Arakhin 21b (כא:) — the Talmud in English

One who says:

“The sin-offering and guilt-offering of so-and-so are upon me”

to bring them, if he sacrifices them

with the knowledge

of the one attaining atonement,

that person has fulfilled

his obligation of atonement. But if he sacrifices it

without the knowledge

of the one attaining atonement,

he has not fulfilled it.

And if he said:

“The burnt-offering and peace-offerings of so-and-so are upon me,”

for he has come to relieve his fellow of the obligation of the vow that he made concerning a burnt-offering and peace-offerings],

whether

he sacrificed it

with the knowledge

of his fellow

or without the knowledge

of his fellow,

his fellow has fulfilled

his vow. This is difficult for Shmuel, who said that a burnt-offering requires knowledge.

And we answer:

Shmuel can say to you: When that teaching was taught

that he fulfilled his obligation, it was referring to a case in which

at the time of attaining atonement

it was without his knowledge, but the designation had been made with his knowledge. Since

he was favorably disposed at the time of designation,

surely he is also favorably disposed toward it now. [And in the case of a sin-offering and a guilt-offering, even if the designation was made with his knowledge, he does not attain atonement without his knowledge. Perhaps he does not consent to its being sacrificed by his fellow, since he thereby loses the mitzva of semikha. But in the case of a burnt-offering, he does not mind this, since it does not come to atone for a sin (Tosafot)].

When I said

that the knowledge of the one attaining atonement is required,

I meant at the time of designation.

I said.

And it disagrees:

Shmuel

with Ulla. As Ulla said: They did not distinguish between a sin-offering and a burnt-offering; rather, a sin-offering requires knowledge at the time of designation

when one’s fellow designates it on his behalf, and without this knowledge it is not consecrated,

whereas a burnt-offering does not require knowledge at the time of designation. [A sin-offering comes to provide atonement, and Ulla holds that a person is not favorably disposed toward atonement that is not his. But a burnt-offering does not come to atone for a sin, and he does not mind this. Tosafot.]

But at the time of attaining atonement, in both cases, with knowledge

of the one attaining atonement

he fulfills his obligation; without knowledge, he does not fulfill it. [In both cases, it is possible that he is not favorably disposed toward it, because he wishes to fulfill the mitzva of semikha. Tosafot.]

One who says:

‘The sin-offering, guilt-offering, burnt-offering, and peace-offerings of so-and-so are upon me—with knowledge he fulfills his obligation; without knowledge he does not fulfill it’.”

This contradicts the first beraita, which distinguishes between a sin-offering and a guilt-offering on the one hand and a burnt-offering and peace-offerings on the other, in this regard.

And we answer:

Shmuel establishes

this beraita

as referring to the time of designation, when knowledge is required in all cases, because perhaps he is not favorably disposed toward attaining atonement through something that is not his. The first beraita, which distinguishes between them, refers to the time of attaining atonement, as explained.

And Ulla establishes

this beraita

as referring to the time of attaining atonement, when knowledge is required in all cases because of semikha; and the earlier beraita refers to the time of designation.

Rav Pappa said:

These

two teachings do not contradict one another. This one refers to the time of attaining atonement, and that one to the time of designation,

as we explained.

And as for the amoraim as well,

according to both of them

there is no difficulty. Shmuel establishes the first [teaching] as referring to the time of attaining atonement and the latter as referring to the time of designation, whereas Ulla establishes them in the opposite manner. The amoraim [Shmuel and Ulla]

certainly disagree.

Shmuel holds that a burnt-offering requires knowledge at the time of designation but not at the time of attaining atonement, whereas Ulla holds the opposite.

And we challenge this:

It is obvious;

what is Rav Pappa teaching us?

And we answer:

It might enter your mind to say: What does Shmuel mean when he says “the time of designation”

at which knowledge is required for a burnt-offering?

He means even at the time of designation,

and all the more so knowledge is required at the time of attaining atonement, in which he agrees with Ulla.

And although, if

we say this,

this

first

beraita

would remain a refutation

of his view,

baraitha

it would remain

against his position.

Rav Pappa teaches us

that this is not so; rather, according to Shmuel, knowledge is required specifically at the time of designation, and the beraita is compatible with his view as well.

We learned in the Mishna:

And similarly, in the case of bills of divorce, they compel him

until he says, “I am willing.”

Rav Sheshet said: One who delivers a declaration nullifying a bill of divorce

before divorcing with it [saying: “The bill of divorce that I am writing for my wife is null.” Rambam, chapter 6 of the Laws of Divorce],

his declaration is a valid declaration,

and it is effective to invalidate the bill of divorce.

And he asks:

It is obvious

that it is not a valid bill of divorce, since he made his intention known that he does not desire the divorce.

And we answer:

It is necessary

to teach this only in a case

where he was compelled [by the court after making the declaration],

and he consented

to divorce, and gave the bill of divorce.

It might enter your mind to say that since he consented after the court compelled him, surely

he nullified the declaration.

Rav Sheshet teaches us

that this does not constitute nullification of the declaration until he explicitly nullifies it.

And he deduces this from the Mishna:

If so,

if this is considered nullification,

let it teach

in the Mishna: “They compel him

until he gives it,”

and it would be obvious that if he gave it, he certainly consented.

What is the meaning of “until he says

‘I am willing’”? Rather, it is because we are concerned that perhaps he delivered

a declaration. Therefore, they compel him

until

he says

that he nullifies his declaration, meaning that he says, “I am willing,” and through this statement he retracts what he initially made known—that he does not desire the divorce. We shall return to you, chapter “One Who Says: My Valuations”

until

he says

that he nullifies his declaration—that is, he says, “I am willing,” and by saying this he retracts what he initially declared: that he did not want the divorce.

that is, he says, “I am willing,” and with this statement he retracts what he initially revealed—that he does not wish to divorce.

We have completed the chapter “One Who Says: My Valuation Is Upon Me.”

Mishna:

Appraisal of orphans’ property

When the court must sell property belonging to orphans in order to collect from a creditor, they must appraise the value of the property and announce: “Whoever wishes to purchase, let him come and purchase!” This is so that people will hear and come to purchase, and each person will raise the price over that offered by the other for the property. And if they do not find anyone who offers more than the court’s appraisal, they give the property to the creditor according to the court’s appraisal [according to most of the Rishonim]. And they announce it for

thirty days. And the appraisal of consecrated property

when the treasurer sells land belonging to hekdesh, the period of the announcement is

sixty days.

And they announce

both in the case of orphans and in the case of consecrated property

in the morning and in the evening.

Gemara:

What is different about the morning and the evening?

And we explain:

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said:

They announce in the evening, because it is

the time when workers are released

by the homeowner from their work to their homes.

And

they announce in the morning, because it is

the time when workers are brought in

to their work.

And we explain: The reason that they announce in the evening,

at the time when workers are released,

is:

there is

a homeowner

who would like to buy

[who wants to purchase], and since his workers are with him,

he says to them

[he will say to them]

to the workers: “Go and inspect it for me”

[go and look at the land for me] to determine whether it is worthwhile to purchase. They will report back to him the next day, when they are with him at his work. And the reason they announce in the morning,

at the time when workers are brought in

to work, is: So that

he will remember that he said to them

[that the homeowner told his workers] to inspect the field, and

he will go and ask them

[he will go and ask his workers] whether it is worthwhile.

And we support this:

It was taught likewise in a beraita: The appraisal of orphans’ property is for thirty days, and the appraisal of consecrated property is for sixty days,

and

they announce in the morning and in the evening, at the time when workers are released

from their work to their homes,

and at the time when workers are brought in

to their work.

And how do they make the announcement?

The announcer says

:

“A certain field, by its identifying features”

[whose identifying features are] such and such,

“and by its boundaries”

[and whose boundaries are] here and there,

“such

and such

is its yield”

for producing crops, and

“such and such is its appraisal”

[it was appraised] by the court;

“whoever wishes

to purchase, let him come and purchase.”

And this land is being sold

on the condition that the woman be given

the money that will be paid

for her ketuba, and to the creditor

[or to a creditor]

for his debt,

as applicable.

And we challenge this:

Why must

the announcer

say

in his announcement:

“on the condition that the woman be given

her ketuba and the creditor

his debt”

? What concern is it of the purchasers for what purpose the property is being sold?!

And we explain: It is because

there is

a purchaser

who prefers

specifically

a creditor

for whom the property is being sold to satisfy a debt,

because he is lenient with coins

that he accepts as payment for the land even broken or deficient coins, which merchants do not accept — as they are the creditors—are particular about this.

And there is—

on the other hand—

a purchaser

who prefers

specifically

a woman, because she takes

the money little by little

[in small amounts], as she does not need all the money at once. Since she does not know how to engage in business with money, and needs it only for expenditures, she does not mind if she is not paid all at once [Ran].