Arakhin 21a (כא.) — the Talmud in English

They consecrated the rent in it, above

the tenant

rents

the apartment

to the Temple treasury. [(

This is a matter in its own right, and it is not discussing a house afflicted with leprosy. We thought that “they consecrated the rent in it” means that the one residing in it—that is, the tenant—consecrated it.)

And we raise a difficulty concerning it:

“They consecrated the rent in it”—how can he consecrate it?

But it is not his. And they expound from the verse:

“If a man consecrates his house as sacred,” the Merciful One states: Just as his house is in his possession, so too everything must be in his possession;

only what is in his possession can he consecrate, but not what is not in his possession.

And we explain:

This is what it means: “The landlord consecrated it, and the one residing in it raises the rent for the Temple treasury.”

And we object: If

the landlord consecrated it, how can he reside in it

the tenant? For

the

prohibition of

misappropriation of consecrated property

rests upon him,

since he is deriving benefit from consecrated property.

Furthermore,

there is another difficulty: Why

does he raise the rent for the Temple treasury?

But

once he has committed misappropriation

through it

the tenant, by using the house,

the house leaves

the realm of consecrated property

for ordinary use [(

as it is written with regard to misappropriation: “There is no misappropriation after misappropriation,” because through misappropriation the property leaves the realm of consecrated property for ordinary use)], and he becomes liable only for the principal and an additional one-fifth, and no more.

And we answer: The landlord did not consecrate the house itself; rather,

he said: “When its rent arrives, it shall be consecrated,”

and this resolves the difficulties we raised. The house itself is not sacred; only the rent is consecrated, and that is why he raises the rent for the Temple treasury.

And we object: How can consecration take effect on the rent?

But

it does not yet exist,

and a person cannot consecrate something that has not yet come into existence!

And we answer:

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Whose opinion is this? It is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that a person can consecrate something that has not yet come into existence.

Some say that Rav Pappa said to Abaye—and some say that it was others [who said this] in the name of Rami bar Hama—

others

of Rami bar Hama

said

to Rav Hisda: In accordance with whom

does this beraita proceed?

Is it in accordance with Rabbi Meir, who says that a person can consecrate something that has not yet come into existence?

He said to him:

Certainly that is so.

If not, in accordance with whom?

Mishna:

Those liable for valuations are taken as collateral

from them,

meaning that if a person does not pay on his own, the Temple treasurer enters his house and takes property from him against his will as collateral for his debt.

Those liable for sin-offerings and guilt-offerings are not taken as collateral

from them.

Since these offerings come for atonement, it is assumed that they will certainly hasten to bring them on their own.

Those liable for burnt-offerings and peace-offerings,

since they are not required for atonement [although a burnt-offering atones for failure to fulfill positive commandments, it is not brought as an obligation for that purpose], but are brought only because of the payment of a vow, a person may delay bringing them [and there is concern that ultimately he will not have enough left to purchase them. Tosafot, Rosh Hashana 6a.] Therefore,

property is taken as collateral from them, even though

the sin

is not atoned

for him until he becomes willing

to bring the offering,

as it is stated “

he shall offer it

willingly

before the Lord.” If so, taking collateral by force will not help in the case of a burnt-offering or peace-offering. Nevertheless,

he is coerced until he says, “I am willing,”

and it is again called “willingly.”

And similarly you say with regard to bills of divorce,

which require the husband’s willingness; nevertheless,

he is coerced until he says, “I am willing,”

and this is considered willingness on his part.

Gemara:

Rav Pappa said: Sometimes those liable for sin-offerings are taken as collateral from them,

and sometimes

those liable for burnt-offerings are not taken as collateral from them.

And he explains it: There are times when

those liable for sin-offerings are taken as collateral from them,

when the offerings do not come for atonement, such as

the sin-offering of a

Nazirite [(

A Nazirite brings three offerings on the day his term of naziriteship is completed: a sin-offering, a burnt-offering, and a peace-offering. He shaves on account of them, and afterward is permitted to drink wine.)]

For since the master said

that although, ideally, the Nazirite shaves only after all his offerings have been brought,

if he shaved on account of one of the three, he has fulfilled

the obligation of shaving after the fact,

and if one of the bloods was sprinkled for him [(

meaning that he brought only one of his offerings)],

the Nazirite is permitted to drink wine and become impure through contact with the dead,

and they derive this in the Sifrei from the verse, “Afterward the Nazirite may drink wine”—after a single act.

It follows that the sin-offering does not prevent him from achieving his status, since in the case of a burnt-offering or peace-offering one of them is sufficient to permit him. Therefore, property is taken as collateral for this, because there is concern that perhaps

he will act negligently regarding it and will not bring it.

And there are times

when those liable for burnt-offerings are not taken as collateral from them,

when the offering is an impediment to atonement, such as

the burnt-offering of a woman after childbirth,

which prevents her from eating sacrificial food and entering the Temple. Therefore, property is not taken as collateral for this, since she will certainly not delay bringing it.

And he challenges this:

What is this?

That is, why did you say that her burnt-offering is an impediment? The sin-offering alone already permits her to eat sacrificial food. And if you say it is because

the verse mentioned it first

with regard to the burnt-offering, as it is written, “You shall bring a year-old lamb as a burnt-offering and a pigeon or dove as a sin-offering,” it follows that the burnt-offering also prevents her, since she cannot bring the sin-offering until she brings the burnt-offering.

But Rava said: Only for its reading

alone

did the verse mention it first

with regard to the burnt-offering: It is to be read first, not offered first; rather, the sin-offering precedes it. The sin-offering alone permits her to eat sacrificial food, and therefore there is concern that she will act negligently regarding her burnt-offering, so property should be taken as collateral for it.

Rather,

Rav Pappa’s ruling applies

to the burnt-offering of one afflicted with leprosy. For it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, says: Just as his sin-offering and guilt-offering prevent him

from eating sacrificial food,

so too his burnt-offering prevents him.

Therefore, property is not taken as collateral for it, because there is no concern that he will delay bringing it.

We learned in the Mishna:

“And although he does not attain atonement until he becomes willing, and so on.”

The Sages taught: “He shall offer it” teaches that they coerce

him. One might have thought that this means against his will; the verse states, “willingly.” How is this possible?

These statements appear contradictory. Rather,

they coerce him until he says, “I am willing.”

And it is explained in Kiddushin 50a that even if he does not want it in his heart, matters concealed in the heart are not considered legally significant. Alternatively, the reason is that it is clear to us that, even in his heart, he is pleased to attain atonement. Similarly, in the case of bills of divorce, he is pleased to heed the words of the Sages, who obligate him to divorce his wife.

Shmuel said: A burnt-offering requires the awareness of

the person attaining atonement,

as it is stated: “Willingly.”

And we object:

What does this come to teach us?

But

we already learned: “Although he does not attain atonement until he becomes willing, as it is stated: ‘Willingly.’”

And we answer:

It is necessary

for Shmuel only in a case

where another person designated an offering for him

from his own property for his atonement. Shmuel teaches that he must notify the person attaining atonement.

Lest you say: When awareness is required,

that is, that he must say, “I am willing,” this applies only when the court takes collateral from him

from his own property, but

when an offering was designated for him

from another person’s property,

we assume that he is certainly pleased with it

and

there is no need to ask him about it [(

because one may act to a person’s benefit in his absence)], this comes to teach us

that it is not considered a benefit. This is because

there are times

when he is not pleased to attain atonement with something that does not belong to him,

as he wishes to perform the mitzva with his own money. Therefore, if he was not informed and did not express his willingness, it is not considered “willingly” .