Avodah Zarah 42a — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Judah said: It happened with the maidservant ![](pamud.bmp "

exact folio location")

of a certain oppressor

an Israeli violent man and a convert

in

a place whose name was

Rimon, which

she miscarried and

cast

the

miscarried fetus into a pit, and a priest came,

a sage and decisor of halakha,

and looked into it

into the pit,

to know whether it was male or female

in order to determine for her how many days of impurity and purity she was to observe [for a maidservant too observes days of impurity and purity], but he did not see the miscarried fetus. Apparently, this priest had become impure by overshadowing the corpse, and he was not careful regarding his impurity,

and the matter came before the Sages, and they declared him pure

from the impurity of overshadowing the corpse,

because a weasel and a wildcat were commonly found there

and dragged it to a place that does not impart the impurity of a tent.

And

from now on,

here

in this incident

she certainly cast a miscarried fetus

into the pit, and

it is uncertain

whether the weasel

dragged it or did not drag it.

And

it comes

that the

uncertainty removes [the matter] from the status of certainty,

and therefore the Sages declared him pure.

It follows that an uncertainty removes [a matter] from the status of certainty, and this is difficult for Rabbi Yohanan?

And we answer:

Do not say

“she certainly

cast a ‘miscarried fetus’

into the pit,

but rather say

say:

she cast ‘something resembling a miscarried fetus’ into the pit

such as an embryonic sac, which is a sac found in the womb filled with air, in which a fetus has not yet taken form, and it does not impart impurity.

And there is “uncertainty” whether there is any impurity in the pit at all, and the “uncertainty” of the weasel’s dragging comes and removes [the matter] from the status of uncertainty. There is no proof from here that an uncertainty removes [a matter] from the status of “certainty.”

And we object: How can one explain it this way,

but it says, “to know whether it was male or female”

it teaches

and in an embryonic sac filled with air there is no indication distinguishing male from female?

And we answer: All this was what the priest came to examine, and

this is what he said

this is what Rabbi Judah intended: The priest looked

to know whether she had miscarried air

and she need not observe any days on account of it, neither days of impurity nor days of purity,

if she had cast a miscarried fetus

and she must observe days of impurity and purity,

and

he further examined

if you should say she had cast a miscarried fetus,

then he would examine

whether it was male or female.

And here there is an uncertainty removing [a matter] from the status of uncertainty.

And if you wish, say:

Even if she certainly cast a miscarried fetus, the Sages declared him pure

since a weasel and a wildcat were commonly found there, “they certainly dragged it away,”

since they were established as doing so.

And certainty comes and removes [the matter] from the status of certainty.

Rabbi Yohanan continues to prove his position that an idolatrous object that broke by itself is forbidden.

He raised an objection

from what we learned:

If one found the form of a hand

or

the form of a foot—

these are forbidden, because an object like them is worshipped.

And this is difficult:

Why

are they forbidden—

they are fragments,

they have, after all, broken; it proves that fragments are significant, and the gentiles worship them.

And we answer:

Samuel interpreted this

explained

Samuel

that the Mishna is speaking

of

the form of a hand and foot that

stand on their bases,

and because these forms are significant and are themselves idols, they set them upon their bases. No proof can be brought from here concerning fragments of idols.

He raised an objection

Rabbi Yohanan to Resh Lakish from what we learned in the next chapter:

A gentile can annul an idolatrous object

his own idol

and

also

that of his fellow,

although it is not his idol. And we learned there: How does he annul it? He cuts off the top of its ear, the top of its nose, or the top of its finger.

But

if it were

an Israelite, he cannot annul the idolatrous object of a gentile,

a non-Jew.

And we object from the latter clause:

Why,

why is it not annulled, although it was not the gentile who broke it but the Israelite who broke it?

Let it be

its status

like that of an idolatrous object that broke by itself,

based on the reasoning of Resh Lakish: If it cannot save itself from an Israelite, it cannot save others .

And this is difficult for Resh Lakish: Why is it not annulled merely by virtue of its being broken?

Abaye said:

According to Resh Lakish, indeed, if the Israelite broke it, it would be annulled and permitted, and the Mishna is speaking when the Israelite did not break it, but

crushed it,

he pressed it with a hammer until its form was ruined, but removed nothing, and this is not an idolatrous object that broke.

And

we object:

When he crushed it, what of it?

Why is it not annulled? Is not crushing one of the methods of annulling idols?

But we learned,

we learned there in the Mishna:

If he crushed it,

the gentile,

even though he removed nothing—

he annulled it.

And the objection returns: It is now crushed and ruined, and just as when the Israelite broke it, according to Abaye, it is annulled, why should it not be annulled when the Israelite crushed it? And we answer: Indeed, there is a distinction between breaking and crushing. When an Israelite breaks it, it is annulled; but when he crushes it,

these words

the matter is stated

when a gentile crushed it,

and thereby reveals that he is angry with it and disgraces it; the act of crushing itself annuls it [together with the fact that it is damaged, whereas other acts of disgrace and anger are not called annulment, as explained there].

But

when

an Israelite crushed it, it was not annulled,

and the gentile says: The idol does not object to crushing.

But if the Israelite broke it “literally,” it is annulled by itself, according to Abaye and according to Resh Lakish, based on the aforementioned reasoning: The gentile says, “If it could not save itself from an Israelite, it cannot save others.”

And Rava said: In fact

the truth is

that when an Israelite crushed it, it too was annulled.

That is, there is no distinction between breaking and crushing, and the Israelite’s act of crushing, like an act of breaking, is an excellent annulment.

But

if so, why is it not annulled according to Resh Lakish? After all, it is broken in the end, and the gentile despairs of it?

The reason is that the Sages prohibited it in every case in which an Israelite annulled it, because of

a decree, lest

perhaps beforehand he

lift it up

from the ownerless property , and by this lifting he acquires it, and it is his,

and then annuls it.

And it is an idolatrous object in the hand of an Israelite.

And every idolatrous object

that comes

into the hand of an Israelite

and is his acquisition

can never be annulled,

and requires destruction, as we learned in the next chapter.

He raised an objection

Rabbi Yohanan to Resh Lakish: We learned a beraita:

A gentile who brought stones from the

idol called

Markulis,

which is a heap of stones, and everyone who worships it throws a stone to it,

and

the gentile

paved with them

with the stones

roads and highways [

the version of the Rashash:

and intercity roads,

which are roads from one city to another]—

they are permitted,

the stones are permitted for benefit, because the gentile annulled them by dismantling the heap.

But

if

an Israelite brought stones from Markulis and paved with them roads and highways—

they are forbidden

for benefit.

And this is difficult:

Why

are they forbidden?

Let them be like an idolatrous object that broke by itself,

for in the end it was dismantled, as stated above,

are they forbidden?

and this is difficult for Resh Lakish?

And we answer:

Here too, like

as

that

said

Rava: A decree lest the Israelite lift the entire heap before dismantling it, in which case annulment would not help him, because it is an idolatrous object in the hand of an Israelite .

He raised an objection

Rabbi Yohanan to Resh Lakish from what we learned in a beraita:

A gentile who shaved an idolatrous object,

scraped pieces from a wooden idolatrous object, if he did so

for his own needs,

of the gentile, to use the shavings as fuel, then

it,

the idolatrous object,

and its shavings are permitted,

for through the act of shaving he annulled it. But if he did so

for its needs,

to beautify it, then

it is forbidden,

because he did not annul it,

but its shavings are permitted,

because he throws them away and does not worship them.

But

if

an Israelite shaved an idolatrous object

belonging to a gentile,

whether for his own needs or for its needs—

it and its shavings are forbidden.

And this is difficult:

Why

are they forbidden when an Israelite shaved it for his own needs?

Let it be like an idolatrous object that broke by itself.

For indeed, if he shaved it for its needs, it is forbidden, because even if the gentile had shaved it, it would be forbidden. But if the Israelite shaved it for his own needs, it should have been annulled?

And we answer:

Here too, like

as

that

said

Rava:

A decree lest he lift it before annulling it, and acquire it, and annulment does not help for it, since there is no annulment for an idolatrous object belonging to an Israelite.

He raised an objection

Rabbi Yohanan to Resh Lakish from what we learned: An Israelite who finds an idolatrous object of metal—what should he do with it in order to remove it from the world, so that an Israelite will not benefit from it?

Rabbi Yose says: He grinds it

it

and scatters

its particles

to the wind,

or

throws it into the sea.

They said to him

the Sages to Rabbi Yose: This is not a proper way to destroy it, because

even it

the particles

become fertilizer,

to fertilize the soil when they are scattered to the wind, and it follows that the Israelite benefits from them when his field improves,

and it is written [

Deuteronomy 13]: “

Nothing of the banned object shall cleave to your hand,”

but he should lead it to the Dead Sea and other similar places where it is entirely lost.

And this is difficult:

Why

are the particles forbidden for benefit?

Let them be like an idolatrous object that broke by itself?

And we answer:

Here too, like

as

that

said

Rava,

that it is forbidden only because of the decree lest he lift it and afterward annul it.

He raised an objection

Rabbi Yohanan to Resh Lakish: We learned a beraita:

Rabbi Yose ben Yasyan says: He found

the Israelite

the form of a dragon [

like a serpent], and it is among the forms that the gentiles worship, and

its head was cut off—

it is uncertain

for him whether

a gentile cut it off

and annulled it, or

an Israelite cut it off

and it is forbidden;

it is permitted

to benefit from the form, on account of “a compound uncertainty”: perhaps it was never worshipped, and even if it was worshipped, perhaps the gentile annulled it .

But if it was

certain

that

the Israelite cut it—

it is forbidden.

And this is difficult:

Why

is it forbidden?

Let it be like an idolatrous object that broke by itself,

for it is now broken?

And we answer:

Here too, like

as

that

said

Rava,

there is concern lest he lift it and afterward annul it.

He raised an objection

Rabbi Yohanan to Resh Lakish: Regarding an asherah tree, one may not sow vegetables beneath it during the summer, because he benefits from the shade of the tree, and an asherah is forbidden for benefit; but one may sow vegetables beneath it during the rainy season, since the shade harms the vegetables during the rainy season, he does not benefit from the asherah—these are the words of the Sages.

Rabbi Yose says: Even not

may one sow beneath it

vegetables during the rainy season, because the fallen leaves

the leaves that fall from it during the rainy season

fall upon them,

and the owner of the vegetables benefits from it as fertilizer for the soil.

And this is difficult:

Why,

for surely the leaves fall by themselves from the wind—

let them be like an idolatrous object that broke by itself

and be annulled and permitted for benefit according to Resh Lakish—and why is it forbidden to benefit from the fallen leaves?

And concerning this objection, the aforementioned answer, “like Rava,” obviously cannot be given, because it is not an Israelite who annuls them; rather, they fall from the tree by themselves.

And we answer:

There it is different

there, in the case of an asherah, its law is different, since

the principal idolatrous object

the asherah

remains,

therefore even the fallen leaves that fall from it are forbidden [as will be explained].