Avodah Zarah 14a (יד.) — the Talmud in English

The Gemara explains what itztrobelin are.

Gemara:

What are itztrobelin? —

Toranita.

A type of cedar.

And he raised an objection

to this from a beraita concerning the laws of the Sabbatical year, which lists the types of fruit that possess “the sanctity of the Sabbatical year,” may not be used for commerce, and must be declared ownerless. The beraita continues:

They added to them

also, in addition to these fruits,

alkasin, itztrobelin, muksesin, and benot shuaḥ,

which are types of fruit that are not especially important; therefore, at first the practice was not to apply to them “the sanctity of the Sabbatical year” —

And now there is a difficulty:

And if it enters your mind

that

itztrobelin

are the species called

toranita —

Toranita —

is it subject to the laws of the Sabbatical year!?

Is it possible that the laws of the Sabbatical year apply to this fruit?

But it was taught

in another beraita:

This is the principle

with regard to the sanctity of the Sabbatical year:

Every

thing

that has a root,

that has a root which endures in the soil and from which it derives its vitality —

is subject to the Sabbatical year. And every

thing

that has no root,

that has no root enduring in the soil by means of which it can remain in the soil even during the rainy season, such as cucumbers and pumpkins —

is not subject to the Sabbatical year,

and it is permitted to engage in commerce with it, and there is no need to declare it ownerless.

But toranita has no root in the land, so why did the beraita say that itztrobelin were added to them? Rather, it is proven that itztrobelin is not the species called “toranita.”

Rather,

Rav Safra said, and likewise when

Ravin

came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia,

he said

in the name of

Rabbi Elazar:

Itztrobelin is

the fruit of the cedar,

the fruit of the cedar [called in foreign languages “galant”].

We learned in our Mishna:

Benot shuaḥ.

And the Gemara explains what “benot shuaḥ” are —

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: White figs,

white figs.

We learned in our Mishna:

And stalks.

And the Gemara explains:

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: They taught this with regard to “their stalks.”

That is, the “stalks” mentioned by the Mishna are not a distinct species called by that name. Rather, the reference is to the stalks of all the fruits, which are called “stalks.” The Mishna is saying as follows: The prohibition against selling itztrobelin and benot shuaḥ to a gentile applies only when they are attached to their stalks, because it is the practice of gentiles to worship idolatry by hanging them by their stalks before the idol. But without the stalks, they do not hang them; therefore, their purchase is not for idolatrous purposes, and it is permitted to sell them to them.

We learned in our Mishna:

And frankincense.

Rav Yitzḥak said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said:

What the Mishna prohibited refers to the type of frankincense called

pure frankincense.

And gentiles offer that species to idols.

A tanna

taught a beraita:

And from all of them,

from all the species listed in our Mishna —

they may sell them to gentiles in a bundle,

many together, because in that case it is certain that he purchases them for commerce and not to worship them himself.

And how large

is a

bundle?

Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira explained: A bundle may not contain less than

the weight of

three manin [“

maneh”].

And we raise a difficulty: How did they permit selling a bundle, even though he is not purchasing it for himself?

And let us be concerned, perhaps

perhaps

he will go and sell it to others,

go and sell the individual portions of the bundle to other gentiles for use as an idolatrous offering,

and

they

will burn them as incense,

burning them to their idols?

And we answer:

Abaye said:

Only with regard to

the “before,”

the prohibition of “Before the blind you shall not place a stumbling block,”

are we commanded.

But

with regard to “the before of the before,” we are not commanded.

That is, the reason the Sages prohibited selling to a gentile is that the Jew would violate the prohibition of “Before the blind you shall not place a stumbling block,” which prohibits causing a person—even a gentile—to sin. Since a gentile is forbidden to worship idolatry, it is forbidden for a Jew to provide him with something that he will use for an idolatrous act forbidden to him, because we are warned not to cause him to sin. But there is no prohibition against causing one who causes sin to cause sin, as here, where he sells to one gentile and that gentile will sell to another. This is the meaning of “with regard to the ‘before’ of ‘Before the blind,’ we are not commanded”: We are not commanded concerning that, and therefore there is no prohibition.

We learned in our Mishna:

And a white rooster.

The Gemara explains the words of the first tanna, who prohibits selling a white rooster: When is it forbidden, and when is it permitted?

Rabbi Yona said that Rabbi Zeira said that Rav Zevid said—and some say

that this teaching was transmitted as follows:

Rabbi Yona said that Rabbi Zeira said:

If the gentile asks,

“A rooster—for whom

is one to sell?” —

it is permitted to sell him a white rooster,

because since he did not mention “white,” he is not purchasing it for idolatrous worship.

Only if he asks,

“A white rooster—for whom?”

then

it is forbidden to sell him a white rooster,

because in that case he is purchasing it for idolatrous worship.

And the Gemara infers from Rabbi Yehuda’s words that the first tanna prohibits selling even when he asks, “A rooster—for whom?”

We learned:

we learned in the continuation of the Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda says: He may sell him a white rooster among other roosters.

And the Gemara infers:

What are the circumstances?

When does Rabbi Yehuda permit it?

If you say

that

the

gentile

said

“A white rooster—for whom?”

“A white rooster—for whom?” —

Surely in such a case

even

a white rooster

among other roosters, he did not permit Rabbi Yehuda, for the gentile reveals that he needs it for idolatrous purposes. His taking it among the other roosters is only because he wants the white one and is prepared to purchase many roosters in order to obtain the white one!

permit Rabbi Yehuda to sell it to him. After all, the gentile has made it clear that he needs it for idolatrous purposes. The fact that he takes it together with the other roosters is only because he wants the white one and is willing to purchase many roosters in order to obtain it!

Rather, is it not

that Rabbi Yehuda permits only in a case where he

said

without specification,

“A rooster—for whom?”

“A rooster—for whom?”

And even so,

even though he merely says, “A rooster—for whom?”

according to Rabbi Yehuda,

only a white rooster

among the other roosters —

yes,

it is permitted to sell him. But a white rooster

by itself, no.

And from here we infer:

And according to the first tanna, even

when he sells him the white rooster

among the other roosters,

it is also not

permitted to him, even if he merely said, “A rooster—for whom?”

If so, this is difficult for Rabbi Zeira, who holds that according to the first tanna it is permitted to sell him a white rooster when he says merely, “A rooster—for whom?” even when it is not among other roosters.

And we answer:

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

Do not infer this from our Mishna. Rather, the truth is as Rabbi Zeira stated: When he says merely, “A rooster—for whom?” it is permitted to sell him one, even according to the first tanna; and when he says, “A white rooster—for whom?” it is forbidden even among the other roosters, even according to Rabbi Yehuda. For

here,

in our Mishna,

with what are we dealing,

what is the case concerning which the first tanna and Rabbi Yehuda disagree? With a third formulation,

for example, when he said

the gentile:

“This and this.”

At first he asked, “A white, black, and red rooster—for whom?”

In this case, which is the case discussed by our Mishna, Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is forbidden to sell him a white rooster by itself, but it is permitted to sell it among the other roosters.

By itself it is forbidden, since at first he mentioned “white” and now he takes a “white” one. It is therefore reasonable to say that this gentile intended to obtain the white one, and added the request for a black and a red one because he knew that the Jews would not sell him a “white” one. Thus he is acting deceitfully [acting cunningly] and does not ask for “white” alone.

But this applies when in the end he actually takes the “white” one by itself. If in the end he takes the “white” one together with other roosters, it is permitted, since he is not purchasing the other roosters for idolatrous purposes; it is therefore evident that he is not purchasing the “white” one for that purpose either.

Nevertheless, the first tanna prohibits it, since at the outset he asked for “white.”

It was taught likewise,

for it was taught in a beraita in accordance with this interpretation of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak:

Rabbi Yehuda said: When

did the Sages prohibit selling a white rooster?

When he said

the gentile:

“This rooster

white,”

but if he said “a rooster

“rooster”

this and this,”

black and white —

it is permitted

to sell it to him among the other roosters.

And it is evident that Rabbi Yehuda permitted “this and this” only to sell it to him among the other roosters, whereas he did not permit it by itself. All this applies only when he mentioned “white.” It follows that when he says merely, “A rooster—for whom?” it is permitted even by itself. Since we do not find that the Sages disagreed with him, it follows that Rabbi Zeira’s statement is correct: Even according to the first tanna, when he says merely, “A rooster—for whom?” it is permitted.

And the Gemara cites the continuation of the beraita:

And even if he said

“This rooster [

white,”]

if he is

a gentile who made a banquet for his son, or if he had

a gentile

a sick person in his house —

it is permitted

to sell him a white rooster, since he is purchasing the “white” one for the adornment of his banquet or for the medical needs of the sick person.

And we raise a difficulty against Rabbi Yehuda’s statement, permitting one to sell it to him for the banquet of his son: The day of his son’s banquet is his festival day, and on that day it is certainly forbidden to sell to him, even if he is not purchasing it for an idolatrous offering, because of the concern that he will go and offer thanks.

But we learned

in our Mishna:

A gentile who made a banquet for his son —

is not forbidden

for the three days preceding it,

but only on that day and to that particular person.

And it is proven that

that day and that particular person

at least,

in any event,

are forbidden.

If so, how could Rabbi Yehuda permit selling to him for “the banquet of his son”?

And we answer:

Rav Yitzḥak bar Mesharsheya said:

What

Rabbi Yehuda

permitted one to sell him for “the banquet of his son” does not refer to his son’s wedding. Rather, it refers to

a tuziz,

a friendly meal that young men hold with one another, which is not an important banquet; he does not offer anything to idols on that day, nor does he go and offer thanks. Rav Yehuda agrees that on the day of “his son’s wedding” it is forbidden to sell to him.

The Gemara now returns to raise a difficulty against Rabbi Zeira’s statement, which permits selling a white rooster when he says merely, “A rooster—for whom?”

We learned

in the continuation of our Mishna:

And all other objects, when their purpose is unspecified,

if the gentile purchases them without specifying —

it is permitted.

But when their purpose is specified,

when he explicitly states it —

it is forbidden.

What

is the meaning of

“when their purpose is unspecified,”

and what is the meaning of “when their purpose is specified”?

If you say

that

“when their purpose is unspecified”

means

that the

gentile

said

“white wheat,”

white wheat, whereas

“when their purpose is specified”

means

that the

gentile

said explicitly

“for idolatry,” —