Arakhin 5a — the Talmud in English

And Abaye proves this:

Is it not taught: ![](pamud.bmp "

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If one says, “The leg of

this animal

is an olah, can its entirety be an

olah]], and

be brought?

The Talmud says: “All that one gives from it to Hashem shall be holy.” “From it”

implies that if one gives a limb from the animal to the Sanctuary, that limb alone shall be

“holy,” and not

the animal

in its entirety

shall be

holy. Can the remainder

of the animal

go out to non-sacred status? The verse says: “It shall be”—in its state it shall remain!

That is, in sanctity.

How is this so?

Behold, the two expositions contradict one another.

Rather, it shall be sold

for the needs of olot]]

[and the purchaser shall sanctify the remainder and bring it]

and its money is non-sacred,

for the entire remainder of the animal belongs to the seller,

except

that he may not take from the purchaser

the money for that limb in it]],

because it is sanctified with the sanctity of the altar, and a sale does not take hold in it since it is not his.

These are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Shimon

disagree and

say: From where [do we know] that when one says, “The leg of this is an olah,” its entirety is an olah,

for the intrinsic sanctity that took hold in its leg extends to the entire animal,

the Talmud says: “All that one gives from it to Hashem shall be holy,” to include its entirety,

which becomes holy, even though he sanctified only “from it” and not all of it.

And Abaye concludes his objection:

And even according to the one who says

[Rabbi Meir]

its entirety is not an olah

but only the limb that he consecrated,

this applies only where he consecrated something upon which life does not depend

such as a leg, and this is their dispute;

but something upon which life depends

such as the head of a cow, which the beraita mentioned above, according to everyone

its entirety becomes holy,

and from now it is difficult: if this concerns the sanctity of the altar, why does the Sanctuary have only the value of its head? Surely the sanctity should spread throughout its entirety.

And Rabba answers:

This is not difficult. This

law—that sanctity spread throughout its entirety—is only

with intrinsic sanctity,

such as when he said, “I will bring the head of this animal as an olah.”

And this

that it is taught that the altar has only the value of its head concerns

monetary sanctity.

He did not consecrate the limb so that it itself would be brought; rather, he consecrated it only for the value of an olah, meaning that it should be sold and an olah purchased with its money. The law that sanctity spreads throughout its entirety was stated only with intrinsic sanctity, and not with monetary sanctity.

And Abaye further asks:

But it was you, Master,

[Rabba himself]

who said: One who consecrates

a ram

a male

[which itself is fit to be brought as an olah]

for its value,

to purchase with the money of its sale another animal for an olah,

is holy with intrinsic sanctity

and it itself is brought as an olah. For once monetary sanctity takes hold in it, intrinsic sanctity also takes hold in it, since it itself is fit for a sacrifice. Likewise, when he said, “The head of a cow shall be consecrated for the value of an olah,” intrinsic sanctity should take hold, since it itself is fit for the altar; and if so, the objection returns to its place: the sanctity should spread throughout its entirety.

And Rabba answers:

This is not difficult. This

that Rabba said—that one who consecrates for its value becomes holy with intrinsic sanctity—applies specifically when he

consecrated its entirety

for monetary value, for it is one migo: since it is holy with monetary sanctity, intrinsic sanctity also takes hold in it.

This

beraita, which says that the altar has only the value of its head, because only monetary sanctity takes hold, concerns one who

consecrated one limb,

and we do not say: since the one limb is holy, sanctity takes hold throughout its entirety, and since monetary sanctity takes hold, intrinsic sanctity also takes hold. For we do not say two migo together.

And Abaye further asks: One who consecrates

one limb also—you have raised a question about it! For Rabba asked: If one consecrated a limb

for its value—

what is

the law that it becomes holy with intrinsic sanctity? And if we explain the beraita as the answer above, the uncertainty can be resolved and it can be proved that intrinsic sanctity does not take hold when one consecrates a limb for its value.

And Rabba answers:

When we raised the question,

whether it becomes holy with intrinsic sanctity, it was

in

concerning one who consecrates a

sound

limb for its monetary value, for it is fit to be brought.

Here,

where it is proven from the beraita that it is not holy with intrinsic sanctity, it concerns

a blemished animal

that is unfit for the altar,

similar to a donkey

in the opening clause of the beraita, which is likewise unfit for the altar.

And Abaye further asks:

A blemished animal also—you have raised a question about it, for Rabba asked: “The value of my head”

with regard to

the altar—what is the law?

And although intrinsic sanctity certainly does not apply to a human being, the uncertainty is whether there is a law of being assessed according to his full worth even with regard to monetary value for the altar, and he pays the value of his entirety, or not. The same applies to one who consecrates the head of a blemished animal for monetary value for the altar. [And not because of sanctity spreading throughout its entirety, for it is only monetary sanctity since it is unfit to be brought, but because of being assessed according to his full worth: one who consecrates the value of a limb upon which life depends gives the value of the entire animal.] And again the earlier beraita is difficult.

And Rabba responds:

When we raised the question, it was before I had taught you this teaching. Now that you have heard this teaching

that the Sanctuary has only the value of its head, I have retracted

and we do not raise the question, and there is no law of being assessed according to his full worth with consecrated things of the altar. The matter itself: Rabba asked: “The value of

my head with regard to the altar—what is the law?”

Is he

assessed according to his full worth,

and pays the value of his entirety, as is the law with one who appraises a limb upon which life depends,

or is he not assessed according to his full worth

and gives the value of half of him? [For an appraisal of the head by itself is not applicable.] And he explains the sides of the uncertainty:

We have not found, with monetary values,

in Appraisals and Vows,

that he is not assessed according to his full worth,

as we expound from “persons,”

or perhaps we have not found

a blemished animal

with regard to the altar

that is holy for its value [and a human being is like a blemished animal]

being assessed according to his full worth.

Teyku.

[But after he heard the beraita, he resolved the uncertainty as brought above.]

Rava asked: “My valuation is upon me” with regard to

the money being consecrated

for the altar—what is the law?

Is he

assessed according to what

his hand can afford

as with valuations for the maintenance of the Temple, [for if his hand cannot afford to pay his full valuation, the koen appraises him according to what his hand can afford, and he pays that, and this suffices; and even if he becomes wealthy afterward, he is exempt].

Or is he not assessed according to what his hand can afford?

And he explains the sides of the uncertainty:

Do we say: We have not found in valuations that he is not assessed according to what his hand can afford

and there is no distinction whether it is for the altar or for the maintenance of the Temple,

or perhaps we have not found with regard to

consecrated things of the

altar that he is assessed according to what his hand can afford,

and he is not exempt through paying less than his value?

Teyku.

Rav Ashi asked: “One who consecrated an ancestral field

[and if he consecrated it for the maintenance of the Temple, it is a scriptural decree that he redeems a field of a homer of barley seed for fifty silver shekels, even if its value is one thousand zuz]

with regard to

its money being consecrated

for the altar—

what is the law?

Should it be said:

We have not found an ancestral field redeemed except as a field of a homer of barley seed for fifty silver shekels,

and there is no distinction whether it is for the altar or for the maintenance of the Temple,

or perhaps we have not found with regard to

consecrated things of the

altar that it is redeemed except at its value,

for only animals are brought upon the altar, and if they develop a blemish they are redeemed at their value, since the Torah did not give them a fixed measure for their redemption; and likewise this should be said with regard to an ancestral field.

And it remains

at teyku.

Mishna:

One less than a month old may be vowed,

if one says, “Its value is upon me,” for it has some monetary value,

but may not be appraised,

for the obligation of a valuation is stated in the passage only from one month old and above.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: One who appraises one less than a month old—Rabbi Meir says: He gives its value

as it is sold in the market,

and the Sages say: He has said nothing.

And this is like the Mishna.

And they explain:

With what do they disagree? Rabbi Meir holds: A person does not utter his words for naught, and he knows

that there are no valuations for one less than a month old

77, and he resolved and said it for the purpose of monetary value,

and it is a vow; although he uttered with his mouth the language of valuation, we follow the intention of the heart which was for monetary value.

And the Rabbis hold: A person does utter his words for naught,

and we do not attribute to him the intention of monetary value.

And we raised concerning it:

According to whom is this statement that Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav: “One who says, ‘The valuation of this vessel is upon me [

and a vessel has no law of valuations]

gives its value”?”

And we answer:

According to Rabbi Meir,

who said: A person does not utter his words in vain, and here he knows that there is no valuation for a vessel, and he resolved in his heart to designate it for monetary value.

And we object:

It is obvious that it follows Rabbi Meir,

so why was it necessary to say this?

And we answer:

Lest you say that even according to the Rabbis

the law is so,

there,

with regard to one less than a month old, the Rabbis exempt because it may be said that although a person does not utter his words in vain, it is possible that

he erred and thought: Just as there are valuations for one a month old, so too there is one for one less than a month old,

and there is no proof that he intended monetary value.

But here,

with regard to a vessel,

where there is no possibility of error,

for

surely a person knows that there is no valuation for a vessel,

it is said that a person does not utter his words in vain,

and he resolved and said it for monetary value, this teaches us

that the reason for the Rabbis is not because he errs, but because they hold that a person does utter his words in vain, and consequently they also disagree with regard to a vessel. And Rav Giddel follows the view of Rabbi Meir.