Arakhin 20b — the Talmud in English

4

You might have said: Since they had not yet assessed him,

the one bound by the vow during the lifetime of the one who made the vow had not yet become obligated until he died,

and the assets had not become encumbered; it teaches us

that once he stood in judgment, his obligation had already taken effect,

and his assets had become encumbered

even before the assessment.

And the assessment is merely disclosure of the matter,

to clarify his obligation. And since the one bound by the vow is alive, they assess him now.

Mishna:

One who says:

“This ox is a burnt-offering, and this house is a sacrificial offering.” [

That is, consecration for the repair of the Temple],

and the ox died or the house collapsed, he is exempt from paying,

for the person did not obligate himself in anything, and sanctity took effect only upon the body of the ox and the house. [And this is a “donation” and not a “vow”].

But if he said:

“This ox is a burnt-offering upon me, and this house is a sacrificial offering upon me,” and the ox died or the house collapsed, he is obligated to pay

their value. For this is an obligation upon the person, and it is the law of a vow, since he said that their obligation is “upon me.”

Gemara:

Rav Hiyya bar Rav said: They taught

in the latter clause of the Mishna, that he is obligated to pay,

only

in a case

where he said, “The value of”

“this ox is a burnt-offering upon me,”

for then he obligated himself with regard to its value, and even if the ox died, since he did not become obligated with regard to a particular amount of money.

But if he said, “This ox is a burnt-offering upon me,” since he said

ox

this

and did not mention its value,

if it dies, he is not obligated for its responsibility.

For he intended only the consecration of this ox, and when he said

“upon me”

he did not come to obligate himself with regard to its value, but “upon me” means that he must trouble himself

and bring it

to the Temple ,

he said.

He raised an objection: “

One who says

‘This ox is a burnt-offering’: the ox is consecrated, and one commits misuse with it; if it dies or is stolen, he is not obligated for its responsibility.

It is the law of a donation. Only the ox is sacred, and he did not obligate himself in anything.

And if he said

‘This ox is a burnt-offering upon me’: the ox is consecrated, and one commits misuse with it,

for here too, sanctity takes effect in its body. But this is what the addition of “upon me” accomplishes: if

it dies or is stolen, he is obligated for its responsibility.

For a monetary obligation also takes effect upon the person, and this is not in accordance with Rav Hiyya.

And we answer:

Is it stronger

than this beraita

than the Mishna that we established

it

as saying, “The value of”

“this ox is a burnt-offering upon me”?

Here too

we will interpret the beraita

as saying, “The value of”?

And we refute: And how is it possible to interpret the beraita in this way?

But since the latter clause

of the beraita speaks

of one who says, “The value of

the ox,”

it follows that the first clause

speaks

of one who did not say, “The value of,” for the latter clause teaches: “The value of this ox is a burnt-offering upon me; the ox is nonconsecrated, and one does not commit misuse with it.”

For he did not consecrate its body, but obligated himself to give its value when it would be sold. And if

the ox died or was stolen, he is not obligated for its responsibility.

For it did not come to be sold, and its money did not come into his possession.

But

if he sold the ox and the money had already become consecrated, and afterward the money was lost ,

he is obligated for the responsibility of its value.

For this is what the statement “upon me” accomplishes: to obligate himself in its responsibility.

In any event, it is proven from this that the first clause, which states that the body of the ox is sacred, speaks of one who says, “This ox is upon me,” and did not mention “its value.” And nevertheless he is obligated for its responsibility, and once again this is difficult for Rav Hiyya.

And we answer: In truth,

the first clause and the latter clause

speak

of one who says, “The value of.”

But they concern two different formulations.

The first clause

speaks

of one who said, “The ox shall be consecrated for its value,”

which implies two things: both that he consecrates the body of the ox immediately and that he accepts responsibility for its value, since he said “upon me.” [And he need not say this wording explicitly; rather, even when he says, “The value of this ox is a burnt-offering upon me,” we interpret his speech in this way. Tosafot].

And the latter clause

speaks

of one who says, “When its value comes, it shall become consecrated,”

so that nothing takes effect upon the body of the ox, and he applies sanctity only to the money that will come into his possession after the sale of the ox. Therefore the ox is nonconsecrated, and he is not obligated for its responsibility; he is obligated only for the responsibility of its value if the money is lost.

And we ask: In such a manner, does consecration take effect upon the money?

But a person cannot consecrate something that does not yet exist 30.

Before the sale, the money is as though it does not exist, since it is not yet his.

And we answer:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: Whose opinion is this? It is Rabbi Meir’s, who says that a person can consecrate something that does not yet exist,

and the consecration takes effect when it comes into existence.

There are those who state it as follows: Rav Pappa said to Abaye—and some say

others—that

Rami bar Hama

said

to Rav Hisda: In accordance with whom

does this beraita proceed?

In accordance with Rabbi Meir, who says that a person can consecrate something that does not yet exist.

He said to him:

Certainly this is so,

for otherwise, in accordance with whom

would you establish it? For it is impossible to establish it in accordance with the Rabbis, since money is something that does not yet exist.

And there are those who teach it

the statement of Rav Yehuda, Abaye, and Rami bar Hama, who established it in accordance with Rabbi Meir, not with regard to the preceding beraita but with regard to another matter.

With regard to this

which was taught:

One who rents a house to another, and it became afflicted with a lesion,

the house,

even though a koen declared it permanently impure,

so that its law is that it must be demolished, as long as it has not been demolished,

he says to him

the landlord:

“It is yours”

“before you,”

for the house that I rented to you still exists.

But if

he demolished it, he is obligated to provide him with another house.

For the fortune of the landlord [who was suspected of theft or stinginess] caused the impurity.