Arakhin 7a — the Talmud in English

And we challenge it:

by inference, the first Tanna

who obligates him

holds that it is possible to return him to the court for a renewed standing of the court

to obligate him for the injury? But this is a denial of justice, and it is not possible that he disputes this.

And we answer:

Rav Yosef said:

In fact, even the first Tanna agrees that we do not return him to the court; rather,

they disagree concerning whether an oral loan is collected from heirs. The first Tanna holds that an oral loan is collected from heirs,

and the injured person should litigate with the heirs. And although an injury is like an oral loan, nevertheless it is collected from the heirs.

And Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds that an oral loan is not collected from heirs.

And since the one who inflicted the injury himself does not return to litigate in court, there is no basis to obligate the heirs, for an oral loan does not create a lien on property.

Rabba said: Everyone

both the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar agree

that an oral loan is not collected from heirs. And here

in the beraita,

they disagree concerning a loan written in the Torah,

such as an injury, which is an obligation of the Torah.

The first Tanna holds that it is comparable to one written in a document,

and therefore it is collected from the heirs;

and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds

that a loan written in the Torah

is not comparable to one written in a document,

but is like an oral loan, and therefore it is not collected from the heirs.

We challenge this: One who dug a pit in the public domain, and an ox fell upon him and killed him, is exempt.

The owner of the ox is exempt, since the negligence was that of the one who was killed.

Moreover, if the ox died, the heirs of the owner of the pit are liable to pay the value of the ox to its owners,

as is the law concerning a pit that caused damage. It follows that a loan written in the Torah is like one written in a document. And this is difficult for what we explained concerning the dispute between the first Tanna and Rabbi Yosei in the Mishna, that according to the first Tanna the heirs are exempt. The anonymous Mishna, which says that the heirs are exempt, contradicts the anonymous beraita, which says that the heirs are liable.

And we answer:

A

mar

R

av

Ilai said in the name of Rav:

The beraita is speaking

when

the one who dug the pit

stood trial

before he died, and they had already obligated him to pay. The act of the court is like a loan in a document, and the property thereby becomes encumbered; therefore it is collected from the heirs.

And we refute this:

But it teaches, “and it killed him,”

and how can we explain that he stood trial before he died?

And we answer: Here it is speaking

when it made him mortally wounded ,

and he did not die immediately, but had time to stand trial before his death.

And he refutes:

But Rav Naḥman said: Rav Ḥana taught

the beraita as speaking when the ox fell

and died

and a clod of earth fell with it

and buried him,

the one who dug the pit, and it is no longer possible to say that he stood trial afterward; nevertheless, the heirs are liable.

And we answer:

And the halakha is:

The beraita that says that the heirs are liable is speaking

when the judges were sitting over the mouth of the pit

while the one who dug it was still alive, and there they completed his judgment; therefore the heirs are liable , since the judgment was completed during his lifetime and the lien on the property took effect.

The Sages taught: One who is taken out to be executed

in court after he has brought his offering,

they sprinkle upon him [

they throw on his behalf]

the blood of his sin-offering and the blood of his guilt-offering

on the altar. And this is not like an offering whose owner has died, because he is still alive.

If he sinned unwittingly at that time

when he is being taken out to be executed, through a transgression for which one is liable to bring an offering,

they do not attend to him

to obligate him in an offering; rather, he is executed immediately.

And it explains it:

What is the reason? Rav Yosef said: Because we do not afflict

by delaying

his judgment

by refraining from executing him until the sacrifice has been slaughtered and the blood sprinkled.

And we challenge this:

Abaye said to him: If so,

even in

the first clause

of the beraita

as well

let us say that we do not afflict his judgment. Why, then, do we wait until the blood is sprinkled upon him?

And we answer: The first clause is speaking

when his sacrifice had already been slaughtered at that time

and only the sprinkling remained. A short period of time required for sprinkling is not considered a denial of justice.

And furthermore we refute:

But if there is no sacrifice

of the one taken out to be executed

already slaughtered at that time

when he is taken out to be executed,

what then? Is it not

that we should delay his judgment until he brings it? And this is difficult:

rather than teaching

in the latter clause

“if he sinned at that time, they do not attend to him,” let it distinguish

between the law of the first clause and the law of the latter clause,

and let it teach it there,

that both the first clause and the latter clause concern one who sinned earlier and brought an offering, while in the latter clause it would teach

“In what case is this statement said? When the sacrifice was slaughtered at that time. But if the sacrifice was not already slaughtered, they do not attend to him.”

And we answer:

This is also what it says,

something is missing from the beraita, and this is what it teaches:

“In what case is this statement said? When the sacrifice was slaughtered at that time. But if the sacrifice was not slaughtered at that time, he is treated as one who sinned at that time, and they do not attend to him.”

Mishna:

A woman who was taken out to be executed

by the court while she was pregnant,

they do not wait

for her

before executing her until she gives birth. Rather, they execute the fetus with her, because it is one body.

But

when she was sitting on the birthing stool

to give birth [and Rashi explained: before her judgment was completed while Tosafot disagree and explain that it was after her judgment was completed],

they wait

for her until she gives birth,

because at that time the fetus has already detached and moved from its place, and it is like an independent body, and it is forbidden to kill it.

From a woman who was executed they derive benefit from her hair,

even though after death it is forbidden to derive benefit from her.

An animal that was executed

by the court

is forbidden for benefit.

And this is learned from “the owner of the ox is innocent,” which is written concerning an ox sentenced to stoning; that is, he is innocent of his property, and he may have no benefit whatsoever from it.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: They do not wait for her until she gives birth. And we challenge:

Is it obvious? It is like her body

the fetus.

And we answer:

It was necessary. It might enter your mind to say: Since it is written

“and they pushed a pregnant woman, and her children emerged, etc.”

“as the husband of the woman shall impose upon him,”

and he pays the value of the fetuses to the husband, it follows that the fetus is the husband’s property.

And

therefore it might be said

“not to cause him a loss”

of the fetus, and we should wait for her until she gives birth.

It teaches us

that they do not wait.

We examine this:

But say this as well,

that we should wait so as not to cause the husband a loss.

And we answer:

Rabbi Abbahu said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: The verse says

concerning a married woman who committed adultery,

“and both of them shall die,”

the adulterer and the adulteress. And from this we include

the

fetus.

The Gemara now thought that “both of them” is superfluous, since it would have sufficed to write “and they shall die.”

And we challenge:

And

this

very

verse, “both of them,” is needed for another exposition;

it is needed for it.

For they expound: From the fact that it says “both of them,” there is no liability for death unless

until they are

the adulterer and the adulteress

both equal,

that is, liable to punishment. But if she is a minor and he is an adult, or the reverse, even the adult is not executed.

These are the words of Rabbi Yoshiyah.

If so, there is no superfluity available here for an exposition concerning the fetus.

And we answer:

When you say

that the fetus is included, we do not learn it from “both of them,” but rather

from the

superfluity of

“also”

“both of them.”

And this is what is stated in the Mishna:

When she was sitting on the birthing stool,

they wait for her until she gives birth.

What is the reason? Since it has detached,

the fetus from its place,

it is a body

of another kind,

and it is forbidden to kill it.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: A woman

who is pregnant

who is being taken out to be executed,

and they do not wait for her, as explained in the Mishna, but execute her immediately—

they strike her opposite the womb so that the fetus will die first, so that she will not come to disgrace.

For if the fetus remains alive, it will emerge after her death, and this is a disgrace for her.

And he refutes:

But we have established that the fetus dies first

before the death of its mother. If so, there is no concern that it will emerge after her death and disgrace her.

And they prove as follows:

For we learned: A child one day old,

if an inheritance falls to him,

inherits and transfers the inheritance

if he dies on that same day.

And Rav Sheshet said

to explain:

“Inherits”

means

from the property of the mother,

and “transfers the inheritance” means

to transfer the inheritance to the paternal brothers. [

And without this—that they inherit from him—they would not inherit from her, since they are not her relatives.]

And specifically a child one day old, but a fetus

in such a case

does not

transfer the inheritance, because

it dies first

before its mother.

And a son does not inherit his mother in the grave

after his death, in order

to transfer the inheritance to the paternal brothers. [

And although there is the law of inheritance transmission, whereby a dead person inherits in the grave when his bequeather dies and transfers the inheritance to his heirs, this applies specifically to inheritance from the father, but not to inheritance from the mother.]

And it is proved from this that it is not possible for it still to be alive after the mother’s death. And this is difficult for Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel, who is concerned for this possibility.

And we answer:

These words

that the fetus dies first apply

with regard to death

that occurs on its own.

Since the fetus has less vitality

than the mother,

a drop from the Angel of Death enters and cuts its signs

of life

first. But when she was executed,

by others,

she dies first.

And he then challenges:

And

when

it dies first

when its mother dies?

But there was an incident

in which the mother died

and the fetus convulsed

up to three convulsions.

And we answer:

Mar bar Rav Ashi said:

This convulsion is not life,

just as is the case with the tail of a lizard,

after they cut it off,

which convulses,

even though it has no life.

Rav Naḥman said in the name of Shmuel: A woman who was sitting on the birthing stool and died on Shabbat: they bring a knife, tear open her abdomen, and remove the fetus

to save it , for it is the saving of a life [and therefore overrides Shabbat].