Avodah Zarah 41b — the Talmud in English

And it is difficult:

why:

why are they forbidden?

But they are fragments,

and even though they were worshipped, in any event, we have before us “proof” that the gentile nullified them?

He explained it

—he clarified it—

Shmuel:

Indeed, if they are ordinary fragments, they are permitted. And that which the Mishna said, that they are forbidden, is speaking

of those standing on their bases,

for they prepared for these fragments a “seat” and a “base,” and their very sitting upon a base proves their importance, even though they are only part of an image, and they worship them.

And now the Gemara brings a dispute of amoraim concerning an object of idolatry that broke, meaning that the gentile worshipped it and did not himself nullify it; rather, it broke on its own. Are its fragments permitted, since it broke and they are broken before us, or not? The sides of the dispute will be explained in the Gemara.

It was stated: An object of idolatry that broke on its own—

Rabbi Yohanan said: It is forbidden. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: It is permitted.

And the Gemara explains:

Rabbi Yohanan said: It is forbidden, for he did not nullify it,

and it is not nullified on its own.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: It is permitted,

because

presumably, he nullified it,

because

he says,

the gentile says to himself:

“It could not save itself,

it did not save itself, and if so,

would it save that man for me?!”

And would it save me?! And the Gemara brings the continuation of the debate between Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish. First it brings proofs and evidences from Rabbi Yohanan to establish his position, and at the end of the sugya Resh Lakish brings evidence for his position.

Rabbi Yohanan raised an objection to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish:

It is stated in the Book of Samuel [I 5], at the time when the Philistines captured the Ark of the Covenant and placed it in the house of Dagon, the god of the Philistines, and set it beside Dagon. On the first morning they found Dagon fallen before it, on the ground, before the Ark of the Lord, and they took Dagon and restored him to his place. And on the second morning they saw

“And behold, Dagon had fallen before it, on the ground, before the Ark of the Lord, and the head of Dagon and his two hands were cut off upon the threshold.”

And here it is an object of idolatry that broke on its own.

And it is written: “Therefore the priests of Dagon and all who enter the house of Dagon do not tread upon the threshold of Dagon in Ashdod, to this day.”

And Rabbi Yohanan understood that they did not tread there because the fragments were important to them.

And it is proven that an object of idolatry that broke on its own retained its importance?

And we answer:

He said to him,

Resh Lakish said to Rabbi Yohanan: Is that

a proof?!

On the contrary, the Philistines did not attach importance to Dagon, but only to the threshold, since he did not fall beyond the threshold.

There—

there was the incident—

they left Dagon and worshipped the threshold,

and therefore they would no longer tread there.

For they said thus,

so the gentiles said in their error:

“Its authority has left Dagon

—its sovereignty has left him—

and it came

and

settled itself upon it,

and the sovereignty settled itself

upon the threshold.

He raised an objection to him,

Rabbi Yohanan raised an objection against Resh Lakish from our Mishna.

For we learned:

“One who finds fragments of images—behold, these are permitted.”

And it should be inferred:

“but

if he found

fragments of an object of idolatry,

which were certainly worshipped,

they are forbidden.”

And it implies that even if they are broken before us, they are important and forbidden. And this is difficult for the position of Resh Lakish.

And Resh Lakish answers:

Do not say

—do not infer from the Mishna—“but

fragments of an object of idolatry are forbidden.” Rather, say: “But the images themselves are forbidden.”

And

the Mishna comes to teach us

an anonymous statement according to Rabbi Meir,

to state anonymously the view of Rabbi Meir in the preceding Mishna: that all images are forbidden, and not specifically those that have a staff, a bird, or a ball in their hands. And although Rabbi Meir forbids the images, he agrees that their fragments are to be permitted.

But now the Gemara raises the opposite difficulty against Rabbi Yohanan:

And Rabbi Yohanan

—what proof did he bring from the Mishna against Resh Lakish? On the contrary,

from

the words of

Rabbi Meir, it follows for the Sages!

For Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagreed only concerning whether the gentiles worship the images or not. But it is clear that just as Rabbi Meir, who forbids all the images, permits their fragments, so too the Sages, who forbid only those images that the gentiles certainly worshipped—even though the images themselves are forbidden—permit their fragments. And it is proven that fragments of worshipped images are permitted?

And this is how the Gemara raises the difficulty:

Is that not so?

Does Rabbi Meir not say that

images

that are whole

are forbidden,

but

fragments of images are permitted?

If so,

according to the Sages, an object of idolatry also,

that is, even images that have a staff, a bird, or a ball in their hands, which are worshipped, let us also say:

it,

when it is whole,

is forbidden,

and

its

fragments are permitted.

Thus it is possible to infer from our Mishna that the fragments are not important and that the gentiles do not worship them.

And we answer:

How can you compare this?!

How is it possible to compare images with an object of idolatry?!

There,

those images—even according to the Sages—it is not certain that they were indeed worshipped. Rather, on the one hand,

perhaps they worshipped them,

it is possible to say that they worshipped them, but on the other hand,

perhaps they did not worship them. And

even if

you should say that they worshipped them, perhaps

it may still be said:

they nullified them.

It is possible that the gentiles nullified them. That is, there is there a “doubt compounded of doubts” as to whether the fragments are forbidden, and therefore the Mishna permits them.

But here, with fragments of

an object of idolatry,

concerning which Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish disagreed,

they certainly worshipped it,

and now we are uncertain whether they nullified it:

who can say

—who will tell us—

that they nullified it?

And if so,

it is a doubt

whether they indeed nullified it,

and

opposed to this, that it had been forbidden, is

certainty.

And

we have a principle that

a doubt does not dislodge a certainty.

That is, since it was certainly established as forbidden, its fragments may not be permitted on the basis of a “doubt,” lest they nullified it .

But the Gemara again raises a difficulty:

And

since

a doubt

does not dislodge a certainty?! 15

And

it is

taught

—we learned in a beraita:

A chaver,

one who is trustworthy concerning tithes,

who died,

and left a storehouse full of produce,

without informing whether he tithed it,

even

if the produce

is of the current day,

recognizably threshed today,

it has the presumptive status of prepared produce.

And the questioner held that we rely on the assumption that ordinarily the chaver tithed it immediately, before his death. Therefore he raised the difficulty:

But here,

since they had already been threshed and were in the house,

they are certainly tevel,

they are certainly tevel, since their work was completed [and there are two conditions for the obligation of tithing: one is “completion of the work,” which is the action of leveling the grain pile, the completion of the actions performed on the grain; and the second is that the produce “saw the face of the house,” meaning that it entered the house, as will be explained below],

and it is uncertain whether he tithed it,

the chaver,

or uncertain whether he did not tithe it. And a

doubt comes

and dislodges a certainty,

that they are tevel.

Thus a doubt dislodges a certainty. How, then, did Rabbi Yohanan answer that a doubt does not dislodge a certainty?

And we answer:

There,

with these fruits,

it is certainty and certainty;

there is no doubt here whether he tithed them,

for he certainly tithed them,

and just as they were certainly tevel, so now they are certainly prepared.

J

ust

a

s

Rabbi Hanina of Kuza’a said. For Rabbi Hanina of Kuza’a said: There is a certainty

—it is certain—

concerning a chaver, that he does not bring out from his possession anything that is not prepared.

Since the produce belongs to him and the obligation rests upon him, he is concerned not to cause people to stumble through it, and he certainly tithed it. Therefore no proof can be brought from there that a “doubt” dislodges a certainty, since it is not a doubt but “certainty.”

And if you wish, say:

the reason the produce is permitted is not that the chaver “certainly” tithed it; rather, even if it is not certain, it is permitted, because

it is a doubt and a doubt.

That is, just as it is uncertain whether he tithed it or not, so too it is uncertain whether the produce was ever tevel produce.

For

perhaps he acted

in accordance with Rabbi Oshaya.

Grain and produce are obligated in terumot and tithes by Torah law only under two conditions. One is that their work was completed in the field, which is called “leveling,” such as winnowing the grain in the wind after threshing in order to separate the chaff from it, or smoothing the pile [the “grain heap”]. The second is “seeing the face of the house.”

If their work was completed but they were not brought into the house, then it is forbidden to eat them as a “fixed meal,” by rabbinic law, and it is permitted to eat a “casual meal” [and it is also permitted to feed them to an animal, since every eating by an animal has the status of a casual meal].

The bringing into the house that establishes the obligation of tithing applies only when the produce is brought through the doorway after it has been leveled. Then it becomes tevel by Torah law, and it is obligated in terumot and tithes by Torah law.

But if he brought in the grain while it was still “with its chaff,” before leveling, and leveled it in the house, or if he brought it into the house indirectly, not through the doorway, then even if the grain was leveled, it is not tevel by Torah law.

This chaver who died and left leveled grain in the house may have brought the grain into his house before leveling it, and it is not “certain” that he leveled it in the field. Therefore, concerning this produce it is uncertain whether it ever became obligated in tithing by Torah law. And although it is obligated in tithes by rabbinic law, the Sages trusted him because he was a chaver, relying on the uncertainty that perhaps he tithed it.

And concerning the “doubt” regarding their obligation in tithes, there comes the “doubt” regarding their preparation—that he tithed them.

For

Rav Oshaya said:

A person may employ a subterfuge

and act cunningly in order to exempt his produce from tithes,

from his produce, and

how does he do it?

He brings it

into his house

with its chaff,

and although this subterfuge will not permit him to eat a fixed meal from it, but only a “casual” meal, nevertheless he gains from this subterfuge

so that his animal may eat,

since every eating by an animal is a casual meal, and it is permitted,

and

in this manner

the grain is exempt

from

the tithe.

And it is resolved: no proof may be brought from this beraita that a “doubt dislodges a certainty,” either because it is “certainty and certainty,” or because it is “a doubt and a doubt.”

And the Gemara continues to prove that a doubt removes from certainty.

And

thus

does a doubt not remove from certainty?!

And

but

it was taught

, for we learned in a beraita:

A woman who gives birth is impure with childbirth impurity, for one week after giving birth to a male and two weeks after giving birth to a female. And after them she has “days of purity,” during which the blood issuing from her source is considered pure blood, for thirty-three days in the case of a male and sixty-six days in the case of a female.