Arakhin 18b — the Talmud in English

And it implies that they themselves are not included,

as in the matter that is stated:

“And if the leprosy should blossom forth, and the leprosy cover all the skin of the affliction,

from his head [of a person]

of a person]

to his feet,” for all that the eyes of the priest can see. “And the priest shall see, and behold, and the priest shall see him, and behold, and the affliction has covered all his flesh; then he shall pronounce the affliction pure: it has turned white; he is pure.” And there the intention is: “

from his

head”—but not his head itself is included, for even if the leprosy did not blossom forth on his head, he is pure; “and

to his

feet”—but not his feet themselves are included.

And since this is so, shall it likewise be said concerning the karet stated with regard to leaven?

The verse says: “On the first day, on the fourteenth day of the month, in the evening, you shall eat unleavened bread”—so the first day itself is included; “

until the twenty-first day of the month in the evening”—so the seventh day itself is included. “For seven days leaven shall not be found in your houses, for whoever eats what is leavened, and his soul shall be cut off,” and thus, for everything stated above, he is liable even to karet—Tosafot.

Until the twenty-first day of the month at evening”; thus, the seventh day is included. “For seven days leaven shall not be found in your houses, for whoever eats leavened food shall be cut off,” and therefore, for everything stated above, one is liable to karet—Tosafot.

Rabbi says: It is not necessary

to include the first and the seventh from another verse, because

“first”—and the first itself is included,

as it is written, “from the first day”;

“seventh”—and the seventh itself is included,

as it is written, “until the seventh day.” And it implies that these themselves, too, are included.

And if so, it implies that the Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi, for according to Rabbi the twentieth year itself is included in “until twenty years.”

And we reject this:

You may even say

that the Mishna is in accordance with

Rabbi.

Even so, a verse is needed to teach that the years themselves are like what is below, and this cannot be learned from “until.” This is because

the verses are balanced against one another [the interpretations of the verses are evenly balanced],

and it cannot be determined from them whether the year itself is like what is below or like what is above.

Since it is written: “From one month old until five years old,

then his valuation for a male shall be five shekels,” if it had been written only: “Until twenty years old, then his valuation for a male shall be twenty shekels,” and “And if he is from five years old” [until twenty years old, and so on] had not been written, we would know that from five years old his valuation changes to twenty shekels.

Then “

and if he is

from five

years old” [until twenty years old, and so on]

why do I need it?!

And since this is so, it can be learned from that which the Torah wrote, “and if he is from five years old,” that the fifth year itself is like what is above: “from five years”—and five is included [according to Rabbi, just as “from the first day” means that the first is included]. On the other hand, from that which is written, “until five,” it can be learned that the fifth year itself is like what is below, for “until” means until and including [according to Rabbi].

Therefore,

it is found that

the interpretations have been set against one another,

whether it is like what is below or like what is above. Therefore, even according to Rabbi, a gezerah shavah is needed, so that the fifth, twentieth, and sixtieth years will be like what is below.

The Master said: “One might have thought: the first, but the first itself is not included, and so forth, as in the matter that is stated: ‘from his head to his feet,’”

“

‘his head’—but not his head itself is included; ‘his feet’—but not his feet themselves are included.”

And we wonder:

From where do we know

that this is so, so that it was obvious to the Rabbis to learn from here [were it not for the verse] that also where it says “from the first day,” the first itself is not included, and “until the seventh day,” the seventh itself is not included?

And we explain:

If you wish, say:

It is necessarily the case that “his head” is not included, for

the signs of his body differ from the signs of his head [the signs of impurity in a leprous affliction on his body are either that healthy flesh has turned white in the affliction, or that the leprosy spread when the priest quarantined him; whereas the signs of impurity on the head, which is a place of hair, are either that the hair turned yellow, or that the leprosy spread when the priest quarantined him]. Therefore, it is impossible that the Torah’s intention was that the head be included and that it should be necessary for the leprosy on the body to blossom forth—even on the head—in order to purify him. And since his head is not included, his feet, too, are not included.

[the signs of impurity in a leprous affliction on the body are either that the affliction has turned the hair white, or that the leprosy spread when the priest quarantined him. The signs of impurity on the head, which is a place of hair, are either that the hair has turned yellow, or that the leprosy spread when the priest quarantined him]. Therefore, it is impossible that the intention of the Torah is for the head to be included, and that it would be necessary for the leprosy on the body to erupt even on the head in order to render him pure. And since his head is not included, his feet are likewise not included.

If you wish, say:

From here it is obvious to us that his head and his feet are not included, since it is written: “from his head to his feet,”

“for all that the eyes of the priest can see,”

and the priest cannot see the head because of the hair, nor the feet between one toe and another toe . Necessarily, his head and his feet are not included.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Eliezer says: Until they exceed the years by one month and one day.

It was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: It is stated here,

in the passage concerning valuations: “And if he is from sixty years old”

“and upward,” and it is stated there

[in Numbers 3]: “Take a census of the sons of Levi, and so forth, every male from one month old”

“and upward”

shall you number them.

Just as there,

concerning the Levites,

a month

is written: “from one month old,”

and one day

as it is written: “from one month old ‘and upward’”—that is, he has already entered the following month,

so here too

one adds to the sixty years

one month and one day.

And we ask: From where is it derived that one adds a month in addition to one day?

And say: Since “

and upward”

there, just as there “and upward”

adds

one day, so here

we should add to the years by means of the gezerah shavah

one day

alone, to teach that he must enter his sixty-first year?

And we answer:

If so,

if it came only to teach that he must enter his sixty-first year,

the gezerah shavah

which came to teach us from the Levites something that is not written here,

what use is it,

since “and upward” is written here too, and we would know to add one day? Necessarily, the gezerah shavah comes to add all that is stated with the Levites, namely, a month and upward.

The Sages taught: The year stated with regard to

the age of

sacred offerings,

such as what the Torah said, to bring lambs that are “a year old” [within their year], is a year from time to time—that is, from the day and hour when it was born until that same day and that same hour in the following year—and we do not follow the calendar year.

And likewise

the year stated with regard to

the sale of

houses of walled cities, [cities surrounded by a wall from the days of Joshua son of Nun], for the seller may redeem it from the purchaser, if he wishes, until “a year” from its sale; afterward it becomes the purchaser’s absolutely, and the seller may no longer redeem it.

[cities surrounded by a wall from the days of Joshua, son of Nun], such that the seller may redeem it from the purchaser, if he wishes, until “a year” from its sale; after that, it becomes the purchaser’s permanently, and the seller may no longer redeem it.

And likewise

the two years in

the redemption of

ancestral land ,

for the seller is not permitted to redeem it until it has been in the purchaser’s possession for two “years,” and this is learned from what is written: “According to the number of years of produce shall he sell it to you”—and the minimum of a plural is two.

And the six years in

the release of

a Hebrew slave,

to freedom: the slave works for six “years,” and goes out.

And the years in a son and in a daughter,

the years stated concerning a son and a daughter [and below they disputed which years are meant].

The years mentioned

all

are “a year”

from time to time,

from the day and hour when the year begins [in each case according to its matter] until that same day and that same hour in the following year; and this excludes following the reckoning of the calendar year—from Tishrei to Tishrei—for if the first Tishrei arrives, it is counted for him as a year.

And we explain the baraita:

The year stated with regard to sacred offerings—from where do we know

that it is from time to time?

Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov said: The verse says: A lamb in its “year,”

to teach:

its own year, and not the calendar year.

And

the year stated concerning houses of walled cities

is learned to be from time to time

as it is written:

“And its redemption shall be

until the end of the year of ‘its sale,’”

to teach:

the year of its own sale, and not a year according to the calendar reckoning.

And

the two years in ancestral land

are learned

as it is written: “According to the number of years of produce shall he sell it to you,”

and from this verse it can be learned that

sometimes a person [the purchaser]

the purchaser]

eats three harvests in two years,

and since this is necessarily so, the year concerning the two years of ancestral land is a year from time to time, and not years according to the calendar reckoning.

And this is the explanation of the matter: That which the Torah said, “two years of produce,” is superfluous, for from “two” we already know that it must be in the purchaser’s possession for two years. This superfluous expression comes to teach that all the produce that the purchaser finds during those two years—he may eat it, even three harvests. For example, if it was sold to him in Nisan, full of standing grain, he may not redeem it until two years later in Nisan, on that same day. And if the purchaser preceded this and harvested the produce that the field yielded at the end of the second year from its sale, before his two years in Nisan were completed, it follows that he ate three harvests: the produce of the field that was full when he purchased it, and two additional harvests of the two years. And since this is necessarily so, a year is from time to time from the date of its sale; for had we followed the calendar reckoning, in Tishrei of the second year after its sale the seller would already redeem it [since two years in ancestral land had been completed], and the purchaser would eat only two harvests.

And

six

years

in a Hebrew slave

are learned to be years from time to time from the date of his sale,

as it is written: “For six years he shall work, and in the seventh”

[he shall go out free without payment], and it implies:

sometimes in the seventh

according to the calendar reckoning

he shall also work.

For example, he was sold in the middle of a calendar year. Thus, in Tishrei at the end of the sixth year [including the year in which he was sold], six years according to the calendar reckoning had already been completed for him [for when the first Tishrei after his sale arrived, a year had already been completed for him]. The Torah therefore said that he should continue working in the seventh year according to the calendar reckoning, until six years from time to time have been completed for him.

They now come to explain what was said in the baraita:

“And the years in a son and in a daughter are all from time to time”—for what halakhic purpose?

That is, which years concerning a son and a daughter is the baraita discussing?

And we explain:

Rav Giddel said that Rav said:

That is,

for valuations,

for the Torah set the valuation according to years, for a male and for a female. And it teaches that in the fifth year [from which age and above the valuation rises], the twentieth [from which age and above the valuation rises], and the sixtieth [from which age and above the valuation decreases], one does not follow the calendar reckoning, but counts the years from the time of his birth.

Rav Yosef said [in the name of Rav—Rabbeinu Gershom]: “The years in a son and in a daughter” that we learned means

to the chapter on a child born by caesarean section

for the chapter of the hermaphrodite

in tractate Niddah, where we learned many years concerning a son and a daughter. For example: “A son of twelve years—his vows are examined [whether he knows for whose sake he vowed], and a son of thirteen years—his vows stand.” And concerning a daughter: “A daughter of eleven years—her vows are examined, and a daughter of twelve years—her vows stand,” and more. And concerning these years we said that they are from time to time.

Abaye said to Rav Yosef,

who explained the baraita in the name of Rav as referring to the chapter of the hermaphrodite:

Are you divided

—are you disputing the law, and according to your view the years of valuations are not from time to time?

He said to him,

Rav Yosef to Abaye:

No,

we are not disputing! Rather,

I said one thing, and he,

Rav Giddel,

said one thing—that is, we disagreed concerning the interpretation in Rav’s view, which years the baraita is discussing, but not concerning the law.

And we support this, that there is no dispute concerning Rav’s view as a matter of law:

This too is reasonable, for if you should think that they dispute, and the one who says “for valuations” does not say

[or hold] that

also for the hermaphrodite

one requires from time to time,

but Rav said

in tractate Niddah:

The halakha throughout the entire chapter

of the hermaphrodite is that the years stated there are

from time to time.

Thus, according to Rav, even in the chapter of the hermaphrodite the years are from time to time, and not specifically concerning valuations. Rav Giddel does not dispute Rav Yosef, and likewise Rav Yosef does not dispute Rav Giddel.

And we ask: Since they did not dispute concerning the law,

but rather, according to the one who says: “for valuations,”

the baraita is speaking,

what is the reason he did not say

and explain that it

“for the hermaphrodite,”

that the baraita is speaking of?

And we answer: His reason is that “the years in a son and in a daughter” mentioned in the baraita are

analogous to those

other years mentioned in the baraita.

Just as those

years are years

written

in the Torah,

so too those

years in a son and in a daughter are years

written

in the Torah—and these are the years of valuations, and not the years of the chapter of the hermaphrodite, which are not written in the Torah but are from a law given to Moses at Sinai.

And we ask:

But the other one,

Rav Yosef—why did he explain that the baraita is speaking of the years of the chapter of the hermaphrodite and not of the years of valuations, since he admits that these years too require reckoning from time to time?

And we answer: On the contrary, it implies that “the years in a son and in a daughter” refers to years that are not explicit in the Torah [namely, the years of the chapter of the hermaphrodite],

for if you should think that they are written,

and it is speaking of the years of valuations,

this “in a son and in a daughter,”

that is, why did the tanna of the baraita use the expression “in a son and in a daughter,”