Zevachim 85a (פה.) — the Talmud in English

And the reason is that it stands to reason that

this

should not be

inferior to one who slaughters outside and offers outside

for which one is liable both for its slaughter and for its offering, even though it is not fit to be offered inside, since it was slaughtered outside [that is, one must distinguish between an item that was fit to be offered inside and then became disqualified, in which case one is not liable for offering it outside, and an item that was never fit to be offered inside, in which case one is liable; and the same applies to an animal slaughtered at night: since it was never fit to be offered inside, one is liable for offering it outside].

Rav Hiyya bar Avin raises an objection

to the statement of Rabbi Yohanan: We learned in the Mishna:

One who slaughters a bird

of sacrificial animals

inside and offers

it afterward

outside is exempt

from liability for offering it, because he offered something that is not accepted inside, as a slaughtered bird is not sacrificed; only a bird that underwent melika is sacrificed. But if he

slaughters

the bird

outside and offers

it

outside, he is liable

both for its slaughter, because the Torah expanded the liability to include everything slaughtered outside, and for its offering, because the Torah expanded the liability to include offering everything that was slaughtered, just as one is liable for its slaughter.

And according to Rabbi Yohanan, why is one exempt for offering a bird that he slaughtered inside?

Let us say that this offering

is

not inferior to one who slaughters and offers outside!?

For even a bird slaughtered inside was never fit to be offered inside, since it did not undergo melika!

The Gemara says: Indeed,

this is a refutation

of Rabbi Yohanan.

Alternatively,

it is possible to reconcile Rabbi Yohanan’s statement:

The slaughter of the bird inside

is defective, for this is not considered “slaughter”; rather,

he merely killed it

because slaughtering a bird inside is not applicable at all, neither with regard to non-sacred animals nor with regard to sacrificial animals. This is unlike slaughter at night, which is considered slaughter with regard to non-sacred animals, and therefore, with regard to sacrificial animals, it is called “invalid slaughter,” but it is nevertheless slaughter.

Ulla said: With regard to the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that one offered

on the altar

before the sprinkling of their blood,

once they have ascended,

they do not descend.

Even though they may not be offered until after the sprinkling of the blood, nevertheless, once they have ascended,

they have become the altar’s food,

and therefore they do not descend.

Rav Zeira said: We too have learned this

in our Mishna: “And these are the ones that, if they ascended, do not descend,” etc., “whose blood was spilled and whose blood went outside the curtains.”

And the case there

From this it follows:

And just as there

when the blood was spilled,

if he comes to sprinkle

the blood after offering the sacrificial portions,

he has no

blood

to sprinkle,

even so

you said

that

if they ascended, they do not descend; here,

when he offered the sacrificial portions before the sprinkling,

if he comes to sprinkle

the blood,

he may sprinkle,

since the blood exists;

all the more so

they do not descend.

The Gemara rejects this:

Interpret

and explain the Mishna as referring

to offerings of the most sacred order,

whose bodily sanctity [for their offering] exists even before the sprinkling; therefore, if they ascended, they do not descend. But in fact, with regard to the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity, which are not sanctified with bodily sanctity [for the purpose of their offering] until after the sprinkling of the blood, if they ascended, they descend. And we raise a difficulty:

But the Paschal offering is an offering of lesser sanctity,

and it too is taught in the beraita among those that, if they ascended, do not descend. For it is stated in the beraita: “The Paschal offering and the sin offering that one slaughtered not for their sake, if they ascended, they do not descend” [and the Gemara assumed that this applies also with regard to the other disqualifications listed by the beraita at the beginning]. If so, it is apparent that even the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that ascended when the blood was spilled do not descend!?

And we answer:

Interpret it as referring to a case where it was slaughtered not for its sake,

not that the beraita taught that a Paschal offering that ascended does not descend in the case where its blood was spilled. Since it is an offering of lesser sanctity, its law in that case is that if it ascended, it descends.

The Gemara brings another proof for Ulla’s ruling:

We learned

in our Mishna:

And all of them,

the valid offerings,

that ascended

while they were

alive onto the altar, descend.

This indicates that specifically if they ascended alive,

but

if they ascended

slaughtered, they do not descend.

Is it not so

that the Mishna is referring to all offerings,

whether offerings of the most sacred order or offerings of lesser sanctity,

as “all of them” is stated? It cannot be explained that this refers to all the disqualified offerings mentioned above, since those disqualifications can exist only after slaughter and not while the animal is alive. What, then, has the Mishna taught us by saying that if they are slaughtered they do not descend? It is obvious that a valid offering whose blood was sprinkled and which ascended onto the altar does not descend. Rather, the Mishna must be dealing with a case where these valid offerings ascended before their blood was sprinkled, in accordance with Ulla’s statement: even though their blood was not sprinkled, if they ascended, they do not descend!

The Gemara rejects this:

No,

do not infer from here that all slaughtered offerings do not descend, including offerings of lesser sanctity. Rather, this is what you should infer:

As for slaughtered offerings

that ascended—

some of them descend,

namely, offerings of lesser sanctity;

and some of them do not descend,

namely, offerings of the most sacred order.

And we raise a difficulty:

But it teaches “all of them”,

in the Mishna. Does this not mean that “all of them” are included even in the inference we drew—“but slaughtered offerings do not descend”—to indicate that all of them are included in this law?

And we answer: What the Mishna states,

“all of them,”

means

all those that were alive

only: all the living offerings that ascended descend. It included all of them only with regard to this matter. But the law of the slaughtered offerings that you inferred does not apply to all of them; it applies only to offerings of the most sacred order.

And we raise a difficulty: The law that living offerings that ascended descend is

obvious,

for since they return to the altar after slaughter and are valid, they must descend; the Mishna should not have needed to teach this law at all. It follows that the principal novelty here concerns what we inferred regarding slaughtered offerings, and if so, the emphasis “and all of them” should also apply to this matter!?

And we answer:

Actually, what the Mishna stated, “and all of them,” means all those that were alive,

In fact, the word “all” in the Mishna refers to

and

the case here is offerings that developed a defect

in the membrane of the eye, and

the Mishna stated that if they ascended they descend

in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, who said

that blemished animals,

if they ascended, do not descend. This refers to the particular defect of a blemish in the membrane of the eye, teaching that they are disqualified even while alive and that if they ascended they descend. Although the law with regard to all disqualified offerings is that just as, if they ascended, they do not descend, so too, if they descended, they may not ascend again, nevertheless, if they ascended while alive, they descend, because the altar does not sanctify disqualified offerings.

and this is with regard to this blemish, which is in the membrane of the eye, to teach that they are disqualified while alive and that if they rose they descend. And although the law with all disqualified offerings is that just as if they rise they do not descend, so too if they descend they do not rise, nevertheless, if they rose while alive they descend, because the altar does not sanctify disqualified offerings.

And we raise a difficulty:

According to what did you establish

this statement of the Mishna

as referring to disqualified offerings

that ascended while alive?

Read the latter clause: “And similarly, an olah that ascended alive to the top of the altar shall descend”;

but if one had already

slaughtered

it

at the top of the altar, he shall flay and cut it into pieces

there

in its place. But if

the olah is

disqualified,

is it

fit for flaying and cutting into pieces?

For

“and you shall place it” [

Leviticus 1]

the Merciful One states,

and we learn from this:

it—

a valid offering, but not it—a disqualified offering!

If it became disqualified before it was flayed, it is burned in the Temple courtyard. If so, even this offering that had already ascended onto the altar was indeed sanctified by the altar and its law is that it does not descend; nevertheless, it does not require flaying and cutting into pieces!? And we answer:

The latter clause

refers

to an

olah

that is valid,

and this is what the Mishna says: “And similarly, a valid olah that ascended alive to the top of the altar shall descend,” etc.

And what does it teach us

by this? Since it is valid, it is obvious that it should descend, as it returns to the altar after slaughter!? Rather, the novelty is

that there is flaying and cutting into pieces at the top of the altar

even for a valid olah. When one slaughtered it there, he need not bring it down and flay it below [even though he subsequently returns it]; rather, he flays it at the top of the altar.

And we raise a difficulty:

But according to the one who says that there is no flaying and cutting into pieces at the top of the altar

[in the case of a valid olah], who holds that since it can be returned to the top of the altar after being flayed below, it should not be flayed above, as this is not proper conduct,

what can be said?

How can we establish the Mishna’s statement? According to him, the Mishna can be established neither with regard to a valid olah, whose flaying must be performed below, nor with regard to a disqualified one, which does not require flaying at all!?

And we answer:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case where it had

for this offering

a time when it was fit

for flaying: it ascended alive to the top of the altar while it was valid,

and became disqualified

after he slaughtered it there and sprinkled its blood.

And

even though a disqualified olah is not fit for flaying and cutting into pieces, nevertheless, in this case, where it became disqualified after the sprinkling, he flays it, for our Mishna is in accordance with the opinion of

Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon,

who holds that in such a case even a disqualified olah is fit for flaying and cutting into pieces,

as he said: Once the blood was sprinkled and the meat was accepted for one moment, he shall flay it, and its hide

is

given to the priests

and is not burned with it. Since, if it had been below, it would be fit for flaying and cutting into pieces, the same law applies when it was slaughtered at the top of the altar, its blood was sprinkled, and it became disqualified: its hide is to be flayed and is not burned with it [and in this all agree that the flaying of a disqualified olah is performed at the top of the altar and not below].

And we challenge this:

But if so,

what

does it teach

in the beraita concerning a burnt-offering that ascended alive to the altar and was slaughtered: “He shall flay it and cut it up in its place,”

how does he proceed? He brings the innards down below and washes them

so that they will be burned when they are clean, and if the beraita is dealing with an invalid burnt-offering [

why do I need

all this? After all, once he brings it down, he will no longer bring it back up]!?

And we answer:

What should we do? Shall we offer them with their excrement

together with their excrement? After all, Scripture has already said concerning an abominable offering [Malachi 1]

“Present it, please, to your governor”?!

to the official and ruler over you. That is, present that abominable offering to him.

“Would he accept you or show you favor”?!

when such an offering is presented to him. Therefore, it is obvious that they may not be burned without being washed, since they are abominable.

The one raising the objection explains his objection:

This is what we are saying:

since they are not returned to be burned, then

why do I need to wash them?

And we answer: They must be washed, since

if another kohen happens to come and does not know

that this burnt-offering was rendered invalid,

he would take them up,

and therefore they must be washed so that that kohen will burn them when they are clean.