Arakhin 20b (כ:) — the Talmud in English

D.

You might have said: Since they did not appraise him

while the one obligated by the vow was still alive, he had not yet become obligated until he died,

and the debtor’s property had not become subject to the obligation; this

teaches us that since he had appeared in court, his obligation had already taken effect,

and his property had already become subject to the obligation

even before the appraisal.

And the appraisal is merely disclosure of the matter,

to clarify his obligation. And since the one obligated by the vow is alive, he is appraised now.

Mishna:

One who says:

“This ox is an olah offering, and this house is a korban offering,”

[that is, consecration for the maintenance of the Temple],

and the ox dies or the house collapses, he is exempt from payment,

because the person did not obligate himself in any way; rather, the sanctity applies to the ox and the house themselves. [And this is a nedava, a voluntary offering, and not a neder, a vow.]

But if he said:

“This ox is an olah offering upon me, and this house is a korban offering upon me,” and the ox died or the house collapsed, he is obligated to pay

their value. For this is an obligation upon the person, and it is the law of a neder, since he said that their obligation was “upon me.”

Gemara:

Rav Hiyya bar Rav said: They taught

in the latter clause of the Mishna, that he is obligated to pay,

only

in a case

where he said: “The value of

this ox is an olah offering upon me,”

in which case he obligated himself to pay its value, even if the ox died, since he had not obligated himself to a specific sum.

But if he said: “This ox is an olah offering upon me,” since he said

an ox

“this”

and did not mention its value,

if it dies, he is not responsible for it.

For he intended only to consecrate this ox, and when he said

“upon me,”

he did not come to obligate himself monetarily; rather, he meant that it was upon him to take the trouble

and bring it

to the Temple,

he said.

Meytivi: “

One who says

‘This ox is an olah offering,’ the ox is consecrated and one who derives benefit from it commits misuse of consecrated property; if it dies or is stolen, he is not responsible for it.

This is the law of a nedava: only the ox is sanctified, and he did not obligate himself in any way.

And if he said

‘This ox is an olah offering upon me, the ox is consecrated and one who derives benefit from it commits misuse of consecrated property,’

here too, sanctity takes effect in its body. But the addition of “upon me” serves this purpose: if

it dies or is stolen, he is responsible for it.

For a monetary obligation also takes effect upon the person, contrary to the statement of Rav Hiyya.

And we answer:

Is

this beraita

more authoritative than the Mishna, which we established

as referring to a case

where he said: “Its value is upon me”

—“the value of this ox is upon me”?

Here too

we will interpret the beraita

as referring to a case where he said: “Its value is upon me”?

And we challenge this: How can the beraita be interpreted in this manner?

But since the latter clause

of the beraita is speaking

of one who said: “The value of

the ox,”

it follows that the first clause

is speaking

of one who did not say: “Its value,” as the latter clause teaches: “The value of this ox is upon me as an olah offering; the ox is non-sacred, and no misuse of consecrated property is involved.

For he did not consecrate its body; rather, he obligated himself to give its value once it was sold. And if

the ox dies or is stolen, he is not responsible for it.

For it never reached the point of sale, and the money never came into his possession.

But

if he sold the ox and the money had already become consecrated, and afterward the money was lost,

he is responsible for the consecrated money.

For the statement “upon me” serves to obligate him to assume responsibility.

In any event, this proves that the first clause, which states that the body of the ox is consecrated, is speaking of one who says, “This ox is upon me,” without mentioning “its value.” Nevertheless, he is responsible for it, and this again presents a difficulty to Rav Hiyya.

And we answer: Actually,

the first clause and the latter clause

are speaking

of one who said: “Its value is upon me.”

However, they refer to two different formulations.

The first clause

is speaking

of one who said: “The ox shall be consecrated for its value,”

which implies two things: both that he immediately consecrates the body of the ox and that he assumes responsibility for its value, since he said “upon me.” [He need not explicitly use this precise wording; even if he says, “The value of this ox is upon me as an olah offering,” his statement is interpreted in this manner. Tosafot.]

And the latter clause

is speaking

of one who said: “When its value comes, it shall become consecrated,”

meaning that nothing takes effect upon the body of the ox. Rather, he imposes sanctity only upon the money that will come into his possession after the ox is sold. Therefore, the ox is non-sacred and he is not responsible for it; he is responsible only for its value if that money is lost.

And we ask: In such a case, does consecration take effect upon the money?

But a person cannot consecrate an object that has not yet come into the world 30.

Before the sale, the money is considered as not yet in existence, since it is not yet his.

And we answer:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: This is Rabbi Meir, who says that a person can consecrate an object that has not yet come into the world,

and the consecration takes effect when the money comes into existence.

Some say that Rav Pappa said to Abaye, and others say

that others

say that Rami bar Hama

said

to Rav Hisda: In accordance with whom

does this beraita proceed?

In accordance with Rabbi Meir, who says that a person can consecrate an object that has not yet come into the world.

He said to him:

That is certainly so;

otherwise, in accordance with whom

could you establish it? It cannot be established in accordance with the Rabbis, since the money is an object that has not yet come into the world.

And there are those who taught this

statement of Rav Yehuda, Abaye, and Rami bar Hama, who established it in accordance with Rabbi Meir, not with regard to the above beraita, but with regard to another matter.

With regard to this

as it is taught in a beraita:

One who rents a house to another and it becomes afflicted with leprosy,

the house,

even though a koen has declared it definitively impure,

so that it is to be demolished, as long as it has not yet been demolished,

the landlord says to him

—the landlord says—

“It is yours

before you,”

since the house that he rented to him still exists.

But if

he demolishes it, he is obligated to provide him with another house.

For the landlord’s misfortune [having been suspected of theft or of stinginess] caused the impurity.