Avodah Zarah 16b (טז:) — the Talmud in English

The reason for the leniency is

according to Rabbi Yehuda

, who permits a large domesticated animal that is injured; therefore, it is permitted—

and we should not infer from this the position of the Sages, who prohibit even an injured large domesticated animal, that they would also prohibit an injured large wild animal—

and likewise, according to Rabbi Yehuda, in the case of an uninjured lion it is indeed prohibited, just as a large domesticated animal is prohibited—in accordance with Rav’s opinion.

Rav Ashi said:

There is no need to establish that the Mishna is referring to an injured lion, because

an ordinary lion

, even when uninjured, is

injured with regard to labor

, since a lion is not fit for labor. Therefore, it is permitted according to Rabbi Yehuda, just as he permits an injured domesticated animal, and it is prohibited according to the Sages, just as they prohibited an injured domesticated animal.

According to this answer, Rabbi Yehuda agrees that a large wild animal whose normal function is labor, such as a wild donkey used to turn millstones, is prohibited.

The Gemara raises an objection:

The Gemara cites a beraita in accordance with Rav’s opinion, and it constitutes a tiyu vta against Rav Hanan:

Just as one may not sell them a large domesticated animal

, so too one may not sell them a large wild animal. And even in a place where one may sell them a small domesticated animal

, one may not sell them a large wild animal.

The wording seems redundant. And the Ritva explains: just as they do not sell to them a behema gasa — so they do not sell to them a chaya gasa. And do not say that it is because of a fear of shavua (rebia), hence the baraita continues: even in a place where they sell them a behema deka, that is, where they are not concerned for rebia — a chaya gasa they still do not sell. Because of the duplication of the wording Rabbenu Chananel and the Raavad have a different recension. And so it is my understanding. And see in the novellae of the Rashba and the Ritva who raise several difficulties on Rabbenu Chananel’s recension.

The objection against Rav Hanan bar Rava is established. The objection is established!

The Gemara cites Ravina’s version, which presents the above question and answer in a different form.

Ravina juxtaposed

a contradiction

between the Mishna and the beraita

, from the Mishna to the beraita,

and resolved it

:

We learned

in the Mishna:

One may not sell them bears, lions, or anything else that can cause harm to the public—

The reason

for the prohibition is

that it can cause harm.

And we infer:

But

a domesticated lion,

which cannot cause harm—

one may sell it—

But we juxtapose it with the beraita,

which contradicts this. For we learned:

Just as one may not sell a large domesticated animal

, so too one may not sell a large wild animal; and even in a place where one may sell a small domesticated animal

, one may not sell a large wild animal.

It follows that one may not sell them a domesticated lion or a large wild animal, since they are fit for labor?

And he resolved

: He answers that the inference we drew from the Mishna—that one may sell a domesticated lion because it cannot cause harm to the public—refers to

an injured lion

, which is not fit for labor.

And

this leniency is

according to Rabbi Yehuda

, who permits an injured large domesticated animal. But with regard to a wild animal that is fit for labor, Rabbi Yehuda agrees—and certainly the Sages agree—that it is indeed prohibited to sell it, as stated in the beraita.

Rav Ashi said:

There is no need to establish the inference from the Mishna as referring to an injured animal, because

an ordinary lion

, even when whole,

is injured with regard to labor

and is not fit for labor; therefore, it is permitted according to Rabbi Yehuda.

The Gemara challenges the inference drawn from the Mishna, which implies that one may sell a domesticated lion, and from which they sought to learn that one may sell any large wild animal [that cannot cause harm to the public].

Rav Naḥman challenged this:

How could they infer this?

Who can say to us

that

a lion is a large wild animal

, allowing us to infer that one may sell other large wild animals that cannot cause harm to the public?

Perhaps

a lion

is a small wild animal

, and therefore one may sell a domesticated lion, just as one may sell a small domesticated animal—

How, then, can we infer anything from this about other large wild animals?

According to Rav Naḥman, there is no basis for inferring from the Mishna that a domesticated large wild animal may be sold.

Earlier in the discussion, we inferred from the Mishna in accordance with Rav Hanan’s opinion and challenged Rav. Here, Rav Ashi infers the opposite from the Mishna: Its implication is in accordance with Rav’s opinion, and it is a challenge to Rav Hanan!

Rav Ashi inferred from the Mishna

by drawing an inference from the words of the Mishna,

and raised an objection

to Rav Hanan’s statement.

We learned

in the Mishna:

One may not sell them bears, lions, or anything else that can cause harm to the public—

The reason

for the prohibition is

that it can cause harm.

And we infer:

But

a domesticated lion,

which cannot cause harm—

one may sell it—

But the reason

for this inference applies only to

a lion, since an ordinary lion is injured with regard to labor,

meaning that it is not fit for labor, and there is no reason to prohibit it: It causes no harm and does not perform labor. From this we infer:

But anything else—

other wild animals—

that performs labor—

no

, one may not sell it to gentiles.

For if the tanna wished to teach that all harmful wild animals are prohibited and that all domesticated large wild animals are permitted, why did he choose a lion—which is not fit for labor—as the example? He should have stated in general terms: “One may not sell wild animals or anything that can cause harm to the public.” We ourselves would then infer from this that one may sell them all domesticated large wild animals.

According to this approach of Rav Ashi, there is

a challenge to Rav Hanan bar Rava

even from the Mishna

! The challenge is established.

We said earlier, according to Rav’s opinion, that it is prohibited to sell wild animals [even those that do not cause harm to the public] because of the concern of lending, renting, or leaving them in one’s care, since wild animals are fit for labor. And we clarify—

And a large wild animal—

at least

, nevertheless,

what labor does it perform?

What labor is it fit to perform?

Abaye said: Mar Yehuda said to me: In the house of

a certain man named

Mar Yoḥani, they grind millstones with wild donkeys

, the wild donkey being a species of large wild animal.

We learned that Rav’s students transmitted in his name that a large wild animal is like a small domesticated animal with regard to pir kus.

The Gemara explains who was the “master” of this teaching—Rav or Shmuel—and who transmitted the teaching.

Rabbi Zeira said: When we were in the study hall of

Rav Yehuda

Rav Yehuda

, who had been a student of both Rav and Shmuel,

he said to us

, Rav Yehuda said to us:

Learn this matter from me

:

I heard it from

a great man;

it was transmitted to me

by him

, but I do not know

from whom I heard it,

whether from Rav or from Shmuel:

A large wild animal is like a small domesticated animal with regard to pir kus.

Rabbi Zeira continues:

When I came

I came

to

a place called

Korkunyia, I found

that Rav Assi sat and said: Rav Ḥamma bar Goria said in the name of Rav: a chaya gasa is like a behema deka for treading.

Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi, who was sitting and saying

that

in the name of Shmuel: A large wild animal is like a small domesticated animal with regard to pir kus.

I said

,

learn from this

that this statement

was stated in the name of Shmuel

, and Rav Yehuda had heard it from Shmuel.

Rabbi Zeira continues:

When

I came

to

a place called

Sura, I found

that Rav Assi sat and said: Rav Ḥamma bar Goria said in the name of Rav: a chaya gasa is like a behema deka for treading.

Rabba bar Yirmeya sitting and saying

that he had heard this statement

in the name of Rav: A large wild animal is like a small domesticated animal with regard to pir kus.

I said

,

learn from this

that this statement

was stated in the name of Rav and

also

was stated in the name of Shmuel.

When I went up there

to Eretz Yisrael,

I found

that Rav Assi sat and said: Rav Ḥamma bar Goria said in the name of Rav: a chaya gasa is like a behema deka for treading.

Rav Asi sitting and saying: Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said in the name of Rav: A large wild animal is like a small domesticated animal with regard to pir kus.

Rabbi Zeira continues:

I said to him

—I said to Rav Asi: You state this teaching in the name of Rav Ḥama bar Gurya in the name of Rav,

and

do

you not hold

that

the master of this teaching

is

Rabba bar Yirmeya

? I—Rabbi Zeira—heard this statement from him in Sura in the name of Rav! How, then, are you transmitting the teaching in the name of Rav Ḥama bar Gurya?!

He said to me

, Rav Asi said to me:

Black pot

—[that is, you too are accustomed to constant Torah study; great wisdom in an unattractive vessel! This is the way of Torah scholars: They labor over their Torah learning and do not launder their clothes]—

from me and from you

, from my testimony and from yours,

the teaching will be established

, meaning, it will be stated in the name of its original transmitter! That is, indeed Rabba bar Yirmeya heard this teaching from Rav Ḥama bar Gurya, and he heard it from Rav.

It was also stated

:

Rabbi Zeira said that Rav Asi said that Rabba bar Yirmeya said that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said that Rav said: A large wild animal is like a small domesticated animal with regard to pir kus.

We learned in the Mishna:

One may not build with them a basilica, a tribunal, an arena, or a platform.

The Gemara explains what a “basilica” is and for what purpose these large fortresses were used.

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: There are three

types of

basilicas: those of idolatrous kings, those of bathhouses, and those of treasuries

, where the kings’ valuables and treasures were stored

, and therefore they built a strong structure.

Rava said: Two

of the three types are

permitted

—one may build them with gentiles—and they are those of bathhouses and treasuries;

and one

of them is

prohibited

, namely, that of kings.

And as a mnemonic

for which one is prohibited, there is the verse [Psalms 149]: “

To bind their kings with chains

”—that is, the basilica of kings is prohibited because capital cases are judged there and people are executed.

And some say

that this teaching was transmitted as follows:

Rava said: All of them are permitted.

The Gemara challenges this:

But

behold the

we learned

in the Mishna:

One may not build with them a basilica, a tribunal, an arena, or a platform.

It follows that there is a “basilica”

that is prohibited?

And we answer: Say

that the meaning of the Mishna is: A basilica—

for a tribunal, an arena, or a platform

, intended for judging capital cases there. But an ordinary basilica built as a residence for kings is permitted.

Regarding what we learned, that a tribunal is a place of capital judgment, the Gemara relates

an incident involving Rabbi Eliezer [

ben Hyrcanus].

The Sages taught: When Rabbi Eliezer was arrested for heresy

, the Roman heretics seized him and sought to force him to engage in idolatry—

they brought him up to the tribunal to be judged

for death.

That governor said to him: Someone as old as you should be occupied

with such worthless matters?!

He said this about words of Torah.

He said to him

, Rabbi Eliezer said to him in these words: “

The Judge is trustworthy to me”!

That governor thought

that

he was speaking about him

, meaning that he was the judge, and that Rabbi Eliezer was saying that he agreed with his words, that he should not have occupied himself with worthless matters. But

he

, Rabbi Eliezer,

did not say

this

about anyone other than his Father in Heaven

, the True Judge; he accepted the heavenly judgment, that they were executing him, thinking that he had committed sins against the Holy One, blessed be He, and that they were now exacting punishment from him.

He said to him

, the governor said to him:

Since I have placed my trust

[the version of the Ya’avetz:

and you have placed your trust in me]

in you

, since you have placed your trust in me that my judgment is true—

Dimos!

An oath invoking the name of the idol that was there—

You are acquitted!

And that is how he escaped Roman judgment.

When he came home

, he mourned greatly because he did not know why this had happened to him, that he had been sentenced to death, and he searched through his deeds in order to repent . And

his students came in to comfort him—

but he did not accept their consolation.

Rabbi Akiva said to him: My master! Will you permit me to say one thing that you taught me?

He said to him

, Rabbi Eliezer said to him:

Say it!

He said to him

, Rabbi Akiva said to him:

My master! Perhaps

words of

heresy came before you

, you heard words of heresy

and enjoyed them,

and the matter seemed right to you,

and because of it

, because of this enjoyment,

were you arrested?