Arakhin 20a (כ.) — the Talmud in English

And he further asks: If

he said, “My value is upon me,” but they did not assess him

yet,

and he then said again, “My value is upon me”—what is the law? Here, certainly

we assess him once

for his two vows,

or perhaps, since he vowed one after the other

and they are two vows,

we assess him twice.

For the Torah decree is that an assessment is required for each vow separately.

And he further asks:

If you say that since he vowed one after the other, we assess him twice,

there is still a question: If

he said, “Two values are upon me,” all at once—what is the law? Here, certainly,

since

he vowed them simultaneously, we assess him simultaneously,

and it is considered one vow,

or perhaps, since he said, “Two

values are upon me,”

it is equivalent to saying one after the other,

and they are two vows, each of which requires a separate assessment.

And he further asks:

If you say that since he said “two,” it is equivalent to saying one after the other,

there is still a question:

If they assessed him on their own

at ten before he vowed, without any need to do so, and afterward he said, “My value is upon me,”

what is the law?

Do we say that he has already been assessed on his own and remains so,

and there is no need to assess him again,

or perhaps intent is required

for the sake of the vow

for the assessment,

and the first assessment, which was made without a specific intent, is of no consequence? [This question is not dependent on any of the questions above and could have been asked independently. Tosafot].

And we say:

Resolve one

of the questions,

the first,

namely, the last question, and intent is required for an assessment.

As we learned:

With regard to one who says,

“My value is upon me,” and dies

before they assessed him,

the heirs shall not give

his value,

as there is no monetary value for the dead,

and it is impossible to assess him; without an assessment, the obligation does not take effect.

And if it enters your mind that an assessment made on his own is considered an assessment

and does not require intent,

then

every person

is assessable

and remains so,

at least for a minimal amount.

Is there a man who is not worth

at least

four zuz?

And with regard to that amount, he was in effect assessed while alive, and the heirs should give it. Rather, it must necessarily be that without intent, it is not considered an assessment.

And we reject this: This is not comparable.

When they assessed him on their own, he submitted to an assessment

and although there was no intent for the sake of a vow, there was an act of assessment. But when he said,

“My value is upon me,”

and died, he

did not submit to an assessment,

and he was not actually assessed even at four zuz before his death.

Mishna:

The valuation laws are more stringent than vows. How so? If one says, “My valuation is upon me,” and dies, the heirs shall give

his valuation. There is no need for an assessment, since the valuation is fixed in the Torah according to age and does not depend on monetary worth.

By contrast, vows require an assessment and are therefore more lenient in this regard. If he said,

“My value is upon me,” and died, the heirs shall not give

his monetary value, because it is impossible to assess him,

as there is no monetary value for the dead 18 .

If one says,

“The valuation of my hand or the valuation of my foot is upon me,” he has said nothing.]]

For the Torah did not assign a valuation to them. This is a leniency in the valuation laws compared with vows, as stated in the previous Mishna.

But if he said,

“The valuation of my head or the valuation of my liver is upon me, he gives the valuation

of the person

in its entirety.]]

This is the general rule: For something upon which the soul depends,

and he vowed its valuation,

he gives the valuation

of the

entire body.]]

If he said,

“Half of my valuation is upon me,” he gives half

of the sum fixed

for his valuation.

For that is what he obligated himself to pay.

But if he said,

“The valuation of half of me is upon me, he gives the valuation of the entire person,”

because “half” refers to the body and not to the valuation, and half of his body is something upon which the soul depends.

And likewise with vows: If he said,

“Half of my monetary value is upon me,” he gives half of his monetary value.]]

But if he said,

“The monetary value of half of me is upon me, he gives the monetary value of the entire person.]]

For with vows as well,

this is the general rule: For something upon which the soul depends, he gives the monetary value of the entire person.]]

If one says, “The valuation of so-and-so is upon me,”

and

the one who vowed and the one whose valuation was vowed both die, the heirs shall give

of the one who vowed the monetary value of the one whose valuation was vowed, since a valuation does not require an assessment, as stated.

But if he said,

“The monetary value of so-and-so is upon me,”

and

the one who vowed dies, the heirs shall give

because the assessment depends on the one whose monetary value was vowed, and he is alive. But if

the one whose monetary value was vowed dies, the heirs shall not give

of the one who vowed the monetary value of the one whose value was vowed,

as there is no monetary value for the dead.]]

Gemara:

The Sages taught: Vows are more stringent than valuations, as vows take effect with regard to domesticated animals, wild animals, and birds.]]

For if he says, “The monetary value of this animal is upon me,” he gives its value. This is because the essential obligation of vows depends on monetary worth, and anything that has a monetary value can be the subject of an obligation to pay its value.

And

vows are further more stringent

in that they are not judged

according to payment according to one’s means

as stated with regard to valuations. [If the one who vowed does not have sufficient means to give the full valuation, he gives according to his means, as assessed for him by the kohen, and thereby fulfills his obligation. Even if he later becomes wealthy, he is not required to complete the valuation.] If he says, “My monetary value is upon me,” and he does not have sufficient means to pay that amount, he gives whatever he has and completes the payment when he has the means.

By contrast, valuations

apply only to a person, and the Torah did not assign valuations to other things. Valuations are also subject to payment according to one’s means.

The valuation laws are more stringent than vows. How so? If he says, “My valuation is upon me,” and dies, the heirs shall give it; if he says, “My monetary value is upon me,” and dies, the heirs shall not give it, as there is no monetary value for the dead.]]

And we say: From the fact that it is written,

“He says, ‘My valuation is upon me,’ and dies; the heirs shall give it”—learn from this

that

an oral loan is collected from the heirs,

because it too creates a lien on property. Yet this law is subject to a dispute.

And we reject this:

Here it is different, because it is a loan written in the Torah,

and its law is like that of a loan documented in a deed, which certainly creates a lien on property.

And we respond: If so,

learn from this that a loan written in the Torah is like one documented in a deed,

and this too is subject to a dispute.

And we reject this:

With what are we dealing here? With a case in which he appeared

before the court

and his obligation was adjudicated by the court. A court judgment is universally regarded as a loan documented in a deed and creates a lien on property.

And he asks: If so,

in an analogous case concerning “My monetary value is upon me,”

we are also dealing

with a case in which he appeared before the court,

and if so,

why shall the heirs not give it?

His obligation was already adjudicated, and it is like a court judgment.

And we answer: The Mishna is dealing with a case in which the court obligated him to pay, but did not manage to assess him before he died.

“My monetary value is upon me” lacks an assessment,

and no assessment can be made after death.

“My valuation is upon me” lacks neither anything nor anything else,

and his obligation was already complete.

We learned in the Mishna:

“The valuation of my hand or the valuation of my foot is upon me”

—he has said nothing.

Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav: And he gives its monetary value

for the hand or foot.

And we challenge this:

But does it not state: “He has said nothing”?

And we answer:

“He has said nothing”

is what the Mishna says according to

the Rabbis,

who hold that when one assigns a valuation to something that is not subject to the laws of valuations, the obligation does not take effect at all, not even as a monetary-value vow.

But what Rav Giddel said,

“And he gives its monetary value,”

was stated according to the view of

Rabbi Meir,

who holds that a person does not utter his words in vain. Whenever one assigns a valuation to something that is not subject to the laws of valuations, we assume that he intended a monetary-value vow. [Their dispute appears above, in the first chapter, concerning one who assigns a valuation to a child less than one month old].

And we challenge this:

Rav Giddel

already said

once

that this is the law according to Rabbi Meir,

as Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav: One who says, “The valuation of this vessel is upon me,” gives its monetary value,

since we assess his intention as having concluded his statement with the intent of a monetary-value vow, in accordance with Rabbi Meir’s reasoning.

And we answer: One cannot be learned from the other.

For it might enter your mind to say that there, a person knows that a vessel has no valuation and concludes his statement with the intent of a monetary-value vow. But here,

it is possible to assume

that he made a mistake, thinking that just as there is a valuation for my head and a valuation for my liver,

[as explained in the Mishna, that he gives the entire valuation,]

there is also a valuation for my hand and my foot; but

he did not say this as a

monetary-value vow. This teaches us

that here too we say that a person does not utter his words in vain.

We learned in the Mishna:

“The valuation of my head or the valuation of my liver is upon me; he gives the entire valuation.” What is the reason?

“In accordance with your valuation of

persons,” the Merciful One said,

indicating that it depends on the soul. Something upon which the soul depends is equivalent to the valuation of the person.

We learned in the Mishna:

“This is the general rule: Something upon which the soul depends, and so forth”—this comes to include from the knee joint

and above .

If he assigned a valuation to the thigh, he gives the entire valuation, as it too falls under this general rule: If it is removed, the person is one of the eighteen cases of terefa.

We learned in the Mishna:

“Half of my valuation is upon me; he gives half his valuation. ‘The valuation of half of me is upon me’; he gives the entire valuation. What is the reason? The Merciful One said ‘persons,’

as above.

The Sages taught: If one says, “Half of my valuation is upon me,” he gives half his valuation. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: He receives lashes, and gives the full valuation.]]

And we challenge this:

Why does he receive lashes?

And we answer:

Rav Pappa said:

This is his meaning: He

receives lashes

[and becomes liable]

for the full valuation.

What is his reason

for this?

It is a decree

of the Sages. They decreed with regard to

“half of my valuation” because of “the valuation of half of me,”

so that people would not confuse them.

“The valuation of half of me”

by Torah law requires him to give the entire valuation,

as it is something upon which the soul depends,

and people might err and think that its law is like that of “half of my valuation”; therefore, they issued a decree.

We learned in the Mishna:

“Half of my monetary value is upon me; he gives the monetary value of half of him. The monetary value of half of me is upon me; he gives the monetary value of the entire person. What is the reason? ‘When one vows, it is according to the valuation of persons,’ is written.]]

The laws of vows were equated with those of valuations in this matter.

We learned in the Mishna:

“This is the general rule: Something upon which the soul depends, he gives

the monetary value of the entire person.”

This comes to include from the knee joint and above

even with regard to vows.

The Sages taught: If one assigns half the valuation of a vessel, Rabbi Meir says he gives its monetary value, while the Rabbis say he has said nothing,

since a vessel has no valuation; and Rabbi Meir follows his own reasoning, that he concluded his statement with the intent of a monetary-value vow.

Rabba fell ill. He went to Abaye and the Rabbis and sat with them, and they were saying

about this beraita:

Granted, Rabbi Meir holds that a person does not utter his words in vain, whether

when he declares the value of an entire vessel

or whether

when he declares the value of

half of it.

In both cases, we assess that he intended to donate its monetary value. And when he spoke of half, he said that even though it is not customary to donate half the value of a vessel, nevertheless he is liable. And all the more so when he spoke of the entire vessel.

But what do the Rabbis hold? If they hold that a person does utter his words in vain,

and he intended a valuation and not monetary value,

even

when he declares the value of an entire vessel

as well

he has said nothing. Why, then, did they say that the case of half is specifically different?

And if

they hold

that a person does not utter his words in vain, even in the case of half as well,

we should say that he completed his statement intending its monetary value. Why, then, do they disagree with Rabbi Meir?

Rabba said to them: The Rabbis here hold like Rabbi Meir

in one respect,

and they hold

also

like Rabbi Shimon

in one respect.

They hold like Rabbi Meir, who says that a person does not utter his words in vain,

and therefore, when he declares the value of the entire vessel, everyone agrees that he completed his statement intending its monetary value.

But when he declares the value of half of it, we do not say this, because

they hold like Rabbi Shimon, who says

with regard to menahot: One who says, “It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal-offering of barley” [and a meal-offering brought as a vow or donation comes only from wheat] is exempt, because

he did not donate in the customary manner.

Here, too, this is not the customary manner.

The entire

vessel

is the customary manner

of people

to donate, whereas half of it

is not the customary manner of donating.

Therefore, he has said nothing.

We learned in the Mishna:

“One who says, ‘The valuation of so-and-so is incumbent upon me,’ and the one who made the vow

and the one whose valuation was vowed

and so on.” What is this referring to?

That is, what are the circumstances?

He stood in court

before he died. For if this were not so, it would be an oral loan, and one cannot collect it from the heirs, as stated above.

And we raise an objection:

This is the same thing

as the first clause, so why was it taught again?

And we answer:

The latter clause

of the latter clause

was necessary for him,

and for that reason he stated the entire passage. For it is written:

“The monetary value of so-and-so is incumbent upon me, and the one who made the vow died; the heirs shall give it.”

And this is a novel point.