Avodah Zarah 14b (יד:) — the Talmud in English

It is impossible to say this, because

it is unnecessary to state that when they are unspecified, we may sell them,

as there is no novelty in the Mishna’s statement that it is permitted to sell him “unspecified” items: we learned only that a “white rooster” may not be sold, whereas wheat, even white wheat, may be sold,

and it is unnecessary to state that when they are specified, we may not sell them,

as there is no novelty in the Mishna’s statement that if he explicitly says that he is purchasing them for idolatrous worship, it is forbidden to sell them to him.

Therefore, it is impossible to interpret the intention of the Mishna in this manner.

Rather,

it should be explained that what it said, “

unspecified,”

means

that

the gentile says without specification

and says

“wheat,”

having announced: “Who has wheat to sell?” Whereas

“specified”

means

that

the gentile specifies

and says

“wheat

that is white,”

announcing: “Who has white wheat to sell?”

The Mishna comes to teach that since he specifies and says “white,” it is forbidden to sell him even wheat.

By inference

you learn

that with regard to a rooster,

which he intends to purchase as an offering for idolatry,

even

when he says

without specification

“Who has a rooster?”

also not

is it permitted to sell him the white one. This poses a difficulty to Rabbi Zeira, who holds that in the case of an “unspecified rooster,” it is permitted to sell him the white one.

And we resolve it:

They say: In fact,

the correct explanation is that “

unspecified”

means that he says

“white wheat.”

The Mishna says that it is permitted to sell it to him because gentiles do not offer wheat, and his desire for white wheat is not due to idolatry. Indeed, there is no novelty in this law; rather, the novelty is in the latter clause:

“Specified,”

means

that

the gentile

says

explicitly: “White wheat, which I need

for idolatrous worship,

who has it?”

And

if you ask: Is it not obvious that it is forbidden to sell it to him? What does the Mishna teach us?

We answer that “

specified”

was necessary for him to state.

The Mishna needed to teach us this, because

it might have entered your mind to say

that

this man

the gentile

does not need it for idolatrous worship,

that he is not purchasing it as an offering for idolatry, since gentiles do not customarily offer wheat,

but

he says this because

he is deeply attached to idolatry.

He is devoted to idols, whereas if he were selling some object to another gentile for idolatrous purposes, he would sell it cheaply, because of his extreme attachment to idols.

And

therefore

he reasoned: Just as that man

himself

is attached to it,

is attached

to idols—

everyone

all the people of the world

are also attached to them,

also connected to them. And he says to himself:

“I would say,”

I will say in the marketplace

this: “Who has white wheat for idolatrous purposes?”

“

so that they will give it to me

cheaply! In truth, his heart is not directed toward idols, and it is permitted to sell it to him.

It teaches us this:

The Mishna comes to reject this reasoning and to say that since he nevertheless mentioned “idolatry,” it is forbidden.

After we have learned that in certain circumstances it is permitted to sell a gentile a white rooster, and in other circumstances it is forbidden, the Gemara presents Rav Ashi’s inquiries concerning this matter.

Rav Ashi raised a dilemma:

If a gentile says:

“A white rooster with a severed

limb,

who has one

to sell?”—

what is the law regarding selling him an intact white rooster?

The two sides of the dilemma are:

The two sides of the question are:

Do we say that, since he said “

severed”—

he does not need it for idolatry,

that he is not purchasing it for idols, because gentiles do not offer an animal that is missing a limb—

or perhaps

it is possible to say:

he is attempting to deceive,

that the gentile says this deceitfully, knowing that Jews do not wish to sell him a white rooster. Therefore, he cleverly says that he wants one with a severed limb, knowing that roosters with severed limbs are not commonly found in the marketplace, so that they will give him “a complete white one.”

The dilemma is not resolved, and Rav Ashi continues:

If you should conclude

that one can resolve this from a Mishna, a beraita, or even through reasoning, that

this

gentile

is merely attempting to deceive,

there is another matter about which one must raise a dilemma:

When the gentile announces in the marketplace: “

Who has a white rooster?” “

Who has a white rooster?”—

and they give him a black one, and he takes it,

whether they give him a black one, he takes it;

and they give him a red one, and he takes it,

and whether they give him a red one, he takes it—the dilemma is:

what

is the law? Is it now permitted

to sell him the white one? [The dilemma is according to Rabbi Yehuda. According to the Sages, once he mentioned “white,” it is forbidden to sell him a white one even among the other roosters] .

The two sides of the dilemma are:

Do we say that, since they gave him a black one and he took it, and a red one and he took it,

this proves that

he does not need it for idolatry,

that he does not need these for idolatrous purposes?

Or perhaps,

it is possible to say that nevertheless

he is attempting to deceive,

doing this deceitfully, knowing that they will also give him a white one.

The Gemara’s conclusion is:

Teiku!

The question remains without a resolution.

The dilemma remains unresolved.

We learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Meir says: Even a good date palm,

the hatzav and the naklav

[and the niklas]

may not be sold to idol worshippers.

The Gemara explains Rabbi Meir’s statement.

Rav Hisda said to Avimi: It was taught,

we received from our teachers

that the tractate

of

Avodah Zarah

was studied by

Abraham our forefather—

there were four hundred chapters in it,

there were four hundred chapters—

but

we

have learned five,

five chapters in our Mishna,

and

we

do not know

what we are saying,

that is, Rav Hisda complains about his lack of understanding of Tractate Avodah Zarah!

Rav Hisda continues:

And what is the difficulty?

What troubles me? It is

that we learned,

what we learned in our Mishna:

“Rabbi Meir says: Even a good date palm, the hatzav and the niklas may not be sold to idol worshippers.”

From this it should be inferred that

a good date palm—

only a good date palm

may not be sold;

it is forbidden to sell it.

But a bad date palm

a poor one—

we may sell,

it is permitted to sell it. But how can this be said?

But we learned

below [19b]:

“We may not sell them

anything in the Land of Israel

that is attached to the ground,”

because it is stated [Deuteronomy 7]: “You shall not show them favor”; and we expound: You may not grant them a holding in the land of Israel. This is difficult with regard to Rabbi Meir, who prohibits the sale only of a good date palm.

And we resolve it:

He said to him

Avimi said to Rav Hisda: When Rabbi Meir prohibited a date palm, he did not mean a date palm attached to the ground. Rather,

what

is the meaning of

“date palm”?

The fruits of a good date palm.

Rabbi Meir prohibits selling them to a gentile because gentiles purchase them as offerings for idolatry.

And Rav Huna likewise said:

Rabbi Meir’s statement means:

the fruits of a good date palm.

Hatzav—

kashba.

A type of date, or a beautiful type of grass.

Niklas—

when Rav Dimi came,

when he arrived from the Land of Israel in Babylonia,

he said

in the name of

Rabbi Hama bar Yosef: Kuraytei.

A type of fruit.

Abaye said to Rav Dimi: We learned,

as we learned:

“Niklas”—

and we do not know what it is,

we did not know how to translate it,

and you said

you came from the Land of Israel and told us

“kuraytei”—

and we do not know what it is,

and we still do not know what kuraytei is;

what benefit have you brought us

with your translation?

He said to him

Rav Dimi said to Abaye:

I have benefited you,

I have nevertheless benefited you,

for when you go there,

when you go up to the Land of Israel,

you will say to them: “Niklas.”

If you say to them, “Niklas,”

and they do not know,

the people of the Land of Israel will not understand what it is—

you will say to them,

you will tell them

“kuraytei,”

and they will know.

Then they will know what it is,

and they will point it out to you,

showing you that species.

This Mishna concerns a decree enacted by the Sages prohibiting the sale of animals to gentiles in general, throughout the year, in order to prevent the transgression of desecrating Shabbat through lending or renting a Jew’s animal to a gentile.

The decree was due to animals designated for labor. However, when they enacted it, the Sages extended their decree even to animals that were not presently fit for labor and with regard to which these concerns do not apply.

The Sages did not enact a decree concerning the sale of small livestock—sheep or goats—since they perform no labor at all. However, in some places people practiced stringency and did not sell animals to gentiles, due to the concern that the gentiles might mate with the animal. This is forbidden to a Jew by a prohibition, as explained in the passage concerning forbidden relations [Leviticus 18:23], and it is also forbidden to Noahides, based on the verse [Genesis 2]: “He shall cleave to his wife, and they shall become one flesh.” We expound: This excludes an animal, with which they do not become one flesh. Consequently, if a Jew sells an animal to a gentile, he causes him to stumble in the transgression of mating with an animal, and the Jew violates the prohibition: “You shall not place a stumbling block before the blind.” Because of this concern, in those places they practiced stringency and did not sell even small livestock to gentiles. However, this is not law but custom, since presumably the gentile will not mate with his animal, as by doing so he would render it incapable of giving birth, and he is concerned for his property. Mishna:

Where it is customary

for Jews there

to sell small livestock to idol worshippers,

because the gentiles there are not suspected of mating with animals—

they may sell

them.

But

where it is customary not to sell—

they may not sell.

And everywhere—

they may not sell large livestock to them,

because of concern for the prohibition against desecrating Shabbat. It is forbidden to sell even

calves and foals,

young animals, although they are not yet fit for labor, whether they are

intact,

and even when they are

injured,

and unfit for labor. The Sages were concerned that if they permitted the sale of animals unfit for labor, ordinary people would come to “exchange” them and sell even animals fit for labor.

Rabbi Yehuda permits

the sale of an animal that is

injured,

and his reason will be explained in the Gemara.

And ben Beteira permits

the sale of a

horse,

since it is not ordinarily used for labor but for riding. The Sages prohibited selling only an object with which, if labor were performed on Shabbat, one would violate a Torah prohibition. But with a horse, even if one rides it on Shabbat, one does not violate a Torah prohibition, because the prohibition against riding is only a rabbinic prohibition of shevut. Therefore, they did not enact a decree concerning the sale of a horse.

Gemara:

Our Mishna states concerning the sale of small livestock that the prohibition or permission depends on “where it is customary,” and the Gemara now understands that the matter depends only on the custom of the Jews in each place. But the Gemara cites a Mishna from the following chapter, which implies that all gentiles in all places are suspected of mating with animals. If so, it should be forbidden everywhere to sell them even small livestock, so as not to cause them to stumble through mating with it.

The Gemara discusses this:

To say that,

the Mishna implies

that there is no prohibition,

that there is no absolute prohibition against selling an animal to a gentile, but only

a custom,

there is a custom concerning the matter. Therefore,

where it is customary to prohibit,

in a place where they practice prohibition—

they should practice it;

they must follow the prohibition there. But

where it is customary to permit,

in a place where they practice permission—

they should practice it,

they should follow the permission there.

But we raise a contradiction

from that which we learned [below, 22a]:

“One may not leave an animal

unattended

at inns

of

idol worshippers, because

they

are suspected of mating with animals.

are suspected of mating with animals.”

In that Mishna no distinction is made between one place and another. It follows that gentiles everywhere are suspected of mating with animals, and if so, it should be forbidden everywhere to sell them animals, so as not to cause them to stumble through mating with them; the matter should not depend on the custom of the Jews in that place!?

And we answer:

Rav said:

The prohibition against leaving an animal alone with a non-Jew is likewise not an absolute prohibition in every place; rather, it too depends on the custom of the place. And the custom of the place depends on the non-Jews’ practice regarding the mating of animals. Thus, when our Mishna said, “a place where they customarily sell,” it meant that in that place the non-Jews were not suspected of engaging in bestiality, and therefore the Jews there customarily sold animals to them. In that place, it was also permitted to leave a Jewish-owned animal alone with a non-Jew. Whereas the Mishna that prohibited leaving an animal alone with non-Jews is speaking of a place where they were suspected of engaging in bestiality, and in that place it was likewise prohibited to sell an animal to them.

And this is the general rule, according to Rav:

A place where they permitted selling,

where the non-Jews were not suspected of engaging in bestiality,

they permitted leaving an animal alone with them. A place where they prohibited leaving an animal alone with them,

because the non-Jews were suspected there of engaging in bestiality,

they prohibited selling to them.

That is, there are different places: in some, they were suspected of engaging in bestiality, and in others, they were not suspected.