Zevachim 8b (ח:) — the Talmud in English

But

the sin offering for idolatry

, which was written in a separate passage and is not included with the sin offering for forbidden fat, from where do we know that a change of sacred designation or a change of ownership invalidates it?

And likewise, this question is necessary with regard to the three sin offerings written in the passage of the sliding-scale offering, but not stated in the passage of the sin offering for forbidden fat:

The sin offering

of witnesses [who were adjured with the oath of testimony to come and testify, but falsely denied knowing the testimony and did not testify], who are obligated to bring a sliding-scale sin offering for

hearing the voice

of an oath.

And likewise, the sin offering brought for a false oath called

“utterance of the lips.”

And likewise, the sin offering brought to atone for

impurity of the Temple and its sacrificial foods

, from where do we know that if they are not performed for their sake, they are disqualified?

And we resolve it:

The sin offering for idolatry is derived

by means of a “what do we find” analogy

from the sin offering for forbidden fat

, since it is comparable to it:

as

it comes for an obligation involving

karet, like it

—the sin offering for forbidden fat—which comes for an inadvertent sin whose intentional violation is punishable by karet.

And all the others [the

sin offerings for hearing the voice, utterance of the lips, and impurity of the Temple and its sacrificial foods, which]

are derived

by means of

a bama analogy

from the three sin offerings—forbidden fat, a leper, and a nazirite.

The sin offering for impurity of the Temple and its sacrificial foods, although its intentional violation involves karet, cannot be derived by a “what do we find” analogy from the sin offering for forbidden fat, since Scripture was lenient with regard to it in that a poor person brings a bird sin offering.

The Sages taught: A

sacrifice of

Passover

that they offered

at its appointed time

, on Passover eve, if he performed it

with its proper designation

, it is

valid.

But if he performed it

not with its proper designation

, it is

disqualified.

But

if he offered it

during the rest of the days of the year

, when it is offered as a peace offering and not as a Passover offering, its law is reversed: If he performed it

with its proper designation

, with the designation of a Passover offering, it is

disqualified

, since this is not the time for a Passover offering; but if he removed from it the designation “Passover offering” by performing it

not with its proper designation

, it is

valid

, and it is offered as a peace offering.

(The

shin-lamed-vav, kuf-bet-alef, yod-tzadi, mem-mem,

reish, resh, tzadi,

alef, bet,

alef,

sign)

These are mnemonic signs for the names of the amoraim who will be mentioned in this sugya.

And the Gemara discusses:

From where are these matters

that a Passover offering performed during the rest of the year not with its proper designation is valid, derived?

Avuh of Shmuel said: The verse states:

“And if his offering is from the flock”—

“for a sacrifice of peace offerings to Hashem.”

And we interpret it:

Something that comes

only

from the flock

, namely, a Passover offering, which is offered only from the flock,

shall be for a sacrifice of peace offerings. Since if he were to offer it on Passover eve with the designation of a peace offering it would be disqualified, the verse must be teaching us that if he wishes to offer a Passover offering during the rest of the year, he must offer it with the designation of a peace offering, for this is what renders it fit to be offered outside its proper time.

Since if one were to sacrifice it on the eve of Passover for the purpose of a peace-offering it would be invalid, the verse must be informing us that if one seeks to sacrifice a Paschal offering during the rest of the year, he must sacrifice it for the purpose of a peace-offering, because that is what makes it fit to be offered when it is not its proper time.

But the Gemara objects: If the source for permitting it during the rest of the year specifically when it is offered not with its proper designation is derived from this verse,

say

: Only if he offers it with the designation of

peace offerings—

yes [indeed, then it is rendered fit]; but if he offers it with the designation of

—indeed, then it becomes valid—but if one offers it for

something else,

such as an elevation offering, it is

not

rendered fit. This cannot be said, for the language of the beraita is: “If he slaughtered it during the rest of the year not with its proper designation, it is valid”—the meaning is that even if he slaughtered the Passover offering with the designation of an elevation offering or a sin offering, it is valid as a peace offering!?

And it answers:

Rabbi Ila said that Rabbi Yohanan said:

The verse states

“for a sacrifice,”

and this word is superfluous, as it could have said, “and if for peace offerings.” It was written in order

to include every sacrifice

, so that if the Passover offering is slaughtered during the rest of the year for the sake of any sacrifice, it is valid.

We inquire: If it is stated that a Passover offering is valid throughout the year when offered “for the sake of any sacrifice,”

say

that the Torah means to say that

for every

sacrifice

for which he slaughters

the Passover offering during the rest of the year with its proper designation,

it should become like it!

And if he slaughters the Passover offering during the rest of the year with the designation of an elevation offering, it should be considered an elevation offering!?

And we reject this:

If it had been written

in the superfluous wording of the verse,

“for peace offerings and for a sacrifice,”

it would have been possible to explain the Torah’s intent

as you say

—that it should be considered like every sacrifice for which it was slaughtered with its proper designation, for that is how the verse would be understood: either for peace offerings or for any other sacrifice.

But

now that it is written

“for a sacrifice of peace offerings,”

the meaning of the verse is:

for every

sacrifice

for which he slaughters it

, even an elevation offering—

it shall be a peace offering!

We still inquire: From where do you derive from the superfluous word “for a sacrifice” that a Passover offering slaughtered for the sake of every sacrifice is valid?

Say:

“For a sacrifice”

is a generalization;

“peace offerings”

is a specification.

According to the thirteen principles by which the Torah is interpreted, we say:

A generalization followed by a specification—

the generalization includes only what is specified.

Consequently, only if he slaughtered the Passover offering for the sake of

peace offerings—yes [indeed, it is valid]; but if he slaughtered it for the sake of

—indeed, it is valid—but if one slaughtered it for

something else, no

, it is not rendered fit, for the designation of Passover was not removed from it, and it is like a Passover offering slaughtered outside its proper time without uprooting its designation, which is disqualified!? And we answer: Even if you would say that “for a sacrifice” is a generalization and “peace offerings” is a specification, “to Hashem” is written after them, and thereby it

“to the Lord,”

and through this it

returns and generalizes

—the verse again generalizes to include everything similar to the specification [as is the method of interpretation for a generalization, specification, and generalization]. This includes the other animal sacrifices as well: if one slaughtered a Passover offering for their sake, it is valid. There is no practical difference whether we make it valid for the sake of every sacrifice by virtue of the superfluous word “for a sacrifice,” or through the derivation of a generalization, specification, and generalization.

Rabbi Yaakov of Nehar Pekod challenges this: Is it possible to say that “to Hashem” returns and generalizes, and to expound it as a generalization, specification, and generalization?

For

the latter generalization is not comparable to the first generalization

[and when the first and final generalizations are not comparable, this principle of interpretation is not applied]. For

the first generalization,

namely, “a sacrifice,”

includes

the Passover offering slaughtered for the sake of

animal sacrifices

[animal offerings]

and no more

, whereas from

the latter generalization,

namely,

“to Hashem,”

it is possible to learn that it is valid if slaughtered for the sake of

any

offering

that is

offered

to Hashem

,

even if he slaughtered it

for the

sake of

bird offerings,

and even if he performed it

for the

sake of

meal offerings!?

And we answer:

This tanna—

he is the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael

, who

expounds through generalizations and specifications

even

in a case such as this

, where the final generalization is not comparable to the first generalization. Accordingly, here too it is possible to expound as follows:

A generalization, a specification, and a generalization—you may derive only what is similar to the specification:

Just as the specification

[peace offerings]

is explicitly one not with the proper designation

of the Passover offering, and thereby uproots it from its status as Passover,

and is valid

to be offered during the rest of the year as a peace offering,

so too, anything that is not with its proper designation

, such as when it is offered for the sake of an elevation offering, removes its designation of Passover

and is valid

as a peace offering!

And we ask: If the verse is expounded as a generalization, specification, and generalization, we can derive the following as well:

If the specification

[peace offerings]

is explicitly

that it is

something brought as a vow or a freewill offering, so too every

sacrifice

brought as a vow or a freewill offering

. Consequently, only if he performed it for the sake of

an elevation offering or peace offerings

, which are brought as vows or freewill offerings,

yes [indeed, it is rendered fit]; but if he performed it for the sake of

a sin offering or a guilt offering

no

—the designation of Passover is not removed from it, and it is disqualified, and it does not count even as a peace offering!?

Rather,

certainly, one cannot derive from this verse a general rule, a specific rule, and a general rule, because the expression “for a sacrifice of shelamim” is not phrased as a general rule. “A sacrifice of shelamim” is a single expression, and it cannot be divided into a general rule and a specific rule, saying that “sacrifice” is a general rule and “shelamim” is a specific rule. Rather, the entire source for rendering a Pesach slaughtered not for its designated purpose valid during the rest of the year is derived from the superfluous wording of the verse. It would have sufficed to write merely “shelamim,” yet it says “for a sacrifice of shelamim,” and we derive:

“For a sacrifice”

is an amplification;

and the verse made this word superfluous in order to include all offerings: if one slaughtered a Pesach for their designated purpose, its designation as a Pesach is uprooted, and during the rest of the year it is valid.

And again we raise the objection stated above: If “for a sacrifice” is an amplification,

say—

for whatever purpose he slaughters it, let it be like that—

and if he slaughters it for the sake of an olah, it should be an olah, and if he slaughters it for the sake of a ḥatat, it should be a ḥatat?

We answer:

Rabbi Avin said:

This Pesach was initially consecrated as an offering that is eaten. Therefore, when it is slaughtered during the rest of the year not for its designated purpose and its designation is uprooted from it, the law governing its being eaten is not uprooted.