Avodah Zarah 16a — the Talmud in English

Rav

Pappa:

It is impossible, if there is a possibility of refraining from selling them wheat and barley,

if it is possible to avoid selling them wheat and barley,

so too,

indeed it is forbidden. That is, the Sages did not decree concerning them, because preventing their sale would lead to enmity. But from selling shields it is possible to refrain without enmity.

There are those who say:

there is one who explains that

shields

this is the reason that it is not

the reason that they prohibited selling shields is

because when their weapons are finished,

when their weapons are exhausted in battle,

they kill with them,

they kill with the shields, and it follows that the shields are included among the instruments of killing that the Sages prohibited.

And “there are those who say”

hold

they sell them shields, because when their weapons are finished,

because when their weapons are exhausted,

they flee,

they flee and do not use the shields for killing.

Rav Naḥman said that Rabbah bar Avuha said: The halakha is like

the words of

those who say,

who permit.

And now the Gemara brings another halakha concerning the sale of instruments of killing to gentiles.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: They do not sell them thick plates

thick pieces

of iron.

And the Gemara discusses:

What is the reason

what is the reason for the prohibition? Is it

because weapons are produced from them,

that they manufacture instruments of killing from the iron,

if so,

if so,

even a hoe and an ax,

implements made of iron,

also

should it be forbidden to sell them, because they can manufacture instruments of killing from their iron?

Rav Zevid said:

ordinary iron implements are permitted to sell to them, and what they prohibited refers to

Indian iron,

iron from the land of India, from which they are accustomed to manufacture instruments of killing. And we conclude:

but nowadays

in our time [in the time of the amoraim in Babylonia]

we sell

we practice leniency and sell them these implements—what is the reason?

Rav Ashi said:

We sell

to the Persians

to the Persians

because they protect us,

because they protect us and use these implements to guard the city and its inhabitants.

We learned in the Mishna:

Whole and injured calves and foals; Rabbi Yehuda permits an injured one.

And the Gemara explains the reason of Rabbi Yehuda, and in what the Sages disagreed with him.

It was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda permits an injured one because it cannot recover and live.

And presumably the gentile buys it for slaughter, and does not keep it, and it will not be seen while it is in the gentile’s possession, and from this they will not learn a permission to sell a “whole one.”

They said to him

the Sages to Rabbi Yehuda:

But do they not mate another animal with it

another animal

and it gives birth?

And since they mate another animal with it and it gives birth—

they will come to keep it,

the gentile will come to keep the injured one with him for this purpose, and one who sees it in the gentile’s possession will learn from this to sell a “whole one.”

He said to them

Rabbi Yehuda:

When it gives birth,

then prohibit it.

And the Gemara proves:

Apparently,

it is evident that Rabbi Yehuda holds that an injured animal

does not receive

upon itself

a male.

We learned in the Mishna:

Ben Beteira permits a horse.

The Gemara explains the permission of Ben Beteira and the reason of those who disagree with him.

It was taught in a baraita: Ben Beteira permits a horse because he performs with it work for which one is not liable to bring a sin-offering.

That is, the work of the horse is riding, which is not prohibited by Torah law [as explained in tractate Shabbat]. And it is not relevant to decree concerning it on account of lending, renting, and trial use, because even if he lends it, rents it, or tries it, he does not transgress a prohibition by Torah law.

And Rabbi prohibits

selling them a horse,

for two reasons.

One, on account of the category of weapons. And one, on account of the category of large livestock,

as will be explained.

And the Gemara discusses:

Granted,

what Rabbi said on account of

the category of weapons

is understood, because

there are

horses

that kill with their striking,

which they train to kill people by striking: they strike downward with their front legs and kill those who fall in battle—

But

what Rabbi said on account of

the category of large livestock—

what is it?

After all, the horse is not fit for work prohibited by Torah law, and it is not relevant to decree concerning it on account of “trial use”? And we answer:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: When it grows old,

the horse

we grind with it at the mill.

It turns the millstone, and this is a principal category of labor

on Shabbat

of the labor of grinding, and therefore Rabbi prohibited it.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The halakha is like Ben Beteira,

who permits selling them a horse.

It was asked of them,

the members of the academy were uncertain:

“a fattened ox,”

which they fattened and it is very fat and unfit for work,

what is its law?

Is it permitted to sell it to a gentile who is not a butcher?

And the sides of the uncertainty are: On the one hand, presumably the ox is designated only for slaughter, and it will immediately be slaughtered, and it will not be seen in the gentile’s possession. But, on the other hand, since it is possible to keep it and afterward it will be fit for work, there is concern that it will be seen in the gentile’s possession, and they will learn from it to sell ordinary oxen to them.

It may be questioned according to Rabbi Yehuda,

it is possible to be uncertain about this question both according to Rabbi Yehuda, who permits selling an injured animal to a gentile,

and it may be questioned according to the Rabbis,

and according to the Sages, who prohibit selling an injured one—

It may be questioned according to Rabbi Yehuda,

because

he permitted only up to this point,

he did not permit

Rabbi Yehuda except an injured one, which does not come to the category of work,

which will never come to be used for work, and certainly the gentile will slaughter it quickly.

But this one,

this fattened ox,

for when he keeps it

if the gentile keeps it with him without continuing to fatten it,

it comes to the category of work,

the ox will in the future be fit for work,

it is forbidden.

And although with that ox there is no concern on account of “trial use,” since at the time of the sale it is fattened and unfit for work, nevertheless, since if the gentile keeps it with him without continuing to fatten it, it will be fit for work, and it will be seen in his possession, they will come to learn from this to sell other oxen, which are not fattened, to a gentile, and therefore there is a side to prohibit.

Or perhaps,

perhaps

even according to the Rabbis

it should be permitted to sell it to a gentile. Because up to this point

they prohibited there only

an injured one,

for ordinarily it is not designated for slaughter,

because it is lean and is intended to produce offspring, and therefore they keep it.

But this one, “

this “fattened ox,”

for ordinarily it is designated for slaughter,

because they fattened it for this purpose, it is possible to say that

even the Rabbis permit,

they permit.

That is, on the one hand it has an advantage over an injured one, since it is designated for immediate slaughter, and on the other hand it has a disadvantage in relation to an injured one, since it is possible to keep it without fattening it further, and then it will be fit for work.

Come and hear

a proof to resolve the question, from that

which Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said:

people

of the house of Rabbi would present

they would customarily bring to the king, as a tax and a gift,

“a fattened ox,” on their festival day.

And since Rabbi was not pleased with this practice, he sought to stop it; therefore, in the first year he

was short four ten-thousands,

Rabbi spent and dispensed from his money a sum of forty thousand [units of] money as a bribe, with the aim

that it not be offered,

so that they would not need to bring the gift of the fattened ox

today,

which was their festival day,

but

they would bring it to the king only

tomorrow,

which was not their festival day.

And in the following year, again he

was short four ten-thousands—

so that they would not offer it

the ox

alive, but slaughtered.

And in the year after that, again he

was short four ten-thousands—

so that they would not offer it at all.

And the Gemara proves:

What is the reason,

why did Rabbi make such an effort that they should not offer it alive? Is it

not because perhaps

perhaps

they will come to keep it,

perhaps they would not slaughter the fattened ox, but would keep it until it became fit for work?

It follows that it is forbidden to sell or give a gentile a gift of a “fattened ox.”

And we reject: There is no proof from here, because

according to your reasoning,

the fact that Rabbi incurred great expenses so

that they would not offer it today but tomorrow—

what is the reason?

After all, there is no legal difference in this matter; it was not their festival day!

Rather,

this is the explanation of the practice that Rabbi followed:

Rabbi sought to uproot the matter.

He wanted to uproot this bad practice.

And

since he knew that he could not uproot it entirely,

he thought: Let it be uprooted, and let it come little by little.

He would uproot it little by little: one year they would offer it on the following day, the next year they would offer it slaughtered, and the year after that they would not offer it at all.

And Rabbi did not do this because there is a legal difference between alive and slaughtered, just as there is no legal difference between today and tomorrow. And the question was not resolved.

And we raise an objection to what the one who asked the question said, that if the fattened ox is kept it will be fit for work:

But if he keeps it, will it be healthy and perform work?!

And we answer:

Rav Ashi said: Zevida said to me,

the fattener of oxen:

a fattened ox

a fattened ox

we keep it,

we keep it until it becomes lean,

and

then

it performs

work

at twice the rate,

twice as much as other oxen.

This Mishna deals with the prohibition against selling gentiles things that cause harm to the public. Several details of these laws are brought in the Gemara in the preceding sugya.

Mishna:

They do not sell them bears or lions, or anything in which there is harm to the public

such as instruments of killing and instruments of imprisonment.

They do not build with them

participate in building them—

basilicas,

courthouses where those sentenced are killed,

a gallows,

a place of execution,

an arena,

a place where bullfights are held and people are killed there,

and a platform

like tall structures from which people are pushed to their deaths—

And in these places there is harm to the public, and it is forbidden to build with them, so that they will not kill Israelites there.

But they may build with them

places in which there is no harm to the public and which are not made for idolatry, such as

bimosiyot,

a platform made of a single stone ,

and bathhouses.

The gentiles were accustomed to place images in bathhouses, and when the Israelite

reached the dome

a vaulted ceiling

in which they place idolatry—

it is forbidden to build .

The Gemara discusses a large wild animal, such as a domesticated lion or an animal whose nature is not at all to cause harm, whether it is permitted to sell it to a gentile.

And in a place where they practice not selling small livestock, it is certainly forbidden to sell a large wild animal [whether because of concern for mating, or whether because perhaps they will also sell large livestock]. Rather, the Gemara’s discussion is in a place where they practice selling small livestock: is it permitted to sell a non-harmful large wild animal?

And the sides are: whether one must be concerned that they perform work, and they were prohibited on account of “lending, renting, and trial use,” or whether their nature is not to perform work.

The Gemara brings a statement of Rav, who said two laws concerning a large wild animal. One, concerning pirkoos, and the second, concerning sale. “

Pirkoos,” from the language of shaking, is a law in the laws of slaughter.

And it is as follows: One who slaughters an animal that is dangerously ill—inclined to die—and there is doubt whether he slaughtered it before its death, in which case it is permitted for eating and does not impart the ritual impurities of an animal carcass, or whether it died before slaughter, in which case it is a carcass, examines it by means of pirkoos after slaughter, and this is a sign of “life.”

And there is a difference between large livestock and small livestock. With small livestock, whose movements are light, if it extended its foreleg and did not retract it, it does not thereby display signs of life, but rather signs of the departure of life—until it convulses. But with large livestock, which is heavy in its movements, whether it extended its foreleg and did not bend it, or bent it and did not extend it, this is pirkoos, and it is fit.

Rav discusses a [pure] large wild animal: what is its pirkoos that permits it?

Gemara:

Rav Hanin bar Bar Ḥisda said, and some say

there is one who transmitted this report:

Rav Hanan bar Rava said that Rav said: A large wild animal is like small livestock with regard to

the law of pirkoos, because it is its nature to extend a foreleg during the departure of life, since its movements are light, and it is not rendered permitted by this until it convulses, even though it is large.

And Rav continues with a second law:

But not with regard to

the law of

sale

the large wild animal does not have the status of small livestock concerning the prohibition against selling to a gentile, and it is not dependent on the practice of the places; rather, its law is like that of large livestock, and everywhere they do not sell it.

And Rav Hanan continues:

And I say: even for sale

its status is like small livestock; therefore

where they are accustomed to sell

small livestock—

they sell,

and where they are accustomed

not to sell—

they do not sell.

According to Rav, it is forbidden everywhere to sell a large animal to gentiles, whereas according to Rav Hanan, it is forbidden only in a place where they are accustomed to prohibit the sale of small livestock.

The Gemara infers from the words of the Mishna in accordance with the view of Rav Hanan. And it is difficult according to Rav.

We learned

we learned in the Mishna:

They do not sell bears and lions to them, nor anything in which there is harm to the public—

and let us infer:

the reason

the reason that the Sages prohibited it is: because

there is in it

that there is in it

harm to the public—

this,

whereas

there is not in it

there is not in it

harm to the public,

such as a domesticated lion —

it is permitted,

it is permitted to sell, and they were not concerned on account of the prohibition of labor on Shabbat—

It follows in accordance with the words of Rav Hanan, and it is difficult for Rav?

Rabba bar Ulla said

we shall not infer so, because what is implied from the Mishna—that a domesticated lion is permitted—concerns

a broken lion

which is not fit for labor.