Avodah Zarah 16a (טז.) — the Talmud in English

Rav [

Pappa]:

It is impossible,

if there is a possibility of refraining from selling them wheat and barley,

so too,

indeed, it is prohibited. That is, the Sages did not issue a decree concerning them, because refraining from selling them would lead to enmity. But one can refrain from selling shields without causing enmity.

Some say,

there are those who explain that

shields

are the reason that it is not

the reason they prohibited selling shields is

that when their weapons are depleted,

when their weapons run out during the war,

they kill with them,

they kill using the shields, and it follows that the shields are included among the implements of killing that the Sages prohibited.

And “some say”

hold

that one may sell them shields, because when their weapons are depleted,

when their weapons run out,

they flee,

and do not use the shields for killing.

Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha said: The halakha follows

the words of

some say,

who permit it.

The Gemara now cites another halakha concerning the sale of implements of killing to gentiles.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: One may not sell them thick slabs

pieces

of iron.

And the Gemara discusses this:

What is the reason

for the prohibition? Is it

because they make weapons from them,

as they manufacture implements of killing from the iron?

If so,

if that is the case,

even a hoe and an ax,

implements of labor made of iron,

also

should it be prohibited to sell them, because they can manufacture implements of killing from their iron?

Rav Zevid said:

Ordinary iron may be sold to them; what was prohibited refers

to Indian iron,

iron from India, from which they are accustomed to manufacture implements of killing. And we conclude:

But nowadays,

in our times [in the time of the amoraim in Babylonia

we sell

as is our practice, permitting it and selling them these implements—what is the reason?

Rav Ashi said:

We sell

to the Persians

to the Persians

because they protect us,

as they protect us and use these implements to guard the city and its inhabitants.

We learned in the Mishna:

Calves and foals, whole or injured, Rabbi Yehuda permits an injured one.

The Gemara explains Rabbi Yehuda’s rationale and in what way the Sages disagreed with him.

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yehuda permits an injured animal because it cannot heal and live.

Presumably, the gentile purchases it for slaughter and does not keep it, and it will not be seen in the gentile’s possession; therefore, people will not learn from this to permit selling a whole animal.

The Sages said to him,

to Rabbi Yehuda:

But one can mate another animal with it

another animal

and it will give birth.

And since one can mate another animal with it and it will give birth—

he will come to keep it,

the gentile will keep the injured animal for this purpose, and whoever sees it in the gentile’s possession will learn from this to sell a whole animal.

He said to them,

Rabbi Yehuda said:

When it gives birth,

then you should prohibit it.

And the Gemara proves:

Apparently,

it is evident that Rabbi Yehuda maintains that an injured animal

does not accept

upon itself

a male.

We learned in the Mishna:

Ben Beteira permits a horse.

The Gemara explains Ben Beteira’s permission and the rationale of those who disagree with him.

It was taught in a beraita: Ben Beteira permits a horse because one performs with it labor for which one is not liable to bring a sin-offering.

That is, the labor performed with a horse is riding, which is not prohibited by Torah law [as explained in tractate Shabbat]. Therefore, there is no reason to issue a decree concerning it on account of lending, renting, or testing it, because even if one lends it, rents it, or tests it, one does not violate a prohibition by Torah law.

But Rabbi prohibits

selling them a horse

for two reasons.

One, because of the category of weapons; and one, because of the category of a large animal,

as will be explained.

And the Gemara discusses this:

Granted,

what Rabbi said concerning

the category of weapons

is understandable, because

there are

horses

that kill with their stamping,

as they are trained to kill human beings by striking downward with their forelegs, killing those who fall in battle—

But

what Rabbi said concerning

the category of a large animal—

what is it?

After all, a horse is not suitable for labor prohibited by Torah law, and there is no reason to issue a decree concerning it on account of “testing it.” And we answer:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: When it grows old,

the horse

one uses it to turn a millstone.

It turns the millstone, and this is a primary category of labor

on Shabbat

in the category of grinding; therefore Rabbi prohibited it.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The halakha follows Ben Beteira,

who permits selling them a horse.

They raised a dilemma,

the students of the academy were uncertain: “

a fattened ox

that they fattened and it is very fat and unfit for labor,

what is its law?

Is it permitted to sell it to a gentile who is not a butcher?

The sides of the dilemma are as follows: On the one hand, presumably the ox is designated only for slaughter and will be slaughtered immediately, so it will not be seen in the gentile’s possession. On the other hand, since it is possible to keep it and it will subsequently become fit for labor, there is concern that it will be seen in the gentile’s possession, and people will learn from it to sell ordinary oxen to them.

The dilemma may be raised according to Rabbi Yehuda,

as this question may be considered both according to Rabbi Yehuda, who permits selling an injured animal to a gentile,

and it may be raised according to the Rabbis,

who prohibit selling an injured animal—

The dilemma may be raised according to Rabbi Yehuda,

because

Rabbi Yehuda permitted only

he permitted

an injured animal, which does not come to the status of an animal fit for labor,

as it will never become fit for labor, and certainly the gentile will slaughter it quickly.

But this one,

this fattened ox,

if he keeps it

if the gentile keeps it without continuing to fatten it,

it will come to the status of an animal fit for labor,

the ox will eventually become suitable for labor,

it is prohibited.

Although with regard to this ox there is no concern on account of “testing it,” since at the time of the sale it is fattened and unfit for labor, nevertheless, since if the gentile keeps it without continuing to fatten it, it will become fit for labor and will be seen in his possession, people may learn from this to sell other, unfattened oxen to a gentile; therefore, there is reason to prohibit it.

Or perhaps,

perhaps

even according to the Rabbis

it is permitted to sell it to a gentile. Because only

there did they prohibit it,

in the case of an injured animal,

because ordinarily it is not designated for slaughter,

as it is thin and is intended for producing offspring, and therefore it is kept.

But this one, “

this fattened ox,”

since ordinarily it is designated for slaughter,

as it was fattened for that purpose, it is possible to say that

even the Rabbis permit it,

permit.

That is, on the one hand, it has an advantage over an injured animal, as it is designated for immediate slaughter; but on the other hand, it has a disadvantage relative to an injured animal, because it can be kept without further fattening, at which point it will become fit for labor.

Come and hear

a proof to resolve the dilemma, from that

which Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said:

The people

of Rabbi’s household used to offer

they would customarily bring to the king, as a tax and a gift,

“a fattened ox,” on their festival day.

Since Rabbi was displeased with this practice, he sought to stop it. Therefore, in the first year he

spent four ten-thousands,

Rabbi expended and distributed from his own money a sum of forty thousand as a bribe, with the aim

that it not be offered,

so that they would not have to bring the gift of the fattened ox

that day,

which was their festival day,

but

would bring it to the king only

the next day,

which was not their festival day.

And the following year, again he

spent four ten-thousands—

so that it not be offered

the ox

alive, but slaughtered.

And the year after that, again he

spent four ten-thousands—

so that it not be offered at all.

And the Gemara proves:

What is the reason,

why did Rabbi make such an effort not to have it offered alive? Was it

not because perhaps

perhaps

they would come to keep it,

perhaps they would not slaughter the fattened ox but would keep it until it became fit for labor?

Thus, it is prohibited to sell or give a gentile a gift of “a fattened ox.”

And we reject this: There is no proof from here, because

according to your reasoning,

the fact that Rabbi incurred great expenses so

that it not be offered that day but the next day—

what is the reason?

After all, this has no practical legal significance; the next day was not their festival day!

Rather,

this is the explanation of Rabbi’s practice:

Rabbi sought to uproot the matter.

He wanted to uproot this improper practice.

And

since he knew that he could not uproot it entirely,

he reasoned: Let it be uprooted little by little.

He would uproot it gradually: one year they would offer it the next day, the following year they would offer it slaughtered, and the year after that they would not offer it at all.

Rabbi did not do this because there is a practical legal difference between an animal that is alive and one that is slaughtered, just as there is no practical legal difference between that day and the next day. The dilemma therefore remains unresolved.

And we raise an objection to the statement of the one who raised the dilemma, that if a fattened ox is kept, it will become fit for labor:

But if he keeps it, will it become healthy and perform labor?!

And we answer:

Rav Ashi said: Zevida said to me,

regarding one who fattens oxen:

a fattened ox

a fattened ox

we keep it

we keep it until it becomes thin,

and

then

it performs

labor

twice as much,

twice as much as other oxen.

This Mishna deals with the prohibition against selling gentiles things that can cause harm to the public. Several details of these laws were brought in the preceding sugya.

Mishna:

One may not sell them bears or lions, or anything that can cause harm to the public

such as implements of killing and instruments of imprisonment.

One may not build with them

participate in their construction—

basilicas,

courthouses where those sentenced to death are killed,

gallows,

a place of execution,

stadiums,

a place where bullfights are held and people are killed there,

and platforms

structures resembling tall buildings from which people are pushed to their deaths—

These places can cause harm to the public, and it is prohibited to build with them, so that Jews will not be killed there.

But one may build with them

places that do not cause harm to the public and are not made for idolatry, such as

stone platforms

a platform made of a single stone

and bathhouses.

The gentiles were accustomed to placing idols in bathhouses, and when the Jew

reached the dome

the vaulted ceiling

in which they placed idolatry—

it was prohibited to build .

The Gemara discusses a large wild animal, such as a domesticated lion or an animal that is not at all accustomed to causing harm, and whether it is permitted to sell it to a gentile.

In a place where the custom is not to sell small livestock, it is certainly prohibited to sell a large wild animal [whether because of concern about mating, or because they may come to sell large livestock as well]. Rather, the Gemara’s discussion concerns a place where the custom is to sell small livestock: Is it permitted to sell a large wild animal that does not cause harm?

The sides of the question are whether there is concern that such animals perform labor, in which case they are prohibited because of lending, renting, and testing, or whether they are not accustomed to performing labor.

The Gemara cites a statement of Rav who said two laws concerning a large wild animal. One concerns “movement,” and the other concerns sale. “

Movement” is derived from a term meaning shaking; it is a law in the laws of slaughter.

The matter is as follows: When one slaughters a dangerously ill animal—one that is close to death—and there is doubt whether he slaughtered it before its death, in which case it is permitted to eat and does not impart the ritual impurity of an animal carcass, or whether it died before the slaughter, in which case it is a carcass, one examines it through “movement” after the slaughter, which is a sign of life.

There is a difference between a large animal and a small animal. In the case of a small animal, whose movements are light, if it extended its leg and did not retract it, this does not demonstrate signs of life, but rather signs of the departure of life; it must move. In contrast, with a large animal, whose movements are heavy, whether it extended its leg and did not bend it, or bent it and did not extend it, this constitutes movement, and it is kosher.

Rav discusses a large [kosher] wild animal: What movement permits it?

Gemara:

Rav Ḥanin bar bar Ḥisda said, and some say

there are those who transmitted this teaching

Rav Ḥanan bar Rava said that Rav said: A large wild animal is like a small animal with regard to

the law of movement, because it extends its leg as life departs, since its movements are light, and it is not rendered permitted by this until it moves, even though it is large.

Rav continues with a second law:

But it is not like a small animal with regard to

the law of

sale.

A large wild animal does not have the status of a small animal with regard to the prohibition against selling to a gentile; its law does not depend on the custom of the places. Rather, its status is that of a large animal, and everywhere it may not be sold.

And Rav Hanan continues:

And I say: even with regard to sale

its ruling is like that of small livestock; therefore,

where it is customary to sell

small livestock—

they sell, and

where it is customary

not to sell—

they do not sell.

According to Rav, it is prohibited everywhere to sell a large animal to gentiles, whereas according to Rav Hanan, it is prohibited only in a place where the custom is to prohibit the sale of small livestock.

The Gemara infers from the wording of the Mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rav Hanan. And this is difficult according to Rav.

We learned

we learned in the Mishna:

They may not sell bears or lions to them, nor anything else that can cause harm to the public—

And let us infer:

the reason

the reason that the Sages prohibited it is because

there is in it

that it contains

harm to the public—

this,

whereas

there is not in it

it does not contain

harm to the public,

such as a domesticated lion —

it is permitted

to sell it, and they were not concerned about the prohibition of performing labor on Shabbat—

This implies in accordance with the words of Rav Hanan, and it is difficult according to Rav?

Rabba bar Ulla said

that we should not infer this, because the implication from the Mishna that a domesticated lion is permitted refers to

a crippled lion

that is unfit for labor.