for an offering; this excludes an animal that was worshipped, an animal that was worshipped as an idol. It is disqualified as an offering—

This implies that for the purposes of an ordinary person it is fit, since if it were prohibited to derive benefit from, no derivation would be necessary to disqualify it as an offering, because an offering is fit only if it is “fit to be eaten by Israel” [Ezekiel 45], meaning fit for ordinary human consumption—as non-sacred food.

And we challenge this: No proof can be brought from an animal, because

what is distinctive about an animal

is that the Torah permitted it

because it is a living creature,

and this gives it importance. Can you say the same concerning these stones and permit them? They are not living creatures.

And we answer: The reason an animal is permitted is not that it is a living creature, and

a mountain proves this,

as it is not a living creature, yet the Torah permits it—

And the matter returns

to its original reasoning: When we challenge that a mountain is attached, we establish the proof from an animal.

This one is not like that one,

the leniency of a mountain is not like the leniency of an animal,

and that one is not like this one;

the leniency of an animal is not like the leniency of a mountain. That is to say, the permission depends neither on being attached nor on being a living creature—

The common denominator between them

is that which they share, and the reason for their permission is

that they lack human intervention—

and

therefore they are

permitted;

the Torah permitted them, and we extend this principle to

any

thing

that lacks human intervention—

it is permitted.

Therefore these stones that detached themselves from their place are permitted as well, since they too lack human intervention.

And we challenge this: It can still be said:

What is distinctive about the common denominator between them,

why did the Torah permit both of them, the mountain and the animal?

That they have not changed from their original form,

for they remain in their natural state since their creation, and therefore the Torah permitted them. Can you say the same concerning these stones, which have changed from their original form and detached themselves from their place?

And we answer:

Rather, it is derived

that the law of these stones is learned

from a blemished animal,

which has changed from its original form, yet the Torah permitted it; therefore the reason for its permission cannot be that it is a living creature,

and from a mountain,

since a mountain is also permitted and is not a living creature, and the reason for its permission cannot be that it has not changed from its original form, since it has changed through its blemish.

Alternatively,

the law of the stones can be learned

from an unblemished animal,

which has no blemish,

and from a dried tree,

which has changed from its original form.

A tree is permitted—according to the Rabbis, in the case of one that was planted and only afterward worshipped, and according to Rabbi Yosei ben Rabbi Yehuda, in the case of a tree that grew by itself, having been present in the forest since the Six Days of Creation.

In any event, with regard to these trees, it makes no difference whether they are dry or not; they are permitted in either case, even if they changed from their original form and dried up.

The common denominator of a mountain and an animal is therefore that they lack human intervention and are permitted even if they have changed from their original form, and that the reason for their permission is neither that they are attached nor that they are living creatures. I, too, will consequently permit stones of a mountain that detached themselves.

This is the reasoning of the one who says: They are permitted.

And the one who prohibits

holds:

This is why it is written:

Therefore the Torah wrote: “

You shall utterly detest it, and you shall utterly abhor it”—

for although it can be derived by legal reasoning as permitted,

since it could be learned through a “common denominator” and permitted, nevertheless the Torah commanded:

Do not derive this conclusion;

it is proscribed, and the Torah renders it detestable and abhorrent. You may permit only that which Scripture explicitly permitted.

In this dispute, it was not specified who is the one who prohibits and who is the one who permits. The Gemara seeks to prove from another statement who prohibits and who permits.

It may be concluded—

that the sons of Rabbi Hiyya—

are the ones who permit.

They are the ones who permit.

For Hezekiah asked:

Hezekiah, son of Rabbi Hiyya, was uncertain: If one

stood upright

by setting upright

an egg in order to prostrate himself before it—

what is

its status? Is it permitted or prohibited?

It might enter your mind

that the author of the statement who wished to establish the identification thought that the question was whether he set up the egg in order

to prostrate himself before it, and

indeed

prostrated himself before it—

and the question he raised

concerns the two sides of the uncertainty:

This act of setting it upright

this standing upright—

is it considered an act,

a significant act constituting human intervention,

or is it not considered an act,

and is it not included in human intervention?

It follows from this

that

if

he did not set it upright

but prostrated himself before it as it was—

it is not rendered prohibited,

because it lacks human intervention, even though it is detached—

conclude from this: The sons of Rabbi Hiyya

are the ones who hold

that they permit,

permitting detached stones of a mountain because they lack human intervention.

And we reject this:

No!

There is no compelling basis here for concluding that this is the position of the sons of Rabbi Hiyya—

For

I could say to you that, in fact,

it is possible to say:

the sons of Rabbi Hiyya are the ones who prohibit.

They hold that it is prohibited even without human intervention, if it is detached and is not a living creature, and if he already

prostrated himself before it, even though he had not set it upright

and it lacks human intervention—

it is prohibited.

And Hezekiah’s question concerns a different matter, namely:

What are we dealing with here? For example, he set up an egg in order to prostrate himself before it, and

subsequently

did not

prostrate himself before it. The Gemara will explain the two sides of the uncertainty—

But first we clarify:

According to whom

is Hezekiah uncertain?

If it is according to the one who says

in the next chapter:

An idol belonging to a Jew

that a Jew set up with the intention of worshipping it

is prohibited immediately—

even before he worships it, what is the uncertainty? If he set up an egg to worship it,

it is prohibited

immediately, since he designated it for idol worship—even without human intervention [for according to this rejection, human intervention is unnecessary] and even without an act, from the moment he designated it for idol worship.

If it is according to the one who says

that an idol belonging to a Jew is not prohibited immediately, but

only once it has been worshipped—

what is the uncertainty?

It has not yet been worshipped;

it is obvious that it is permitted.

And we conclude:

No,

[not as the questioner understood, but]

it is necessary—

the uncertainty concerns

a case in which he set up an egg in order to prostrate himself before it, but did not prostrate himself before it.

Indeed, according to the one who holds that it is not prohibited until it is worshipped, it is not yet prohibited.

And

afterward

a gentile came

a gentile

and prostrated himself before it—

The question is whether it was rendered prohibited through the gentile’s prostration.

And apparently, what is the uncertainty here? How could the gentile prohibit a Jewish-owned egg, given the principle that “a person cannot prohibit something that does not belong to him”?

The answer is: Indeed, “a person cannot prohibit something that does not belong to him.” However, since the Jew demonstrated his intent that he was pleased to make it into an idol, in such a case it is certainly possible to prohibit something that does not belong to him—

For this is like

the case

stated by Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel: If a Jew set upright a brick in order to prostrate himself before it,

but did not prostrate himself before it,

and a gentile came

a gentile

and prostrated himself before it—

it is prohibited.

Now

he raised the following question

to Hezekiah: Does this ruling of Shmuel—that merely through demonstrating intent another person can prohibit an object even when it does not belong to him—apply to an egg as well, or only to a brick and similar objects?

And what is the reason to distinguish between a brick and an egg?

A brick

is such that its being stood upright is discernible:

at first it lay on its broad side, whereas now, when it is stood upright, it visibly stands high.

But an egg,

whose being stood upright is not discernible, and which therefore does not constitute a “demonstration of intent”—

no,

this ruling of Shmuel does not apply—

Or perhaps

it is possible to say:

There is no difference,

and an egg too becomes prohibited through this act of setting it upright.

The act of “setting upright” that Hezekiah had to mention in the question is necessary so that this act would constitute a “demonstration of intent” that he wanted the egg to be an idol, thereby enabling the gentile to prohibit it through his prostration—

It is not an act of “human intervention,” without which an object is deemed “attached,” because according to this rejection Hezekiah holds that it is deemed detached because it is not attached, and since it is neither attached nor a living creature, it is prohibited.]

The matter remains unresolved.

The question was not resolved.

We learned in our Mishna that something attached to the ground that was worshipped as an idol is not rendered prohibited to derive benefit from,

and we further learned earlier in the sugya that a living creature that was worshipped as an idol is not rendered prohibited to derive benefit from. We derived this from the fact that the Torah prohibited an object that was worshipped with regard to the Most High—that is, from bringing it as an offering—which proves that it is permitted for an ordinary person.

Rami bar Hama was uncertain whether something attached to the ground that was worshipped as an idol is prohibited with regard to the Most High—for example, using stones hewn from a mountain that was worshipped as an idol for the construction of an altar—

just as a living creature is prohibited with regard to the Most High, despite not being prohibited for an ordinary person.

The two sides of the uncertainty are as follows: Did the designation “worshipped object” take effect upon something attached to the ground, but the Torah nevertheless permitted it? If so, it is prohibited with regard to the Most High. Or did the designation “worshipped object” not take effect upon it at all, in which case it is not prohibited with regard to the Most High?

Rami bar Hama asked: If one prostrates himself before a mountain

for the sake of idol worship—

what is the status of its stones,

which were hewn from it?

What is

the ruling? Is it permitted

to

build from them

an altar?