Zevachim 69b — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Yehuda says: It imparts ritual impurity

in the throat, and it does not cease to have the status of an animal carcass.

Their dispute also applies to an unconsecrated bird that was slaughtered and found to be a tereifa—an animal with a condition that renders it unfit for consumption. According to Rabbi Meir, the slaughter purifies it from the ritual impurity of an animal carcass, whereas according to Rabbi Yehuda it does not.

Rabbi Meir said:

these matters

follow an a-fortiori inference

:

If the carcass of an animal

whose impurity is more severe,

as it imparts impurity through contact and through carrying,

nevertheless

its slaughter purifies

even

its tereifa status from its impurity,

as the Gemara—the Talmudic discussion of the Mishna—will derive below,

the carcass of a bird

whose impurity is less severe,

as it does not impart impurity through contact and through carrying, should it not certainly follow that its slaughter purifies its tereifa status from its impurity?!

And now that we have learned through an a-fortiori inference that the slaughter of an unconsecrated tereifa bird purifies it from its impurity, we derive by means of a foundational analogy that the pinching of the neck of a consecrated tereifa bird purifies it as well:

Just as we find with the slaughter

of an unconsecrated bird

that it makes it fit for consumption

when it is not a tereifa,

and purifies its tereifa status from its impurity, so too its pinching

in the case of consecrated offerings

which makes it fit for consumption

in the case of a bird sin-offering, when it is not a tereifa,

should purify

the pinching

of its tereifa status from its impurity!

Rabbi Yosei says: It is sufficient

for the carcass of a kosher bird to be

like the carcass of an animal,

since we learned the law of purifying a tereifa bird from the case of an animal, whose tereifa status is purified through slaughter, it is sufficient for the bird, whose law is derived from the animal, to be like the case from which it is derived. Just as with an animal, only

its slaughter purifies it, but not its pinching,

so too, with a bird, one may say that only slaughter purifies a tereifa, but not pinching.

We have therefore learned three opinions regarding the slaughter and pinching of a tereifa bird in order to purify it from the impurity of an animal carcass:

According to Rabbi Meir: Both slaughter in the case of unconsecrated birds and pinching in the case of consecrated birds purify it.

According to Rabbi Yehuda: Neither slaughter nor pinching purifies it.

According to Rabbi Yosei: Slaughter purifies an unconsecrated bird, but pinching does not purify a consecrated bird.

Gemara:

We raise a question about the fact that Rabbi Meir disagrees with Rabbi Yosei, who says, “It is sufficient”: Is it possible that

Rabbi Meir does not expound

the principle of

“it is sufficient”

“for what is derived through an inference to be no more stringent than the case from which it is derived”?

But

“it is sufficient”—

“it is sufficient”

is a principle of Torah law!?

For it was taught

in the beraita of Rabbi Yishmael—a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna—that the Torah is expounded through thirteen interpretive principles, and an a-fortiori inference is one of them:

How is the principle of an a-fortiori inference applied?

That is, from where do we know that the Torah is to be expounded through the principle of an a-fortiori inference? As it is written concerning Miriam:

“And the Lord said to Moses: If her father had surely spit in her face, and so on,

would she not be ashamed for seven days?” The expression “would she not be ashamed” is an expression of astonishment, and it conveys an a-fortiori inference: If she would be ashamed for seven days because of her father’s reprimand, then

all the more so, when reprimanded by the Divine Presence,

the period of reprimand should be at least twice as long,

fourteen days!

This is the source that the Torah is to be expounded through an a-fortiori inference,

but

from the fact that Miriam was confined for only seven days and not fourteen days, as would have been learned from the a-fortiori inference, we see that

“what is derived through an inference is to be no more stringent than the case from which it is derived,”

meaning that one may not impose an additional stringency on what is derived through an inference—on what is learned through an a-fortiori inference—when that stringency does not exist in the source from which it was derived. Therefore Miriam was confined for only seven days. The same applies wherever the Torah is expounded through an a-fortiori inference: The derived case is not more stringent than the teaching case.

?If so, the question arises: How could Rabbi Meir not apply the principle of “it is sufficient” in our Mishna?

Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Avin said: Rabbi Meir

did not derive his ruling through an a-fortiori inference; rather,

he found a verse and expounded it!

It is written in the passage concerning the impurity of an animal carcass:

“This is the law of the animal and the bird.”

And we expound:

In what respect did the Torah make an animal equal to a bird, and a bird equal to an animal?

Yet their laws of impurity are different, since

an animal imparts impurity through contact and through carrying,

whereas

a bird does not impart impurity through contact and through carrying.

On the other hand,

a bird imparts impurity to garments while in the throat

because the carcass of a kosher bird imparts impurity to the garments he is wearing when he swallows it, whereas the carcass of an

animal does not impart impurity to garments while in the throat,

for if another person inserted an olive-sized portion of a carcass into his throat, he would not become impure—neither because of eating, since eating the carcass of an animal does not impart impurity, nor because of contact, since if the carcass did not touch his body externally but only remained inside his throat, he does not become impure. And we derive in tractate Nidda that the impurity of the throat does not apply to it—!?

If so, it is difficult: Why did the Torah compare the impurity of an animal and a bird?

Rather,

for this purpose the Torah compared an animal to a bird,

to teach you:

Just as an animal,

its slaughter is

what makes it fit for consumption,

since through it the animal becomes permitted for consumption, and it is also what

purifies

its

tereifa status from its impurity, so too a bird: the act that makes it fit for consumption,

namely, pinching in the case of consecrated offerings, and, all the more so, slaughter in the case of unconsecrated birds,

purifies its tereifa status from its impurity!

The Gemara now explains Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion in our Mishna:

And Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds that neither slaughter in the case of unconsecrated birds nor pinching in the case of consecrated birds purifies a tereifa,

what is his reason?

And we explain:

Rabba said:

Rabbi Yehuda found another verse

another

and expounded it,

concerning the carcass of a kosher bird,

as follows,

as it is written: “And the person who eats

an animal carcass or a tereifa—

he shall launder his garments, bathe in water, remain impure until evening, and then become pure.”

Rabbi Yehuda said:

“A tereifa,”

which is written in this verse,

why is it stated?

For in either case:

If a tereifa

is considered

alive

—and there is a dispute whether a tereifa retains the status of a living creature or is considered as though it were dead—then when it dies, it becomes an animal carcass, like every carcass of a kosher bird. If so, the question arises:

“An animal carcass”

already

appears

in that same verse, so why was it necessary to add “tereifa”?

And

And if

we accept the opinion of the one who says that

we follow the one who says that a tereifa does not live, then

already during its lifetime

it is included in the category of an animal carcass,

from the moment it became a tereifa it was impure; so how can its impurity as an animal carcass now be removed?

Rather,

Rabbi Yehuda expounded that the verse comes

to include a tereifa that was slaughtered, teaching that it imparts impurity!

In fact, even if a tereifa is considered alive and is not included in the category of an animal carcass, the Torah teaches that the status of tereifa causes it to become impure during its lifetime, at the moment it becomes a tereifa. Slaughter does not purify it from this impurity, since slaughter does not function like a ritual immersion pool that removes an impurity that had already descended upon it! [Based on Rashi in the manuscript; see Rashi and Tosafot carefully]!

After Rabba explained why tereifa is written after animal carcass, the Gemara raises a question from another place where they are written together:

Rav Shizevi said to Rabba: If so, now that you say this, as it is written

concerning an animal:

“And the fat of an animal carcass and the fat of a tereifa

“may be used for any work,” from which we learn that the fat of an animal carcass does not impart impurity like the carcass itself,

there too should we say

“tereifa”

“why is it stated”

after “animal carcass” has already been stated? For in either case:

If a tereifa

is considered

alive,

it is obvious that when it dies it becomes an animal carcass, and

“animal carcass”

already

appears

in that verse. And

in this verse. And if a tereifa does not live, it is already included in the category of an animal carcass

during its lifetime, so why was it necessary to write it, after “animal carcass” had already been explicitly written?

Rather,

what can you say, according to your approach above? That the verse comes

to include

a case of

a tereifa that was slaughtered, whose fat is pure; which implies that the tereifa

itself, its flesh,

imparts impurity.

But is it possible to say this?

For Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav—and some say

and there are those who say that this law

was taught in a beraita:

it was taught:

“When an animal dies”—

from the fact that “from the animal” is written, it is inferred precisely

that some animals impart impurity,

while

and some animals do not impart impurity! And which is this?

The animal that does not impart impurity is

this

animal

that was a slaughtered tereifa,

for although it is a tereifa, its slaughter was effective in purifying it. According to Rabba’s approach, we would therefore learn that it is impure?!

Rav Shizevi continues to raise his objection:

Rather,

necessarily,

this

“tereifa”

is needed

for another exposition,

to exclude

an

impure animal

whose fat is not pure, but impure like its flesh [only the fat of a carcass from a kosher animal is pure]. And this is how we derive and expound it: “Tereifa”

means an animal whose species includes the category of tereifa,

that is, an animal that is kosher and becomes forbidden only because it became a tereifa,

this one is excluded,

an impure animal,

whose species does not include the category of tereifa

and whose prohibition is because it is an impure animal, not because it is a tereifa.

And if this is how you expound the verse there, concerning fat,

here too,

in the case of the carcass of a kosher bird, you should expound from the same principle

to exclude an impure bird, whose species does not include the category of tereifa,

and therefore its carcass does not impart the impurity of the throat, as does the carcass of a kosher bird. If so, the question remains for Rabba: From where can he derive from this verse, in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, that the slaughter of a kosher tereifa bird does not purify it?

We answer on behalf of Rabba:

An impure bird,

whose carcass does not impart impurity,

according to Rabbi Yehuda,

is derived from

“animal carcass”

—he derives it from there!

For it was taught: Rabbi Yehuda says: Could it be that the carcass of an impure bird imparts impurity to garments while in the throat?

The verse states: “He shall not eat an animal carcass or a tereifa

in order to become impure through it!” And we expound:

Only that whose prohibition is “Do not eat an animal carcass”

imparts to the person who eats it the impurity of garments in the throat.

This one is excluded,

an impure bird,

whose prohibition is not “Do not eat an animal carcass,” but rather “Do not eat an impure animal”,

and therefore it does not impart impurity to the person who eats it.

We challenge the explanation given above: You said that the word “tereifa” in the verse concerning “the fat of an animal carcass and the fat of a tereifa” is needed to teach that the fat of an impure animal imparts impurity like its flesh. But this can be learned from the meaning of the word “animal carcass” itself: