Avodah Zarah 15b (טו:) — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara explains:

And from where do you say this?

From where do we know to say

that we say in a similar case

that one may assume that he is purchasing it for slaughter, and rule leniently?

Since we find with regard to the prohibition of “placing a stumbling block before the blind” that where one may assume that he is purchasing it for slaughter, we assume the lenient possibility, and there is no need for him to be concerned about “placing a stumbling block before the blind.”

As we learned

in tractate Sheviit [5:8]:

Beit Shammai say: A person may not sell

to a Jew suspected of failing to observe the mitzvot of Sheviit

a plowing cow

accustomed to plowing

, during Sheviit,

because of “placing a stumbling block before the blind.”

And Beit Hillel permit it, because he can slaughter it,

and we assume that he is purchasing it for slaughter.

This proves that with regard to the prohibition of “placing a stumbling block before the blind,” one may assume that the sale is permitted, since it is possible that the buyer will not come to stumble; similarly, Rav Huna relied on this when he sold his animal to a gentile: one may assume that the gentile purchased it for slaughter, and therefore there is no reason to issue a decree because of the concern that he might borrow it, rent it, or test it on Shabbat.

Rabba said: Are the cases comparable?

What is the comparison?

There,

with regard to Sheviit,

a person is not commanded concerning

the resting of his animal during Sheviit,

and therefore, even if the buyer works with his animal during Sheviit, he does not violate a prohibition, and there is no basis for issuing a decree that one may not sell his animal to another Jew because of “borrowing, renting, or testing it.” The entire reason Beit Shammai prohibited the sale is only because of “placing a stumbling block before the blind”: the Jewish seller causes the Jewish buyer to stumble by enabling him to violate the prohibition against plowing during Sheviit. To this Beit Hillel respond that since it is not certain that his fellow will indeed plow with it and thereby create a “stumbling block,” since he may have purchased it for slaughter, we assume that his intention is to slaughter it, and it is permitted to sell it to him without concern for the prohibition of placing a stumbling block before the blind.

But

here,

with regard to Shabbat,

a person is commanded concerning the resting of his animal,

and therefore it is appropriate to issue a decree prohibiting the sale to a gentile because of “borrowing, renting, or testing it.” From where do we know that even with regard to this concern one may assume the permitted possibility and permit the sale?

Abaye said to Rabba: And

if

wherever a person

is commanded

concerning his animal,

it is prohibited

to sell it, and we do not assume that the buyer will use it in a permitted manner?

But what of a field—

a person is commanded concerning the resting of his field during Sheviit,

and even if he does not work it himself, but his field is “worked” by others, the owner of the field violates the prohibition of Sheviit, as it is stated [Leviticus 25]: “It shall be a year of rest for the land.”—

And it was taught

in the Tosefta of Sheviit [chapter 3]:

Beit Shammai say: A person may not sell a plowed field

that is ready for sowing to his fellow who is suspected of sowing

during Sheviit,

because he causes him to sow in it, and the seller violates the prohibition of “placing a stumbling block before the blind.”

And Beit Hillel permit it, because he can leave it fallow,

making it a fallow field, so that it will be uncultivated land.

Thus, even though a person is commanded concerning the resting of his field, Beit Hillel nevertheless permitted him to sell it to his fellow and did not concern themselves with the prohibition of placing a stumbling block before the blind, since one may assume the permitted possibility: his fellow may leave it fallow.

Conversely, the Gemara brings a difficulty against Rabba’s statement that one assumes the permitted possibility where a person is not commanded concerning his animal:

Rav Ashi raised an objection to him: And

if

wherever a person is not commanded—

it is permitted,

he may sell it, and we assume that the buyer will use it in a permitted manner?

But what of utensils, concerning which a person is not commanded to ensure their resting during Sheviit, and

nevertheless

we learned

in the Mishna in tractate Sheviit [5:6]:

These are

the

utensils that a person may not sell

to another Jew suspected of using them

during Sheviit: the plow and all its accessories,

with which a field is plowed,

the yoke

of the animal that pulls the plow,

the winnowing fork,

a fork with which grain is tossed in the wind at the time of threshing, and, when there is no threshing floor, with which the earth is hoed,

and the spade,

a digging implement. This is because the person suspected of violating Sheviit will work with them, and the seller will thereby cause him to stumble into a prohibition.

Apparently, according to Rabba, it should have been permitted, since one may assume that the buyer does not intend to use the utensils for working the land during the seventh year, but is purchasing them for use in the following year. Did Rabba not say that when a person is not commanded concerning resting, one assumes the permitted possibility?

Rather, Rav Ashi said:

The matter does not depend on whether one is commanded concerning the object or is not commanded concerning it; it depends only on the degree of likelihood—whether there is indeed a basis for making such an assumption—

Wherever

there is a place

to assume the permitted possibility,

where there is a basis for such an assumption and it is reasonable to make it—

we assume it.

For example, the animal that Rav Huna sold, and likewise a plowed field, whose sale Beit Hillel permitted: since these things are not available for purchase at every moment, their purchase now is not proof that the buyer intends to commit a transgression with them now. Therefore, we assume that he is purchasing them now for the following year, and that he will indeed observe the mitzvot of Sheviit.

And even though he is commanded.

But wherever there is no basis for making such an assumption,

where it is not reasonable to assume the permitted possibility,

we do not assume it, even though he is not commanded.

Therefore, we do not sell him work implements, since it is not reasonable to assume that he is purchasing them for the following year: these utensils are available for purchase at all times, so why would he purchase them already now? Therefore, we do not make this assumption.

And the Gemara relates:

Rabba sold that donkey

that is not suitable for slaughter,

to a Jew suspected of selling to gentiles.

Abaye said to him: For what reason did the Master do this?

What was your reason for doing so?

He said to him,

Rabba:

I sold it to a Jew;

I sold it to a Jew!

He said to him,

Abaye:

But

will he not

go

and the Jew

sell it to a gentile,

so that you will have caused him to stumble into the prohibition against selling to gentiles?

Rabba said to Abaye: Is it only that

he will sell to a gentile

that the buyer will sell what he purchased from him, whereas

he will not sell to a Jew?!

Is it not possible that the buyer who purchased it from him will sell it to a Jew? Therefore, there is room to assume the permitted possibility.

Abaye challenged him

from two baraitot that prove that we are concerned lest the person suspected of violating the law sell to gentiles:

The first baraita concerns the Kutim. They were a people who lived in the Land of Israel and observed Jewish practices and laws in some matters, while in other matters they did not observe them at all, or at any rate were suspected of not observing them.

As it was taught:

In a place where the practice was to sell small livestock to Kutim—

they may sell.

And in a place where the practice was

not to sell—

they may not sell.

And Abaye explains:

What is the reason?

Why did those places practice not selling to them, and why may large livestock never be sold to them? In other words, what concern is there in these cases?

If you say

that

because

the Kutim

are suspected of bestiality,

it is impossible to say this, because—

Are they suspected?

Are the Kutim in fact suspected of this?

But it was taught

in another baraita that the Kutim are not suspected of bestiality, as it was taught:

One may not place an animal in the inns of gentiles

because gentiles engage in bestiality with animals. Even

male animals with

gentile

males, and

female animals

with

gentile women,

females,

as explained in the second chapter.

And it goes without saying

that it is prohibited to place

females with

gentile

males, and

male animals

with

gentile women,

females,

for even their women practice the abominations of the gentiles.

And

likewise,

one may not entrust an animal to one of their shepherds

because of bestiality.

And one may not be secluded with them

or remain together with them, because they are suspected of bloodshed.

And one may not entrust them with a child to teach him Scripture or to teach him a trade

a craft, because they will convert him to their religion, and also because of male homosexual intercourse. This prohibition applies even to gentiles.

But one may place an animal in the inns of Kutim. Males with females and females with males, and it goes without saying

that it is permitted to place them with the Kutim

males with males and females with females. And one may entrust an animal to one of their shepherds. And one may be secluded with them.

And one may entrust them with a child to teach him Scripture or to teach him a trade.

This is because the Kutim are not suspected of any of these matters.

Apparently,

it is proven from here that

they are not suspected

of bestiality.

If so, the statement of the baraita that there are places where the practice was not to sell small livestock to Kutim—and it follows from this that large livestock may not be sold to them anywhere—must necessarily be because they were concerned that the Kuti would resell it to a gentile!?

And it was further taught: One may not sell them

to gentiles harmful objects, weapons, and the like:

neither a weapon

a sword or spear,

nor weapon accessories

a shaft for a spear or a sheath for a sword.

And one may not sharpen weapons for them.

And one may not sell them an anvil,

to which the feet of prisoners are fastened,

nor collars,

hanging devices,

nor fetters,

strangling ropes,

nor iron chains

for binding the hands—

And included in this prohibition are

both a gentile and a Kuti.

What is the reason?

What is the reason that it is prohibited to sell weapons even to a Kuti?

If you say

that the reason is

that

the Kutim

are suspected of bloodshed,

just as gentiles are suspected—this cannot be said, because—

Are they suspected?

Are the Kutim suspected of bloodshed?

You said

that the previous baraita stated:

And one may be secluded with them,

with the Kutim. This shows that they are not suspected of bloodshed!

Rather,

necessarily, the reason in both baraitot is

because he may come to sell it to a gentile.

Perhaps the Kuti will sell the animal, or the destructive implements, to a gentile.

If so, how did Rabba sell his donkey to a Jew suspected of selling it to a gentile?

And if you would say

that perhaps one might distinguish between selling to a Kuti and selling to a Jew suspected of selling to a gentile, because

a Kuti does not repent,

there is no likelihood that he will abandon the path of the Kutim that he follows. Once the Kuti purchases it, he will not change his practice of selling to gentiles, because a Kuti does not obey the Sages’ decrees prohibiting the sale of these things to gentiles. But

a Jew does repent.

Even if he was previously suspected of selling to a gentile, we may assume that now he will not sell it to a gentile: he may repent and obey the decree that the Sages issued prohibiting the sale of these things to a gentile. Therefore, Rabba sold his donkey to a Jew who was suspected of violating the law. This cannot be said, because—

Did Rav Naḥman not say in the name of Rabba bar Avuha: In the same manner as they said

that the Sages

prohibited selling to a gentile, so they prohibited selling to a Jew suspected of violating the law!

When Rabba heard Abaye’s words, he retracted his sale to the buyer, and

ran

Rabba ran and pursued him

after him

the buyer,

three parasangs

three parasangs, in order to buy his donkey back from him.

Some say

that this report was transmitted with the account that he pursued him

one parasang

one

through the sand dunes,

a place difficult to traverse,

but he did not catch up with him.

He did not reach him.

Just as it is prohibited to sell weapons to gentiles, so it is prohibited to sell them to a Jew suspected of using them for this purpose.

Rav Dimi bar Abba said: In the same manner as it is prohibited to sell

weapons

to a gentile—

so

it is prohibited to sell them to a Jewish bandit.

And the Gemara discusses this:

What are the circumstances?

What case is being discussed here?

If he is suspected of killing,

if the Jew is suspected of murder, this is difficult:

is it obvious?

What is Rav Dimi bar Abba teaching us?

And if he is not suspected,

this too is difficult:

why may we not

sell to him?

And we answer:

Actually, he does not kill.

The case concerns a Jew who is not suspected of killing.

And here, what are we dealing with?

With a mashmuta,

a bandit who habitually snatches money from its owner,

for sometimes

when he flees with his theft and attempts are made to take it from him,

he uses them to save his life,

he uses these implements to save himself together with the money he took. Thus, one who sells him weapons causes property to be taken from its owner.

The Gemara now cites a baraita concerning the sale of weapons to gentiles.