Avodah Zarah 14b — the Talmud in English

It is not possible to say so, because

“Their unspecified [request]” would not need to say that we sell [to him],

there is no novelty in the words of the Mishna that when his request is unspecified it is permitted to sell to him, for we learned only that a “white rooster” is forbidden, but wheat—even white [wheat]—is permitted,

and “their specified [request]” would not need to say that we do not sell [to him],

there is no novelty in the words of the Mishna that if he says explicitly that he is purchasing them for idolatry, it is forbidden to sell [them to him].

And therefore, it is not possible to interpret the intention of the Mishna in this way.

Rather,

it must be explained that what it said,

“their request is unspecified,”

means

that

the gentile, without specifying,

says

“wheat,”

for he announced, “Who has wheat to sell?” whereas

“their request is specified”

means

that

the gentile specifies

and says “

wheat

white,”

announcing, “Who has white wheat to sell

”— And the Mishna comes to teach a novelty: since he specifies and says “white,” it is therefore forbidden even with wheat.

By inference

you learn this,

that in the case of a rooster,

which is intended to be purchased as an offering to idols,

even

when he says

without specifying, “

Rooster—for whom?”

also not

is it permitted to sell him the white one. And this is difficult for Rabbi Zeira, who holds that with an “unspecified rooster” it is permitted to sell him the white one?

And we answer:

They say: Actually,

the correct explanation is that

“their request is unspecified”

is that he says

“white wheat.”

And the Mishna says that it is permitted to sell to him, because gentiles do not offer wheat, and his desire for white [wheat] is not on account of idols. Indeed, there is no novelty at all in this law; rather, the novelty is in the latter clause:

“Their request is specified,”

means

that

the gentile

says explicitly, “White wheat, which I need

explicitly: “White wheat, which I need

for idolatry,

for whom [is there any]?”

And

if you ask: It is obvious that it is forbidden to sell to him, so what does the Mishna teach us?

We shall answer that

“their request is specified”

was necessary for it.

The Mishna needed to teach us this, for

it might enter your mind to say

that

this man,

this gentile

does not need it for idolatry,

he is not purchasing them for an offering to idols, since it is not customary among gentiles to offer wheat,

but

he says this because

he is merely attached to idolatry.

He is attached to idols, and if he were selling some object to another gentile for the sake of idols, he would sell it cheaply, because of his great attachment to idols,

and

therefore

he reasoned: Just as that man,

as he himself

is attached to it,

is attached

to idols—

everyone

all the people of the world

are also attached to them,

also connected to them, and he says to himself:

I shall say,

he says in the marketplace

thus: “

Who has white wheat for the sake of idols

, so that they will give it to me

so that they will give it to me cheaply! Indeed, his heart is not directed toward idols, and it is permitted to sell to him,

it teaches us,

the Mishna comes to exclude this reasoning and to say: Since, nevertheless, he mentioned “idolatry,” it is forbidden.

After we have learned that in certain circumstances it is permitted to sell a white rooster to a gentile, and in certain circumstances it is forbidden, the Gemara brings Rav Ashi’s ibayot concerning this matter.

Rav Ashi raised a question:

a gentile who says

“A white rooster with a severed limb

a limb,

for whom

is there to sell [it]?”—

what is [the law] regarding selling him an intact white rooster?

The two sides of the dilemma are:

The sides of the uncertainty are:

Do we say: Since he said

“severed,”—

he does not need it for idolatry,

he is not purchasing it for idols, because gentiles do not offer an animal lacking a limb—

or perhaps

it is possible to say:

he is deceiving,

for the gentile says this deceitfully, since he knows that Jews do not wish to sell him a white rooster. Therefore he acts cleverly and says that he wants one with a severed limb, knowing that roosters with a severed limb are not commonly found in the marketplace, and they will give him an “intact white one

. The question is not resolved, and Rav Ashi continues:

If you should say,

if you resolve from a Mishna or a beraita, or even from reasoning, that

this

this gentile

is merely deceiving,

there is another question to be considered:

When the gentile announces in the marketplace

“White rooster—for whom?”

“White rooster—for whom?”—

and they give him a black one, and he takes it,

whether they give him a black one, he takes it,

and they give him a red one, and he takes it,

and whether they give him a red one, he takes it; there is a question:

what is

the law? Is it now permitted

to sell him a white one?—

And the question is according to Rabbi Judah. For according to the Sages, if he mentioned “white,” it is forbidden to sell him even a white one among the roosters] .

The sides of the uncertainty are:

Do we say: Since they gave him a black one and he took it, and a red one and he took it,

there is proof from this that

he does not need it for idolatry,

that he does not need them for idolatry.

Or perhaps,

it is possible to say that nevertheless

he is deceiving,

he does this deceitfully, knowing that they will also give him a white one.

And the conclusion of the Gemara is:

Teyku!

The question is not resolved.

We learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Meir says: Even a good date palm,

and hav, hatzav, and naklav [

and nakles ]

it is forbidden to sell to idolaters.

The Gemara explains the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rav Hisda said to Avimi: We have received,

we received from our teachers

that

the tractate

Avoda Zara

which

Abraham our forefather used to study—

there were four hundred chapters in it,

there were four hundred chapters in it—

and

whereas

we—

we have learned five

five chapters in our Mishna,

and we do not

know, and we do not know

what we are saying,

what we are saying! That is, Rav Hisda complains about his lack of understanding of tractate Avoda Zara!

Rav Hisda continues:

And what is difficult

what is difficult for me?—

that which we learned,

what we learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Meir says: Even a good date palm, and hatzav and nakles, it is forbidden to sell to idolaters—

And from here it should be inferred that

a good date palm

only a good date palm

is what we do not sell,

it is forbidden to sell.

But a bad date palm

bad—

we sell,

it is permitted to sell. And how is it possible to say so

But we learned

we learned below [19b]:

we do not sell them

anything in the Land of Israel

attached to the ground,

because it is stated [Deuteronomy 7], “You shall not favor them,” and we expound: You shall not give them a resting-place on the land of the Land of Israel. And this is difficult against the words of Rabbi Meir, who prohibits only a good date palm

And we answer:

He said to him

Avimi said to Rav Hisda: What Rabbi Meir prohibited regarding a date palm does not mean a date-palm tree attached to the ground, but rather

what is

the meaning of

“date palm”—

the fruits of a good date palm.

And Rabbi Meir prohibits selling them to a gentile, because gentiles purchase them for an offering to idols.

And Rav Huna likewise said:

The meaning of Rabbi Meir’s words is:

the fruits of a good date palm.

Hatzav—

kashba.

A type of dates. Or, a type of attractive grass.

Nakles—

when Rav Dimi came,

when he arrived from the Land of Israel in Babylonia,

he said

in the name of

Rabbi Hama bar Yosef: kureiti.

A type of fruit.

Abaye said to Rav Dimi: We have learned,

as we learned:

“Nakles”—

and we do not know what it is,

we do not know how to translate it,

and you say,

you arrived from the Land of Israel and said to us

“kureiti”—

and we do not know what it is,

and we still do not know what kureiti is,

what benefit have you brought us

what benefit have you brought us with your translation?

He said to him,

Rav Dimi said to Abaye:

I have benefited you,

nevertheless I have benefited you,

for when you go there,

when you go up to the Land of Israel,

you will say to them: “Nakles,”

if you say to them, “Nakles,”

and they do not know,

the inhabitants of the Land of Israel will not understand what it is—

you will say to them,

you will say to them

“kureiti,”

and they will know.

And then they will know what it is,

and they will show you,

and they will show you that species.

This Mishna concerns a decree by which the Sages prohibited selling animals to gentiles in general, throughout the entire year, in order to prevent the stumbling block of desecrating Shabbat through lending or renting a Jew’s animal to a gentile.

The decree was on account of animals designated for work, but when they issued the decree, the Sages extended their decree even to animals that are not presently fit for work and with which these concerns do not exist.

Regarding the sale of “small livestock,” sheep or goats, the Sages did not issue a decree, since they do no work at all. However, there were places where they followed the practice of being stringent and not selling them an animal, because of the concern lest the gentiles mate with the animal. This is forbidden to a Jew by a prohibition [as explained in the section of Aharei, Leviticus 18:23], and it is also forbidden to the descendants of Noah, from what is stated [Genesis 2], “And he shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be one flesh.” And we expound: this excludes an animal, for they do not become one flesh. It follows that if a Jew sells an animal to a gentile, he causes him to stumble in the transgression of mating with an animal, and the Jew violates the prohibition, “You shall not place a stumbling block before the blind.” Because of this concern, in those places they followed the practice of being stringent and not selling gentiles even small livestock. But this is not a law, but rather a custom, since presumably the gentile does not mate with his animal, because by doing so he renders it incapable of giving birth, and he is concerned for his property.

Mishna:

A place where they practiced

there, Jews

selling small livestock to idolaters,

because the gentiles there were not suspected concerning mating—

they may sell.

And in

a place where they practiced not selling—

they may not sell.

And everywhere—

And everywhere—

they may not sell them large livestock,

because of concern for the prohibition of desecrating Shabbat. And it is forbidden to sell even

calves and foals,

young and small ones, even though they are not yet fit for work, when they are

intact,

and even when they are

injured,

which are not fit for work. For the Sages were concerned that if they permitted selling animals that are not fit for work, ordinary people would come to “exchange” [the cases] and sell even animals fit for work.

Rabbi Judah permits the sale of

an animal

that is injured,

and his reason will be explained in the Gemara.

And Ben Beteira permits the sale of

the sale of

a horse,

because its usual use is not for work, but for riding. The Sages prohibited selling only something with which, if they performed work on Shabbat, they would violate a Torah prohibition. But with a horse, even if they ride it on Shabbat, they would not violate a Torah prohibition, because the prohibition of riding is only a prohibition of shevut enacted by the Sages. Therefore they did not issue a decree against selling a horse.

Gemara:

It was stated in our Mishna regarding the sale of small livestock that the prohibition or permission depends on “a place where they practiced,” and it now appears to the Gemara that the matter depends only on the custom of the Jews in each place. But the Gemara brings a Mishna from the following chapter, from which it appears that all gentiles in all places are suspected concerning mating. If so, it should be forbidden everywhere to sell them even small livestock, so as not to cause them to stumble through mating with it.

The Gemara discusses this:

Does it mean to say,

from the words of the Mishna it appears to say,

that there is no prohibition,

that there is no absolute prohibition against selling an animal to a gentile, but only

there is a custom,

there is a custom in the matter, and therefore

where they practiced prohibition,

in a place where they practiced prohibiting it—

let them practice [the prohibition],

one should practice prohibition in it, whereas

where they practiced permission,

in a place where they practiced permitting it—

let them practice [the permission],

one should practice permission in it.

But we raise a contradiction

to this from what we learned [below 22a]:

one may not place an animal

it is forbidden to leave an animal without supervision

in the inns

lodgings for travelers

of idolaters, because

they

are suspected concerning mating.

And in that Mishna no distinction was stated between one place and another. Thus, in all places the gentiles are suspected concerning mating, and if so, it should be forbidden everywhere to sell to them, so as not to cause them to stumble through mating, and the matter does not depend on the custom of the Jews in that place

And we answer:

Rav said:

the prohibition against secluding an animal with a gentile is also not an absolute prohibition everywhere; rather, it too depends upon the custom of the place. And the custom of the place depends upon the gentiles’ practice concerning copulation with animals. And what our Mishna said, “a place where they were accustomed to sell,” refers to the fact that in that place the gentiles are not suspected of copulation, and therefore the Jews there were accustomed to sell animals to them. And in that place it is even permitted to seclude a Jewish animal with a gentile. Whereas the Mishna that prohibited secluding an animal with gentiles is speaking of a place where they were suspected of copulation, and in that place it is also prohibited to sell an animal to them.

And this is the rule, according to Rav:

a place where they permitted selling,

where the gentiles were not suspected of copulation with animals,

they permitted secluding. A place where they prohibited secluding,

because the gentiles were suspected there of copulation with animals,

they prohibited selling.

And that is to say, there are different places and different places: there are places where they were suspected of copulation, and there are places where they were not suspected.