Arakhin 7a (ז.) — the Talmud in English

And we challenge this:

This implies that the first tanna

who holds him liable

maintains that it is possible to restore the case to court

and impose liability upon him for the injury? But this would be a delay of justice, and it is not possible that he disagrees concerning this.

And we answer:

Rav Yosef said:

Actually, the first tanna also agrees that he is not returned to court; rather,

they disagree concerning whether an oral loan can be collected from the heirs. The first tanna maintains that an oral loan can be collected from the heirs,

and the injured party should litigate with the heirs. And although liability for injury is like an oral loan, nevertheless it can be collected from the heirs.

And Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar maintains that an oral loan cannot be collected from the heirs.

And since the one who caused the injury himself is not returned to court for judgment, the heirs cannot be held liable, because an oral loan does not create a lien on property.

Rabba said: Everyone—

both the Sages and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar—agrees

that an oral loan cannot be collected from the heirs. And here

in the beraita,

they disagree concerning a loan written in the Torah,

such as liability for injury, which is mandated by the Torah.

The first tanna maintains that it is analogous to a loan written in a document,

and therefore it can be collected from the heirs;

but Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar maintains

that a loan written in the Torah

is not analogous to a loan written in a document,

but is like an oral loan, and therefore it cannot be collected from the heirs.

The Gemara raises an objection: If one dug a pit in the public domain, and an ox fell upon him and killed him, the owner of the ox is exempt,

since the negligence was that of the one who was killed.

Moreover, if the ox died, the heirs of the owner of the pit are liable to pay the value of the ox to its owner,

as in the case of a pit that caused damage. This demonstrates that a loan written in the Torah is like a loan written in a document. And this is difficult for what we explained concerning the dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei in the Mishna, according to which the first tanna holds that the heirs are exempt. The anonymous Mishna, which says that the heirs are exempt, contradicts the anonymous beraita, which says that the heirs are liable.

And we answer:

A

mar

R

av

Eila said in the name of Rav:

The beraita is speaking

when

the one who dug the pit had already stood

in judgment

before he died, and the court had already obligated him to pay. The ruling of the court is like a loan in a document, and the property becomes subject to a lien; therefore, the debt can be collected from the heirs.

And we refute this:

But it teaches: “and it killed him,”

so how can we interpret it as referring to one who stood in judgment before he died?

And we answer: Here it is referring

to one whom it rendered a tereifa ,

and he did not die immediately, but had time to stand in judgment before his death.

He asks:

But did Rav Naḥman not say: Rav Ḥana taught

the beraita as referring to a case in which the ox fell

and died,

and a clod of earth fell together with it

and buried him,

the one who dug the pit? In that case, it is no longer possible to say that he stood in judgment afterward, and nevertheless the heirs are liable.

And we answer:

And the halakha is:

The beraita, which says that the heirs are liable, is referring to a case

where the judges were sitting at the mouth of the pit

while the one who dug it was still alive, and there they completed his judgment. Therefore, the heirs are liable , since the judgment was completed during his lifetime and a lien on his property took effect.

The Sages taught: One who is being led out to be executed

by the court after bringing his offering,

the blood of his sin-offering

[they sprinkle it on his behalf]

and the blood of his guilt-offering

is sprinkled on the altar. This is not like a sin-offering whose owner has died, since he is still alive.

If he sinned unintentionally at that time

when he was being led out to be executed, committing a transgression for which one is liable to bring an offering,

the court does not attend to him

to obligate him to bring an offering; rather, he is executed immediately.

And the Gemara explains this:

What is the reason? Rav Yosef said: Because one may not delay

to postpone

his judgment,

by postponing his execution until the sacrifice is slaughtered and its blood sprinkled.

And we challenge this:

Abaye said to him: If so,

even in

the first clause

of the beraita

as well,

let us say that his judgment may not be delayed. Why, then, do we wait until the blood is sprinkled on his behalf?

And we answer: The first clause is speaking

of a case where his sacrifice had already been slaughtered at that time

and only the sprinkling remained. The brief amount of time required for sprinkling is not considered a delay of justice.

The Gemara further refutes this:

But if there is no sacrifice

of the one being led out to be executed yet

slaughtered at that time

when he is being led out to be executed,

what

is the law? Do we not delay his judgment until he brings the offering? This is difficult:

Rather than teach

in the latter clause

“if he sinned at that time, the court does not attend to him,” let it distinguish

between the law of the first clause and that of the latter clause

and teach it there:

Both the first clause and the latter clause could be speaking of one who sinned earlier and brought an offering; and the latter clause would teach us:

When does this statement apply? When the sacrifice had been slaughtered at that time. But if the sacrifice had not yet been slaughtered, the court does not attend to him.

And we answer:

This is also what it says:

Something is missing from the beraita, and this is what it should say:

When does this statement apply? When the sacrifice had been slaughtered at that time. But if the sacrifice had not been slaughtered at that time, he is treated as one who sinned at that time, and the court does not attend to him.

Mishna:

A woman who was led out to be executed

by the court while pregnant,

they do not wait

for her

to execute her until she gives birth. Rather, they execute the fetus with her, because they are one body.

But

if she is sitting on the birthing stool

to give birth [and Rashi explained that this means before her judgment was completed [but Tosafot disagree and explain that it means after her judgment was completed]],

they wait

for her until she gives birth,

because at that point the fetus has already emerged from its place and moved, and it is like a separate body, so it is forbidden to kill it.

A woman who was executed—the use of her hair is permitted,

even though once she dies it is forbidden to derive benefit from her.

An animal that was executed

by the court

is forbidden for benefit.

This is derived from the phrase “the owner of the ox is clean,” which is written concerning an ox that was stoned, meaning that he is clean of his property and may derive no benefit from it.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: They do not wait for her until she gives birth. And we challenge this:

Is this not obvious? The fetus is her body.

—the fetus is considered part of her body.

And we answer:

It was necessary, for it might enter your mind to say: Since it is written

“and they collide with a pregnant woman and her children emerge, etc.,”

“as the husband of the woman shall impose upon him,”

and he pays the value of the fetuses to the husband, this shows that the fetus is the husband’s property.

And

therefore one might say that they should not

cause him the loss of it

—the fetus belonging to the husband—and should wait for her until she gives birth.

It teaches us

that they do not wait.

We inquire concerning this:

But let us say this as well:

that we should wait so as not to cause the husband a loss.

And we answer:

Rabbi Abbahu said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: The verse states

concerning a married woman who committed adultery,

“And both of them shall die,”

the adulterer and the adulteress. And from this we derive

to include

the fetus.

The Gemara now assumes that the word “both” is superfluous, since it would have sufficed to write, “And they shall die.”

And we challenge this:

A

nd

this

verse, “both of them,” is needed for another exposition.

It is needed

to teach that from the fact that it says “both,” we derive that there is liability for execution only

when

the adulterer and adulteress

are both equal,

that is, both are of the age of legal responsibility. But if she is a minor and he is an adult, or vice versa, even the adult is not executed.

These are the words of Rabbi Yoshiyya.

If so, there is no superfluous word available for the exposition concerning the fetus.

And we answer:

When you say that the verse includes the fetus, we do not derive it from “both of them,” but rather

that the fetus is included, we do not learn it from “both of them,” but rather

from the

superfluous word

“also”

“both of them.”

And this is what is stated in the Mishna:

If she is sitting on the birthing stool,

they wait for her until she gives birth.

What is the reason? Once the fetus has emerged

from its place, it is

a body

unto itself,

and it is forbidden to kill it.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: A woman

who is pregnant

and is being led out to be executed,

since they do not wait for her, as explained in the Mishna, and she is executed immediately—

they strike her opposite the womb so that the fetus will die first, so that she will not come to disgrace.

For if the fetus remains alive, it may emerge after her death, and this would be a disgrace to her.

He asks:

But we have established that the fetus dies first,

before the death of its mother. If so, there is no concern that it will emerge after her death and disgrace her.

And they prove this as follows:

We learned: A child who is one day old,

if an inheritance falls to him,

inherits and bequeaths,

if he dies on that same day.

And Rav Sheshet said

to explain:

“Inherits”

means

the mother’s property,

and “bequeaths” means

to bequeath it to the paternal brothers.

Without this—that they inherit from him—they would not inherit from her, since they are not her relatives.]

And this applies specifically to a child who is one day old, but a fetus

in such a situation

does not

bequeath, since

it dies first

before its mother.

And a son does not inherit his mother in the grave

after his own death, in order

to bequeath it to the paternal brothers.

Although there is a principle of inheritance passing through an heir, whereby a deceased person inherits in the grave when his bequeather dies and then bequeaths the property to his heirs, this applies specifically to inheritance from the father, but not to inheritance from the mother.]

This proves that it is not possible for the fetus still to be alive after the mother’s death, and this is difficult for Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel, who is concerned about such a possibility.

And we answer:

These words—that the fetus dies first—apply

when the fetus dies first

in relation to death

that occurs naturally.

Since the fetus has less vitality

than the mother,

a drop of the Angel of Death enters and severs its vital signs

of the fetus

first. But when she is executed

by others,

she dies first.

And he then asks:

A

nd

does it die first

when its mother dies?

But there was an incident

in which the mother died

and the fetus convulsed

three times.

And we answer:

Mar bar Rav Ashi said:

This convulsion is not a sign of life,

just as with the tail of a lizard,

which continues to move after it has been cut off,

convulsing,

even though it has no life.

Rav Naḥman said in the name of Shmuel: If a woman who is sitting on the birthing stool dies on Shabbat, they bring a knife, cut open her abdomen, and remove the fetus

to save it , for it is a matter of life and saving a life overrides Shabbat.