Avodah Zarah 37a (לז.) — the Talmud in English

For Rabbi Ḥiyya said

Rabbi Ḥiyya:

When does a gentile male child become impure with ziva? —

When he is nine years and one day

old,

since he is fit

he is

for intercourse,

and consequently there is concern that he might engage in male homosexual intercourse with a Jewish male child. Therefore, the Sages decreed that he should be

also impure

as well

with ziva,

but not before that age.

Ravina said: Therefore, a gentile female child who is three years and one day old,

since she is fit for intercourse, should also become impure

as well

with ziva,

as is the law with regard to a gentile male child,

The Gemara is astonished:

Obviously,

she would certainly become impure from the time when she becomes fit for intercourse, so that Jewish male children would not be drawn after her, and this is the same law as that of a male child. Why would there have been any reason to distinguish between them?

The Gemara explains:

It was necessary to teach this,

as I might have said that

this one,

the nine-year-old male child,

knows how to entice,

that is, he knows how to accustom and draw other children to him for sinful behavior, and therefore the decree of impurity was imposed upon him.

However,

this one,

the three-year-old female child,

does not know how to entice,

as she does not know how to accustom others to come to her; consequently, there would be no reason to impose this impurity upon her.

It teaches us

that in fact there is no distinction between them: gentile male and female children are impure once they become fit for intercourse.

Rabbi Yehuda Nesia was leaning

was supported

and going

along

on the shoulders of Rabbi Shemaya,

the Nasi [the grandson of Rabbi,

his shoulders

upon his shoulders

of Rabbi Shemaya,

who served him.

He said to him

Rabbi Yehuda the Nasi said to Rabbi Shemaya:

Shemaya, you were not in the study hall last night when we permitted the oil

of the gentiles.

He said to him

Rabbi Shemaya said to Rabbi: If so, then

in our days permit even the bread

of gentiles.

He said to him

Rabbi said to him:

If so,

I will also permit the bread, as you say;

they will call us “the lenient court,”

and people will call us, “the court that permits everything.”

And where do we find that those who are excessively lenient in permitting matters are called by such a name?

As we learned in a mishna: Rabbi Yosei ben Yo’ezer, איש צרידה, testified concerning the ayyal kamtza

a species of locust

that it is pure,

meaning that it is ritually pure and permitted to be eaten.

And

also

concerning the liquids of the slaughterhouse,

the slaughterhouse of the Temple [such as the blood and water found there] —

that they are pure,

and they do not impart the impurity of liquids.

And concerning one who comes into contact with a corpse,

one who approaches and touches a corpse, that he should be

impure,

ritually impure.

And

because of these permissions,

they called him

they called him

“Yosef the Permitter,”

the one who permits.

He said to him

Rabbi Shemaya said to Rabbi Yehuda Nesia: There is no comparison between my request to permit the bread and the permissions granted by Rabbi Yosei.

For

there,

there Rabbi Yosei ben Yo’ezer of Tzereida

permitted

permitted

three

three matters, and since he permitted so much, they called him Yosef the Permitter.

However,

you,

you, Rabbi Yehuda Nesia,

permitted one.

You permitted only the oil, which is one matter,

and if the Master permits one other matter,

whereas if you add and permit only one further matter,

there will still be only two.

There will still be two permissions, not three. Therefore they will not call you “the lenient court.”

He said to him

Rabbi Yehuda Nesia said to him:

I permitted another one.

In addition to the oil, I permitted another matter. If I add and permit the bread, there will be three permissions.

What is it?

What was the additional matter that Rabbi Yehuda Nesia permitted?

As we learned in a mishna: One who says

to his wife,

“This is your bill of divorce if I do not come from now until twelve months,” and he dies within twelve months—it is not a bill of divorce,

since he did not say that the bill of divorce should take effect retroactively from now if he did not come by the end of twelve months. Rather, he merely said: “If I do not come from now until twelve months.” She is not divorced from him until twelve months have passed, but he has already died before then and cannot divorce her at that time. Therefore, if she falls before his brother for levirate marriage, she may not marry outside the levirate bond without ḥalitza!

And it was taught concerning it

and it was taught in a beraita concerning this mishna:

“And our Sages permitted her to marry,”

without requiring ḥalitza from the yavam.

And we say: Who are

who are

“our Sages”

who permitted her?

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel,

they are

the court that permitted the oil.

That same court that permitted the oil of gentiles—namely, Rabbi Yehuda the Nasi and his court. It was concerning this matter that Rabbi said to Rabbi Shemaya that he had already permitted another matter.

The Gemara explains that, with regard to this permission by which Rabbi Yehuda Nesia permitted the woman to rely on the bill of divorce,

they held

Rabbi held

in accordance with Rabbi Yosei,

in his dispute with the Sages [Bava Batra 136a; in the note we brought their dispute in full].

For

Rabbi Yosei said:

the date of a document,

which is written in the document,

proves its meaning,

that the document takes effect from the date written in it.

And Rabbi Abba, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, said: Rabbi Yehuda the Nasi

who was Rabbi’s grandson—he was the one who

ruled

to permit the woman on the basis of this bill of divorce,

but they did not agree with him throughout his entire lifetime,

all his days they disagreed with him.

And some say

that there are those who say that they did not agree with him,

all his faction.

That is, his colleagues in the faction of Sages on his court.

Rabbi Elazar said to that elder

one of the elders who was with Rabbi Yehuda Nesia when he permitted this woman to rely on the bill of divorce:

When you permitted her,

when you heard that her husband had died and permitted her, did you

permit her immediately,

permit her at once, since it was clear to you

that he would not come,

that the husband would never return, and therefore did you not wait until twelve months had been completed?

Or perhaps

only

after twelve months

did you permit her,

since his condition had been fulfilled,

because only after this period was the husband’s condition fulfilled: “If I do not come from now until twelve months.”

That elder replied to him with a question: Instead of being uncertain about the basis of our permission,

and having the question arise for you

you should have raised this question

concerning the mishna,

concerning the continuation of the same mishna cited above.

As we learned in a mishna: “This is your bill of divorce from now if I do not come from now until twelve months,” and he dies within twelve months—it is

it is

a bill of divorce, since his condition had been fulfilled,

his condition was fulfilled, and indeed he did not come by the end of twelve months.

And if so,

the question should arise for you

concerning that mishna: whether

it is a bill of divorce immediately,

and the woman is permitted immediately, even though the twelve months have not yet elapsed,

since he did not come,

because the husband died and necessarily cannot come.

Or perhaps

perhaps only

after twelve months

will the woman be permitted,

since his condition had been fulfilled,

because only then is his condition fulfilled. Why, then, were you uncertain only about the permission granted by our court and not about the mishna?

Rabbi Elazar answered him:

Indeed, that is so.

Indeed, I should have raised this question concerning the mishna as well,

but because you were present in that assembly,

I asked you because you were present in the assembly that permitted her to marry.

The Gemara further discusses the matter of the permission granted by Rabbi Yehuda Nesia:

Abaye said: Everyone agrees

[even Rabbi Yosei] that when a man says to his wife at night, “This is your bill of divorce

when the sun emerges from its sheath,”

his intention is

he tells her that it is to take effect when it emerges,

that the bill of divorce should take effect only when the sun emerges.

And if he dies at night,

therefore, if that man dies at night, this

bill of divorce

this

is after death,

and a bill of divorce cannot take effect after death. This woman is therefore not divorced and requires ḥalitza or levirate marriage if she has no son and her deceased husband has a brother.

But if he said, “This is your bill of divorce

on the condition that the sun emerges from its sheath”—

he is telling her that it takes effect from now,

and its effectiveness will be retroactive from now once the sun emerges from its sheath,

and if he dies at night, this is certainly a condition, and it is a bill of divorce during his lifetime.

This bill of divorce will take effect retroactively, from now. Therefore she is already divorced from now, during his lifetime.

The Gemara explains that this ruling is

in accordance with Rav Huna. For Rav Huna said: Anyone who says “on the condition that,”

as in this case, where he says, “on the condition that the sun emerges from its sheath,” is

like one who says

that this bill of divorce shall be

from now, it is considered.

And in this matter everyone agrees—Rabbi Yehuda Nesia and the Rabbis.

They disagree only

when a man says to his wife, “This is your bill of divorce

if it emerges

the sun.”

Rabbi Yehuda Nesia holds in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, who said

Rabbi Yosei:

the date of a document proves its meaning, and it is

and this is

as

though he had said, “This is your bill of divorce

from today if I die,”

and

as

though he says to his wife, “This is your bill of divorce

from now if I die,”

so that the bill of divorce takes effect from now, during his lifetime. After he dies, it will become clear retroactively that she had already been divorced from now.

And

according to

the Rabbis, they do not hold

they do not accept the words of

Rabbi Yosei

that the date of a document proves its meaning,

and

therefore, when one says to his wife, “This is your bill of divorce if the sun emerges from its sheath,”

it is

it is

as

though he says

“This is your bill of divorce if I die,” alone.

He does not establish that the bill of divorce should take effect immediately; rather, it takes effect after his death. Therefore, it is not a bill of divorce.

The body of the matter,

the Gemara discusses the three halakhot concerning which

Yosei ben Yo’ezer of Tzereida testified.

A.

Concerning

the locust called

ayyal kamtza, which is pure,

meaning that it is pure and permitted to eat,

B.

And concerning the liquid

of the blood and water of

the slaughterhouse,

the slaughterhouse in the Temple,

that they are pure,

as they are pure from the impurity of liquids,

C.

And concerning one who comes into contact with a corpse,

one who touches a corpse—that he is

impure,

ritually impure.

And

because of these halakhot and permissions,

they called him “Yosef the Permitter”

the Permitter.

The Gemara clarifies:

What is

what is

ayyal kamtza?

Rav Pappa said: It is a shosheiva,

a species of locust with an elongated head.

And Rav Ḥiyya bar Ami, in the name

in the name

of Ulla, said:

It is a species of locust called

“susbil.”

According to both approaches to the definition of “ayyal kamtza,” the Gemara explains the dispute between Yosei ben Yo’ezer and the Sages as to whether this locust is pure or impure.

Rav Pappa said:

This locust is

“shosheiva,”

and its head is elongated.

And they disagree

Rabbi Yosei ben Yo’ezer and the Sages disagree

with regard to an elongated head.

One Master holds: an elongated head renders it forbidden,

since it is not mentioned in the Torah,

and one Master holds: an elongated head permits it,

because it possesses all the signs of purity.