Arakhin 7b — the Talmud in English

And we raise an objection:

It is obvious; what is he doing? ![](pamud.bmp "

Exact folio location")

He is cutting into flesh,

and there is no violation of Shabbat in this, for there is liability only when one wounds a living being and extracts blood; but here, since the mother is dead, there is no prohibition of wounding.

And we answer:

Said Rabba: It was necessary

not to permit it on account of saving a life, but rather

to bring a knife through the public domain,

which is a prohibition of carrying from one domain to another.

And it is still difficult:

And what is he teaching us

by this,

that because of uncertainty

regarding saving a life—perhaps the fetus is alive—

we violate Shabbat?

But

we already learned

this:

If a person upon whom a collapse fell, and it is uncertain whether he is there or whether he is not there, uncertain whether he is alive or dead, uncertain whether he is a gentile

[who has no permission on account of saving a life]

or an Israelite, we clear the rubble from upon him,

for even uncertainty regarding saving a life overrides Shabbat. And what does Rav Naḥman come to teach us?

And we answer:

It might enter your mind

that specifically

there

is it the case that uncertainty overrides Shabbat,

for he has a presumption of being alive

since at the outset he was certainly alive;

but here,

with regard to a fetus,

he does not have a presumption of being alive

from the outset,

since he has not yet been born,

let it be said: no,

we should not permit it;

he teaches us

that in every case uncertainty regarding saving a life overrides Shabbat.

We learned in the Mishna:

A woman who was executed

one may derive benefit from her hair. And we raise an objection:

And why?

But the hairs of the dead

are

prohibited articles of benefit.

And we answer:

Said Rav: [This is] when she says

before her death:

Give my hair to my daughter!

And we raise another objection:

If she had said, “Give my hand to my daughter,” would we give it to her?

Rather, it is a prohibition of benefit; and why does her statement avail with regard to the hair?

And we answer:

Said Rav: [This is referring] to a wig.

And although it is tied to her and one should regard it as her body, since she said, “Give it to my daughter,” she revealed her intention that she did not want it to be regarded as her body and become prohibited, and it is like something removed while she was alive.

And we raise an objection:

The reason is that she said, “Give [it],”

and it is permitted;

but if she did not say, “Give [it],” it is her body

since it is tied to her,

and it becomes prohibited

for benefit.

But Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina had a question

whether it is like her body or not?

For Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina asked: [Regarding] the hair of righteous women

of an idolatrous city, who did not sin together with all the inhabitants of the city,

what

is the law? Is it like their bodies and is saved with them, or is hair not like their bodies and is burned together with all the spoils of the city? For we hold that the righteous people in an idolatrous city [who were not led astray with it] leave it naked, and all their property is burned.

And Rava

explained:

He had his question regarding a wig

—Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina—whether it is burned, and his doubt is whether the wig is like her body or not. But one should resolve it from Rav, who says that if she did not say, “Give [it],” it is prohibited, demonstrating that the wig is like her body.

And we answer:

When Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina had his question

whether it is like her body or not, this was in a case

where she hung

the wig

on a peg

on a post. But

here,

the words of Rav refer to a case

where she attached it to her

and therefore

the reason is that she said, “Give [it],”

and then it is not like her body;

but if she did not say, “Give [it],”

in this case certainly

it is her body and becomes prohibited.

This was difficult for Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak

regarding Rav’s words, who established the Mishna as referring to a wig:

But

a woman

analogous to an animal

[which was killed and is prohibited for benefit, and they were stated together in the Mishna]

is taught. Just as there

with regard to the animal it is

its body

that is being discussed,

so too here

with regard to the woman, it should be established as

her body

itself; and how can we explain that it refers to a wig?

Rather, Rav Naḥman said

to explain the Mishna: In fact, it refers to her actual hair, and the difficulty that it is a prohibition of benefit is not a difficulty.

This woman

[the woman]

her death renders prohibited,

and her body becomes prohibited because death applies to it; but death does not apply to hair, because it is not changed through death, and therefore there is no prohibition of benefit from the dead. And this

[the animal]

[животное]

its verdict

renders prohibited,

and not death, as is explained in Pesaḥim: From the implication of what is stated, “The ox shall surely be stoned,” do I not know that it is an animal carcass and prohibited for eating? And what does the verse teach by stating, “It shall not be eaten”? It teaches that if one slaughtered it after its verdict, it is prohibited. And since the prohibition does not depend on death but on its verdict, everything attached to it becomes prohibited along with it.

Levi taught

a beraita

in accordance with Rav,

that specifically a wig is permitted.

And Levi taught in accordance with Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak

that even actual hair is permitted.

Levi taught in accordance with Rav: “A woman who is going out to be executed and said, ‘Give my hair to my daughter,’ they give it.”

But if she did not say [this],

and she died, they do not give it, because the dead are prohibited for benefit.

And we discuss it:

It is obvious

that it is prohibited for benefit, for this is learned by a gzera shava: it is written, “And Miriam died there.” And with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken, “there” is written, and we learn: just as the heifer whose neck is broken is prohibited for benefit, so too the dead is prohibited for benefit.

Rather,

certainly this is the intention of the beraita: they do not give it because

the alterations of the dead are prohibited for benefit

like the dead person himself. And it follows like Rav, that it is referring to a wig; and this is what the beraita comes to teach, that it refers to a wig and not to actual hair.

It was taught:

Levi

in accordance with Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak

[that the reference is to actual hair]:

“A woman who died—one may derive benefit from her hair. An animal that died is prohibited for benefit. And what is the difference between this one and that one? This one—her death renders her prohibited; and that one—its verdict renders it prohibited,”

and therefore her hair too is included in the prohibition.

We shall return to you, chapter ‘All Make Valuations.’

Mishna:

1.

In valuations there is no

obligation that is

less than a sela,

for even a poor person, who becomes obligated according to what the koen assesses him, as much as his means suffice for him to pay, is not exempt with less than this.

And not more than fifty sela.

For this is the greatest obligation among the valuations written in the passage [for a male from twenty years old until sixty years old].

How so?

If he gave a sela

while he was poor, when his means at that time did not suffice for more,

and

afterward

he became wealthy,

and now his means suffice to pay his full valuation, nevertheless

he does not

add

and give

now

anything.

For he was already exempted by the first giving. But if he gave while he was poor

less than a sela 3,

as much as his means reached,

and he became wealthy

afterward, he

gives fifty sela!

For he was not exempted by the first giving, and he still remains in his obligation.

b. A poor person who assessed himself,

and there were in

his means

five sela—

Rabbi Meir says: he gives only

one sela

alone!

For this is the fixed measure for everyone assessed according to his means: he pays only one sela.

And the Sages say: he gives the

five sela

all of them!

For according to what his means reach, he becomes obligated, and his measure is not fixed.

c.

In valuations there is nothing less than a sela, and not more than fifty sela!

And the Gemara explains why this clause was repeated.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna

“In valuations there is nothing less than a sela.”

And we raise the question:

From where do we know

that there is no valuation that is less than a sela?

And we answer:

for it is written, “And every valuation of yours shall be according to the shekel of the Sanctuary,”

and they expound:

every valuation that you assess [

even when he is assessed according to his means]

shall not be less than a shekel

of the Sanctuary, which is a sela.

And that which we learned:

“And not more than fifty sela,”

is obvious

from what is written, “fifty”

in the valuation of a man from twenty years old until sixty, and there is no more than this in the passage.

We learned in the Mishna:

“There were five sela in his possession, Rabbi Meir says: he gives only

one sela

alone.”

And we raise the question:

What is Rabbi Meir’s reason?

Why should he not give according to what his means reach, namely, the five sela that he has?

And we answer: Because

it is written, “fifty

shekels” in the valuation of a male from twenty years old,

and it is written

also later in the passage, “And every valuation of yours shall be

according to the shekel

of the Sanctuary.” This is a contradiction. Rather, we learn from this:

either fifty

for a wealthy person,

or a shekel

for a poor person, for we have found no other measure in the Torah.

And we challenge:

And the Sages,

who hold that it is not specifically a shekel, what do they expound from the verse “a shekel”?

And we answer:

That

verse

“for every valuation that you assess

shall not be less than a shekel” is what it came for!

But where he has

more, he is obligated to give more, for

the verse says,

“according to

what the means of the one who vows reach,

the koen shall assess him,”

and his means do reach [more].

And Rabbi Meir—

that

verse came to teach us that the law of assessment according to means depends

upon the means of the one who vows,

and

not upon the means of the one vowed for is what it came to teach.

For a poor person who said, “The valuation of so-and-so, a wealthy person, is upon me,” becomes obligated for only a sela, and this is “his means do not reach it.” But a wealthy person who became obligated for the valuation of a certain poor person is liable for its full valuation.

And we challenge:

And the Sages,

from where do they derive this law, that assessment according to means depends upon the means of the one who vows?

And we answer: Indeed,

do you not hear it automatically

also, this law,

that where his means reach, take from him

even more than a sela? For the Sages also hold that “what the means of the one who vows reach” teaches us that the law of assessment according to means depends upon the means of the one who vows and not upon the means of the one vowed for, for the wording of the verse implies this, and no extra expression is needed for it.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: There were in

his means

five sela, and he said, “My valuation is upon me,” and he again said, “My valuation is upon me,”

thereby becoming obligated in two valuations, and he preceded

and gave four

for the second obligation,

and

afterward gave one sela

for

the

first obligation [

for this is how the koen assesses him: after he had already given four of the five for his second obligation, he has only one sela in his possession],

he has fulfilled both!

And even if he subsequently becomes wealthy, he is already exempt, because he gave “according to what his means reach.”

And we explain:

What is the reason?

Because this is the law concerning one who borrowed from two people and has the ability to repay only one loan: even though he must repay first the one from whom he borrowed first, nevertheless,

a later creditor who preceded and collected, what he collected he collected 6,

and the earlier creditor does not take it from him. [This is in a case where there is no lien on property, such as movable property; Shita Mekubetzet.]

And likewise, with two valuations, the first valuation is like an earlier creditor, and the second like a later creditor.

Therefore, if he preceded and gave four to the second, he is exempt through this, because it is considered that his means do not reach more than this. And although he has five at that time [for he has not yet given to the first], since

at the time when he gives to the second

he

is liened to the first! [

For the four sela that he gave to the second he should have given for his first obligation; it is only retrospectively that we say: what the second collected, he collected.]

And that he fulfills the first with one sela is because

at the time when he gives to the first, he no longer has

it

in excess of this. Those four sela that he already gave for the second valuation cannot be taken from the Temple treasury for the sake of the first valuation [and although they are considered like a later creditor, it has already been explained that what he collected, he collected].