Avodah Zarah 41b (מא:) — the Talmud in English

And this is difficult:

Why:

why are they forbidden?

But they are fragments,

and although they were worshipped, nevertheless, we have before us “proof” that the gentile nullified them?

Explain it

—clarified it—

Shmuel:

Indeed, if they are merely fragments, they are permitted. And when the Mishna says that they are forbidden, it is referring

to those standing on their bases,

for they prepared a “seat” and “base” for these fragments, and the very fact that they sit upon a base demonstrates their importance, even though they are merely part of an image, and they worship them.

The Gemara now brings a dispute among amoraim concerning an object of idolatry that broke, meaning that the gentile worshipped it but did not personally nullify it; rather, it broke on its own. The question is whether its fragments are permitted because it broke and its broken state is before us, or whether they are not permitted. The grounds of the dispute will be explained in the Gemara.

It was stated: In the case of an object of idolatry that broke on its own—

Rabbi Yohanan says it is forbidden. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says it is permitted.

The Gemara explains:

Rabbi Yohanan says it is forbidden, for he did not nullify it,

and it is not nullified on its own.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says it is permitted,

because

presumably, he nullifies it,

because

he says,

the gentile says to himself:

“It could not save itself,

it did not save itself; if so,

will it save that man?”

Will it save me?! The Gemara continues the exchange between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish. It first presents Rabbi Yohanan’s proofs and evidence in support of his position, and at the end of the sugya Reish Lakish brings proof for his position.

Rabbi Yohanan raised an objection to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish:

It is stated in the Book of Samuel [I 5] that when the Philistines captured the Ark of the Covenant and placed it in the house of Dagon, the god of the Philistines, they set it beside Dagon. On the first morning they found Dagon fallen before it, on the ground, before the Ark of the Lord, and they took Dagon and returned him to his place. On the second morning they saw

“And behold, Dagon had fallen before it, on the ground, before the Ark of the Lord, and the head of Dagon and both the palms of his hands were cut off upon the threshold.”

This is an object of idolatry that broke on its own.

And it is written: “Therefore, the priests of Dagon and all who enter the house of Dagon do not tread upon the threshold of Dagon in Ashdod to this day.”

Rabbi Yohanan understood that they did not tread upon it because the fragments were important to them.

This proves that an object of idolatry that breaks on its own retains its importance?

And we answer:

He said to him,

Reish Lakish said to Rabbi Yohanan: Is this

a proof from there?!

On the contrary, the Philistines did not attach importance to Dagon, but only to the threshold, since he had not fallen beyond the threshold.

There,

in that incident, it was

that they placed Dagon and worshipped the threshold;

therefore they no longer trod there.

For they said this:

so said the gentiles in their error:

“His authority has left

Dagon, and

it came

and

settled upon it,

and the authority settled

upon the threshold.

He raised an objection to him,

Rabbi Yohanan challenged Reish Lakish from our Mishna.

For we learned:

“One who finds fragments of images—these are permitted.”

And it may be inferred:

“This”—

if he found

fragments of an object of idolatry

that were certainly worshipped,

they are forbidden.

This implies that even if their broken state is before us, they retain their importance and are forbidden. This is difficult for the position of Reish Lakish.

Reish Lakish answers:

Do not say

that the inference from the Mishna is: “This”—

fragments of an object of idolatry are forbidden. Rather, say: “This”—the images themselves are forbidden.

And

the Mishna comes to teach us

an unattributed statement in accordance with Rabbi Meir,

to state anonymously the opinion of Rabbi Meir in the preceding Mishna: all images are forbidden, and not only those holding a staff, bird, or sphere in their hands. And although Rabbi Meir forbids the images, he agrees that their fragments should be permitted.

But now the Gemara challenges Rabbi Yohanan in the opposite direction:

And Rabbi Yohanan

—what proof did he bring from the Mishna against Reish Lakish? On the contrary,

from

the words of

Rabbi Meir, the Sages’ position may be inferred!

For Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree only over whether gentiles worship images or not. But it is clear that just as Rabbi Meir, who forbids all images, permits their fragments, so too the Sages, who forbid only those images that the gentiles certainly worshipped, maintain that although the images themselves are forbidden, their fragments are permitted. This proves that fragments of worshipped images are permitted?

And this is how the Gemara challenges it:

No,

is it not the case that

Rabbi Meir said: Complete images

—

are forbidden,

but

fragments of images are permitted?

If so,

according to the Sages, an object of idolatry as well,

meaning, even images holding a staff, bird, or sphere, which are worshipped, should also be said to be

it,

when complete,

forbidden,

but

its

fragments are permitted. This would show that one may infer from our Mishna that fragments are not important and that gentiles do not worship them.

And we answer:

How can these be compared?!

How can images be compared with an object of idolatry?!

There,

those images, even according to the Sages, are not certainly worshipped. On the one hand,

perhaps they worshipped them,

it is possible to say that they worshipped them; but on the other hand,

perhaps they did not worship them. And

even if

you should say that they worshipped them, perhaps

one may still say:

they nullified them.

It is possible that the gentiles nullified them. In other words, there is a “double doubt” as to whether the fragments are forbidden, and therefore the Mishna permits them.

But here, concerning fragments of

an object of idolatry,

which are the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish,

they certainly worshipped it,

and now we are uncertain whether they nullified it.

Who can say

—who can tell us—

that they nullified it?

If so,

it is a doubt

whether they indeed nullified it,

but

in contrast, the fact that it had been forbidden is

certain.

And

we have a principle that

a doubt does not dislodge a certainty.

That is, since it had been certainly established as forbidden, its fragments may not be permitted on the basis of a doubt that perhaps they nullified it.

But the Gemara challenges again:

And

since

a doubt

does not dislodge a certainty?! 15

And

it was

taught

—we learned in a beraita:

A ḥaver,

one who is trusted concerning tithes,

who died,

and left a granary full of produce,

without indicating whether he had tithed it,

even

if the produce

is of that very day,

meaning that it is evident that it was smoothed today,

it is presumed to have been prepared.

The one raising the challenge assumed that we rely on the presumption that the ḥaver presumably tithed it immediately, before his death. Therefore he challenged:

But here,

since the produce had already been smoothed and was in the house,

it is certainly untithed produce,

certainly tevel, since its processing had been completed [there are two conditions for the obligation of tithes: one is “completion of the work,” the act of smoothing the grain pile, which is the completion of the processes performed on the grain; and the second is that the produce has “seen the face of the house,” meaning that it entered the house, as will be explained below], and

it is uncertain whether he tithed it

the ḥaver,

or uncertain whether he did not tithe it. And

the

doubt comes and dislodges the certainty

that it is tevel.

Thus, a doubt does dislodge a certainty. How, then, did Rabbi Yohanan answer that a doubt does not dislodge a certainty?

And we answer:

There,

with this produce,

it is certainly a certainty.

There is no doubt here as to whether he tithed it,

for he certainly tithed it;

just as it had certainly been tevel, so now it is certainly prepared.

As

Rabbi Hanina of Khuzistan

said.

He said:

Rabbi Hanina of Khuzistan said: There is a presumption

that is certain

concerning a ḥaver: He does not remove from his possession anything that is unprepared.

Since the produce belonged to him and the obligation rested upon him, he was concerned lest he cause others to sin through it, and he certainly tithed it. Therefore, no proof can be brought from there that a “doubt” dislodges a certainty, since it is not a doubt but a “certainty.”

And if you wish, say:

The reason the produce is permitted is not that the ḥaver “certainly” tithed it. Rather, even if this is not certain, it is permitted, because

it is a doubt and a doubt.

That is, just as it is uncertain whether he tithed it, so too it is uncertain whether it was ever produce that was tevel.

For

perhaps he acted

in accordance with Rabbi Oshaya.

Grain and produce are not obligated by Torah law in terumot and tithes unless two conditions are met. The first is that their processing was completed in the field, which is called “smoothing,” such as winnowing the grain in the wind after threshing in order to separate the chaff, or smoothing the pile [the kri] of grain. The second is “seeing the face of the house.”

If their processing was completed but they were not brought into the house, it is rabbinically forbidden to eat them as a fixed meal, but it is permitted to eat them as a casual snack [and it is also permitted to feed them to an animal, since all animal consumption is considered casual consumption].

The entry into the house that establishes the obligation of tithes is only when the produce is brought through the doorway after it has been smoothed. In that case it becomes tevel by Torah law and is obligated in terumot and tithes by Torah law.

But if he brought in the grain while it still had “its chaff,” before it was smoothed, and smoothed it in the house, or if he brought it into the house indirectly, not through the doorway, then even if the grain was smoothed, it is not tevel by Torah law.

This ḥaver who died and left smoothed grain in the house may have brought the grain into his house before smoothing it, and it is not certain that he smoothed it in the field. Therefore, it is uncertain whether this produce was ever obligated in tithes by Torah law. And although it is rabbinically obligated in tithes, the Sages trusted him on the basis of his status as a ḥaver, relying on the possibility that he tithed it.

And corresponding to the “doubt” concerning their obligation in tithes is the “doubt” concerning their preparation—that he tithed them.

For

Rav Oshaya

said:

A person may employ a ruse

concerning his grain, and

how does he do so?

He brings it

into his house

with its chaff,

and although this ruse does not permit him to eat it as a fixed meal, but only as a “casual snack,” nevertheless he gains from this ruse

so that his animal may eat it,

since all animal consumption is casual consumption, and it is permitted;

and

in this manner

the grain is exempt

from

tithes.

And the matter is resolved: no proof may be brought from this beraita that a “doubt dislodges a certainty,” whether because it is a “certainty and certainty,” or because it is a “doubt and doubt.”

And the Gemara continues to prove that uncertainty can dislodge certainty.

But

is it so that

uncertainty cannot dislodge certainty?!

But

wasn't it

taught

for we learned in a beraita:

A woman who gives birth is impure with the impurity of childbirth: for one week after giving birth to a male and for two weeks after giving birth to a female. Afterward, she has “days of purity,” during which the blood issuing from her source is considered pure blood: for thirty-three days in the case of a male and sixty-six days in the case of a female.