Arakhin 17b (יז:) — the Talmud in English

a wealthy leper and a poor person who imposed the vow,

which is the second example. This teaches us that with offerings, even when the person who imposed the vow is poor, he brings an offering of a wealthy person. This example distinguishes offerings from valuations: with valuations, since the one who makes the assessment is poor, he is judged according to his means and brings only the valuation of a poor person; but in the first example, valuations and offerings are identical.

The novelty of this law is that if the leper was wealthy and the person who imposed the vow was poor, he brings an offering of a wealthy person:

It might have entered your mind to say

that the person who imposed the vow should bring an offering of a poor person because he is poor, since

once the person who imposed the vow was included

among those judged according to assessment of means, and the Torah showed compassion for him by allowing him to bring an offering of a poor person when he is poor and the leper is poor, as we derived above from “and lacks sufficient means,”

he was included

among those judged according to assessment of means even when the leper is wealthy!

It teaches us

that the person who imposed the vow was included among those judged according to assessment of means only when the leper too is poor, but not when the leper is wealthy.

The reason is

as it was taught in a baraita: Since we find with regard to valuations

that

a poor person who assessed a wealthy person,

for example, the wealthy person said, “My valuation is incumbent upon me,” and the poor person heard him and said, “What this one said is incumbent upon me,”

gives the valuation of a poor person, might this case too

in which he said, “The offering of this leper is incumbent upon me,” be governed by the

same

law, so that the poor person who imposed the vow would bring an offering of a poor person even though the leper is wealthy?

The verse states: “If he is poor”

to exclude the person who imposed the vow [Rabbenu Gershom].

We challenge this: And according to Rabbi, meaning: According to the Rabbis, the derivation “he” is needed to exclude a poor person who imposed the vow when the leper is wealthy, and to teach that the person who imposed the vow brings an offering of a wealthy person. This is because they hold that with valuations, when the wealthy person said, “My valuation is incumbent upon me,” and the poor person said, “What this one said is incumbent upon me,” the poor person brings the valuation of a poor person; one might have said that the same applies with regard to the leper, and therefore “he” is needed to exclude that possibility. But according to Rabbi, who says: I say that even with regard to valuations the law is so, that when a wealthy person says, “My valuation is incumbent upon me,” and a poor person says, “What this one said is incumbent upon me,” the poor person brings the valuation of a wealthy person, it follows that when the first person [the wealthy person] is also obligated,

We object: but according to Rabbi, meaning, according to the Rabbis the derivation “he” is needed to exclude a poor sponsor of a wealthy person with leprosy and to teach that the sponsor brings an offering of a wealthy person, because they hold that with valuations, when the wealthy person said, “My valuation is upon me,” and the poor person said, “What that man said is upon me,” the poor person pays the valuation of a poor person. One might therefore have thought that the same applies to a person with leprosy, so the word “he” is needed to exclude this. But according to Rabbi, who says: “I say that the same applies even to valuations,”

The verse states: If he is poor, “he”

to exclude the one who imposes the vow [Rabbeinu Gershom].

we follow the obligation of the first person,

the first person,

and proceed

accordingly, so that the poor person gives what the first person's obligation requires.

But — that is, if so —

no verse is needed

with regard to the leper

to exclude

the possibility that we follow the obligation of the first person [the leper], since even with valuations the law is the same. If so, according to Rabbi, what does

“he”

written with regard to the leper

serve to exclude?!

written with regard to the person with leprosy—

what does it exclude?!

in the case of the leper

to exclude,

that we should follow the obligation of the first one [the leper], for with valuations too the law is so. If so, according to Rabbi,

“he”

written concerning the leper

to exclude what?!

And we answer: According to Rabbi, “he” comes

to exclude a poor metzora whose provider is wealthy,

so that we should not compare him to Arakhin in a similar manner—namely, when the poor man said, “My valuation is upon me,” and the wealthy man said, “What this man said is upon me.” And

it might enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi said

with regard to Arakhin

that we follow the first person’s liability

the first one’s

and proceed accordingly,

as explained in the Mishna: If a poor man said concerning a wealthy man who had valued himself and thereby incurred an obligation, “What this man said is upon me,” the poor man is obligated to pay the valuation of a wealthy man, in accordance with the first man’s obligation. Likewise, if a wealthy man said this concerning a poor man who had valued himself and thereby incurred an obligation, the second man is obligated only in accordance with the first man’s obligation and pays the valuation of a poor man; and if so,

here too

with regard to a metzora,

we should follow the person’s liability

and say that the wealthy provider brings the offering of a poor man, in accordance with the metzora’s obligation.

He teaches us

that from the verse “he” we learn that, with regard to a metzora, the provider brings the offering of a wealthy man, since he himself is wealthy. But according to the Rabbis, no verse is needed for this, since in their opinion, even with regard to Arakhin, one follows the person making the vow and not the first person’s obligation.

Mishna:

If

the one who made the valuation was

poor

when he made the valuation [according to Rashi’s understanding, this refers to a thanksgiving offering],

and became wealthy

before the payment,

or

he was

wealthy

when he made the valuation

and became poor

before the payment,

he pays the valuation of a wealthy man. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even

if the one who made the valuation was

poor

when he made the valuation

and became wealthy,

and then

became poor

by the time of payment,

he pays the valuation of a wealthy man,

since he was not poor from beginning to end.

But with regard to offerings

where there is a distinction between the offering of a wealthy man and the offering of a poor man,

this is not so!

If a metzora was wealthy and became poor, or poor and became wealthy, everything follows the time when he brings his offerings. [The beraita in the Gemara below explains which offering determines the matter.]

Even if the father of the one who made the valuation dies

of the one who made the valuation,

and leaves him ten thousand

dinars,

or his ship

of the one who made the valuation

is at sea and arrives carrying ten thousand

[with merchandise worth tens of thousands of dinars],

the Temple treasury has no claim on any of it,

[this is the straightforward meaning, although the reason for the law is not understood; it is explained in the Gemara.]

Gemara:

It is written in the passage concerning Arakhin: “But if he is poor in comparison with your valuation [meaning that he cannot afford to give the valuation prescribed by the Torah], then he shall be presented [the person being valued] before the koen, and the koen shall assess him according to what the hand of the one who made the vow can afford; the koen shall assess him.”

And from this verse the laws stated in the Mishna are derived:

If he was poor and became wealthy

he pays the valuation of a wealthy man, based on the verse:

“According to what the ‘hand’ of the one who made the vow can afford,”

which indicates that the time when his hand can afford the payment determines the matter—Rabbeinu Gershom;

and behold, his hand can afford it

at the time of payment.

And the second law in the Mishna:

If he was wealthy and became poor,

he pays the valuation of a wealthy man, based on the verse:

“According to what the hand of ‘the one who made the vow’ can afford,”

which indicates that one follows the time of the vow.

We learned in the Mishna:

“Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if he was poor and became wealthy and then became poor again, he pays the valuation of a wealthy man.”

What is the reason for Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion? The verse says: “But if he is ‘poor’ in comparison with your valuation,”

and so on, “according to what his hand can afford,” and they derive:

“Until he has been in his poverty”

[in his state of poverty]

from the beginning

at the time of the vow and

until the end

at the time of payment. Then he brings according to what his hand can afford. This teaches that if he became wealthy in the interim, he pays his entire valuation.

And we object:

“But if so,”

if we derive from “he is poor” that he must have been in his poverty from beginning to end, then regarding what is written in the passage concerning the metzora, concerning the offerings that the metzora brings on the eighth day of his purification:

“And if ‘he is poor’”

and cannot afford it, he brings the offering of a poor man,

should we likewise

say that he does not bring the offering of a poor man, but rather

“until he has been in his poverty from the beginning”

[from the time he began bringing his offerings, or perhaps from the time he became obligated to bring his offerings]

until the end,

when he brought his offering—the offering of a poor man?!

But we learned

otherwise:

A metzora who brought

some of

his offerings

that he is required to bring [namely, for a wealthy man: a guilt offering, an animal sin offering, and an animal burnt offering; and for a poor man: a bird sin offering and a bird burnt offering, as well as a meal offering and a log of oil], when he was

poor and became wealthy

before bringing his offerings as a poor man, or when he was

wealthy

at the beginning of bringing his offerings

and became poor

before bringing all his offerings as a wealthy man,

everything follows

the bringing of the

sin offering . If he was wealthy when he brought his sin offering and brought it from an animal, he also brings his burnt offering from an animal, as a wealthy man, even if he became poor between the sin offering and the burnt offering. And if he was poor when he brought his sin offering and brought it from a bird, as a poor man, he likewise brings his burnt offering from a bird, even if he became wealthy between the sin offering and the burnt offering.

This is the statement of Rabbi Shimon.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Everything follows

the bringing of the

guilt offering,

so that if he brought his guilt offering while poor, he brings his sin offering and burnt offering from birds, as a poor man; and if he was wealthy when he brought his guilt offering, he brings his sin offering and burnt offering from animals, as a wealthy man.

And it was taught

another, third opinion:

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says:

Poverty and wealth with regard to bringing his offerings are not determined according to his status when he brings the offerings. Rather,

everything follows

the time of the sprinkling of the

birds

—the live birds that the metzora brings before his first shaving [before he counts seven days]. If he was poor when they were sprinkled over him, he brings the offering of a poor man; and if he was wealthy when they were sprinkled over him, he brings the offering of a wealthy man!

This now presents a difficulty: It is evident that we do not derive from “if he is poor” that he must have been in his poverty from beginning to end, for even if at some point he was wealthy, he brings the offering of a poor man. Yet with regard to Arakhin we derived from “if he is poor” that he must have been in his poverty from beginning to end?

And we answer: With regard to a metzora, it is a halakhic decree stated by the verse that he need not have been poor from beginning to end, for

it was said concerning this matter, Rabbi Yehuda said that Rav said: And all three

[Rabbi Shimon, who follows the sin offering; Rabbi Yehuda, who follows the guilt offering; and Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, who follows the birds]

derived their opinions from one verse—

and they learned their respective opinions from what is written in the passage concerning the metzora, after the laws of the offering of a poor metzora: “This shall be the law of the leprous affliction

for one who cannot afford it in his purification.”

Rabbi Shimon holds

that since it is written: “And the koen shall effect atonement for the one being purified before the Lord. This shall be the law of the leprous affliction for one who cannot afford it in his purification,” and the verse juxtaposes “and the koen shall effect atonement” to “this shall be the law ... for one who cannot afford it,” it comes to teach that he brings the offering mentioned above when the metzora cannot afford it “at the time of atonement,” and everything follows

the element that effects atonement 13,

for sin—Rabbeinu Gershom. And

what is that? The sin offering! For the afflictions come on account of eight matters, and the sin offering effects atonement.

—Rabbeinu Gershom, see there. [This has been explained according to Rashi here, but in Nidda 70a and Keritot 9b Rashi explains it differently; see there.]

And Rabbi Yehuda holds

that since it is written “for one who cannot afford it ‘in his purification,’” it comes to teach that one who cannot afford it “at the time of purification” is assigned the law of poverty. And “the time of purification” indicates:

the element that renders him fit—and what is that? The guilt offering!

For “purification” refers to the guilt offering, which renders him fit to enter the Temple and eat consecrated food [from which the metzora had been prohibited], since the koen places the blood of the guilt offering on the metzora’s thumbs and earlobe.

And Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov holds

that the time of purification to which the verse refers indicates:

the element that causes him to become purified—and what is that? The birds!

For as long as he has not brought the birds, he cannot shave.

And we object:

“But then,

since we do not derive from “he” that he must have been in his poverty from beginning to end, and if he is poor,

why do I need ‘he’?”

And we answer: It comes to teach

Rabbi

[mentioned in the previous Mishna]

according to his opinion

[as explained above in the Gemara]: “he” comes to exclude a poor metzora whose provider—who said, “The offerings of this metzora are upon me”— \-

is wealthy, for the provider does not bring the offering of a poor metzora; rather, he brings the offering of a wealthy metzora.

And according to the Rabbis

[mentioned in the previous Mishna],

according to their opinion

[as explained above in the Gemara]: “he” comes to exclude a wealthy metzora whose provider is poor. The provider is not exempted through the offering of a poor metzora; rather, he brings the offering of a wealthy man.

They raise another difficulty against the interpretation that we derive from “if he is poor” that he must remain so from beginning to end:

“But if so,”

regarding what is written concerning testimony:

“And he is a witness,”

whether he saw or knew, if he does not testify, he shall bear his iniquity—should we also derive

“until he is fit”

to testify

from the beginning

at the time he saw the testimony

until the end

at the time he gives testimony, so that one who was fit to testify both when he saw the testimony and when he testifies, but was disqualified in between [for example, he became related to one of the litigants in the interim and subsequently ceased to be related], is disqualified from testifying?!

And if you would say: Indeed, so,

he is disqualified from testifying,

but wasn’t it taught

that he is fit:

If he knew testimony concerning him

[concerning one of the litigants]

that he had seen

the testimony

before he became his son-in-law, and he became his son-in-law

[so that he is disqualified from testifying on account of being a relative], or he was

mentally competent

when he saw the testimony and

became deaf

due to illness, and he is a fool [Rashbam, Bava Batra 128a], or he was

sighted

with his eyes open and seeing properly [ibid],

and became blind

and is disqualified from testifying, as the verse requires: “and he is a witness, whether he saw”; or he was

of sound mind and became insane, he is disqualified

from testifying, since he is disqualified at the time he gives testimony.

But if he knew testimony

through having seen the testimony

before he became his son-in-law, and he became

in the interim

his son-in-law

of the litigant,