Arakhin 19b — the Talmud in English

One who says

“My width”

is upon me,

what is the law?

Does it mean that the length of the rod should be according to the measure of his width, or does it mean that it should be thick according to his width?

One who says

“My sitting”

is upon me,

what is the law?

Does it mean a rod of the measure of his height when he is sitting, or does it mean one as long as the measure of the width of his seat? [Shita Mekubetzet]

One who says

“My circumference”

is upon me,

what is the law?

Does he give a thin rod that bends and is as long as the measure of his circumference, or must he give a thick rod, as thick as his circumference and as long as his height?

And all these dilemmas remained

unresolved.

We learned in the Mishna:

“The weight of my hand is upon me, etc.”

The Sages taught:

One who says

“The weight of my hand and the weight of my foot are upon me, Rabbi Yehuda says: He brings a barrel, fills it with water, and inserts

his hand and foot.

For the hand—

he inserts it

up to the upper arm

[the elbow], for up to there it is called a hand.

And for the foot—

up to the knee,

and from there upward it is not a foot but a thigh.

And he weighs

donkey flesh, sinews, and bones, and places it into it until it is filled. And although there is no proof for the matter

that human flesh and donkey flesh are equal in their weight,

there is an allusion to the matter

in Scripture.

As it says: “Whose flesh is the flesh of donkeys.”

Rabbi Yosei said to him: How is it possible to determine

precisely the measure of

flesh

of a donkey

corresponding to

the measure of

flesh

that is in the hand,

sinews corresponding to sinews, bones corresponding to bones?

Rabbi Yehuda said to him: They estimate

what their measure is.

Rabbi Yosei said to him: Since in any event we rely on an estimation,

why not

until they measure the flesh, sinews, and bones, let them measure the hand

how much it weighs? Why did you require weighing?

And Rabbi Yehuda

holds:

As much as possible, we do

precisely; only regarding the measure of the flesh and bones, where it is impossible to perform a measurement, do we rely on an estimation.

We learned:

For the hand, up to the upper arm,

the elbow, for up to there it is called a hand.

And we juxtapose a contradiction: The sanctification of the hands and feet

of the priests

in the Temple is up to the joint

of the connection between the palm and the forearm. Thus, it is not called a hand except for the palm alone, for the verse says, “And they shall wash their hands and their feet.”

And we answer: In the language of

the Torah, up to the joint

it is [called a hand], but

regarding vows,

which depend on the intention of the one who vows,

follow the language of people,

and among them up to the elbow is called a hand.

And we challenge:

And

a hand, in the language of

the Torah, is it up to the joint

?

But regarding phylacteries, it is written

“And you shall bind them as a sign upon

your hand,” and the school of Menashe taught: “‘Your hand’—this is the biceps,”

where the phylacteries are placed.

And we answer:

In the Torah,

up to

the biceps,

the entire forearm

all of it

is called a hand, and even above the elbow.

Regarding vows

follow the language of people,

for up to the elbow it is called a hand.

And the sanctification of the hands and feet in the Temple,

where it is only up to the joint, is not learned from the meaning of “hand”; rather,

it is a received halakhic tradition

that only the palm is liable.

We learned:

For the foot, up to the knee

[the knee]. From there onward it is not a foot but a thigh.

And we juxtapose a contradiction: It is stated in the Mishna regarding the obligation of appearing [in the Temple],

“

feet”—

excluding those with artificial legs,

who are exempt. For one whose foot was amputated and whose lower leg is placed inside an artificial leg is considered to have no foot. Thus, it is not called a foot except up to the first joint, which is the ankle.

And we answer: With regard to the wording

of Torah law, until the first joint the limb is called a foot, and therefore they exclude

those included in the phrase

“except for those with wooden legs”; with regard to vows, one follows ordinary human usage, and the entire lower leg is called a foot.

and the entire lower leg is called a foot.

We challenge this:

And according to Torah law, “except for those with wooden legs,” does only the sole count as a foot?

Is only the sole considered a foot?

But concerning the rite of chalitza, it is written, “

and she shall remove his shoe from

his foot,” and it was taught in a beraita, a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna: If she performed chalitza for a man whose foot had been amputated but some of it remained

and remained

from the knee downward, her chalitza is valid. Thus, the foot is considered to include even the part above the first joint.

Thus, it is considered a foot even above the first joint.

And we answer:

There it is different, as the verse says, “

and she shall remove it

from above his foot, and not literally from his foot; the area up to the knee is considered “above the foot.”

and not literally from his foot; and up to the knee, this is considered “above the foot.”

We challenge this:

If so, since the word “his foot” is unnecessary,

even

above the knee as well should be valid, since that too is above the foot.

it should be valid, since that too is above the foot.

And we answer:

“Above” is written, meaning the lower leg, which is one joint above the foot.

is written, and this refers to the lower leg, which is one joint above the foot,

And

not above the knee, because that area is already

above the “above” of the foot.

the foot.

Rav Pappa said: Conclude from this beraita, which says that if some of the limb remained from the knee downward, her chalitza is valid,

that

this ankle joint

[the ankle]

extends down to the ground,

so that from it downward there is no additional joint and it is all one part.

For if it enters your mind that it is divided

from it downward by another joint,

the ankle would be “above”

the foot, since it would already be the second joint from below,

and the lower leg would be “above the above,”

since it would be above the second joint.

Rav Ashi said: Even if you say

that from the ankle downward

it is divided

by an additional joint, there is still no difficulty.

Anything that is alongside the leg is considered like the leg.

The area up to the ankle is considered a foot because it is level with and opposite the sole. Therefore, the lower leg is called “above his foot.”

Mishna:

One who says

“The monetary value of my hand is upon me,”

thereby obligating himself to give the Temple treasury the monetary value of his hand,

is assessed for how much he would be worth

if sold as a slave

and with a hand, and how much he would be worth without a hand.

The difference is the value of his hand that he obligated himself to give.

This

law

is

a stringency with regard to vows,

meaning that one who obligates himself with the wording “the monetary value

of” differs from the laws of valuations,

where he says the wording “the valuation.” He is exempt with regard to the valuation of his hand, because that does not depend on its monetary worth, but on the fixed valuation prescribed by the Torah; and we find a prescribed valuation only for a person as a whole.

Gemara, the Talmudic discussion of the Mishna:

We ask about this:

How do we assess him?

Rava said: We assess him using the assessment used for damages.

That is, one assesses a person whose fellow amputated his hand. He is assessed as a slave sold in the marketplace: how much he was worth beforehand and how much he is worth now, and the difference is paid. Here too, this vow is according to that measure this is the vow.

Abaye said to him: Are

damages and a vow comparable?

There,

with regard to damages, since his hand was ultimately amputated, even his assessed value before the amputation is lower, because now

he is a devalued person.

But

here,

in the assessment for a vow,

he is an intact person.

For he has not actually suffered a loss. There is a substantial difference between what he is worth now, while whole, and what he would be worth if he were missing the hand. [Thus explained Rashi. But Tosafot, a collection of the commentaries of the Tosafists,

wondered at his explanation and interpreted the matter in the opposite way: the assessment for damages is greater. Besides the loss of the hand, there is also the person’s devaluation caused by the amputation. Here, however, one assesses only the loss of the hand and nothing more.]

Rather, Abaye said: We assess how much a person would wish to pay for a slave who performs work with one hand,

and how much he would pay

for one who works with both hands.

He shall give the difference between them.

And we explain: The one who performs work

with one hand,

as Abaye said,

what exactly does this mean?

That is, why is he fit for work with only one hand? If it is because

the other hand

hand is

has been severed [a hand that has been amputated],

(amputated),

that is the same as the assessment for damages stated by Rava,

because he is a devalued person.

Rather,

because

his

other hand

is pledged to his first master,

and he did not sell it to a second master. Thus, he is an intact person. The difference between this slave and one sold with the use of both hands is the full monetary value of the hand.

Rava raised a question:

If another person injured him and for that purpose

they assessed him using the assessment for damages,

determining how much he was worth before and how much he is worth now,

and

afterward

he said, “My monetary value is upon me”—what is the law? Is it possible to say that he has already been assessed once,

determining how much he is worth now, and we can rely on that assessment also for his obligation resulting from the vow?

Or perhaps: The assessment

for a vow is different,

as it requires

ten

there are ten, because the word “kohein,” referring to a member of the priestly class serving in the Temple, appears ten times in the passage, and at the beginning of tractate Sanhedrin it is derived from this that nine judges and a kohein are required]

than the assessment

for damages, for which

three

are sufficient. Therefore, the first assessment is not effective, and they must assess him again before ten.

The Gemara raises another question:

If you say that the assessment by ten is different from the assessment by three,

there is still a doubt: If

he said, “My monetary value is upon me,” and they assessed him, and he again said, “My monetary value is upon me”—what is the law?

Do we say:

Here, certainly, he has already been assessed

already

by ten,

and that same assessment is sufficient for the second vow as well,

or perhaps

a new assessment is required, because perhaps he

increased in value

in monetary worth

between the two assessments.