Arakhin 5b (ה:) — the Talmud in English

And he raises a further difficulty:

And according to Rabbi Meir,

since Rav Giddel’s statement was said in accordance with his view, it is obvious that in the case of a vessel he gives its monetary value, as all the more so he completed his statement with the intention of obligating himself to pay money, since it is impossible to say that he was mistaken,

and for what purpose was it necessary

for Rav Giddel to state this?

And we answer:

You might have said that the reason of Rabbi Meir there

is not that he completed his statement with the intention of obligating himself to pay money, but rather that it is a decree.

For he decreed that one who is less than a month old is treated like one who is a month old.

And if we exempt one who is less than a month old, there is concern that people will also come to exempt one who is a month old.

But here,

in the case of a vessel,

there is no basis to decree

that perhaps people will err and equate a vessel with a person, and say that he is not liable,

this teaches us that the reason of Rabbi Meir

is not because of a decree, but because

a person does not utter his words in vain. It makes no difference here

with regard to one who is less than a month old,

and it makes no difference here

in the case of a vessel, where this reason certainly applies.

And we inquire about this:

In accordance with whose opinion is that which Rabba bar Yosei said that Rav said—and some say that Rav Yeiva bar Yosei said that Rav said: “One who consecrates another’s animal gives its monetary value”?

And he answers:

In accordance with whose opinion? In accordance with Rabbi Meir’s.

He maintains that a person does not utter his words in vain, and the same applies here: a person knows that consecration does not take effect upon an object that is not his, and he completed his statement with the intention of obligating himself to pay money. Even though these are the words of Rabbi Meir, who maintains that a person can transfer ownership of an object that has not yet come into the world—and it is explained in the Gemara in tractate Bava Batra that according to Rabbi Meir, if one sells this field when he acquires it, the sale takes effect, so too, he should be able to consecrate the animal from now, effective when he acquires it— in the Olat Shlomo explained that Rabbi Meir’s statement that a person can transfer ownership of an object that has not yet come into the world applies only to something that regularly comes into existence, such as the fruit of a date palm, which regularly grows. And in the Gemara in Bava Batra, the case is one in which he had already spoken with the owner and the owner had agreed to sell him the land; since it is something that is destined to become his, he can sell it. Here, however, the case is one in which he has not yet spoken with the owner about selling him the animal. It is not something destined to become his, and Rabbi Meir concedes that he cannot consecrate it.

And he raises an objection:

Did Rav state this

in accordance with Rabbi Meir’s view

once already!? For Rav Giddel said that Rav said: “One who says, ‘The valuation of this vessel is upon me,’ gives its monetary value,”

so why did he need to repeat it?

And we answer:

You might have said that there

in the case of a vessel,

it

is that Rabbi Meir’s reasoning applies,

for he knows that there is no valuation for a vessel, and he completed his statement with the intention of obligating himself to pay money; but in the case of

another person’s

animal, which can be consecrated

and whose owner can consecrate its substance,

it can be said that this is what he meant

when he consecrated it:

If I say to its owner,

that he should sell it to me—

“Sell it to me,”

therefore

“let it become consecrated to me now, and I will offer it”

once I acquire it. And although it still does not belong to him, he is mistaken in this regard, thinking that consecration from now is effective for the time after he acquires it; but he did not intend to obligate himself to pay money.

It teaches us

that he is not mistaken in this regard; rather, he certainly knows that consecration does not take effect upon the animal itself, and he intended to obligate himself to pay its monetary value.

Mar bar Rav Ashi said

with regard to this law:

And that is when he said

“This other person’s animal is

upon me,”

and then there is an obligation to pay its monetary value [for the expression “it is upon me” means an obligation upon the person].

But if he said, “This is

my fellow’s animal,

this one,

consecrated,” and did not say “upon me,”

he

has said nothing, since he did not obligate himself in any way; rather, he spoke about the animal.

Mishna:

A gentile—

Rabbi Meir says: He can be assessed,

if an Israelite says, “His valuation is upon me,” he gives his valuation.

But he cannot assess

if the gentile says, “My valuation,” or “The valuation of another is upon me,” he has said nothing.

Rabbi Yehuda says: He can assess,

but he cannot be assessed.

And both

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda

agree

that a gentile

can vow

“The monetary value of so-and-so is upon me,”

and can be the subject of a vow

when he says, “The monetary value of a gentile is upon me.”

Gemara:

The Sages taught: “The children of Israel”

is written in the passage. And they expound that specifically they

can assess, whereas gentiles cannot assess.

One might have thought

that

they should also not be

gentiles

assessed?

The verse states: “When a person expressly avows,”

which implies everyone, and includes gentiles.

These are the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Meir said

to explain his statement:

Since one verse

“a person”

includes

gentiles,

and one verse

“the children of Israel”

excludes

gentiles,

for what reason

do I

say

that a gentile

can be assessed

and exclude him from

being able to assess?

Could one not say the opposite?

And he answers:

Because the verse expanded

the law of

those who are assessed more

than the law of

those who assess.

For a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor can be assessed,

since he is included in the fixed valuation stated in the passage,

but they cannot assess.

Therefore it stands to reason to apply the inclusion to those who are assessed and the exclusion to those who assess.

Rabbi Yehuda says: “The children of Israel”

is written in the passage, to teach that specifically they

can be assessed, whereas gentiles cannot be assessed. One might have thought

that they should also

not be able to assess; the verse states: “When a person

expressly avows,” to include gentiles.

Rabbi Yehuda said

to explain his statement:

Since one verse

“a person”

includes

gentiles,

and one verse

“the children of Israel”

excludes

gentiles,

for what reason do I say that a gentile can assess but cannot be assessed?

And he answers:

Because the verse expanded

the law to be more stringent

with regard to those who assess than with regard to those who are assessed. For a tumtum and an androgynos can assess, but cannot be assessed,

because only one who is certainly male or certainly female can be assessed. Therefore, it is more reasonable to apply the inclusion to gentiles who assess.

Rava said: The halakha of Rabbi Meir

that a gentile can be assessed but cannot assess

stands to reason,

but

his reasoning does not stand to reason.

The halakha of Rabbi Meir stands to reason

because

it is written: “It is not for you

and for us to build a house for our God.”

Thus Nehemiah ben Hachaliah said to gentiles who were volunteering and wishing to assist in building the Temple that it was inappropriate for gentiles to participate in building the Temple. From this one can derive with regard to valuations, which also go to the repair of the Temple, that gentiles cannot assess; and the verse “the children of Israel” is applied to this.

The reasoning

of Rabbi Meir

does not stand to reason, for he derives it

from the fact that the verse expanded the law of those who are assessed more than that of those who assess,

from a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor—

this is not proof.

For a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor are different,

as this is a logical principle: throughout the Torah, the law is

that they are not people of understanding

and their acts have no legal effect; therefore, they cannot assess. But with regard to a gentile who vows and consecrates, it can be said that he too can assess, were it not for the verse cited above [“It is not for you and for us to build a house for our God”].

The reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda stands to reason, for he derives it

from the fact that the verse expanded the law of those who assess more,

from a tumtum and an androgynos, who, although they are people of understanding

like gentiles,

the Merciful One excluded them

from valuation. This is considered a leniency with regard to those who are assessed as compared with those who assess. Therefore, one can say the same with regard to gentiles.

His halakha,

that of Rabbi Yehuda,

does not stand to reason.

For it is written: “It is not for you and for us to build a house for our God.”

This shows that the power of gentiles to consecrate has been diminished, and likewise one can say that they cannot assess.

And we raise a difficulty:

And Rabbi Yehuda,

who maintains that gentiles can assess,

what does he do with this verse, “for you and not for us,”

which implies from the verse that they cannot assess,

what does he derive from it?

And we answer:

Rav Hisda said that Avimi said:

Rabbi Yehuda also concedes that the money of the valuations of gentiles is not used for the repair of the Temple; rather,

its valuation is put into storage.

This is as is demonstrated by the fact that Nehemiah ben Hachaliah prevented gentiles from bringing offerings. Nevertheless, they can assess, meaning that sanctity takes effect upon the money.

And he raises an objection:

If that is so,

if property consecrated by a gentile for the repair of the Temple is destined to be lost,

one should not misuse it

and thereby become liable for an offering of misuse of consecrated property. For it was taught in a beraita:

Animals designated for death

such as the offspring of a sin-offering and the substitute for a sin-offering, and so on, which are not offered but are left until they die on their own,

and

likewise

money

that one set aside for a sin-offering and that was lost and found after the owner had already achieved atonement, whose law is

that it goes to the Salt Sea

to destroy it—

one may not derive benefit

from it, since deriving benefit from it is forbidden,

but one does not commit misuse

with it: if one derives benefit from it, he is not liable to bring an offering for misuse, since it is not considered “from the consecrated property of the Lord,” with regard to which there is liability for an offering, because it is destined to be lost. And similarly, it is said with regard to the consecrated property of gentiles for the repair of the Temple, whose law is that it must be put into storage, that there is no misuse of it.

Rather, this is what was taught with regard to the consecrated property of gentiles: In what case is this statement said, that one does not commit misuse with it? With regard to consecrated property of the altar,

for the law of misuse is derived by a gzera shava from the word “sin” written with regard to misuse and the word “sin” written with regard to a non-kohen who ate teruma. Just as with teruma the death penalty applies only to the teruma of an Israelite, so too the law of misuse applies only to the consecrated property of an Israelite.

But with regard to consecrated property

of a gentile

designated for the repair of the Temple, one does commit misuse with it,

and it is not derived from teruma, whose sanctity is sanctity of substance, whereas consecrated property designated for the repair of the Temple has sanctity of monetary value. And from the fact that it is written that one commits misuse with the consecrated property of gentiles, it follows that it is not put into storage; rather, it is used for the repair of the Temple.

Rather, Rava said

to reconcile the verse “It is not for you and for us” according to Rabbi Yehuda, who certainly maintains that the consecrated property of gentiles is accepted for the repair of the Temple: The reason Nehemiah ben Hachaliah prevented them from bringing it

was the weakening of the hands,

as the gentiles did not intend this for the good. Rather, they intended that the Jews would rely upon them as well and heed their counsel, and they would delay the construction until they could influence Cyrus not to build it.

For it is written: “And the people of the land weakened the hands of the people of Judah and frightened them from building.”