Arakhin 23b (כג:) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

He was a contractor-guarantor!

Rav Huna had designated movable property for his wife’s ketuba, and she gave it to his father, who returned it to his son. This is the status of a contractor-guarantor, who takes and gives the loan directly from the lender to the borrower and thereby becomes the lender’s borrower. Here too, by her giving the property to his father, who was the guarantor, the guarantor became liable to the woman.

And we raise an objection:

This works well according to the one who says

below in the discussion:

A contractor-guarantor, even though the borrower does not have property

at the time of the loan—with which the guarantor could collect from him if the borrower failed to pay and the guarantor had to pay—

becomes liable;

it is understandable that Moshe bar Atzrei became liable through his contractor-guarantee to pay the woman, even though Rav Huna, who was poor, had no property at the time of his marriage.

But according to the one who says:

If

the borrower has

property at the time of the loan,

the guarantor becomes liable,

but if

he does not have

property at the time of the loan,

he does not become liable,

because since the guarantor has nothing from which to collect from the borrower if he must pay the lender, he does not fully resolve to assume the obligation,

what can be said?

How did Moshe bar Atzrei become liable to the woman? Rav Huna did not have property at the time of his marriage, since he was poor!

And we answer:

a.

Alternatively, one can say: Rav Huna had

property at the time of his marriage,

but it was destroyed

[and became ruined] afterward, and only then did he become poor!

b.

And alternatively, one can say:

Although an ordinary contractor-guarantor does not become liable when the borrower has no property, nevertheless,

a father for his son

[a father on behalf of his son]

fully assumes the obligation

[he resolves to assume the obligation], even when his son has no property from which he could collect! Therefore, Moshe bar Atzrei became liable to pay the ketuba of his son Rav Huna’s wife, even though Rav Huna had no property at the time of his marriage.

And now the laws governing an ordinary guarantor and a contractor-guarantor are explained,

as it was stated:

An ordinary guarantor

who is not a contractor-guarantor

for a ketuba: everyone agrees that he does not become liable,

even if the husband has property at the time the guarantor assumes the obligation.

A contractor-guarantor for a debt: everyone agrees that he becomes liable,

even when the borrower has no property at the time of the loan.

An ordinary guarantor for a debt, and a contractor-guarantor for a ketuba,

when the borrower or husband has no property at the time the guarantor assumes the obligation,

there is a dispute: Some say: If the borrower

or husband had property at the time the guarantor assumed the obligation,

he becomes liable,

but if

he does not have

property,

he does not become liable!

And some say: Even though he does not have

property,

he becomes liable!

And the halakha is: In all of them—

that is, an ordinary guarantor and a contractor-guarantor for a debt, and a contractor-guarantor for a ketuba—

even though he does not have property

of the borrower or husband,

he becomes liable! Except

from

an ordinary guarantor

for a ketuba,

who, even though he has

property,

does not become liable!

What is the reason

that an ordinary guarantor for a ketuba does not become liable?

It is a mitzva

that

the guarantor performs: He does not intend to pay the guarantee, but intends to bring the couple together, and through this guarantee they become reconciled,

and she loses nothing

at all; for it is better for a woman to live in a two-person union than to live as a widow, and he intended her benefit [Rashbam, Bava Batra 174b].

because it is better for a woman to live as part of a couple than to live as a widow. He intended this for her benefit. [Rashbam, Bava Batra 174a].

There was a certain man who sold his property

[he sold his land, although the woman was entitled to collect her ketuba upon her divorce even from purchasers],

and then divorced his wife

[and divorced his wife]. There was a doubt whether one must be concerned that he was conspiring against the purchasers: The woman would collect her ketuba from them, he would take her back, and both of them would benefit from what she had collected. Therefore, perhaps when he divorces her he should become prohibited by vow from deriving benefit from her, so that he could not take her back, as we learned in our Mishna concerning one who consecrates his property and one who became a guarantor for his wife’s ketuba.

Rav Yosef, son of Rava, sent

this question

before Rav Pappa,

and wrote to him as follows: When a woman can collect her ketuba from

a guarantor, we learned

in our Mishna that when the husband divorces her, he must become prohibited by vow from deriving benefit from her. And if she can collect from

consecrated property, we learned

also in our Mishna that he must become prohibited by vow from deriving benefit from her when he divorces her. But if she can collect from

a purchaser, what is the law? Must he become prohibited by vow from deriving benefit from her when he divorces her?

He said to him: Rav Pappa said to him: Certainly, when the husband divorces her, he must vow that he will derive no benefit from her, just as he must vow in the case of a guarantor and consecrated property. Even though the tanna did not mention in our Mishna that he must also vow in the case of a purchaser,

He said to him:

Rav Pappa said to him: Certainly the husband must become prohibited by vow from deriving benefit from her when he divorces her, just as he must do so in the cases of a guarantor and consecrated property. Although the tanna did not mention in our Mishna that he must also do so in the case of a purchaser,

does the tanna have to enumerate everything like a peddler counting his coins

[must the tanna specify every case, like a merchant counting his money]? The tanna taught us the cases of a guarantor and consecrated property, and the same applies to a purchaser!

The scholars of Nehardea say:

He does not have to become prohibited by vow from deriving benefit from her in the case of a purchaser. Their reasoning is:

As we learned

in our Mishna that he must become prohibited by vow—in the cases of a guarantor and consecrated property—

we learned! What we did not learn

in our Mishna that he must become prohibited by vow—for example, the case of a purchaser—

we did not learn!

Rav Mesharsheya said: What is the reason of the scholars of Nehardea,

who say that he does not have to become prohibited by vow from deriving benefit from her in the case of a purchaser?

Granted,

when his property is in the hands of

consecrated property,

he must become prohibited by vow

for the benefit of consecrated property,

so that they will not remove it from consecrated property. Similarly, when there is

a guarantor, too,

he must become prohibited by vow, because the guarantor

performs a mitzva

to bring the couple together;

that is all he did, and she loses nothing,

the woman. For this reason, we require the husband to prohibit himself by vow, so that a person will not refrain from performing a mitzva [Rabbeinu Gershom]!

But in the case of a purchaser,

why should we require him to prohibit himself by vow?

Since

[after all],

the purchaser knows

the purchaser

that every property has a ketuba lien upon it,

and therefore,

why did he go and purchase it

[why did he go and buy it]?! And if he purchased it,

he himself caused his own loss

through his own action,

and we do not need to require the husband to prohibit himself by vow!

Mishna:

One who consecrates his property, and has upon him a woman’s ketuba or a creditor

[or a creditor], although by law they can collect their debts from the consecrated property without its redemption, nevertheless, the Sages enacted:

That

the woman cannot collect her ketuba from consecrated property, nor can a creditor collect his debt

without redemption,

rather: the redeemer

[the owner]

redeems

the property from consecrated status for one dinar, or even for a small amount less than a dinar [Zevach Todah],

on the condition that he give the woman—

her ketuba

from the property that he consecrated,

and the creditor his debt.

How so [Zevach Todah]?

If he consecrated ninety maneh, and his debt was

even

one hundred maneh, which is more than the value of the consecrated property, nevertheless the creditor can collect his debt through a minimal redemption. Therefore,

he adds

the creditor lends the consecrator

another dinar,

so that

he may redeem with it

the creditor himself [Tosafot Yom Tov and Zevach Todah, explaining Rashi]

these properties

from consecrated status,

on the condition that he give the woman—

her ketuba, and the creditor his debt.

statement below, on page 33b.

As Rabbi Abbahu said: It is an enactment, so that people will not say,

Gemara:

And we are astonished:

Why do I need it to say

in the Mishna

“the redeemer redeems”?

That is, why must the property be redeemed from consecrated status, so that the woman or creditor may collect their debt without redemption? After all, the consecration did not take effect upon the property, since a person cannot consecrate something that is not his , but belongs to his creditor?!

And we explain:

Because of Rabbi Abbahu,

below, on page 33b,

as Rabbi Abbahu said: It is an enactment

in order

that people should not say that consecrated property leaves consecrated status without redemption!

We further explain the latter part of the Mishna, which states that even if the creditor’s debt was one hundred maneh and the borrower’s consecrated property was worth only ninety maneh, the creditor can collect from the consecrated property and a redemption of one dinar suffices:

This Mishna is not in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel! For it was taught in a beraita: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If the debt

of the creditor

corresponds to the consecrated property

of the borrower, he may collect, and the owner

redeems

it for a minimal amount.

But if not,

rather, the creditor’s debt was greater than the value of the consecrated property,

he does not redeem

it for a minimal amount, but requires redemption like other consecrated properties.

The reasoning of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is that if the debt corresponds to the value of the consecrated property, one can say that when he lent the money, he lent it with the intention of collecting from this property. But when the debt exceeds the value of the consecrated property, he did not lend with the intention of collecting from this property ; rather, he trusted the borrower to pay, and therefore he cannot collect from the consecrated property.

And we raise the question:

And what do the Rabbis

who disagree with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and hold that even when the debt exceeds the value of the consecrated property, we say that he lent with the intention of collecting from this property, and he may collect from the consecrated property and redeem it for a minimal amount—

to what extent

may the debt exceed the value of the consecrated property while we still say that he lent with the intention of collecting from this property, enabling him to collect from the consecrated property and redeem it for a minimal amount?

Rav Huna bar Yehuda said in the name of Rav Sheshet: Until

the value of the property he consecrated is

half [half] of his debt. But if the value of the property was less than half of his debt, he cannot collect from the consecrated property through a minimal redemption. Since it is worth less than half, he certainly did not lend with the intention of collecting from this property [Tosafot].

what they can: when the treasurer comes to seize property from a person whose means are insufficient, and he is judged according to what his hand can afford, as it is written in the passage concerning valuations, “But if he is too poor for your valuation, he shall be placed before the priest, and the priest shall value him according to what the one who made the vow can afford,” the treasurer leaves him what he needs for his livelihood and takes the rest .

Mishna:

Although they said

[above, 21a] that

those liable

to pay money to consecrated property for

valuations

that they accepted upon themselves

are compelled to pay,

as the Temple treasurer enters their homes and takes property against their will, nevertheless,

they give him

when the treasurer comes to take a pledge and the one who made the valuation cannot afford the full amount, and he is judged according to his means, as it is written in the passage concerning valuations: “[And if he is poor in comparison with your valuation,] he shall be presented before the koen, and the koen shall value him [according to what the one who vows can afford].” The treasurer leaves him what he needs for his livelihood and takes the rest , and he thereby fulfills his obligation to consecrated property , even if he became wealthy after they assessed him and took what he had [Rashi, Bava Metzia 113b and Homash], and leaves him

food

for

thirty days, and clothing for twelve months,

and

a prepared bed,

that is, a bed and its bedding [Tosafot, Bava Metzia 113b],

and his shoes and tefillin ,

[and if he has none, they leave him money with which to purchase them]. They give only

to him, but not to his wife

or his children.

That is, they do not provide from his property clothing and food for his wife and children.

If

the debtor is

an artisan, they give him

that is, they leave in his possession

two tools of each type

of the tools of his trade. For example, if he was

a carpenter

of wood,

they give him two adzes [

a tool used to smooth boards — Rashi, end of Bava Kamma]

and two saws [

a knife with many serrations that cuts quickly].

Rabbi Eliezer says:

even

if he was a farmer, they give him his team [

a pair of oxen, which is his tool of trade], and if he was

a donkey driver, they give him his donkey;

but the first tanna disagrees with this.

If he had one type

of tool of his trade

in abundance,

more than the two that are left for him—for example, he had three adzes—

and one type

he had only

a small number of,

for example, he had only one saw,

we do not tell him to sell the abundant type

one adze

and purchase

with its proceeds

from the scarce type,

so that he will have two saws!

Rather, they give him two types

that is, two tools

from the abundant type, and all that he has of the scarce type

they give him, but no more.

One who consecrates his property

his phylacteries are also included in his consecration, and therefore:

they assess

that is, they appraise — Rashi, Bava Kamma 102

his phylacteries

for him; he borrows money [Rashi, there] and redeems them according to the amount at which they were appraised for him.

Gemara:

What is the reason

that they give him all these things?