Avodah Zarah 15b — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara explains:

And from where do you say this,

from where do we know to say

that we say in such a case,

that one may presume that he is buying it for slaughter and be lenient? —

Because we find concerning the prohibition of “placing a stumbling block before the blind” that, in a place where one may presume that he is buying it for slaughter, one presumes leniently, and he need not be concerned on account of “placing a stumbling block before the blind”.

As we learned,

we learned in tractate Sheviit [5:8]:

Beit Shammai say: A person may not sell

to an Israelite suspected of not observing the mitzvot of Sheviit

a plowing cow

accustomed to plowing

, during Sheviit,

on account of “placing a stumbling block before the blind”.

And Beit Hillel permit, because he can slaughter it,

and we presume that he is buying it for slaughter.

And it is thereby demonstrated that, concerning the prohibition of “placing a stumbling block before the blind”, it is possible to presume that the sale is permitted because it is possible that he will not come to a stumbling block, and similarly Rav Huna relied on this when he sold his animal to a gentile: it is possible to presume that the gentile bought it for slaughter, and therefore there is no basis for a decree on account of the concern of borrowing, renting, and testing concerning Shabbat.

Rabba said: Are they comparable?

What is the comparison?! For

there,

concerning Sheviit,

a person is not commanded concerning

the cessation of his animal during Sheviit,

and therefore, even if the buyer works with his animal during Sheviit, he does not transgress a prohibition, and there is no reason to decree that one may not sell his animal to another Israelite on account of “borrowing, renting, and testing”. The entire reason that Beit Shammai prohibited it is only on account of “placing a stumbling block before the blind”: the Israelite seller causes his fellow, the buyer, to stumble by enabling him to transgress the prohibition of plowing during Sheviit. And concerning this Beit Hillel argues that, since it is not clear that his fellow will indeed plow with it and there will be a “stumbling block”—because it is possible that he is buying it for slaughter—therefore we presume that his intention is to slaughter it, and it is permitted to sell it to him without concern for the prohibition of placing a stumbling block before the blind.

But

here,

concerning Shabbat,

a person is commanded concerning the cessation of his animal,

and it is properly applicable to decree that one may not sell to a gentile on account of “borrowing, renting, and testing”; and from where is it likewise possible, concerning this concern, to presume and permit?

Abaye said to Rabba: And

what,

wherever a person

is commanded

concerning his animal,

it is forbidden

to sell it, and we do not presume that the buyer will use it in a permitted manner?

But what of a field—

for a person is commanded concerning the cessation of his field during Sheviit,

and even if he himself does not work it, but rather his field is “worked” by others, the owner of the field transgresses the prohibition of Sheviit, as it is stated [Leviticus 25]: “A year of cessation shall it be for the land”—

And it was taught,

we learned in the Tosefta of Sheviit [chapter 3]:

Beit Shammai say: A person may not sell a plowed field

that is plowed and designated for sowing, to his fellow who is suspected of sowing

during Sheviit,

because he causes him to stumble by sowing in it, and the seller transgresses the prohibition of “placing a stumbling block before the blind.”

And Beit Hillel permit because he can leave it fallow,

making it a fallow field, so that it will be unsown land.

Thus, even though a person is commanded concerning the cessation of his field, Beit Hillel nevertheless permitted selling it to his fellow and did not fear the prohibition of placing a stumbling block before the blind, because one may presume leniently: his fellow can leave it fallow.

Conversely, the Gemara brings a difficulty against Rabba’s words, who said that one presumes a permitted use in a place where a person is not commanded concerning his animal—

Rav Ashi challenged him: And

what,

wherever a person is not commanded—

it is permitted,

it is permitted for him to sell it, and we presume that the buyer will use it in a permitted manner?

But what of utensils, for a person is not commanded concerning the cessation of utensils during Sheviit, and

nevertheless

we learned

in the Mishna in tractate Sheviit [5:6]:

These are

the

utensils that a person is not permitted to sell

to another Israelite suspected of working with them

during Sheviit: the plow and all its implements,

with which one plows a field,

the yoke

of the plowing animal,

and the winnowing fork,

a fork with which grain is tossed in the wind at the time of threshing, and when there is no threshing floor one digs the earth with it,

and the mattock,

a digging implement. Because the suspect will work with them during Sheviit, and it follows that the seller causes him to stumble in a prohibition.

Apparently, according to Rabba, it would be possible to permit this, because one may presume that the buyer does not intend to use the utensils for working the land during the seventh year, but is buying them for the following year. Yet Rabba said that if one is not commanded concerning cessation, one presumes a permitted use?

Rather, Rav Ashi said:

The matter does not depend on whether one is commanded concerning the object or is not commanded concerning it, but only on the degree of “probability,” whether there is indeed a basis for presuming—

Wherever

there is a place

to presume,

where there is a basis for presuming and it is reasonable to presume in this way—

we presume.

For example, the animal that Rav Huna sold, and likewise a plowed field that Beit Hillel permitted, because these things are not available to purchase at every time; therefore, their purchase now is no proof that the buyer is about to commit a transgression with them now. Consequently, we presume that he is buying them now for the following year, and he will indeed observe the mitzvot of Sheviit.

And even though he is commanded.

And wherever there is no basis for presuming,

in a place where it is not reasonable to presume,

we do not presume even though he is not commanded.

Therefore, we do not sell him work implements, since it is not reasonable to presume that he is buying them for the following year: these utensils are available to purchase at every time, so why would he buy them already now? Therefore, we do not presume.

And the Gemara relates:

Rabba sold that donkey—

he sold a donkey, which is not fit for slaughter—

to an Israelite suspected of selling to a gentile.

Abaye said to him: What is the reason that the Master did this,

what was the reason that you did this?

He said to him,

Rabba:

I sold it to an Israelite,

I sold it to an Israelite!

He said to him,

Abaye:

But

is it not so that

he will go

the Israelite

and sell it to a gentile,

and it will be found that you caused him to stumble in the prohibition against selling to gentiles?

Rabba said to Abaye: Is it only

to a gentile that he will sell

will the buyer sell what he bought from him, whereas

to an Israelite he will not sell it!?

Is it not possible that the buyer who bought it from him will sell it to an Israelite?! Therefore, there is room to presume a permitted outcome.

Abaye raised an objection to him

from two beraitot from which it is proven that we do indeed fear lest the suspect sell to gentiles:

The first beraita deals with the Kutim, who were a people that dwelled in the Land of Israel and in some matters followed the practices and laws of Israel, while in some matters they did not follow them at all, or, at any rate, were suspected.

As it was taught,

In a place where they customarily sell small livestock to Kutim—

they sell.

And in a place where they customarily

do not sell—

they do not sell.

And Abaye explains:

What is the reason,

why did those places practice not selling, and why do they not sell large livestock at all? That is to say, what concern is there to fear in these cases?

If you say,

if it is said

because the

Kutim

are suspected of bestiality,

of intercourse with animals, it is impossible to say this, because—

Are they suspected?

Are the Kutim indeed suspected of this?!

And it was taught,

for we learned another beraita, in which it is stated that the Kutim are not suspected of bestiality, as it was taught:

One may not place an animal in the inns of gentiles

because gentiles have intercourse with animals. Even

males with

gentile

males, and

animals

females with

gentile

females, as is explained in the second chapter.

as explained in the second chapter.

And it is not necessary to say

that it is forbidden to place animals

females with

gentile

males, and

animals

males with

gentile

females,

for even their women practice the abominations of the gentiles.

And

likewise

one may not entrust an animal to their shepherd

because of bestiality.

And one may not be secluded with them

to remain together with them, because they are suspected of bloodshed.

And one may not give them a child to teach him Scripture and to teach him a trade

a craft, because they will transfer him to their religion, and additionally because of male intercourse. And this prohibition applies even to gentiles.

But one may place an animal in the inns of Kutim. Males with females and females with males, and it is not necessary to say

that it is permitted to place them with the Kutim

males with males and females with females. And one may entrust an animal to their shepherd. And one may be secluded with them.

And one may give them a child to teach him Scripture and to teach him a trade.

Because the Kutim are not suspected of any of these matters.

It follows

it is proven from here that

they are not suspected

the Kutim of bestiality.

If so, what the beraita said—that there are places where they practiced not selling small livestock to Kutim, and it implies from it that everywhere it is forbidden to sell large livestock to them—must necessarily be because they feared that the Kuti would return and sell them to a gentile?!

And it was further taught: One may not sell them

to gentiles harmful objects, or instruments of murder, and the like:

neither a weapon

a sword or spear,

nor weapon accessories

a shaft for a spear and a sheath for a sword.

And one may not sharpen weapons for them.

And one may not sell them an anvil,

to which the feet of prisoners are bound,

nor collars

instruments of hanging,

nor chains

ropes of strangulation,

nor iron chains

with which to bind the hands—

And included in this prohibition is

both a gentile and a Kuti.

What is the reason,

what is the reason that it is forbidden to sell weapons even to a Kuti?

If you say,

if it is said that the reason is

that

the Kutim

are suspected of bloodshed,

just as gentiles are suspected—this cannot be said, because—

Are they suspected,

are the Kutim suspected of bloodshed?

You have said,

for they said in the previous beraita:

And one may be secluded with them,

with the Kutim. It follows that they are not suspected of bloodshed?!

Rather,

necessarily, the reason in both beraitot is

because he may come to sell it to a gentile.

Perhaps the Kuti will come to sell the animal, or the harmful implements, to a gentile.

If so, how did Rabba sell his donkey to an Israelite suspected of selling it to a gentile?

And if you would say,

perhaps you will wish to distinguish between a sale to a Kuti and a sale to an Israelite suspected of selling to a gentile, because

a Kuti does not repent,

there is no likelihood that he will abandon the Kuti way that he follows, and after the Kuti buys it, he will not abandon his practice of selling to gentiles, because the Kuti does not obey the decrees of the Sages that prohibited selling to gentiles. But

an Israelite does repent.

And even if he was previously suspected of selling to a gentile, we may presume that now he will not sell it to a gentile, that he will repent and obey the decree of the Sages who decreed not to sell these things to a gentile. Therefore Rabba sold his donkey to the Israelite suspect. This cannot be said, because—

But did Rav Naḥman not say in the name of Rabba bar Avuha: In the manner that they said

the Sages that it is

forbidden to sell to a gentile, so it is forbidden to sell to an Israelite suspected [of this]!

And when Rabba heard Abaye’s words, he retracted from his sale to the buyer, and

ran

Rabba ran and pursued

after him

after the buyer

three parasangs

three parasangs, in order to buy his donkey back from him.

Some say,

there are those who transmitted this report, that he pursued him

one parasang

one

through the sands,

through sandy terrain, a place difficult to walk,

but did not overtake him.

And he did not catch him.

Just as it is forbidden to sell instruments of murder to gentiles, so it is forbidden to sell them to an Israelite suspected of this.

Rav Dimi bar Abba said: In the manner that it is forbidden to sell

instruments of murder

to a gentile—

so

it is forbidden to sell them to an Israelite bandit.

And the Gemara discusses:

What are the circumstances,

what is being discussed here?

If he is suspected of killing,

if the Israelite is suspected of murder, this is difficult:

is it obvious?

What is Rav Dimi bar Abba teaching us?

And if he is not suspected,

this is difficult:

why not

sell to him?

And we answer:

Actually, he does not kill.

It concerns an Israelite who is not suspected of killing,

and here, with what

are we dealing? With a bandit,

a bandit who customarily snatches property from its owner,

for sometimes

at times, when he is fleeing with his theft and they attempt to take it from him,

he acts to save his life,

he uses these implements to save himself together with the property he took. It follows that one who sells him weapons causes property to be lost from its owner.

And now the Gemara brings a beraita dealing with the matter of selling instruments of murder to gentiles.

The Sages taught: They may not sell them shields,

shields.

And some say: They may sell them shields.

And the Gemara asks:

What is the reason

of the one who holds that they may not sell them? Is a shield not considered an instrument of killing? —

If you say,

if you say,

because they protect them,

that the shields protect them,

if so, even wheat and barley, too, not

! That it should be forbidden to sell them wheat and barley as well?