Avodah Zarah 33a (לג.) — the Talmud in English

to engage in business with him. Once

he adheres to it,

he is attached to idolatry,

he will repeatedly return and go,

he will go back there in order to worship it.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

But wasn’t it taught in a beraita: A Jew who goes to a place of idolatry, both on his way there and on his way back—

is prohibited.

Yet here we said that on his way there it is permitted?

The Gemara answers:

Rav Ashi said: When that beraita was taught,

the beraita that prohibits business with him both on his way there and on his way back was speaking

of an apostate Jew, who certainly goes there,

he certainly goes to idolatry and presumably will not turn back. Whereas the ruling cited here by Shmuel concerns an ordinary Jew who is not an apostate.

The Sages taught: With regard to a gentile who goes to a fair

a market held in honor of idolatry

whether

the gentile is

on his way there

to that market,

or

he is

on his way back

from that market,

it is permitted

to engage in business with him.

But

a Jew who goes to a fair

of idolatry:

on his way there it is permitted

to engage in business with him, but

on his way back

from there

it is prohibited.

And the Gemara analyzes this:

What is different with regard to a Jew, that on his way back it is prohibited

to engage in business with him, whereas with a gentile it is permitted? This is because

we say: He sold idolatry,

he sold idols there at the market,

and now he has money from idolatry with him,

he has it in his possession. Therefore, it is prohibited to engage in business with him, so as not to derive benefit from this money.

If so,

with regard to a gentile as well, let us say

the same thing about him:

He sold idolatry,

he sold it there, and now

he has money from idolatry with him,

he has it in his possession. Why, then, should it not be prohibited to engage in business even with him on his return?

Rather,

if you would say that with regard to

a gentile we say,

we say that

he sold a cloak,

he sold a cloak there,

he sold wine,

he sold wine there, and not necessarily an object of idolatry. Therefore, his money is permitted.

If so, with regard to

a Jew as well, let us say: Perhaps he sold a cloak, he sold wine,

why, then, is the money of a Jew returning from there prohibited?

The Gemara explains:

If he had had it,

if the Jew had had a cloak or wine to sell,

he would have sold it here

he would have sold them here, among us, and would not have needed to trouble himself to go as far as a market of idolatry. Since in any event he went there, it is reasonable to assume that he sold objects of idolatry there; therefore, his money is prohibited.

We learned in our Mishna:

And those who come

from there—

it is permitted

to engage in business with them.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: They taught

this ruling

only when

the gentiles returning from there are not

bound together

and coming as a single group.

But

if they are

bound together

and constitute a single group,

they are prohibited

to engage in business with them. Since they are a single group,

let us say

that

he intends to return

with them once more to the house of idolatry.

We learned in our Mishna:

The wineskins

leather vessels of

the gentiles and their jugs,

and the wine of a Jew stored in them are prohibited. And their prohibition is a prohibition of deriving benefit, according to the statement of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: Their prohibition is not a prohibition of deriving benefit.

The Sages taught: Wineskins

of

the gentiles,

if they were

scraped,

scraped and without pitch, and

new—

they are

permitted.

Since even if wine had been in them for a short time, the leather would not have absorbed it.

This ruling applies specifically to leather wineskins. But earthenware vessels absorb immediately and are prohibited. And if the vessels were

old or

or

pitched,

coated with pitch on the inside—

they are prohibited.

For an old vessel in which libation wine had remained for a long time certainly absorbed it.

Likewise, if it was coated with pitch, the pitch immediately absorbed wine. Therefore, these vessels are prohibited.

And if

a gentile softened the pitch,

melting the pitch into them,

and processed them and placed wine in them,

while the pitch was hot, as they would do in order to dispel the bitter taste of the pitch,

and

there was

a Jew standing over him—

he need not be concerned

that perhaps the gentile performed libation with the wine.

The Gemara asks:

But since the gentile places wine in them, while a Jew is standing over him—

what has been accomplished,

what benefit does the Jew’s standing there provide? In the end, it is gentile wine, since the gentile poured it in.

Rav Pappa said: This is what it means,

this is how this halakha was stated:

A gentile softened the pitch,

melting it to coat the wineskin,

and

the gentile

processed them, but

it is

a Jew

who

places wine in them, and another Jew is standing

over him. And he need not be concerned

that perhaps it is libation wine.

The Gemara objects:

And

since

a Jew places wine in them, another Jew

is

standing over him—why do I need this?

It is not gentile wine at all!

The Gemara answers:

Perhaps

perhaps

due to his preoccupation

with the Jew’s being occupied with pouring the wine into the wineskin,

he performs libation

the gentile performs libation with the wine

without his awareness.

Perhaps the Jew placing the wine into the pitched wineskin will not pay attention to observe the gentile’s actions, and the gentile will perform libation with it. Therefore, another Jew must stand over him to guard against the gentile.

Rav Zevid said:

There is no need to alter what was stated initially.

And in fact, it is as you said at first,

as we initially said: It is indeed the gentile who pours the wine into the wineskin.

And here,

in this case there is no concern for libation wine, because

at the time when he pours it,

when the gentile pours the wine into the wineskin coated with pitch,

it becomes like

a situation in which he is

throwing water into mud,

and destroying it, so that the wine disappears on its own. For the wine placed into the pitch is lost and its flavor is nullified. It becomes mixed into and lost within the pitch. Once the pitch dries, the wine is gone and is no longer expelled. Therefore, there is no concern that libation wine might become mixed with wine subsequently placed into the wineskin.

Rav Pappi said: Infer from this

we learn

from

this statement

of Rav Zevid,

that

in the case of such a gentile who poured wine into the salt of a Jew,

who poured wine into a vessel filled with a Jew’s salt,

it is permitted,

the salt is permitted, since the wine is absorbed and consumed within the salt.

Rav Ashi strongly objected to this: Are they comparable?

Is placing wine into pitch comparable to placing wine into salt?

But

there,

there, in the case of pitch,

it goes

the wine goes

to waste

within the pitch and no longer exists at all.

However,

here,

in the case of placing wine into salt,

it does not go

the wine does not go

to waste,

rather, it imparts flavor to the salt permanently; it does not dry up and disappear.

There was an incident involving

Bar Adda the Arab,

an Arab, who

forcibly took

snatched

those wineskins

several wineskins

from Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef.

He poured wine into them

he placed wine inside them,

and returned them to him

he returned them to him.

He came and asked in the beit-midrash,

he came and asked in the house of study what the status of these wineskins was.

Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: This is what Rabbi Ami ruled, as a practical halakha: Fill them with water for three days

so that the water will absorb the wine embedded in the vessel,

and

after three days

pour it out,

pour out this water.

And Rava said: It is necessary to pour it out

to replace the water

from one day to the next,

on each of the three days.

They understood

they learned and reasoned concerning this halakha that

this matter

this ruling—that the vessel can be prepared by placing water in it for three days—applies only to

our

vessel, ours, like the vessel of Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef, which had been in their possession only briefly.

But theirs,

a vessel of theirs that had remained in their possession for a long time and had absorbed their wine,

not

this procedure is ineffective for it, and it cannot be prepared at all.

When

when

Ravin arrived, he said

in the name of

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish:

The law is

the same

for a wineskin

of ours

that had been in the possession of a gentile,

and

the law is

the same

for a wineskin

of theirs

that is now in our possession: In both cases, they can be prepared by filling them with water for three days and pouring it out.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, thought

he reasoned

in the presence of

before

Rav Ashi, to say

that the law is as follows:

This matter,

this ruling—that they can be prepared by placing them in water for three days—applies only to

wineskins

of leather that came from the gentiles.

But jugs

of earthenware, which absorb a great deal of the wine placed in them,

no.

They have no means of preparation at all.

Rav Ashi said to him: There is no difference—

the law of the

skins, and there is no difference—

the law of the

jars;

rather, this remedy applies to both: one should put water into them for three days and pour it out.

The Sages taught: Jars belonging to gentiles

that a Jew wishes to use. If they are

new and scraped,

meaning that they were never coated with pitch—

they are permitted.

However, if they are

old and

or

pitched,

coated with pitch—

they are forbidden.

If the

gentile had been putting wine into them,

and

a Jew

now wishes to use them, the law is:

he puts water into them

for three days and pours it out, and the jars are permitted.

And similarly, if a

gentile

had been

putting wine into them, a Jew may put brine and fish sauce into them and need not be concerned

on account of the wine, because fish brine and fish sauce, which is fish oil, burn up the wine and destroy it.