Arakhin 4b (ד:) — the Talmud in English

Alternatively:

“souls”

This verse comes for this purpose.

I have derived only that a man who assessed, whether he

assessed

a man or a woman, as it is written: “When a man expresses a vow,” which implies specifically a man who assessed.

as it is written: “When a man expressly takes a vow,” which implies specifically a man who made the assessment.

As for a woman who assessed a man,

and likewise

a woman who assessed a woman—

from where?

The verse states: “according to your valuation,”

“souls,”

which implies that all people, both men and women, can perform an assessment.

Alternatively: “souls”

why is this stated?

To include one who is repulsive and one afflicted with leprosy,

so that if they are assessed, the obligation of the valuation takes effect.

One might have thought

that vows should be equated with valuations based on the verse

“a vow according to your valuation,”

and it is stated:

Anyone who is subject to a

vow

of monetary value is subject to valuations, and anyone who is not subject to a monetary value

such as one who is repulsive or afflicted with leprosy, who have no monetary value, is not subject to

valuations.

The verse states

“souls,”

to include anyone who is a living person, even one who has no monetary value.

The entire beraita was brought because of this exposition, thereby resolving what we asked: From where is it derived that one who is repulsive or afflicted with leprosy is subject to valuations? The beraita further expounds:

“And your valuation shall be

the male’”—

to include a tumtum and an androgynos with regard to monetary values

from the word “and it shall be”.

One might have thought

that monetary values should be equated with valuations, based on the verse

“a vow according to your valuation,”

and it is stated:

Anyone who is subject to valuations is subject to monetary values, and anyone who is not subject to valuations,

such as a tumtum and an androgynos,

is not subject to monetary values; the verse therefore states: “And your valuation shall be”

which teaches that they are subject to monetary values. [Although the primary subject of the verse is valuations, if it is not needed for valuations, apply it to monetary values. Rashi].

The Gemara now explains the source for the fact that a tumtum and an androgynos are not subject to valuations:

“Male,” but not a tumtum or an androgynos. One might have thought that they would not be subject to the

legal provision of

the valuation

of a

man ,

since they are not certainly male,

but they would be subject to the

legal provision of

the valuation

of a

woman

which is the lower of the two?

The verse states: “And your valuation shall be that of a male [

and later in the verses]

and if she is female”—

a definite male and a definite female

are subject to valuations,

but not a tumtum

which is uncertain,

and

and not

an androgynos

which has both a male aspect and a female aspect.

We have now returned to explain the beginning of the beraita:

The Master said: “According to your valuation,” to include an unspecified valuation!

What is an unspecified valuation?

As it is taught in a beraita: One who says, “An unspecified valuation is incumbent upon me,”

and did not specify whose valuation, but merely said, “A valuation is incumbent upon me,” and no more,

gives the lowest of the valuations. And what is the lowest of the valuations

the valuation of a female from one month old until five years old? It is

three shekels.

The Gemara challenges this:

But say that it is fifty

shekels, corresponding to the highest valuation, that of a male from twenty to sixty years of age?

The Gemara answers: This is a general principle:

When you grasp the greater amount—

you have not grasped it!

For how do you know to select specifically the greater amount? But if

you grasp the lesser amount—

you have grasped it!

For this is certainly true, since the lesser amount is included within the greater.

The Gemara further challenges:

But say that it is one shekel,

which is the smallest of the valuations,

as it is written: “And every valuation of yours shall be in the shekel of the Sanctuary”?

The Gemara answers:

That

verse

is written with regard to “

one’s means”:

that is what it is written about,

For if he is poor and cannot afford to pay his full valuation, the koen does not assess him at less than one shekel. But the law concerning a fixed valuation does not involve less than three shekels.

The Gemara challenges:

But then,

since an unspecified valuation is three sela,

why is the

verse “according to your valuation,” from which the law of an unspecified valuation is derived,

necessary?

It is obvious by reasoning that he must give the lowest fixed valuation among the valuations!

The Gemara answers:

Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha said: It comes to teach that he who says “an unspecified valuation” is not judged

the one who says an unspecified valuation

according to “

one’s means,”

even if he can afford only one shekel, he is not exempted with less than three shekels.

What is the reason

that one who says an unspecified valuation is not judged according to his means, like all others who make valuations?

The Gemara answers: One who says an unspecified valuation

is considered like one who specified

that he obligated himself to three shekels. And specifically when one says, “The valuation of so-and-so is incumbent upon me,” but does not specify the valuation, so that it is not clear how much he obligated himself, since not everyone knows the age of the person being assessed , the law of “one’s means” applies. But in the case of an unspecified valuation, it is evident that he obligated himself to the lowest fixed valuation, which is three shekels.

Some say: Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha:

This verse comes to teach that even an unspecified valuation

is judged according to one’s means.

The Gemara challenges:

It is obvious,

as with the other valuations?

The Gemara answers:

Lest you say that he is considered like one who specified,

and it is like one who says, “Three shekels are incumbent upon me,” to which the law of “one’s means” does not apply,

it teaches us

that it is like the other valuations, thereby contradicting the first formulation as a matter of halakha.

The Gemara now explains the continuation of the beraita, in which the tanna said:

“According to your valuation”—

he gives the valuation of the entire person, but does not give the valuation of limbs!

This is difficult:

But you have already used it

for this verse, to expound from it

an unspecified valuation,

so it is not superfluous for this exposition.

The Gemara answers:

Read into it

The tanna expounds as follows: It could have written

“valuation,”

but it wrote

“according to your valuation,”

so the bet and the kaf are superfluous, and both expositions are derived from them.

The beraita continues:

One might have thought that I exclude something upon which life depends

from being subject to valuation;

the verse therefore states: “souls.”

Afterward the tanna expounds from this verse

“souls”—

but not the dead,

since the dead are not subject to valuation. This is difficult:

But you have already used

the verse “souls” for another exposition; how can two expositions be derived from it?

The Gemara answers:

Read into it:

It could have written

“a soul,”

but it wrote

“souls,”

and the superfluous plural formulation is used for the second exposition.

Regarding this exposition:

“I exclude the dead

who is not subject to valuation

but I do not exclude one who is dying,

and he would be subject to valuation;

the verse therefore states: “And he shall assess him and stand him,”

which teaches that one who is dying is not subject to valuation. The Gemara raises a difficulty:

If so—

the dead person should likewise be excluded by “and he shall stand him and assess him,”

since he cannot be made to stand; why is the exclusion from “souls” necessary?”

The Gemara answers:

Indeed,

the dead person is also excluded from there.

But then, the exposition of

“a soul” and “souls”—what is it needed for?

It comes for another exposition,

as we are going to say later,

to include one who is repulsive and one afflicted with leprosy.

And later in the beraita we learned:

Alternatively: “souls.”

I have derived only that one person assessed one person.

From where is it derived that one person assessed one hundred? The verse states: “souls.”

Alternatively: “souls.”

I have derived only that a man assessed, whether

he assessed

a man, whether

he assessed

a woman.

From where is it derived that a woman who assessed a man, and a woman who assessed a woman, is included? The verse states: “souls.”

Alternatively: “souls,” to include one who is repulsive and one afflicted with leprosy.

The Gemara asks:

But you have already used

“souls”

for those

expositions above; how can one further include one who is repulsive or afflicted with leprosy?

The Gemara answers:

Those

—one person who assessed one hundred and a woman who assessed—

do not require a verse

stated in the plural, “souls.” Even if it had been written in the singular, “a soul,” we would have derived all of these: both something upon which life depends, and one person assessing one hundred, and a woman assessing. For “a soul” can also imply many souls, a woman, and something upon which life depends. And although these are three expositions, we would nevertheless derive all of them from the verse “a soul.”

What is the reason? Because it is evenly balanced

all three of these expositions, and there is no basis to prefer one over another; whichever one of them you might exclude,

and

necessarily

they must all be included.

The verse was necessary

“souls” in the plural

for one who is repulsive and one afflicted with leprosy

who is subject to valuation;

that is what it was necessary for.

Regarding the exposition

“And your valuation shall be”—

to include a tumtum and an androgynos with regard to monetary values!

We asked:

Monetary values—

why do I need a verse

to include them? [Although the Gemara explained above that one might have equated monetary values with valuations and concluded that just as they are not subject to valuations, they cannot be the object of monetary vows, it is nevertheless difficult: How could we entertain such a possibility?]

Let it be no more than

like one

who says “

the value of a date palm”

is incumbent upon me!

If he said “

the value of a date palm”—

would he not give

its value to the Temple treasury? And in what way are a tumtum and an androgynos inferior?

The Gemara answers:

Rabba said:

The verse is needed

to teach that

to teach that even with regard to a tumtum and an androgynos

each limb is assessed

every limb

according to its full value!

For if one vows the monetary value of a limb upon which life depends, he gives the monetary value of the entire person. For

it might enter your mind to say: “A vow according to your valuation

souls”

is written,

and from there we derive the law that he is assessed according to his full value [from the additional term “souls”],

and let us say: Anyone who is subject to valuations is assessed according to his full value, but anyone who is not subject to valuations,

such as a tumtum or an androgynos, is not assessed according to his full value.

The verse therefore teaches

that even one who is not subject to valuations is assessed according to his full value.

Abaye said to him:

But is one who

is not subject to valuations

subject to the law of

being assessed according to his full value? But it is taught:

One who says

“The head of this slave is consecrated,”

and did not consecrate the rest of his body,

he and the Temple treasury are partners

in him! They sell him and divide the proceeds. Likewise, with regard to a sale, if one says to another:

“The head of a slave is sold to you,” they assess [

evaluate]

between them,

how much he is worth, and divide its value [Rashi was perplexed as to why, with regard to consecration, the term “partnership” is used, whereas with regard to a sale, the term “they assess” is used] .

The same applies to

“The head of this donkey is consecrated”:

he and the Temple treasury are partners in it,

and likewise,

“The head of a donkey is sold to you”—

they assess it between them.

But

“The head of a cow is sold to you”—he sold only the cow’s head

and they do not divide the entire animal as they do in the case of a donkey.

Moreover [

only with regard to a sale],

but even if he said

“The head of a cow is consecrated,”

the Temple treasury receives only its head

and not half of it.

And Rav Pappa said,

explaining the reason for the distinction between a cow, on the one hand, and a donkey and a slave, on the other:

For the head of an ox is sold in the butcher’s market,

and therefore it has an independent value. Accordingly, the intention of one who consecrates or sells it is that the transaction apply to the head alone. This is not so with regard to a donkey or a slave, whose heads are not customarily sold separately; therefore, when one consecrates their heads, he certainly intends half.

Abaye raised a difficulty to Rabba:

But a donkey and a cow are not subject to valuations,

they are not assessed, and therefore

they do not

have the law of

being assessed according to their full value.

And although the head is a limb upon which life depends, the entire animal is not consecrated: only the head in the case of a cow, or half in the case of a donkey. This is difficult for Rabba, who said that even one who is not subject to valuations is, with regard to monetary values, assessed according to his full value.

Rabba responds:

But according to your reasoning,

that the reason in the case of a cow and donkey is that they are not subject to valuations, nevertheless

you still have a difficulty with regard to a slave,

since he too is not entirely consecrated, even though

he is subject to valuations,

as stated in the Mishna,

and he is not assessed according to his full value.

Rather

Rabba says: One must divide it as follows:

This is not difficult: This case

where he is not judged according to its value—refers

to consecrated offerings for the altar,

where he said: “The head of this donkey,” or “the head of this slave, is for the value of a burnt offering.” And that which we said—that he is judged according to its value—refers to one who vows its value, and this applies only

to consecrated property for

Temple maintenance,

because the law that he is judged according to its value is derived from the verse “persons,” which is written with regard to arakhin, whose proceeds are designated for Temple maintenance. This is derived only with regard to a vow of monetary value for Temple maintenance, but not with regard to consecrated offerings for the altar.

Abaye raises another difficulty:

How did you establish

the beraita?

As referring to consecrated offerings for the altar.

Consider the latter clause

of the beraita:

“Moreover, even if he said: ‘The head of this cow is consecrated,’ only its head is consecrated! Why?”

But it is fit to be offered, and the sanctity of the offering takes effect upon it, so

you should derive that the sanctity extends to the entire animal,

even though he consecrated only its head.