Arakhin 18a — the Talmud in English

And afterward

before the testimony was given,

his daughter died

—the daughter of the litigant and the wife of the witness—and at the time the testimony was given he was no longer related to him; or he was

mentally competent

when he saw the event, but

became deaf

in the meantime,

and recovered

before giving testimony and

regained his mental competence; or he was

open-eyed

and became blind, and afterward regained his sight; or he was

of sound mind,

became insane, and then recovered his sanity—he is fit

to testify.

This is the general principle: Anyone whose beginning

at the time of seeing the event

and whose end

at the time of giving testimony

are in a state of fitness—

is fit!

This is apparently proven from the latter clause of the beraita, a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna: We do not derive from the words “and he is a witness” that he must be fit from beginning to end. Yet in tractate Arakhin we derived from the words “and if he is poor” that he must be poor from beginning to end, did we not?

And we answer:

There, with regard to testimony, it is different,

because

the verse says:

“And he is a witness,”

“or he saw”

or knew,

“if he does not testify” ,

he shall bear his iniquity.

The Merciful One made the matter dependent only on seeing and giving testimony:

he must be fit at the time of seeing and at the time of giving testimony, even though he was disqualified in the meantime—Rabbeinu Gershom.

And this condition is present!

And we raise a difficulty:

But

if we do not derive from “and he is a witness” that he must be fit to testify from beginning to end,

“and he is”

a witness—

why do I need it?

And we answer: It is written: “And if a person sins, and hears the sound of an oath, and he is a witness [whom they adjured under oath that if he knew testimony for them, he should testify for them], or he saw or knew, if he does not testify, he shall bear his iniquity. And he shall bring his guilt-offering to the Lord, and so forth.” The phrase “and he is a witness” comes

to teach as it was taught in a source: He saw

the litigant who needed testimony,

a group [

a company ]

of people [

a gathering of people ]

standing, with his witnesses

who knew the matter and were fit to testify for him

among them, and he said

to all of them together:

“I administer an oath to you: If you know testimony for me, will you come and testify for me?” Could they be liable

for an offering?

The verse teaches:

“And hears the sound of an oath,”

“and he is a witness”—

this means that the witness must hear the sound of the oath addressed specifically to him, and not one addressed jointly to him and others—Rabbeinu Gershom.

But

when he administered an oath to the entire group,

he did not address his witnesses specifically.

One might have thought that even if he said

the litigant administering the oath:

“Anyone

who knows testimony—I administer an oath to him!”—and he said this to the entire group,

he would not be liable? The verse teaches: “And he is a witness,” and

when he administered an oath only to whoever knew testimony,

he addressed his witnesses specifically,

since he administered the oath only to his witnesses. [In Shevuot 32a the version reads: “One might have thought that even if he said: ‘All who are standing here…’; the verse teaches, and so forth.” See Rashi’s commentary there.]

We learned in the Mishna: (But this is not so with regard to offerings:)

Even if his father died and left him ten thousand

or his ship was at sea and returned to him with cargo worth ten thousand, the Temple treasury has no claim on it [based on Likutei Halakhot].

And we are puzzled:

“His father died and left him ten thousand”

why did you say that the Temple treasury has no claim on it? The plain meaning implies that even though he inherited ten thousand, he gives the valuation according to his means without taking those ten thousand into account. But

he is wealthy!

And we answer:

Rabbi Abbahu said: Say

[that the Mishna should be read as follows]: “Even if his father [was about to] die and

was leaving him ten thousand,”

meaning that his father was wealthy and was destined to leave the person making the valuation an inheritance of ten thousand, the Temple treasury has no claim on it, since he has not yet inherited anything.

And we are puzzled: If this is how the Mishna should be read,

is it not obvious?!

And we answer: The Mishna is speaking of a case where

his father

was already

dying

when the priest assessed his valuation. This is a novel point, for

one might have thought

that since

most dying people die,

we should already consider him wealthy, or one might explain that we should wait until his inheritor dies—based on Zevach Todah.

It teaches us

that we do not do so!

They raise another difficulty concerning what the Mishna says: “Or

his ship was at sea and returned to him with cargo worth ten thousand;

the Temple treasury has no claim on it.” The plain meaning implies that the person making the valuation owned a ship loaded with merchandise worth ten thousand. If so, why does the Temple treasury have no claim on it, and why does he give only according to what his means allow without those ten thousand?

He is wealthy!

And we answer: The Mishna does not mean that his ship was loaded with merchandise of his worth ten thousand. Rather, it is speaking

when

the ship

was leased and rented [

or rented ]

to others. The phrase “and it returned to him with cargo worth ten thousand” means that they had set the payment for the lease or rental at ten thousand.

And we answer: Although the renter had already become liable for the principal rental debt at each and every moment that he used it, nevertheless,

And we raise a difficulty:

But there is rental income

of ten thousand that the renter must pay the person making the valuation. Should he not be considered wealthy because of the rental debt?

And we answer: Although the renter has already become liable for the basic rental debt at every moment that he uses the ship, nevertheless

rental is not payable

to the owner

until the end

of the rental period. Therefore, at present he is still poor. [The Gemara’s answer concerning the ship is explained according to Zevach Todah. See, however, Lechem Mishne, Laws of Inheritance 3:1, and Sefer Hafla’a on Arakhin.]

And we raise a difficulty:

Why should it not follow

that he is wealthy

because of the ship

itself, since it belongs to the person making the valuation?

And we answer: The law concerning the ship is connected to the law taught below, in the chapter entitled “The Property of Orphans”: When the Temple treasurer comes to seize property from one liable for an assessment, they leave him enough for his livelihood and his tools of trade, such as a hatchet and a saw for a carpenter.

Who is the author of this Mishna?

The Mishna here, which does not take the ship into account, is

that of Rabbi Eliezer, as we learned

there in the Mishna:

Rabbi Eliezer says

that even

if he was a farmer, the treasurer leaves [

leaves ]

him

the person making the valuation

his team [

a team of cattle ],

and if he was a donkey driver, he leaves him his donkey,

since these are his tools of trade. Similarly, according to Rabbi Eliezer, he leaves him his ship when he rents it to others. But the Sages there disagree and hold that a team of cattle and a donkey are not left for him, because they are assets and not tools of trade. Likewise, a ship is not left for him.

Mishna:

The statement made at the beginning of the chapter, that

the two

categories that the Torah established for valuations

depend on the person being valued

and not on the person making the valuation, means the following:

How so? A young man [

a young person ] between the ages of twenty and sixty, whose valuation the Torah set at fifty shekels,

who valued

the

elderly person

over sixty,

gives the valuation of an elderly person,

which is fifteen shekels. We do not say that the young man who made the valuation must give the valuation of a young man; the matter depends on the person being valued.

And an elderly person who valued a young man gives the valuation of a young man,

and not the valuation of an elderly person, because the matter depends on the person being valued.

The statement made at the beginning of the chapter,

“Valuations depend on the person being valued”

and not on the person making the valuation, means the following:

How so? A man,

whose valuation as set by the Torah is higher than that of a woman,

who valued

a

woman

gives the valuation of a woman.

And a woman who made a valuation

of a

man gives the valuation of a man.

The distinction that the Torah made in the fixed valuations between a man and a woman depends on the person being valued.

The statement made at the beginning of the chapter,

“And the valuation

that the Torah set according to age

is determined at the time of the valuation,”

and not at the time of payment, means the following:

How so? They assessed him

when the person being valued was

under five years old,

when his valuation as a male was five shekels,

and he became

before the payment

over five years old,

when his valuation was twenty shekels. Or they assessed him when he was

under twenty years old,

when his valuation was twenty shekels,

and he became

by the time of payment

over twenty years old,

when his valuation was fifty shekels;

he gives the amount applicable at the time of the valuation,

and not the amount applicable at the time of payment.

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

It is written: “When a person expresses a vow, dedicating the valuation of persons to the Lord.” “A vow” refers to a monetary value, when he says: “My monetary value is upon me.” “The valuation” refers to a fixed valuation, when he says: “The valuation of so-and-so is upon me.”

You compared [

above, in the first chapter ]

monetary values to fixed valuations,

meaning that because the Torah compares monetary values and fixed valuations, you learn that the law written with regard to fixed valuations applies to monetary values as well, in two matters:

1.

A precious stone is valued for the poor,

because when the value of a precious stone is assessed, they follow the lower price—the cheap sale price—and not the higher price, according to Mutzal MeEsh.

The resulting law with regard to valuations is as follows: A poor person who valued himself, and a priest came to assess whether his means were sufficient to cover his valuation, and he possessed a precious stone worth only thirty sela in his town, while he did not possess enough to cover his valuation of fifty sela, we do not say: If they wait until the stone is brought to a large city, where wealthy people will buy it for fifty sela, he therefore has fifty sela and must pay the full valuation. We do not say this, because the Temple treasury has only the person’s status at his place and at his present time. This is learned from the verse [Leviticus 27:23]: “And he shall give the valuation on that day.”

The corresponding law with regard to monetary values is that if he says: “The value of this precious stone is upon me,” it is not assessed according to the high price at which it would sell in the large cities, but according to the price at that time and in that place.

2.

And to be judged according to its principal part,

meaning that the entire person is judged according to one limb on which his honor depends—Rashi above, 4b; that is, a limb on which life depends.

The resulting law with regard to valuations is that one who says: “The valuation of my head [which is a limb on which life depends, and likewise any other limb on which life depends] is upon me” must give the full valuation. This is learned from the verse concerning valuations: “When a person expresses a vow, dedicating the valuation of persons,” which implies that the matter follows the person’s life.

The corresponding law with regard to monetary values is that one who says: “The monetary value of my head [or of any other limb on which life depends] is upon me” must give the monetary value of his entire body [Rashi above, 4b], as though he were being sold in the marketplace.

One might have thought

that we should also

compare fixed valuations to monetary values [

and learn through this comparison that the law written with regard to monetary values applies to fixed valuations, and say: ]

that he should give

the valuation according to his age

at the time of payment,

just as, with regard to monetary values, when one says “My monetary value is upon me,” the monetary value is assessed according to the time of payment and not according to the time of the vow. [With regard to monetary values, it is obvious that he gives the amount applicable at the time of payment and not at the time of the vow, because he is assessed like a slave sold in the marketplace. If he says “My monetary value is upon me” and comes to court in Nisan, who knows how much he was worth at the time of the vow and the time of payment means the time when he comes to court?]

The verse states: “according to your valuation shall it stand” [in the section concerning one who consecrates an ancestral field; and if it is not needed for one who consecrates an ancestral field, apply it to valuations — Tosafot Yom Tov], and it implies that the valuations are according to the time of the valuation [for if he valued himself when he was sixty and then became older than sixty, he gives the valuation of an adult, and not that of an old man], to teach that

he gives only according to the time of the valuation.

Mishna:

It is written in the section of valuations [Leviticus 27]: “When a person distinctly vows a vow, according to your valuation of persons to the Lord.”

“And your valuation of the male shall be from twenty years old until sixty years old, and your valuation shall be fifty shekels, etc.”

“And if he is from five years old until twenty years old, your valuation of the male shall be twenty shekels, etc.”

“And if he is from one month old and above until five years old, your valuation of the male shall be five shekels, etc.”

“And if he is from sixty years old and above, if he is male, your valuation shall be fifteen shekels, etc.”

And the Sages learned from what is stated: “from sixty years old and above,” that we judge the one being valued as an old man, older than sixty, only when the sixtieth year from his birth has been completed; but in the sixtieth year itself, he is judged as one younger than sixty.

And from what the Torah taught us concerning the sixtieth year, we learn [according to Rashi in Bekhorot 49a and Zevah Todah here]:

that even

the thirtieth day

is like what is below it,

and if he said: “The valuation of so-and-so, a minor, is upon me,” and that minor was on that day thirty days old, his law is like that of one who values someone younger than one month old, and he has said nothing.

The fifth year

itself [after which his valuation is greater than that of a minor younger than five],

and the twentieth year

itself [after which his valuation is greater than that of a child younger than twenty],

are judged as what is below them,

for one who values someone who is in these years themselves is as though he valued someone who is younger than these years.

As it is stated: “And if he is from sixty years old and above,”

etc., “and your valuation shall be fifteen shekels,” and it implies that when the sixtieth year has been completed, he is then judged as an old man, to give only fifteen shekels; but in the sixtieth year, he is judged as a child.

Thus we learn all of them from the sixtieth year! Just as the sixtieth year is like what is below it, so too the fifth year and the twentieth year are like what is below them.

And he wonders about it himself:

Indeed?

That is to say: Is it indeed so, that we can learn this concerning these years from the sixtieth year? But the fifth year and the twentieth year can be distinguished from the sixtieth year:

if

[he did so,]

we have made [Rashi]

[Раши]

the sixtieth year like what is below it

to judge him as younger than sixty,

to be stringent

and give more [for the valuation of a person younger than sixty is greater than that of an old man],

shall it be made

also

the fifth year and the twentieth year like what is below them,

to judge in these years

leniently

and give less?! [For the valuation of one younger than five is less than that of one older than five, and the valuation of one younger than twenty is less than that of one older than twenty.]

And he explains:

The verse states:

It is written here: “until twenty years old,”

“year,”

and it is written here: “until sixty years old,”

“year,” by a gzera shava: Just as the “year” stated concerning the sixtieth year is like what is below it, so too the “year” stated concerning the fifth year and the twentieth year is like what is below it.

Rabbi Eliezer says:

His law is always like what is below it, whether in the case of one who is sixty, or one who is twenty, or one who is five,

until his days are in excess

of

the years

[sixty, twenty, or five] by

one month and one day!

For the entire year has been completed, and additionally one month and one day [for he has already entered the following month — Rashi below], of the following year.

Gemara:

And we explain: The “year, year” stated in our Mishna, which we learn by a gzera shava,

is free

of its own purpose, but rather is intended to teach by a gzera shava!

For if it were not free,

the general rule is that if it is possible to raise an objection against the gzera shava, one raises it; and here too

there is room to raise an objection

against the gzera shava

as we raised

in the Mishna [when we came to learn one from the other by means of “what do we find”]: One cannot learn the fifth year and the twentieth year from the sixtieth year, for in the sixtieth year the Torah was stringent, to give more, and one cannot learn leniency from it, that the fifth year and the twentieth year should be like what is below them and that they should give less! And likewise, it is free, for

“year” and “year” are written redundantly,

for the Torah could have written: “And if he is from five years old until twenty,” and not written “year”; and we would have known that these twenty are spoken of as “years” by the verse, just as the five are “years.” And likewise, it could have written: “And your valuation of the male shall be from twenty years old until sixty,” and not written “year.”

And we object:

Shall we say that our Mishna,

which required a derivation to teach that the twentieth year is like what is below it,

is not according to Rabbi, for if

our Mishna were according to

Rabbi, he says: “Until—and until—includes”,

and since it is written: “And if he is from five years old until twenty years old, and your valuation of the male shall be twenty shekels,” we know automatically that the twentieth year itself is included, and its law is like that of one younger than twenty. And likewise, no verse is needed for the sixtieth year, for it is written: “until sixty years old,” and for the fifth year, for it is written: “until five years old.”

For it was taught,

that Rabbi holds: “Until—and until—includes”: It is written: “For whoever eats leavened bread, that soul shall be cut off from Israel

from the first day until the seventh day”; it could have meant

“from the

first day,”

that the Torah said that one who eats leavened bread is subject to karet [Tosafot],

but the first itself

itself

is not included

in the obligation of karet; and likewise, what the Torah said, “until the

seventh day,” but the seventh is not included

in the obligation of karet, for it is written “from” the first day, and it is written “until” the seventh day,