Avodah Zarah 13b (יג:) — the Talmud in English

And if he consecrated

produce, garments, and utensils

, they shall rot,

he leaves them to rot.

And if he consecrated

money and metal utensils

—

he takes them and

throws them into the Dead Sea.

And what is uprooting?

—

He locks the door before it,

and it has nothing to eat, and dies on its own.

And this proves that uprooting means locking the door, and not severing its hooves?

Abaye said:

With regard to an animal that one purchased at an idolatrous fair, its hooves should indeed be severed. But

there it is different,

in the case of one who consecrates an animal in the present time,

because of the disgrace

of consecrated property:

if its hooves were severed in a place where this would not render it tereifa, it would not die quickly, and its disgrace would remain visible for a long time.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: Why is it necessary to lock the door before it?

Let him slaughter it!

It has a remedy if he slaughters it [and not for the purpose of eating it, but in order to hasten its death]?

And we answer: This is not a proper remedy, because

they may come to misuse it

, they may come to eat it and thereby stumble into the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property.

The Gemara raises another difficulty:

Let him cut it into two!

He can cut it into two parts in order to hasten its death; there would be no disgrace to consecrated property, and they would not eat it either, because it would be an animal carcass?

Abaye said:

It is prohibited to do so, because

the verse says

[Deuteronomy 12], “You shall utterly destroy all the places where the nations that you are dispossessing served.”

“You shall tear down their altars, smash their pillars; you shall not do thus to the Lord your God.”

And we derive from this: With regard to anything that belongs to the Lord, including property designated for Temple maintenance, one may not treat it in a manner resembling destruction.

Rava said:

There is another reason to prohibit cutting it in two:

because it appears as though he is inflicting a blemish on consecrated property

, and it is prohibited to do so, as it is stated [Leviticus 22], “It shall have no blemish,” from which we derive that it is prohibited to inflict a blemish on consecrated property.

The Gemara challenges Rava’s statement: “

It appears

”? If he cuts it in two, does it merely appear that he is inflicting a blemish? Surely

it is a bona fide blemish!

It is a full-fledged blemish, and not merely something resembling a blemish.

And we answer: Rava’s intention in saying “it appears” is that this act is not prohibited by Torah law.

This applies

—when did the Torah prohibit inflicting a blemish on consecrated property?—

while the Temple is standing, when it is fit to be offered,

when the offering is fit to be offered. But

now,

at the present time,

when it is not fit to be offered, we have no concern.

There is no Torah prohibition in this. Therefore, Rava was precise in saying that it “appears” as though he is inflicting a blemish on consecrated property.

The Gemara challenges what we have answered—that when the animal is not fit to be offered, there is no Torah prohibition in this act. This reason is insufficient to establish that the act is not prohibited by Torah law, because we find [according to several tannaim in tractate Bekhorot 33b] that it is prohibited to inflict a blemish on an offering that has already become blemished, even though, from the moment it became blemished, it is no longer fit to be offered:

Let it be

, meaning, let the prohibition of inflicting a blemish in the present time be a Torah prohibition,

like

one who inflicts a blemish on an already blemished animal,

which, although it is not fit

—the blemished animal—

to be offered,

it is nevertheless prohibited to inflict an additional blemish upon it. Why, then, did Rava say that this merely “appears” to be inflicting a blemish on consecrated property?

And we answer: A distinction must be made between the cases. An offering that is

blemished—granted

, even though

it is not fit in itself,

meaning that the animal itself is not fit to be offered, nevertheless

it is fit with regard to its value

: It can be sold, and another animal can be brought as an offering with its proceeds. Therefore, even when it is blemished, it retains the status of an offering, and the verse “It shall be perfect, to be accepted” can be applied to it—

But

here,

in the case of one who consecrates an offering in the present time,

which is fit neither with regard to its value nor with regard to itself,

as it is fit neither to be offered itself nor to have another offering brought with its proceeds, it is not applicable to say of it, “It shall be perfect, to be accepted.” Therefore, there is no Torah prohibition against inflicting a blemish upon it; there is only a rabbinic prohibition, and that is why Rava said that it “appears” to be inflicting a blemish.

In summary: To cut it in two [to make it a gistera] is prohibited, either for Abaye’s reason—that it is prohibited to destroy sacred objects—or for Rava’s reason—that there is a rabbinic prohibition against inflicting a blemish on consecrated property even in the present time.

To slaughter it is prohibited, because people may come to eat it.

To sever its hooves is prohibited because of the disgrace to consecrated property, as its disgrace would remain visible for a long time.

Rather, one locks the door before it, and it dies on its own.

But in the case of an animal purchased at an idolatrous fair, they penalized him by requiring that its hooves be severed from below the knee.

The Gemara now returns to the law concerning “one who goes to an idolatrous fair.”

He encountered

them:

Rabbi Yona, who was standing

standing

at the entrance

to

Tyre

. He said to him: It is taught

, we learned in a baraita: “

An animal must be uprooted.”

And there is a question: If one purchased

a slave, what

should he do with him? Should he uproot him or not?

Rabbi Yona explains his question: If it were

a Jewish slave

, a Jew who was working for gentiles,

I would have no question

: It is obvious that it is prohibited to uproot him [and, on the contrary, it is a mitzva to redeem him from the gentiles]—

My question is

: What is the law with regard to

a gentile slave

?

What should he do with him?

He said to him: What is your question?

What is your uncertainty? Is it not

taught

in a baraita:

Gentiles and those who graze small livestock

—even Jews, who are considered robbers because they graze their animals in other people’s fields—

are not brought up

if they have fallen into a pit; rather, they are left to die on their own.

And they are not brought down

into the pit; it is prohibited to kill them by direct action.

It follows that it is prohibited to kill gentiles or destroy them by direct action, and likewise one does not uproot them!

He said

—Rabbi Yirmeya

asked Rabbi Zeira: It is taught

, in the baraita of the Sages who disagree with Rabbi Natan:

One may purchase animals, slaves,

and maidservants from them

—what type of slaves is being discussed?

Is it only

a Jewish slave

[a Jew in the hands of gentiles], whom it is a mitzva to remove from their control,

or perhaps even a gentile slave?

He said to him

, Rabbi Zeira to Rabbi Yirmeya:

It is reasonable

that the reference is specifically to

a Jewish slave,

thereby freeing him from his gentile master.

For if

you were to say that the reference is even to

a gentile slave

—

what need is there for him!?

When Ravin came

from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia,

he said

in the name of

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish

: It is permitted to purchase

even a gentile slave.

There is a mitzva in redeeming him from them,

because he brings him under the wings of the Divine Presence,

by converting him, so that he will become obligated in the mitzvot.

Rav Ashi said:

This baraita permits purchasing an animal from them as well as a slave. If so,

is it so

that with regard to

an animal

as well it is relevant to say this?

What is there of “bringing it under the wings of the Divine Presence”?

How can one say of an animal that he “brings it under the wings of the Divine Presence”?—

Rather,

it must be that the reason they permitted him to purchase an animal from the gentiles is

because of reducing their possessions,

because he diminishes the gentiles’ assets and weakens them by purchasing an animal that they use —

Here too,

the same applies to a slave:

they reduce

the gentiles’ possessions, and therefore

it is permitted

for the Sages permitted purchasing from them. And not because he brings him under the wings of the Divine Presence.

The Gemara relates an incident that occurred:

Rabbi Yaakov purchased a sandal,

he purchased a sandal at an idolatrous fair.

Rabbi Yirmeya purchased bread,

he purchased bread there.

One said to the other: “Orphan!”

You are behaving like an orphan, without understanding, because your father did not educate you!

Did your master act this way?!

Did your master too purchase something at a gentile fair and thereby benefit them by paying the customs duty?!

The other said to him: “Orphan! Did your master

act this way?!

And

the Gemara explains why they had actually done so, and why each suspected the other of violating a prohibition:

Both of them,

they both

purchased from a householder

, buying from a householder. And Rabbi Yoḥanan permits [in the preceding sugya] purchasing from a householder.

And each one

of them

thought: “My colleague

,

purchased from a merchant,

buying from a merchant who pays customs to the priests.

For Rabbi Abba, the son

of

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, said: They taught

that it is prohibited to purchase from them

only when one purchases from a merchant, from whom they take customs,

because the priests collect customs from the merchants, and therefore it is prohibited.

But when one purchases from a householder,

a private individual who brings his merchandise to the market,

from whom they do not take customs,

because the priests do not collect customs from such people—

it is permitted.

It is thus clear that both of them purchased permissibly, and it is likewise clear why each suspected the other.

In the end, however, it became clear to them that each one’s suspicion of the other had not been unfounded, because at the fair in question the priests collected customs even from householders.

Rabbi Abba, the son of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, said: If

if

Rabbi Yoḥanan had been here this time

on this occasion,

in the place

where they were,

where they were collecting customs

—the priests were collecting customs

even from householders

—he would have prohibited purchasing even from householders.

He would have prohibited it.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

Rather,

if so,

they

—these two amoraim, Rabbi Yaakov and Rabbi Yirmeya, the disciples of Rabbi Yoḥanan—

how did they purchase

from them?

And we answer: They

purchased from a householder who was not a permanent

participant

at the fair.

The priests did not collect customs from nonpermanent householders, because it had not occurred to them to collect from them: they were not merchants and did not maintain permanent stalls in the market.

Mishna:

This Mishna deals with items that it is prohibited to sell to gentiles throughout the year, even not on their festival day, because gentiles purchase them for use as offerings to idolatry, with the result that the Jew violates the prohibition, “You shall not place a stumbling block before the blind.”

These are the items that it is prohibited to sell to an idolater:

Cones, white figs, and stalks,

as the Gemara explains,

frankincense,

a type of spice,

and a white rooster.

Rabbi Yehuda says: It is permitted to sell him a white rooster among other roosters

: If the Jew sells him many roosters, it is permitted to include a white rooster among them, since the buyer is not particular to purchase specifically a white one. This demonstrates that he does not need it for idolatrous purposes.

And when it is

—the white rooster—

by itself,

and not among the other roosters,

he severs its finger,

and sells it to him, because

gentiles do not

offer

an offering that is

missing

a limb

for idolatry .

And all other items—

when their purpose is unspecified,

if he purchases them “without specification,”

it is permitted

to sell them to gentiles,

but

if

their purpose is specified,

it is prohibited [the Gemara will explain this].

[as will be explained in the Gemara].

Rabbi Meir says: Even tevel dates, colocynth, and naklav

[and naklas, as the Gemara explains]—

it is prohibited to sell them to idolaters.