Arakhin 5a (ה.) — the Talmud in English

And Abaye proves this as follows:

Was it not taught:

One who says, “The leg of

this animal

is an olah, can it be that the entire

animal is an olah

and be sacrificed?

The verse states: “Everything that one gives from it to the Lord shall be sacred.” “From it”

means that if one gives a limb of an animal to the Temple, that limb alone shall be

“sacred,” and not

the

entire

animal shall be

sacred. Can the

rest of the animal

leave to non-sacred status? The verse states: “It shall be”—it shall remain as it is!

That is, in a state of sanctity.

How so?

The two derivations contradict one another.

Rather, it is sold

for the purposes of olot

[and the purchaser sanctifies the remainder and sacrifices it]

and its money is non-sacred,

since the entire remainder of the animal belongs to the seller,

except

that he may not take from the purchaser

the value of that limb in it,

for it is sanctified with the sanctity of the altar, and a sale does not take effect with regard to it since it does not belong to him.

These are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Shimon

disagree and

say: From where is it derived that one who says, “The leg of this animal is an olah,” causes the entire animal to be an olah,

as the sanctity of the body that took effect upon its leg extends to the entire animal?

The verse states: “Everything that one gives from it to the Lord shall be sacred,” to include the entire animal,

which becomes sacred, even though he sanctified only “from it” and not the whole of it.

And Abaye concludes his objection:

And even according to the one who says

[Rabbi Meir]

that the entire animal is not an olah,

but only the limb that he consecrated,

this applies when he consecrated something upon which the animal’s life does not depend,

such as a leg, and this is the subject of their dispute.

But in the case of something upon which the animal’s life depends,

such as the head of a cow, which the beraita mentioned above, according to everyone

the entire animal becomes sacred,

and the difficulty now returns: If the matter concerns sanctity of the altar, why does the Temple have only the value of its head? Surely the sanctity should extend throughout the entire animal.

Rabba answers:

It is not difficult. This

law, that sanctity extends throughout the entire animal, applies only

with sanctity of the body,

for example, when he says, “I will sacrifice the head of this animal as an olah.”

And this

case, in which it was taught that the altar receives only the value of its head, concerns

sanctity of value.

He did not consecrate the limb to be sacrificed itself; rather, he consecrated it only for the value of an olah, meaning that it should be sold and an olah purchased with its proceeds. The law that sanctity extends throughout the entire animal was stated only with regard to sanctity of the body, and not with regard to sanctity of value.

Abaye raises a further objection:

But it was you, Master,

[Rabba himself,]

who said: One who consecrates

a male

ram

[which itself is fit to be sacrificed as an olah]

for its value,

in order to purchase another animal for an olah with the proceeds of its sale,

sanctifies it with sanctity of the body,

and it itself is sacrificed as an olah. Since sanctity of value has taken effect upon it, sanctity of the body also takes effect upon it, because it is itself fit to be offered as a sacrifice. Likewise, when one says, “The head of a cow shall be consecrated for the value of an olah,” sanctity of the body should take effect upon it, since it itself is fit for the altar. If so, the difficulty returns to its place: The sanctity should extend throughout the entire animal.

Rabba answers:

It is not difficult. This

statement of Rabba, that one who consecrates an animal for its value sanctifies it with sanctity of the body, applies specifically when he

consecrated the entire animal

for its value. It is one migo: Since it becomes sacred for its value, sanctity of the body also takes effect upon it.

This

beraita, which says that the altar receives only the value of its head, and that only sanctity of value takes effect, concerns a case in which he

consecrated one limb,

and we do not say: Since the sanctity of one limb extends throughout the entire animal, and since sanctity of value takes effect, sanctity of the body also takes effect. Two migo principles are not invoked.

Abaye raises a further objection: Even one who consecrates

one limb was also a matter about which you were uncertain! For Rabba asked: If one consecrated a limb

for its value—

what is

the law as to whether it becomes sanctified with sanctity of the body? If we explain the beraita as the answer given above, the uncertainty can be resolved, proving that sanctity of the body does not take effect when one consecrates a limb for its value.

Rabba answers:

When we raised the uncertainty,

whether it becomes sanctified with sanctity of the body, it was

with

one who consecrates a

unblemished

limb for its value, since it is fit to be sacrificed.

Here,

where the beraita proves that it is not sanctified with sanctity of the body, the case concerns

an animal with a blemish,

which is unfit for the altar,

analogous to a donkey

in the first clause of the beraita, which is likewise unfit for the altar.

Abaye raises a further objection:

An animal with a blemish was also a matter about which you were uncertain, for Rabba asked: “The value of my head, with regard to

the

altar—what is

the law?” Although sanctity of the body certainly does not apply to a person, the uncertainty is whether the law of valuation according to his full worth applies even with regard to money designated for the altar, so that he pays the value of his entire body, or not. The same applies when one consecrates the head of an animal with a blemish for its value for the altar. [This is not due to sanctity extending throughout the entire animal, since it has only sanctity of value, as it is unfit to be sacrificed, but rather because one is valued according to his full worth: one who consecrates the value of a limb upon which the animal’s life depends gives the value of the entire animal.] The earlier beraita is again difficult.

Rabba responds:

When we raised the uncertainty, it was before I had taught you this Mishna. Now that you have heard this Mishna

which says that the Temple receives only the value of its head, I have retracted my position

and we do not raise the question, and the law of valuation according to one’s full worth does not apply to consecrated property of the altar. In substance, Rabba asked: “The value of

my head, with regard to the altar—what is the law?”

Does one

be valued according to his full worth,

and pay the value of his entire body, as is the law when one values a limb upon which the animal’s life depends,

or is he not valued according to his full worth

and gives the value of half of his body? [For there is no valuation for the head by itself.] He explains the two sides of the uncertainty:

We have not found, with regard to money

in the laws of valuations and vows,

that one is not valued according to his full worth,

as is derived from the term “persons,”

or perhaps we have not found

an animal with a blemish

with regard to the altar

that is sanctified for its value [and a person is like an animal with a blemish]

that one is valued according to his full worth.

Teyku. [However, after he heard the beraita, he resolved the uncertainty as stated above.]

Rava asked: “My valuation is upon me with regard to

the money being consecrated

for the altar—what is

the law? Is he

judged according to his

means

as with valuations for the upkeep of the Temple [where, if his means are insufficient to pay the full valuation, the kohen values him according to what his means can afford, and he pays that amount and is thereby absolved, even if he later becomes wealthy],

or is he not judged according to his means?

He explains the two sides of the uncertainty:

Do we say that we have not found in the laws of valuations that one is not judged according to his means,

and there is no distinction whether the money is for the altar or for the upkeep of the Temple,

or perhaps we have not found with regard to

consecrated property of the

altar that one is judged according to his means,

and he is not absolved by paying less than his full value?

Teyku.

Rav Ashi asked: “If one consecrated an ancestral field

[and if he consecrated it for the upkeep of the Temple, there is a biblical decree that he redeems a field of the area sown with a ḥomer of barley for fifty silver shekels, even if its value is one thousand dinars]

with regard to

the money being consecrated

for the altar—

what is

the law? Shall we say

that we have not found that an ancestral field is redeemed except as a field of the area sown with a ḥomer of barley for fifty silver shekels,

and there is no distinction whether it is for the altar or for the upkeep of the Temple,

or perhaps we have not found with regard to

consecrated property of the

altar that it is redeemed except at its value,

since only animals are sacrificed upon the altar, and if they develop a blemish they are redeemed at their value, as the Torah did not prescribe a fixed amount for their redemption; perhaps the same should be said with regard to an ancestral field.

And the matter

remains unresolved.

Mishna:

One who is less than one month old can be the subject of a vow,

if one says, “Its value is upon me,” since everything has some monetary value,

but cannot be valued,

since the obligation of valuation stated in the passage applies only from one month of age onward.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: With regard to one who values a child less than one month old, Rabbi Meir says: He gives its value,

according to the price for which it would be sold in the marketplace;

and the Sages say: He has said nothing.

And this is in accordance with the Mishna.

And they explain:

With regard to what do they disagree? Rabbi Meir holds that a person does not utter his words for naught, and he knows

that there are no valuations for a child less than one month old

77 , and he consciously stated it for the sake of its value,

so it is a vow; and although he uttered the language of valuation, we follow the intention of his heart which was to give its value.

And the Rabbis hold that a person does utter his words for naught,

and we do not assume that he intended to give its value.

And we raised this question:

According to whom does this statement of Rav Giddel citing Rav follow: “One who says, ‘The valuation of this vessel is incumbent upon me [

and there is no law of valuations applying to a vessel]

gives its monetary value”?

And we answer:

According to Rabbi Meir,

who said that a person does not utter his words in vain; and since he knows that there is no valuation for a vessel, he resolved in his heart to designate its monetary value.

And we challenge this:

It is obvious that it follows Rabbi Meir,

so why was this stated?

And we answer:

Lest you say that even according to the Rabbis

the law is so.

There,

with regard to one who is less than one month old, the Rabbis exempt him because one can say that although a person does not utter his words in vain, it is possible

that he erred and thought: Just as valuations apply to one who is one month old, they also apply to one who is less than one month old,

and there is no proof that he intended its monetary value.

But here,

with regard to a vessel,

where there is no possibility of error,

since

a person certainly knows that there is no valuation for a vessel,

it is said that a person does not utter his words in vain,

and he resolved and stated it with the intention of its monetary value; this teaches us

that the reasoning of the Rabbis is not that he erred, but that they hold that a person does utter his words in vain, and consequently they disagree even with regard to a vessel. And Rav Giddel follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir.