Arakhin 21a — the Talmud in English

“He consecrated it; the one dwelling in it pays

the renter

rent

of the apartment

to the hekdesh.”

[This is a matter in itself, and it is not speaking of a house afflicted with a lesion,] and we thought that “he consecrated it, the one dwelling in it” means that the one dwelling in it—that is, the renter—consecrated it.

And we examine it:

“He consecrated it, the one dwelling in it—how can he consecrate it?”

But it is not his. And they derive from the verse

“When a man consecrates his house as holy,” said the Merciful One: just as his house is in his possession, so everything must be in his possession,

specifically, for him to be able to consecrate it, but not something that is not in his possession.

And we explain:

This is what it says: “The landlord consecrated it; the one dwelling in it pays rent to the hekdesh.”

And we ask: If

the landlord consecrated it, how does he dwell in it

the renter? For

the

prohibition of

misuse of consecrated property

applies

to him, since he benefits from property of the hekdesh.

Furthermore,

there is a difficulty: why

does he pay rent to the hekdesh?

For

once he misused

it

the renter, by using the house,

the house leaves

the house

for ordinary use

[for this is what is written concerning misuse: “There is no misuse after misuse,” because through misuse it leaves for ordinary use], and he becomes liable only for the principal and the fifth, and no more.

And we answer: the landlord did not consecrate the body of the house, but

said, “When its rent comes, it shall be consecrated,”

and through this the difficulties we asked are resolved. The house is not consecrated, but only the apartment’s rent, and therefore he pays rent to the hekdesh.

And we ask: how can consecration take effect upon the rent?

For

it is still not in existence,

and a person cannot consecrate something that has not yet come into existence.

And we answer:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: Whose opinion is this? It is Rabbi Meir’s, who says that a person can consecrate something that has not yet come into existence.

Some say that Rav Pappa said to Abaye, and some say

others

say that Rami bar Hama

said

to Rav Hisda: According to whom

does this beraita proceed?

According to Rabbi Meir, who says that a person can consecrate something that has not yet come into existence?

He said to him:

Certainly it is so;

and if not, according to whom?

Mishna:

Those liable for valuations are seized as collateral

by them,

for if he does not pay of his own accord, the treasurer enters his house and takes property from him against his will as collateral for his debt.

Those liable for sin offerings and guilt offerings are not seized as collateral

by them.

Since they come for atonement, it is presumed that he will certainly hasten to bring them himself.

Those liable for burnt offerings and peace offerings,

since they are not for the obligation of atonement [although a burnt offering atones for failure to perform positive commandments, it does not come as an obligation], but only because of payment of a vow, he may delay them [and they fear that in the end he will no longer have enough to purchase one; Tosafot, Rosh Hashana 6], therefore

they seize them as collateral, even though

the sin

is not atoned

for him until he becomes willing

the owner to bring the sacrifice,

as it is stated:

“He shall offer it”

“for his acceptance”

before the Lord. If so, this seizing them by coercion will not help with a burnt offering or peace offering; nevertheless,

they coerce him until he says, “I am willing,”

and it is again called “for his acceptance.”

And so you say concerning bills of divorce,

that the husband’s willingness is required for them; nevertheless,

they coerce him until he says, “I am willing,”

and thereby it is considered according to his will.

Gemara:

Rav Pappa said: Sometimes those liable for sin offerings are seized as collateral,

and sometimes

those liable for burnt offerings are not seized as collateral.

And he explains it: sometimes

those liable for sin offerings are seized as collateral,

when they do not come for atonement, as

with the sin offering

of a nazirite

[the nazirite brings three sacrifices on the day his nazirite period is completed: a sin offering, a burnt offering, and peace offerings. He shaves because of them, and afterward is permitted to drink wine].

For since the master said

that although ideally the nazirite shaves only after all his sacrifices,

if he shaved because of one of the three, he has fulfilled his obligation

of shaving after the fact.

And if one of the bloods was sprinkled for him

[that is, he brought only one of his sacrifices],

the nazirite is permitted to drink wine and become impure through the dead,

and they derive this in the Sifrei from the verse “afterward the nazirite shall drink wine”—after a single act.

It follows that the sin offering does not hold him back, since with a burnt offering or peace offering it is sufficient to permit him; therefore they seize collateral from him for this, because there is concern that perhaps

he will act negligently with it and not bring it.

And sometimes

those liable for burnt offerings are not seized as collateral,

when this holds back atonement, such as

a woman’s burnt offering after childbirth,

which prevents her from eating consecrated food and entering the Temple. Therefore they do not seize collateral for this, because she will certainly not delay.

And he objects:

What is it?

That is, why did you say that her burnt offering holds her back? Does not the sin offering alone already permit her to eat consecrated food? And if you say it is because

the verse placed it first

before the sin offering, as it is written, “You shall bring a year-old lamb as a burnt offering and a pigeon or a dove as a sin offering,” it follows that the burnt offering also holds her back, since she cannot bring the sin offering until she brings the burnt offering.

But Rava said: Only for reading

alone

did the verse place it first

for the burnt offering, so that it is read first in the verse, but not so that it is offered first; rather, the sin offering precedes it. The sin offering alone permits her to eat consecrated food, and there is consequently concern that she will act negligently with her burnt offering, so it is necessary to seize collateral for it.

Rather,

Rav Pappa’s law applies

to the burnt offering of a leper. For it was taught: Rabbi Ishmael, the son of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, says: Just as his sin offering and guilt offering hold him back

the leper from eating consecrated food,

so his burnt offering holds him back.

Therefore they do not seize collateral for it, since they do not fear that he will delay.

We learned in the Mishna:

“And even though it is not atoned for him until he becomes willing, and so forth.”

The Sages taught: “He shall offer it” teaches that they coerce

him. One might have thought, against his will; the verse says, “for his acceptance.” How so?

But do these statements not contradict one another? Rather,

they coerce him until he says, “I am willing.”

And it is explained in Kiddushin 50a that even if in his heart he does not wish it, matters in the heart are not [legally] matters. Or the reason is that it is clear to us that even in his heart he is pleased with atonement. Likewise, concerning bills of divorce, he is pleased to heed the words of the Sages who obligate him to divorce.

Samuel said: A burnt offering requires the awareness

of the person for whom it brings atonement,

as it is stated, “for his acceptance.”

And we ask:

What does he teach us?

But

we learned: “Even though it is not atoned for him until he becomes willing, as it is stated, ‘for his acceptance.’”

And we answer:

It is necessary

for Samuel only in the case

in which his fellow set it aside for him

from his own property for his atonement; Samuel said that he must inform the person for whom it brings atonement.

Lest you say: When we require awareness,

that he say “I am willing,” this is only when the court seizes collateral from him

from his own property, but

when it was set aside for him

from his fellow’s property,

we presume that he is certainly pleased with this

and does not

need to be asked about it [for one may confer a benefit upon a person in his absence],

he teaches us

that it is not a benefit. Because

sometimes

he is not pleased to receive atonement through something that is not his,

for he wishes to perform the mitzva with his own money. Therefore, if he was not informed and did not consent, it is not considered “for his acceptance.”