Arakhin 17a (יז.) — the Talmud in English

The indication is that

calamity will befall him!

With regard to this, they said that these matters are afflictions: whoever experienced one of them was not considered to have gone forty days without afflictions.

It was taught: Rabbi Eliezer the Great says: Had [

if He had come ]

the Holy One, blessed be He, come with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob to judgment, they would have no

ability

to

withstand the rebuke

with which He would rebuke them!

As it is stated: “Now, present yourselves, and I shall judge you before Hashem concerning all the righteousness of Hashem that He performed for you ‘and for your fathers.’”

For He performed an act of righteousness even with them, in that He did not litigate with them in judgment—Rashi, in Ein Yaakov. [And Rabbeinu Gershom and the Maharsha explained: Everything that Hashem did for your fathers was “the righteousness of Hashem,” and not according to the strict law].

What is the meaning of that which is written [Rashi]:

Rashi ]:

“This is the generation of those who seek Him, those who seek Your presence—Jacob, Selah,”

and it juxtaposes “generation” with “those who seek Him” [that is, the generation determines the character of its leaders, namely, its leaders—Rabbeinu Gershom]?

Rabbi Yehuda Nesia and the Sages disagreed

concerning this juxtaposition.

One said: The generation is according to its leader; and one said: The leader is according to his generation,

as will be explained below.

For what practical purpose

is it stated that the generation is like its leaders:

Perhaps it is with regard to superiority,

namely, with regard to piety, and they disagree about this:

The one

who said that the leader is according to his generation

holds: If the generation is superior, [

if the generation is pious, ]

the leader is superior [

the leader is likewise pious ].

And the other

who said that the generation is according to its leader

holds: If the leader is superior, [

if the leader is pious, ]

the generation is superior?!

It is impossible to say this, for

there was Zedekiah, who was superior [

who was a pious leader ]

but his generation was not superior,

which shows that the generation is not according to its leader.

But

we also find

Jehoiakim, who was not superior, while his generation was superior,

which shows that the leader is not according to the generation; this is difficult for both opinions!

The source for what we said—that Zedekiah was pious but his generation was not, and that Jehoiakim’s generation was pious but he was not—is

that Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: What

is different about Jehoiakim and Zedekiah, concerning whom the expression “in the beginning” is written,

as it is written: “In the beginning of the reign of Jehoiakim son of Josiah, king of Judah,” and it is written: “In the beginning of the reign of Zedekiah, king of Judah” [Rashash]?

[Rashash]?

The Holy One, blessed be He, sought to return the world to chaos and void

in the days of Jehoiakim

because of Jehoiakim; once He looked at his generation,

of Jehoiakim,

His mind was put at ease.

And

the Holy One, blessed be He, sought to return the world to chaos and void

in the days of Zedekiah

because of Zedekiah’s generation; once He looked at Zedekiah, His mind was put at ease,

and since the Holy One, blessed be He, sought to overturn the work of Creation in their days, “in the beginning” is therefore written concerning them.

Accordingly, it is impossible to interpret “the generation is like its leaders” as referring to praise.

And we interpret it

rather, as referring to severity [

anger ]

and gentleness [

being easy to appease ]—that is what

we are saying,

that the generation is like its leaders.

We shall return to you, chapter “There Is in Valuations,”

Mishna:

The Torah states in the passage concerning Arakhin [Leviticus 27] that one who consecrates a person's assessed value is judged according to his

assessment of means:

if he does not have sufficient means to pay the entire valuation prescribed by the Torah, he is not obligated to pay the Temple treasury more than his means permit —

with regard to the one who makes the vow [the one who makes the assessment],

the statement is referring to the one who makes the vow, since the amount of the obligation depends on the financial means of the one who makes the assessment, as the Mishna proceeds to explain.

And the years

[the age] on which the Torah made the amount of the valuations dependent —

with regard to the one assessed

[the person whose value is assessed],

the statement is referring, and not to the one who makes the assessment. The amount of the obligation changes according to the age of the person assessed, and not according to the age of the one who makes the assessment.

And the valuations the distinction made by the Torah between the prescribed valuation of a male and the valuation of a female —

with regard to the person assessed

the statement is referring, and not to the one who makes the assessment. The amount of the obligation changes according to the sex of the person assessed, and not according to the sex of the one who makes the assessment.

And the valuation

prescribed by the Torah according to the age of the person assessed —

at the time of the assessment

the statement is referring, and not at the time of payment. For example, if the person assessed was under twenty when he was assessed [the Torah-prescribed valuation for a male of that age is twenty shekels], and by the time of payment he had already passed the age of twenty [the Torah-prescribed valuation for a male of that age is fifty shekels], they must pay the valuation prescribed for one under twenty.

Assessment of means with regard to the one who makes the vow —

How so?

A poor person who assessed a wealthy person

who said concerning the wealthy person, “Your valuation is incumbent upon me.” [The same law applies if the wealthy person initially said, “My valuation is incumbent upon me,” and the poor person heard him and said, “What this one said is incumbent upon me”] —

he gives

the poor person

the valuation of a poor person

according to whatever his means permit, since in the case of the one who makes the vow the law is determined by his means, and he is poor; it is not determined by the person assessed, who is wealthy.

And a wealthy person who assessed a poor person,

who said concerning the poor person, “Your valuation is incumbent upon me.” [The same law applies if the poor person initially said, “My valuation is incumbent upon me,” and the wealthy person heard him and said, “What this one said is incumbent upon me”] —

he gives

the wealthy person

the valuation of a wealthy person,

and pays the entire amount prescribed by the Torah for one who assessed a person of the poor person's age, since in the case of the one who makes the vow the matter is determined by his means, and he is wealthy; it is not determined by the person assessed, who is poor.

This clause is explained according to Rashi's understanding; see Tosafot and Zevach Todah.

However,

the law of assessment of means stated

with regard to offerings,

where a poor person who lacks sufficient means brings a different offering from a wealthy person,

is not so.

The law does not follow the means of the one who makes the vow; rather, as the Mishna explains [Rabbenu Gershom]:

If he said,

the one who makes the vow: “

The offering of this leper”

[which he must bring on the eighth day of his purification]

is incumbent upon me.”

If

the leper was poor, he brings

the one who made the vow, who undertook to bring his offerings,

the offering of a poor person,

[whose sin-offering and burnt-offering are brought from birds]. And if the leper was

wealthy —

he brings

the one who made the vow

the offering of a wealthy person,

[whose sin-offering and burnt-offering are from animals], even though the one who made the vow is poor.

Rabbi

disagrees and

says: I say that even with regard to valuations,

when they are analogous to offerings [as the Mishna explains below: the wealthy person first said, “My valuation is incumbent upon me,” and the poor person heard him and said, “What this one said is incumbent upon me”], the law is

so,

as it is with offerings, and not like the first tanna, who likewise distinguished in this case between valuations and offerings.

The reason is as follows:

And for what reason

is the law with regard to valuations that

a poor person who assessed a wealthy person,

who said concerning the wealthy person, “Your valuation is incumbent upon me,”

gives the valuation of a poor person

and not the valuation of a wealthy person, whereas with offerings, when a poor person said, “The offering of this [wealthy] leper is incumbent upon me,” the poor person brings the offering of a wealthy person? It is because the case does not resemble offerings.

For the wealthy person

whom the poor person assessed

is not obligated

himself

in anything.

Therefore, when the poor person said to the wealthy person, “Your valuation is incumbent upon me,” he intended only that the valuation be determined according to the wealthy person's age, which is either less than or greater than his own age. Since he specified nothing else, but merely undertook the valuation corresponding to the wealthy person's age, the law of that “valuation” is that it is subject to assessment of means. This is not so with offerings, since the leper himself is obligated to bring them; and one who vows to bring an offering like his is considered as though he specified that he would bring the offering incumbent upon the wealthy leper. Therefore he brings the offering of a wealthy person, even though the one who made the vow is poor.

Since this is the fundamental reason for the distinction, one may distinguish only in the first case mentioned: if the poor person said concerning the wealthy person, “Your valuation is incumbent upon me,” only in this case does the poor person give the valuation of a poor person.

But

in the second case, involving

a wealthy person who said: “My valuation is incumbent upon me,” and a poor person heard him and said: “What this one said

is incumbent upon me” —

the poor person gives

the poor person

the valuation of a wealthy person 3 .

For in this case the wealthy person too is obligated, since he assessed himself, and the case resembles offerings; therefore its law is like that of offerings.

Gemara:

We raise a difficulty concerning the wording of the Mishna, which stated assessment of means with regard to the “one who makes the vow”: But the law of

assessment of means is with regard to the one who makes the assessment,

and not to the one who makes the vow. The one who makes the vow is someone who said, “My value is upon me”; he is not assessed according to his means, but must give the entire amount when he is able to pay it, even though he currently lacks sufficient means. If so, the tanna should have stated the law of assessment of means with regard to the one who makes the assessment?!

We answer: The reason the tanna used the expression “the one who makes the vow” is

as it is written

in the Torah in this context concerning valuations and assessment of means. It is written: “According to

what the hand of the ‘one who makes the vow’ can attain, the priest shall assess him.”

We further question the wording of the Mishna: Are

“the years

dependent upon the person assessed”

? But the division according to age

is with regard to the “person assessed”,

and not with regard to the “person whose value is vowed.” One who says, “The value of so-and-so is upon me” is not judged according to that person's age, but according to the value of that person were he to be sold in the marketplace. If so, the tanna should have stated: “And the years — with regard to the person assessed”?!

We answer:

Since the tanna said

the following:

assessment of means with regard to the “one who makes the vow”,

as we explained,

he also said: “The years

are with regard to the person assessed.”

We learned in the Mishna:

Assessment of means with regard to the one who makes the vow—how so? A poor person who assessed a wealthy person gives the valuation of a poor person.

What is the reason? The verse states: “According to what the hand of the ‘one who makes the vow’ can attain” —

the Merciful One made it dependent upon the one who makes the vow

and not upon the person assessed. [This also includes the second case in the Mishna, in which the one who makes the vow said, “What this one said is incumbent upon me,” since he too is a person who makes a vow — according to the Raavad's explanation in the Sifra; see Tosafot.]

We learned in the Mishna:

But with offerings it is not so. If he said, “The offering of this leper is incumbent upon me,” and the leper was poor, he brings the offering of a poor person!

We question this, since according to its plain meaning it indicates that when the leper is poor, the person who imposed the vow brings the offering of a poor person even if he himself is wealthy:

Even though the one who imposed the vow

[that is, the one who made the vow]

is wealthy,

does he bring the offering of a poor person?! But the law is not so. For

“And if he is poor,”

[the one bringing the offering — Rabbenu Gershom]

the Merciful One said

that he should bring the offering of a poor person,

and he is not poor,

the one bringing the offering, since it is the wealthy person who imposed the vow who brings the offering.

We answer: Rabbi Yitzhak said:

The Mishna does not mean that with offerings one determines the type of offering solely according to the means of the leper, so that if the leper lacks sufficient means, the person who imposed the vow brings an offering of a poor person even though the person who imposed the vow has sufficient means to bring an offering of a wealthy person. Rather, when we learned in the Mishna that if the leper was poor the person who imposed the vow brings an offering of a poor person, the case is

when

the person who imposed the vow was also

poor.

The person who imposed the vow

was poor. In this manner the Mishna distinguishes between the case in which the leper himself was also poor and the case in which the leper was wealthy.

We challenge this: Even so, from where do we know that when the person who imposed the vow is poor he brings an offering of a poor person [when the leper too is poor]?

Perhaps, with regard to him

— the leper, when he himself brings his offerings —

the Merciful One has compassion

[the Torah showed compassion], so that if he is poor he brings an offering of a poor person;

but with regard to the person who imposed the vow,

when he is poor,

the Merciful One did not have compassion,

and he must bring an offering of a wealthy person even though he is poor?

For it is written: “And if he is poor” —

“he”

meaning: he, the leper himself, if he is poor, should bring an offering of a poor person, but not the person who imposed the vow [Rabbenu Gershom].

We answer:

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: “And if he is poor

and lacks sufficient means” is written. It would not have been necessary to write “and lacks sufficient means,” since “and if he is poor” is already written [Rabbenu Gershom]. The apparently superfluous phrase comes

to include the one who makes the vow

[the person who imposed the vow], so that if he lacks sufficient means, he brings an offering of a poor person [when the leper too is poor]!

Now we challenge Rabbi Yitzhak's answer, which said that when we learned in the Mishna, “But with offerings it is not so,” and “If the leper was poor, he brings an offering of a poor person,” this refers only to a case in which the person who imposed the vow was also poor:

But if the person who imposed the vow is wealthy

and the leper is poor,

is it indeed so that he brings an offering of a wealthy person? If so, what does “But with offerings it is not so” mean?!

The tanna intended to distinguish between valuations, which depend on the one who makes the vow, and offerings, which depend on the leper. If the example given by the tanna, “If the leper was poor, he brings an offering of a poor person,” refers to a case in which the person who imposed the vow is also poor, this example does not distinguish offerings from valuations, since with valuations too the law is that if the one who makes the vow is poor, he brings the valuation of a poor person.

Page 17b

We answer: When the tanna said, “But with offerings it is not so,” this does not refer to both examples that the tanna stated concerning the leper: (a) “If the leper was poor, he brings an offering of a poor person”; (b) “If the leper was wealthy, he brings an offering of a wealthy person.” Rather: (

one refers to a poor leper and a poor person who imposed the vow, and one serves to exclude

— Rashi does not have this version.)