Arakhin 20a — the Talmud in English

And furthermore he asks: if

he said, “My valuation is upon me,” and they did not assess him

still,

and he went back and said, “My valuation is upon me,” what is the law? Here, certainly, ![](pamud.bmp "

Exact page location")

we assess him one time

for his two vows,

or perhaps, since he vowed one after the other

and they are two vows,

we assess him two times.

For it is a scriptural decree that an assessment is required for each vow separately.

And furthermore he asks:

if you should say that since he vowed one after the other, we assess him two times,

there is still room for uncertainty: if

he said, “Two valuations are upon me,” at one time, what is the law? Here, certainly,

since

he vowed at one time, we assess him at one time

and it is considered one vow,

or perhaps, since he said, “Two

valuations are upon me,”

it is considered like one after the other,

and they are two vows, for which an assessment is required separately for each one.

And furthermore he asks:

if you should say that since he said “two,” it is considered like one after the other,

there is still room for uncertainty:

they assessed him on their own

at ten before he vowed, without any need, and afterward he said, “My valuation is upon me,”

what is the law?

Do we say: he has already been assessed on his own and stands so,

and he need not be assessed again,

or perhaps intent is required

for the sake of the vow

for the assessment,

and the first assessment, which was made without specification, is nothing. [And this question does not depend on all the questions above, and he could have asked it by itself. Tosafot].

And we say:

resolve from this,

the questions,

one,

namely the last question, that intent is required for the assessment.

For we learned:

one who says

“My valuation is upon me,” and dies

before they assessed him,

the heirs shall not give

his valuation,

for there are no valuations for the dead,

and it is impossible to assess him, and without an assessment the obligation does not take effect.

And if it should enter your mind that being assessed on his own is an assessment

and intent is not required,

then

every person

is assessable

and stands so,

at least according to a small amount.

Is there a person who is not worth

at least

four zuz?

And with that valuation, he has been assessed while alive, and the heirs should give it. Rather, necessarily, without intent it is not considered an assessment.

And we reject: this is not comparable.

When they assessed him on his own, he entered into an assessment,

and although there is no intent for the sake of a vow, there is an act of assessment here. But

“My valuation is upon me”

and he died,

he did not enter into an assessment,

and in practice he was not assessed even at four zuz before his death.

Mishna:

The valuation laws are more stringent than vows. How so? One who says, “My valuation is upon me,” and dies, the heirs shall give

his valuation. For an assessment is not needed for it, since the valuation is fixed in the Torah according to years and does not depend on value.

The opposite is the case with vows, for which an assessment is needed; they are lenient in this respect. If he said,

“My valuation is upon me,” and died, the heirs shall not give

his valuation, because it is impossible to assess him,

for there are no valuations for the dead 18 .

One who says

“The valuation of my hand and the valuation of my foot are upon me” has said nothing.

For the Torah did not establish a valuation for them. This is a leniency in valuation laws compared with vows, and as in the Mishna above.

But if he said

“The valuation of my head and the valuation of my liver are upon me, he gives the valuation

of the person

in its entirety.”

This is the general rule: an organ upon which the soul depends,

and he vowed its valuation,

he gives the valuation

of the body

in its entirety.

If he said

“Half my valuation is upon me, he gives half

of the fixed amount

of his valuation.”

For this is what he obligated himself.

But if he said

“The valuation of half of me is upon me, he gives the valuation in its entirety,”

because the half refers to the body and not to the valuation, and half his body is an organ upon which the soul depends.

And likewise concerning vows, if he said

“Half my valuation is upon me, he gives half its valuation.”

But if he said

“The valuation of half of me is upon me, he gives the valuation of the whole of him.”

For also concerning vows,

this is the general rule: an organ upon which the soul depends, he gives the valuation of the whole of him.

One who says, “The valuation of so-and-so is upon me,”

if

the one who vowed and the one whose valuation was vowed died, the heirs shall give

of the one who vowed the valuation of the one whose valuation was vowed, because a valuation does not require an assessment, as stated.

But if he said

“The valuation of so-and-so is upon me,”

if

the one who vowed died, the heirs shall give.

For the assessment depends on the one whose valuation was vowed, and he is alive. But if

the one whose valuation was vowed died, the heirs shall not give

of the one who vowed the valuation of the one whose valuation was vowed.

For there are no valuations for the dead.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: Vows are more stringent than valuation laws, for vows take effect upon an animal, a living creature, and a bird.

For if he said, “The valuation of this animal is upon me,” he gives its value. Because the primary obligation of vows depends on value, and anything that has a monetary value can be made subject to an obligation of its value.

And

there is another stringency of vows,

that they are not judged

by financial capacity

as stated concerning valuation laws. [If the one who vowed does not have the financial capacity to give the full amount of his valuation, he gives according to his financial capacity, which the koen assesses, and through this he is exempt. Even if he later becomes wealthy, he is not liable to complete his valuation.] And if he said, “My valuation is upon me,” and he does not have the financial capacity for that valuation, he gives what he has and completes it when he has it.

Unlike valuation laws,

which apply only to a person, and for other things the Torah did not establish a valuation. Valuations are also judged according to financial capacity.

Valuation laws are more stringent than vows. How so? If he said, “My valuation is upon me,” and died, the heirs shall give; “My valuation is upon me,” and he died, the heirs shall not give, for there are no valuations for the dead.

And we say: from the fact that it is written,

“If he said, ‘My valuation is upon me,’ and died, the heirs shall give,” infer from it

that

an oral loan is collected from the heirs,

because it too includes a lien on assets. But this law is stated as a dispute.

And we reject:

Here it is different, for it is a loan written in the Torah,

and its law is like a loan in a document, which certainly includes a lien on assets.

And we answer: if so,

infer from it that a loan written in the Torah is considered like one written in a document,

and this too is a dispute.

And we reject:

With what are we dealing here? When he stood

in judgment,

and his obligation was decided in court. A court ruling, according to everyone, is like a loan in a document and includes a lien on assets.

And he asks: if so,

in its equivalent case concerning “My valuation is upon me,”

the matter also concerns

one who stood in judgment,

and if so,

why shall the heirs not give,

for his obligation had already been decided and is like a court ruling?

And we answer: the Mishna is speaking of a case in which the court obligated him to pay, but they did not manage to assess him before he died.

“My valuation is upon me” lacks an assessment

and there is no assessment after death;

“My valuation is upon me” lacks neither anything nor anything,

and his obligation was already completed.

We learned in the Mishna:

“The valuation of my hand and the valuation of my foot are upon me”

has said nothing.

Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav: And he gives its value

of the hand and the foot.

And we challenge:

But it teaches, “has said nothing”!

And we answer:

“Has said nothing”

which the Mishna says applies

to the Rabbis,

who hold that one who declared a valuation concerning something that is not included in the laws of valuations has not brought anything into effect at all, not even as a valuation.

And what Rav Giddel said,

“and he gives its valuation,” is according to

the method of

Rabbi Meir,

who holds that a person does not utter his words in vain, and whenever he declared a valuation concerning something to which valuation laws do not apply, we assume that he intended it as a valuation. [Their dispute appears above, in the first chapter, concerning one who declares a valuation for a person less than one month old].

And we challenge:

He said it

Rav Giddel

one time,

for this is the position of Rabbi Meir,

as Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav: One who says, “The valuation of this utensil is upon me,” gives its value,

for we assess his intention as having completed his statement for the sake of valuations, according to Rabbi Meir’s reasoning.

And we answer: it is impossible to learn one from the other. For

lest you say: there, a person knows that there is no valuation for a utensil and completes his statement for the sake of valuations. But here

it is possible to assume

that he made a mistake, for he thought that just as there is “the valuation of my head” and “the valuation of my liver,” [A0279]as explained in the Mishna, that he gives the entire valuation,

[as explained in the Mishna, that he gives the valuation of the entire person,]

there is also “the valuation of my hand” and “the valuation of my foot,” but

as a

valuation he did not say. This teaches us

that here too we say that a person does not utter his words in vain.

We learned in the Mishna:

“The valuation of my head and the valuation of my liver—he gives the entire valuation.” What is the reason?”

“In your valuation of

persons,” the Merciful One said,

for it depends on the soul. And something upon which the soul depends is like the valuation of a person.

We learned in the Mishna:

“This is the general rule: an organ upon which the soul depends, and so on”—to include from the knee

and above .

For if he declared the valuation of the thigh, he gives the entire valuation. It too is included in this rule, for if it is removed, he is among the eighteen forms of tereifa.

We learned in the Mishna:

“Half my valuation is upon me—he gives half his valuation; the valuation of half of me is upon me—he gives the entire valuation. What is the reason? ‘Persons,’ the Merciful One said,

as above.

The Sages taught: “Half my valuation is upon me”—he gives half his valuation. Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda says: He is flogged, and gives a full valuation.

And we challenge:

He is flogged—for what reason?

And we answer:

Rav Pappa said:

this is his intention:

he is flogged

for being obligated

in a full valuation.

What is the reason

for his view?

A decree

of the Sages. And they decreed concerning

“half my valuation” on account of “the valuation of half of me,”

so that people would not confuse them.

“And ‘the valuation of half of me’”

according to the basic law, he gives the whole,

for it is something upon which the soul depends,

and people might err concerning it, saying that its law is like “half my valuation”; therefore they decreed.

We learned in the Mishna:

“Half my valuation is upon me—he gives the valuation of half of him; the valuation of half of me is upon me—he gives the valuation of the whole of him. What is the reason? ‘A vow according to your valuation of persons’ is written.”

And vows were compared with valuation laws in this matter.

We learned in the Mishna:

“This is the general rule: an organ upon which the soul depends, he gives

the valuation of the whole of him.

To include from the knee and above

also concerning vows.

The Sages taught: One who declares the valuation of half the value of a utensil—Rabbi Meir says he gives its value, and the Rabbis say he has said nothing,

for there is no valuation for a utensil; and Rabbi Meir follows his own position, that he completed his statement for the sake of valuations.

Rabba fell ill. He came to Abaye and the Rabbis, and they were sitting, and they said

about this beraita:

Granted, Rabbi Meir holds that a person does not utter his words in vain, whether

when he values a vessel

all of it, or whether

when he values

half of it.

And in both cases we assess that he intended it as a monetary value. And when he said “half of it,” [he meant] that even though it is not the way to donate half the value of a vessel, nevertheless he is liable. And all the more so when it is all of it.

But what do the Rabbis hold? If they hold that a person does utter his words in vain,

and he intended valuation and not money,

even

when he values a vessel

all of it as well

he has said nothing, so why did they say specifically “half of it”?

And if

they hold

that a person does not utter his words in vain, even “half of it” as well

let it be said that he completed his statement and said it as a monetary value, and why do they disagree with Rabbi Meir?

Rabba said to them: The Rabbis here hold like Rabbi Meir

in one matter,

and they hold

also

like Rabbi Shimon

in one matter.

They hold like Rabbi Meir, who says that a person does not utter his words in vain,

and therefore, when he values the entire vessel, all agree that he completed his statement and said it as a monetary value.

But when he values half of it, we do not say this, because

they hold like Rabbi Shimon, who says

in tractate Menachot: One who says, “It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal-offering of barley” [and it comes for a vow or a freewill offering only from wheat] is exempt, because

he did not make a donation in the manner of those who make donations.

And here too, it is not the customary manner.

For the whole

vessel

is the customary manner

of people

to donate, but half of it

is not the customary manner of donating.

Therefore he has said nothing.

We learned in the Mishna:

“One who says, ‘The valuation of so-and-so is upon me,’ and the one who makes the vow

and the one whose valuation was pledged

died, etc.” What is this?

That is to say, how is this speaking?

That he stood in judgment

before he died. For if not so, it is an oral loan, and one does not collect it from the heirs, as above.

And we raise an objection:

This is the same thing

as the opening clause, so why was it taught again?

And we answer:

The concluding clause

of the concluding clause

was necessary for him,

and because of this he stated the whole of it, as it is written:

“The monetary value of so-and-so is upon me, and the one who makes the vow died—the heirs shall give it.”

And this is a novelty.