Arakhin 18a (יח.) — the Talmud in English

And afterward

before the testimony was given,

his daughter died

of the litigant, and the wife of the witness, and at the time the testimony was given he was distant, or he had been

sane

at the time he saw the event, and

became deaf

in the interim,

and recovered

before giving testimony and

regained his sanity,

or he had been

sighted and became blind, and afterward regained his sight,

or he had been

of sound mind, became insane, and then recovered his sanity; he is fit

to testify.

This is the general rule: Anyone whose beginning

at the time of seeing the event

and whose end

at the time of giving testimony

are in a state of fitness—

is fit!

It is evident from the latter clause of the beraita that we do not expound “and he is a witness” to mean that he must be fit from beginning to end, whereas in Arakhin we expounded “and if he is poor” to mean that he must be poor from beginning to end?

And we answer:

There it is different

with regard to testimony,

as the verse says:

“And he is a witness,”

“or he saw”

“or knew,”

“if he does not tell” [his testimony in court] “he shall bear his iniquity.”

The Merciful One made the matter dependent solely on seeing and giving testimony:

he must be fit at the time of seeing and at the time of giving testimony, even though he was disqualified in the interim—Rabbeinu Gershom.

But this exists!

And we ask:

But

if so,

now that we do not expound “and he is a witness” to mean that he must be fit for testimony from beginning to end,

“and he”

a witness

why do I need it?

It is written: “And if a person sins, and hears the voice of an oath, and he is a witness [whom they adjured by an oath that if he knows testimony for him, he must testify for him], or he saw or knew, if he does not tell, he shall bear his iniquity. And he shall bring his guilt-offering to the Lord, etc.” And “and he is a witness” comes

to include, as it was taught: He saw

the litigant who required testimony

a group [a gathering]

of people [a group of people]

standing, with his witnesses

who knew and were fit to testify for him

among them, and he said

to all of them together:

“I adjure you: If you know testimony for me, come and testify for me!” Could they be liable

for an offering?

The verse states:

“and hears the voice of an oath”—

“and he is a witness,”

that the witness must hear the voice of the oath addressed specifically to him, and not one in which he is included together with others—Rabbeinu Gershom.

But

when he adjured the entire group,

he did not address his witnesses specifically.

One might have thought that even if he said

the litigant administering the oath:

“I adjure anyone

who knows testimony!” and said this to the entire group,

he should not be liable? The verse states: “and he is a witness,” but

when he adjured only those who knew testimony,

he did address his witnesses specifically,

for he adjured no one other than his witnesses! [In Shevuot 32a the version is: “One might have thought that even if he said: ‘All who are standing here’—the verse states, etc.,” and see Rashi’s commentary there].

We learned in the Mishna: (But with regard to offerings, this is not so:)

Even if his father died and left him ten thousand

or his ship was at sea and came to him with goods worth ten thousand, the Sanctuary has no claim to any of it [based on Likkutei Halakhot].

And we wonder:

“His father died and left him ten thousand”

why did you say that the Sanctuary has no claim to any of it? The plain meaning implies that even though he inherited ten thousand, the one who assesses him gives according to his means without taking this ten thousand into account. But

he is wealthy?!

And we answer:

Rabbi Abbahu said: Say

[read the text] as follows: “Even if [his father] died

leaving him ten thousand,”

for his father was wealthy, and was destined to leave the assessor an inheritance of ten thousand, the Sanctuary has no claim to any of it, since he had not yet inherited anything.

And we wonder: If you read it this way,

isn’t it obvious?!

And we answer: The Mishna is speaking when

his father

was already

moribund

at the time the kohen assessed him.

And this is a novel point:

One might have thought that since

the majority of those in the throes of death die,

we should already consider him wealthy, or perhaps the matter should be understood as meaning that we wait until his benefactor dies—based on Zevach Todah.

It teaches us

that this is

not so!

They further raise a difficulty concerning what is stated in the Mishna: “Or his ship was at sea and came to him with goods worth ten thousand; the Sanctuary has no claim to any of it.” The plain meaning implies that the assessor’s ship was loaded with his merchandise, worth ten thousand. If so, why does the Sanctuary have no claim to any of it, and does he give only according to what his means allow without these ten thousand? But

he is wealthy?!

And we answer: The Mishna does not mean that his ship was loaded with his merchandise worth ten thousand. Rather, it is speaking

when

the ship

was leased and rented [or rented]

to others. “And came to him with goods worth ten thousand” means that the lease or rental fee had been fixed at ten thousand.

And we ask:

But

there is rental income

of ten thousand, which the renter must pay the assessor, so he should be considered wealthy on account of the rental debt?

And we answer: Although the renter had already become liable for the principal rental debt at each and every moment that he used it, nevertheless,

rent is not payable

to the lessor

until the end

of the rental period. Therefore, he is still poor now. [The Gemara’s answer concerning the ship has been explained according to Zevach Todah. But see Lechem Mishneh, Laws of Inheritance 3:1, and the book Haflaah on Arakhin].

And we ask:

And let it emerge

that he is wealthy

because of the ship

itself, since it belongs to the assessor?

And we answer: The law concerning the ship relates to what is explained later, in the chapter “What Is Set Aside for Orphans,” that when the treasurer comes to seize property from those liable for Arakhin, he leaves them enough for their livelihood, as well as their implements of trade, such as the maʿatzad and the saw of a carpenter.

And

who is the author

of the Mishna here, which does not take the ship into account?

It is Rabbi Eliezer, as we learned

there in the Mishna:

Rabbi Eliezer says

that even

if he was a farmer, the treasurer

leaves

him

[the assessor]

his

pair [a pair of oxen],

and if he was a donkey driver, he leaves him his donkey,

for these are his implements of trade. The same law applies: According to Rabbi Eliezer, he leaves him his ship that he rents to others. But according to the Sages there, who disagree and maintain that a pair of oxen and a donkey are not left for him, because they are property and not implements of trade, likewise a ship is not left for him.

Mishna:

This is what we said at the beginning of the chapter:

“

The two age categories

that the Torah divided for Arakhin

depend on the one being vowed,”

and not on the assessor.

How so? A child

[a youth] between twenty and sixty, whose valuation, as fixed by the Torah, is fifty shekels,

who assessed

the

elder

over sixty,

gives the valuation of an elder,

which is fifteen shekels. We do not say that the child who made the assessment should give the valuation of a child, since the matter depends on the one being vowed.

And an elder who assessed a child gives the valuation of a child,

and not the valuation of an elder, since the matter depends on the one being vowed.

This is what we said at the beginning of the chapter:

“The valuations depend on the one being assessed”

and not on the assessor.

How so? A man

whose valuation, as fixed by the Torah, is greater than that of a woman,

who assessed

the

woman,

gives the valuation of a woman.

And a woman who assessed

a

man gives the valuation of a man.

The division that the Torah made in the fixed valuations between a man and a woman depends on the one being assessed.

This is what we said at the beginning of the chapter:

“

And the valuation

that the Torah fixed according to age

is determined at the time of the vow,”

and not at the time of payment.

How so? They assessed him

when the one being assessed was

less than five years old,

whose valuation for a male is five shekels,

and he became

before payment

more than five years old,

whose valuation for a male is twenty shekels. Or they assessed him when he was

less than twenty years old,

whose valuation is twenty shekels,

and he became

by the time of payment

more than twenty years old,

whose valuation is fifty shekels,

he gives according to the time of the vow,

and not according to the time of payment.

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

It is written: “When a person expresses a vow, the valuation of persons to the Lord.” “Vow” refers to valuations of monetary worth, as when he says: “My monetary value is upon me.” “Your valuation” refers to Arakhin, as when he says: “The valuation of so-and-so is upon me.”

You have equated [above, in the first chapter]

monetary valuations with Arakhin,

[you learned from the fact that monetary valuations and Arakhin were equated in the Torah that the law written with regard to Arakhin applies to monetary valuations as well], with regard to two matters:

a.

A precious stone is assessed for the poor:

When determining the value of a precious stone, one follows the lower price at which it can be sold—not the higher market price—based on Mutzal MeEsh.

The consequence of this for Arakhin is that if a poor person assessed himself, and a kohen came to assess him to determine whether he had sufficient means to pay his valuation, and he had a precious stone worth only thirty sela in his village, and he did not have enough to pay his valuation of fifty sela, we do not say: If it is kept until it is brought to a large city, where wealthy people will purchase it for fifty sela, then he has fifty sela and must give the full valuation. We do not say this, because the Sanctuary has only its place and its time. This is learned from the verse [Leviticus 27:23]: “And he shall give the valuation on that day.”

This also teaches with regard to monetary valuations that if one says: “The monetary value of this precious stone is upon me,” it is not assessed according to the higher price at which it could be sold in large cities, but according to its price at that time and in that place.

b.

And it is judged according to its honor:

The entire person is judged according to one limb upon which his honor depends—Rashi above, 4b; that is, a limb upon which life depends.

The consequence of this for Arakhin is that one who says: “The valuation of my head [which is a limb upon which life depends, and likewise any other limb upon which life depends] is upon me” gives the full valuation. This is learned from the verse concerning Arakhin: “When a person expresses a vow, the valuation of persons,” which indicates that one follows the person’s life.

This also teaches with regard to monetary valuations that one who says: “The monetary value of my head [or of any other limb upon which life depends] is upon me” gives the monetary value of his entire body [Rashi above, 4b], as it is sold in the marketplace.

One might have thought

that we should also

equate Arakhin with monetary valuations

[and learn through this equation that the law written with regard to monetary valuations applies to Arakhin, and say:]

that he should give

for Arakhin according to his age

at the time of payment,

just as in the case of monetary valuations, when one says: “My monetary value is upon me,” the valuation is made according to the time of payment and not according to the time of the vow. [In the case of monetary valuations, it is obvious that he gives according to the time of payment and not according to the time of the vow, since he is assessed like a slave sold in the marketplace. If he said: “My monetary value is upon me” and came to court in Nisan, who knows how much he was worth at the time of the

vow , and the time of payment means the time when he comes to court ]?

The verse states: “According to your valuation shall it stand” [in the passage concerning one who consecrates an ancestral field; and if this is not needed for one who consecrates an ancestral field, apply it to valuations — Tosafot Yom Tov], indicating that the valuation is determined as at the time of the valuation: [if one assessed himself when he was sixty and then became older than sixty, he pays the valuation of an adult, and not that of an elderly person], to teach that he

pays only according to the time of the valuation.

Mishna:

It is written in the passage of valuations [Leviticus 27]: “When a person explicitly articulates a vow, according to the valuation of persons to the Lord.”

“Then your valuation for a male shall be, from twenty years old until sixty years old, your valuation shall be fifty shekels, and so on.”

“And if it is from five years old until twenty years old, your valuation for a male shall be twenty shekels, and so on.”

“And if it is from one month old until five years old, your valuation for a male shall be five shekels, and so on.”

“And if it is from sixty years old and above, if it is a male, your valuation shall be fifteen shekels, and so on.”

And the Sages derived from that which is stated, “from sixty years old and above,” that we classify the person being assessed as elderly, beyond the age of sixty, only once his sixtieth year from birth has been completed. But during his sixtieth year itself, he is assessed as one who is under sixty.

And from what the Torah taught us concerning the sixtieth year, we learn [based on Rashi, Bekhorot 49a, and Zevaḥ Todah here]:

that even

the thirtieth day

is treated as belonging to the period below it, and if he said, “The valuation of so-and-so, a minor, is upon me,” and that minor was thirty days old on that day, his status is like that of one who assesses a person under one month old, and he has said nothing.

and if he said: “The valuation of so-and-so, a minor, is upon me,” and that minor was on that day thirty days old, his law is like that of one who values someone younger than one month old, and he has said nothing.

The fifth year

itself [after which his valuation is greater than that of a child under five],

and the twentieth year

itself [after which his valuation is greater than that of a child under twenty],

are both treated as belonging to the period below them

: one who assesses a person who is in these years themselves is treated as though he had assessed one who is under these ages.

As it is stated: “And if it is from sixty years old and above,”

and so on: “your valuation shall be fifteen shekels.” This indicates that once the sixtieth year has been completed, he is assessed as elderly and gives only fifteen shekels. But during the sixtieth year, he is assessed as a child.

Thus, we learn all of them from the sixtieth year! Just as the sixtieth year is treated as belonging to the period below it, so too the fifth year and the twentieth year are treated as belonging to the periods below them.

He wonders about this himself:

Indeed?

That is to say: Is it really so that we can derive the rule for these from the age of sixty?! Surely the fifth and twentieth years can be distinguished from the sixtieth year:

If (

)

we have treated [Rashi]

the sixtieth year as belonging to the period below it

in order to assess him as one under sixty,

to be stringent

and give more [since the valuation of a person under sixty is greater than that of an elderly person],

shall we likewise treat

even

the fifth year and the twentieth year as belonging to the periods below them

and assess a person in these years

leniently

and give less?! [Since the valuation of one under five is less than that of one over five, and the valuation of one under twenty is less than that of one over twenty.]

And he explains:

The verse states:

It is written here: “until twenty years old,”

“year,”

and it is written here: “until sixty years old,”

“year,” establishing a gzera shava: just as the “year” stated with regard to the sixtieth year is treated as belonging to the period below it, so too the “year” stated with regard to the fifth and twentieth years is treated as belonging to the period below it.

Rabbi Eliezer says:

His status is always that of the lower period, whether he is in his sixtieth year, twentieth year, or fifth year,

until his days are in excess

of his

years [sixty, twenty, or five] by

one month and one day!

That is, until the entire year has been completed, and an additional month and one day have passed [for he has already entered the additional month, Rashi below], of the following year.

Gemara:

And we explain: The phrase “year, year” stated in our Mishna, which we derive by means of a gzera shava,

is superfluous

and is not needed for its own context, but rather to enable the derivation by means of a gzera shava!

For if it were not superfluous,

the rule is that if it is possible to raise a refutation against a gzera shava, one raises it. And here too

there is a basis for refuting

the gzera shava

as we refuted

in the Mishna [when we attempted to derive one from the other by the method of bameh matzinu]: one cannot derive the fifth and twentieth years from the sixtieth year, since with regard to the sixtieth year the Torah was stringent, requiring one to give more, and one cannot derive a leniency from it—that the fifth and twentieth years should be treated as belonging to the periods below them and one should give less! And likewise, the expression is indeed superfluous, for

“year” and “year” are written superfluously

: the Torah could have written, “And if it is from five years old until twenty,” without writing “year,” and we would have known that these twenty are expressed as years, just as the five are expressed as years. Similarly, it could have written, “Then your valuation for a male shall be from twenty years old until sixty,” without writing “year.”

And we raise a difficulty:

Shall we say that our Mishna,

which required a derivation to teach that the twentieth year is treated as belonging to the period below it,

is not in accordance with Rabbi? For if

our Mishna were in accordance with

Rabbi, he says: “Until—and including the endpoint,”

then, since it is written, “And if it is from five years old ‘until’ twenty years old, your valuation for a male shall be twenty shekels,” we know automatically that the twentieth year itself is included, and its status is that of one under twenty. Likewise, no verse is needed for the sixtieth year, since it is written, “‘until’ sixty years old,” and with regard to the fifth year it is written, “‘until’ five years old.

As it was taught in a beraita,

that Rabbi holds: “Until—and including the endpoint”: It is written, “For whoever eats leavened bread, that soul shall be cut off from Israel

from the first day until the seventh day.” One might have thought

“from the

first day”

on which the Torah stated that one who eats leavened bread is liable to karet [Tosafot],

but not the first day

itself

included

in the liability of karet. And likewise, when the Torah stated “until the

seventh day,” it does not mean that the seventh day is included

in the liability of karet, since it is written “from the” first day, and it is written “until” the seventh day— 天天爱彩票网站 is this so?