Arakhin 6b — the Talmud in English

And we challenge:

Is that so? But Rabbi Yannai

who was a charity collector,

borrowed

—he borrowed—

from charity funds

for his own needs and repaid them. And how could he do this? But they were already in the hands of the charity collector.

And we answer:

Rabbi Yannai is different,

for the poor were pleased with this, that he borrowed.

For the longer it was delayed

the money in his hands and he had nothing with which to repay,

an action

[he would compel] the public, saying that he had no money to distribute, and compel them to give,

and he would bring it to them,

and there was benefit for the poor.

The Sages taught: An Israelite who donated a lamp or a light to the synagogue—

it is forbidden

for the public

to change it

for other public needs.

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba thought to say: It makes no difference whether it is for a matter of permission or whether it is for a matter of mitzva,

it is forbidden.

Rav Ami said to him: This is what Rabbi Yohanan said: They taught

that it is forbidden to change it only

for

public needs that are

a matter of permission

. But for a matter of mitzva it is permitted

to change it.

And he proves this

from what Rabbi Asi said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: A gentile

who donated a lamp or a light to the synagogue, until

the name of its owner has been forgotten,

so that they still say, “This lamp is the donation of so-and-so,”

it is forbidden to change it.

Once the name of its owner has been forgotten

[for it has already been forgotten who the donor was,]

it is permitted to change it.

And we raised the matter:

For what purpose

is it forbidden to change it?

If you say, for a matter of permission, what is the reason that

a gentile

in particular? But

even an Israelite

who donated

also

it is forbidden to change it.

Rather,

necessarily, it is referring

to a matter of mitzva. And the reason

that it is forbidden specifically is

because it is a gentile

who donated,

for he shouts

and cries out, “Why did you change what I gave?” And there is desecration of the Name in this. Therefore, as long as the owner’s name has not been forgotten from it, it is forbidden to change it even for a matter of mitzva. But after the owner’s name has been forgotten, there is no longer concern for this, and it is permitted.

But an Israelite does not shout,

for he listens to the words of the Sages, who permitted changing it,

it is properly acceptable,

and from this Rabbi Ami properly proved that Rabbi Yohanan holds that when an Israelite donates, it is permitted to change it for the need of a mitzva.

Azzarq the Arab

[he was a gentile]

donated a lamp to the synagogue of Rabbi Yehuda. Rahba changed it

for [a matter of] mitzva before his name had been forgotten from it,

and Rabba became angry with him

because of the reason stated above.

Some say: Rabba changed it and Rahba became angry. And some say: The attendant

[the beadle]

of Pumbedita changed it and Rahba became angry,

and also

Rabba became angry.

And the reason of

the one who says that he changed it was: He reasoned that it was not common

Azzarq

in the city

and he did not know that they had changed it.

And the one who became angry reasoned

that in any event it is forbidden to change it, because

sometimes it happens

Azzarq

and comes

to the city and learns that they changed it, and he will cry out about this.

Mishna:

A person in the throes of death and one going out to be executed

by a court —

are neither subject to a vow nor valuation

[and the Gemara explains the reason].

Rabbi Hanina ben Akavia says:

One going out to be executed

is subject to valuation, because his value

of the one subject to valuation

is fixed

in the section of valuations, and the matter does not depend on the price of his sale in the marketplace. Therefore, it does not matter to us here that he has no value at which he could be sold in the marketplace.

But he is not subject to a vow, because his value

of the one subject to a vow

is not fixed,

but the obligation of his value depends on his value for being sold in the marketplace, and this person is worth nothing.

Rabbi Yose says:

One who goes to be executed himself—

may make a vow, assess himself, and consecrate, and if he causes damage he is liable for payment.

[And this is a separate statement and does not belong to the first clause of the Mishna; the Gemara explains what it means.]

Gemara:

And we challenge:

Granted, a person in the throes of death is not subject to a vow,

since

he is not fit to have a monetary value

to be sold in the marketplace.

And he is not subject to valuation,

because

he is not fit for standing

and valuation,

for he cannot stand. And we exclude him above from “the priest shall cause him to stand” and “the priest shall value him.”

But one going out to be executed—

granted, he is not subject to a vow,

because

he is not fit to have a monetary value,

for there is no person who would buy him, since he would lose his money.

But he is not subject to valuation—

why

not? But with regard to valuations it is not necessary that the one being assessed be fit to have a monetary value.

And we answer:

As it is taught: From where is it derived that if one going out to be executed says, “Another’s valuation is upon me,” he has said nothing? The verse states, “Every devoted thing

that is devoted from man

shall not be redeemed.”

That is to say, whoever is devoted to be executed, his valuation may not be redeemed, for he is not subject to valuation.

Could it even be before his sentence to be executed was completed,

since he committed an offense for which he would be liable to death, he is no longer subject to valuation?

The verse states

in this verse

“from man,”

to teach us that only some of those who go out to be executed are not subject to valuation,

and not every man

who is to be executed is not subject to valuation; rather, there are some of them who are subject to valuation, namely, one whose law is that he goes out to be executed, but his sentence has not yet been completed.

And we challenge:

And according to Rabbi Hanina ben Akavia, who says:

One who goes out to be executed

is subject to valuation because his value is fixed,

and he does not expound the verse in this manner,

what does he make of this “every devoted thing”?

And we answer:

He needs it for that which is taught: Rabbi Ishmael, the son of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, says: Since we find that those executed by Heaven

such as the owners of an ox accustomed to gore that killed a person, concerning whom it is written, “The ox shall be stoned and its owner shall also be put to death,” by Heaven

give money and gain atonement, as it is stated, “If a ransom shall be imposed upon him, and so on,” it might be that even

those liable to death

by human hands are likewise,

so that a ransom would be effective to exempt them from death,

the verse states, “A devoted thing shall not be redeemed”!

One whose law is that he is to be executed has no redemption with which to be exempted from death.

I have only

severe deaths for which unintentional violation was not given atonement,

but lesser deaths,

such as murder and desecration of Shabbat, which are lesser in this respect

that

if he violated them unintentionally,

their unintentional violation was given atonement,

through a sacrifice or exile,

from where

is it derived that a ransom also does not benefit them to exempt them from death if they acted intentionally?

The verse states

from the fact that it does not say “a devoted thing,” but rather

“every devoted thing,”

that these too are not redeemed.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yose says: He may make a vow and assess himself:

And we raised the matter:

And

for

the first Tanna

in the first clause,

did he say

that one who goes out to be executed

does not

make a vow and assess himself? But he spoke only of one who is subject to a vow and valuation. And what is the dispute?

And we answer:

Rather, concerning one who makes a vow, assesses himself, and consecrates, everyone agrees

that this is effective in the case of one going out to be executed.

They disagree

concerning liability for payment

if he causes damage

and is executed before he stood trial.

The first Tanna holds

that if he causes damage, he

is not liable

for payment, whereas Rabbi Yose holds that if he causes damage, he is liable for payment.

And we explain:

With regard to what do they disagree? Rav Yosef said: With regard to an oral loan,

whether it

is collected from the heirs

of the borrower after his death,

they disagree.

The first Tanna holds: An oral loan

does not contain an encumbrance of assets, and therefore

it is not collected from the heirs,

and only the borrower himself is obligated to repay. And the obligation of one who causes damage is an oral loan, for there is no document concerning this, and it is not collected from heirs.

And Rabbi Yose holds: An oral loan

does contain an encumbrance of assets, and therefore

it is collected

even

from the heirs,

and although the assets no longer belong to the borrower, the assets had already become encumbered during the borrower’s lifetime. Likewise, in the case of one who causes damage, although it is an oral loan, the injured party collects from the heirs of the one who caused the damage.

Rabba said

to explain their dispute:

Everyone

both the Sages and Rabbi Yose hold

that an oral loan is not collected from heirs.

For there is an encumbrance of assets only with a documented loan.

And here,

in the Mishna,

they disagree concerning a loan written in the Torah

[which the Torah obligated him to pay, as in the case of one who causes damage and the like, and not that he obligates himself like a borrower]

they disagree.

The first Tanna holds: A loan written in the Torah is not like one written in a document

but rather it is like an oral loan. Therefore, even in the case of one who causes damage, the assets do not become encumbered, and he does not collect from the heirs.

And Rabbi Yose holds: A loan written in the Torah,

like the obligation of one who causes damage,

is like one written

in a document,

and the assets become encumbered, and he collects from the heirs.

And there are those who formulate it

as the statements of Rav Yosef and Rabba

with regard to this

which is taught:

One going out to be executed who injured others

is liable. Others who injured him are exempt.

Because he has no monetary value.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: even he

the one going out to be executed] if

he caused injury to others, he is exempt. Since it was not possible

after his verdict had been finalized for execution

to restore the court’s standing

because it is impossible to bring him back to court and judge him again regarding liability for his injury, since it is forbidden to delay his judgment, but he must be executed immediately.