Arakhin 6b (ו:) — the Talmud in English

And we challenge this:

Is that so? But Rabbi Yannai

who was a charity collector,

would borrow

—he borrowed—

from charity funds

for his own needs and repay them. And how could he do this? Were the funds not already in the possession of the charity collector?

And we answer:

Rabbi Yannai is different,

as this arrangement was beneficial to the poor.

For the longer

the money remained in his possession and he was unable to repay it,

an act [that is, he would pressure] the community, saying that he had no money to distribute, and pressure them to give,

[that is, it compelled] the community, since he would say that he had no money to distribute, thereby compelling them to give,

and he would bring it to them,

so there would be a benefit for the poor.

The Sages taught: If a Jew donated a candelabrum or a lamp to a synagogue—

it is forbidden

for the community

to change it

for other communal needs.

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba thought to say: It makes no difference whether it is for a discretionary matter or whether it is for a mitzva;

it is forbidden.

Rav Ami said to him: This is what Rabbi Yohanan said: They taught

that it is forbidden to change it only

for

communal needs that are

a discretionary matter

100. But for a mitzva it is permitted

to change it.

And he proves this

from what Rabbi Asi said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: A gentile

who donated a candelabrum or a lamp to a synagogue, as long as

the name of its owner has not been forgotten,

meaning that people still say, “This candelabrum is the donation of so-and-so,”

it is forbidden to change it.

Once the name of its owner has been forgotten [meaning that it is already forgotten who donated it,]

[for it has already been forgotten who the donor was,]

it is permitted to change it.

And we considered this:

For what

is it forbidden to change it?

If you say for a discretionary matter, why specifically

a gentile

in particular? After all,

even in the case of a Jew

who donated it,

also

it is forbidden to change it.

Rather,

it must necessarily be referring

to a mitzva. And the reason

that it is forbidden specifically is

that it is a gentile

who donated it:

he complains

and cries out, “Why did you change what I gave?” And this involves a desecration of God's name. Therefore, as long as the name of the owner has not been forgotten, it is forbidden to change it even for a mitzva. But once the name has been forgotten, there is no longer concern for this, and it is permitted.

But a Jew does not complain,

as he heeds the words of the Sages who permitted changing it;

it is entirely proper,

and from this Rabbi Ami properly proved that Rabbi Yohanan holds that when a Jew donated an object, it is permitted to change it for the sake of a mitzva.

Azraka the Arab [he was a gentile]

[he was a gentile]

donated a lamp to the synagogue of Rabbi Yehuda. Rahva changed it

for a mitzva before the donor's name had been forgotten,

and Rabba was angry with him

for the reason stated above.

Some say: Rabba was different, and Rahva was angry. And some say: The beadle [a synagogue attendant]

[the synagogue servant]

of Pumbedita was different, and Rahva was angry,

and

Rabba was also angry.

And the reason of the one who said that

the case was different, he held that it was not common

for Azraka

in the city

and he did not know that they had changed it.

And the one who was angry held

that in any event it is forbidden to change it, because

sometimes it happens

that Azraka

comes

to the city, learns that they changed it, and cries out about it.

Mishna:

A person in his final illness and one who is being led out to be executed

by a court —

may neither be vowed for nor valued [the Gemara explains the reason].

[and the Gemara explains the reason].

Rabbi Hanina ben Akiva says:

One who is being led out to be executed

may be valued, because the monetary value of one who is valued

of a person whose value is assessed

is fixed

in the passage concerning valuations, and it does not depend on his market sale value. Therefore, it makes no difference here that he has no value for sale in the marketplace.

But he may not be vowed for, because the monetary value of one for whom a vow is made

of one for whom a vow is made

is not fixed

but rather his monetary obligation depends on his value for sale in the marketplace, and this person is worth nothing.

Rabbi Yosei says:

One who is being led out to be executed himself—

may make vows, assign valuations, and consecrate property; and if he causes damage, he is liable for payment. [This is a separate statement and is not connected to the first clause of the Mishna; the Gemara explains its meaning.]

[This is a separate statement and does not belong to the first clause of the Mishna; the Gemara explains what it means.]

Gemara:

And we challenge this:

Granted, a person in his final illness may not be vowed for,

since

he is not a person with monetary value

for sale in the marketplace.

And he may not be valued,

because

he is not fit for standing

and valuation,

as he cannot stand. We exclude him above from the verses, “The koen shall stand him” and “The koen shall value him.”

But one being led out to be executed—

granted, he may not be vowed for,

because

he is not a person with monetary value,

as no one would purchase him, since the purchaser would lose his money.

But that he may not be valued—

why not? Valuations do not require that the person being valued have monetary value.

not? In valuations, it is not necessary for the person being valuated to have market value.

And we answer: It is as

the baraita teaches: From where is it derived that if one being led out to be executed is told, “I take his valuation upon myself,” he has said nothing? The verse states: “Any thing devoted

that is devoted from among mankind

shall not be redeemed.”

That is, anyone condemned to death may not have his valuation redeemed, for he is not valued.

Could it be that even before his sentence to death has been finalized,

once he has committed an offense for which he is liable to death, he may no longer be valued?

The verse states

in this passage

“from among mankind,”

to teach us that only some of those being led out to be executed may not be valued,

but not every person

who is destined to be executed may not be valued. Rather, some of them may be valued—namely, one whose sentence is that he is to be executed, but whose sentence has not yet been finalized.

And we challenge this:

But according to Rabbi Hanina ben Akiva, who says:

One being led out to be executed

may be valued because his monetary value is fixed,

and he does not interpret the verse in this manner,

what does he do with this “any thing devoted”?

And we answer:

He requires it for that which is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, says: Since we find that those put to death by Heaven

such as the owners of an ox who was forewarned and killed a person, concerning whom it is written, “The ox shall be stoned and its owner shall also be put to death,” by the decree of Heaven,

are given monetary payment and thereby attain atonement, as it is stated: “If a ransom shall be imposed upon him, etc.,” one might have thought that even

those liable to death

at the hands of man are likewise

such that a ransom can release them from death.

The verse states: “A thing devoted shall not be redeemed”!

One whose sentence is death has no redemption by which to be released from death.

I have derived only that this applies to severe deaths for which an inadvertent violation is not atoned,

such as blasphemy and cursing, for which, if one committed them inadvertently, one does not bring a sacrifice. Since they are severe offenses, if one committed them intentionally, for which his sentence is death by a court, he cannot be released through monetary payment. But

less severe deaths,

such as murder and desecrating Shabbat, which are less severe in that

if

one violated them inadvertently,

their inadvertent violation is subject to atonement

through a sacrifice or exile,

from where is it derived

that ransom likewise does not release those who intentionally committed them from death?

The verse states

as indicated by the fact that it does not say merely “a thing devoted,” but rather

“any thing devoted,”

indicating that these too cannot be redeemed.

We learned in the Mishna:

“Rabbi Yosei says: He may make vows and assign valuations.”

And we considered this:

And

if

the first tanna

in the first clause

said that one being led out to be executed

that one going out to be executed

does not

make vows or assign valuations? After all, he spoke only about whether he may be vowed for and valued. What is the dispute?

And we answer:

Rather, with regard to making vows, assigning valuations, and consecrating property, everyone agrees

that these acts are effective when performed by one being led out to be executed.

They disagree

with regard to liability for payment

if he causes damage

and is executed before the case is brought to judgment.

The first tanna holds that if he causes damage, he

that if he causes damage, he

is not liable

for payment, whereas Rabbi Yosei holds that if he causes damage, he is liable for payment.

And we explain:

With regard to what do they disagree? Rav Yosef said: They disagree about an oral loan

whether

it can be collected from the heirs

of the borrower after his death;

this is the subject of their dispute.

The first tanna holds that an oral loan

does not create a lien on assets, and therefore

it cannot be collected from the heirs;

only the borrower himself is obligated to repay it. Liability for damage is an oral loan, since there is no document recording it, and it cannot be collected from the heirs.

But Rabbi Yosei holds that an oral loan

does create a lien on assets, and therefore it

can be collected

even

from the heirs.

Although the assets no longer belong to the borrower, they were already encumbered during the borrower's lifetime. Similarly, in the case of one who causes damage, although his obligation is an oral loan, the injured party can collect from the heirs of the one who caused the damage.

Rabba said

to explain their dispute:

Everyone

both the Sages and Rabbi Yosei—holds that

an oral loan cannot be collected from the heirs.

There is a lien on assets only in the case of a documented loan.

Here,

in the Mishna,

they disagree about a loan written in the Torah [meaning that the Torah obligates him to make the payment, as in the case of one who causes damage, rather than his obligating himself as with a loan,]

[which the Torah obligated him to pay, as in the case of one who causes damage and the like, and not that he obligates himself like a borrower]

they disagree.

The first tanna holds: A loan written in the Torah is not considered like one written in a document,

but rather it is like an oral loan. Therefore, even in the case of one who causes damage, the assets do not become encumbered, and the debt cannot be collected from the heirs.

But Rabbi Yosei holds: A loan written in the Torah,

like the obligation of one who causes damage, is

considered like

one written in a document,

and the assets become encumbered, so the debt can be collected from the heirs.

And there are those who formulate

the statements of Rav Yosef and Rabba

with regard to this

that which is taught in a baraita:

If one being led out to be executed injures others,

he is liable. If others injure him, they are exempt.

Because he has no monetary value.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Even he [

the one going out to be executed] if

he injured others, is exempt. Since it is not possible

to restore him to the court after his judgment was finalized for execution,

for the restoration of the court’s sitting

because it is impossible to bring him back to the court and judge him again regarding his liability for the injury he caused, since it is forbidden to delay his judgment; rather, he must be executed immediately.