Zevachim 69b (סט:) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Yehuda says: It renders one impure

in the mouth, and it does not leave the status of a neveila.

Their dispute also applies to a non-sacred bird that was slaughtered and found to be tereifa: according to Rabbi Meir, the slaughter purifies it from the impurity of a neveila, whereas according to Rabbi Yehuda it does not.

Rabbi Meir said:

And the matter follows a

kal va-chomer

:

If the carcass of a domesticated animal,

whose impurity is more severe,

as it renders one impure through contact and carrying,

nevertheless

its slaughter purifies

even

its tereifa from its impurity,

as the Gemara will derive below,

then the carcass of a bird,

whose impurity is less severe,

as it does not render one impure through contact and carrying—is it not logical that its slaughter should purify its tereifa from its impurity?!

Now that we have derived by means of a kal va-chomer that the slaughter of a non-sacred tereifa bird purifies it from its impurity, we derive by means of a binyan av that the melika of a tereifa bird among consecrated offerings purifies it:

Just as we find with its slaughter,

of a non-sacred bird,

that it renders it fit for consumption

when it is not a tereifa,

and purifies its tereifa from its impurity, so too, its melika,

among consecrated offerings,

which renders it fit for consumption

in a bird sin-offering when it is not a tereifa,

should purify

the bird’s melika

from its tereifa’s impurity!

Rabbi Yosei says: It is sufficient

for the carcass of a kosher bird to be

like the carcass of a domesticated animal,

since, having learned the law of the purification of a tereifa bird from a domesticated animal whose tereifa is purified through slaughter, it is sufficient for the bird, whose law is derived from that of the domesticated animal, to be like the case from which it is derived. Just as with a domesticated animal only

its slaughter purifies it, but not its melika,

so too, with a bird one may say that only slaughter purifies a tereifa, but not melika.

We learn that there are three opinions regarding the slaughter and melika of a tereifa bird in order to purify it from the status of a neveila:

According to Rabbi Meir—both slaughter in the case of non-sacred animals and melika in the case of consecrated offerings purify it.

According to Rabbi Yehuda—neither slaughter nor melika purifies it.

According to Rabbi Yosei—slaughter purifies a non-sacred bird, but melika does not purify a consecrated bird.

Gemara:

We raise an objection concerning the fact that Rabbi Meir disagrees with Rabbi Yosei, who says “dayyo”:

Does Rabbi Meir not expound

the principle of

dayyo,

“that which is derived by means of an inference must be equivalent to the case from which it is derived”?

But

dayyo—

“it is sufficient”

is it not a Torah principle?!

As it was taught

in the baraita of Rabbi Yishmael: The Torah is expounded through thirteen hermeneutical principles, and a kal va-chomer is one of them:

How is a kal va-chomer derived?

That is to say: From where do we know that the Torah is to be expounded through the principle of kal va-chomer? For it is written concerning Miriam: “

And the Lord said to Moses: If her father had but spit in her face, would she not be ashamed for seven days, etc.

would she not be ashamed for seven days?” The expression “would she not be ashamed” is an expression of astonishment, and it conveys a kal va-chomer: If, for her father’s rebuke, she must be ashamed for seven days, then

all the more so before the Divine Presence,

the rebuke should last at least twice as long,

fourteen days!

This is the source that the Torah is to be expounded through the principle of kal va-chomer.

However,

from the fact that Miriam was confined for only seven days and not for fourteen days—as would be derived through the kal va-chomer—we see that

that which is derived by means of an inference must be equivalent to the case from which it is derived: One may not impose an additional stringency upon that which is derived by inference, that is, upon what is learned through a kal va-chomer, when that stringency does not exist in the source from which it was derived. Therefore Miriam was confined for only seven days, and so it is everywhere that we expound through the principle of kal va-chomer: The derived case is not more stringent than the source.

meaning that one may not impose an additional stringency on what is derived through an inference—on what is learned through an a-fortiori inference—when that stringency does not exist in the source from which it was derived. Therefore Miriam was confined for only seven days. The same applies wherever the Torah is expounded through an a-fortiori inference: The derived case is not more stringent than the teaching case.

If so, the question arises: How could Rabbi Meir not have derived “dayyo” in our Mishna?

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Avin, said: Rabbi Meir

did not expound this through a kal va-chomer; rather,

he found a verse and expounded it!

It is written in the passage concerning the impurity of a neveila: “

This is the law of the domesticated animal and the bird.”

And we expound:

In what respect did the domesticated animal become equivalent to the bird, and the bird to the domesticated animal?

But their laws of impurity are different, as

a domesticated animal renders one impure through contact and carrying,

whereas

a bird does not render one impure through contact and carrying.

Conversely,

a bird renders garments impure in the mouth,

as the carcass of a kosher bird renders impure the garments that the person is wearing at the time he swallows it, whereas the carcass of

a domesticated animal does not render garments impure in the mouth,

for if another person thrust an olive-bulk of a carcass down his throat, he would not become impure—neither because of eating, since eating the carcass of a domesticated animal does not render one impure, nor because of contact, since if the carcass did not touch his body externally but only inside his mouth, he would not become impure; and the impurity of the mouth, as we expound in tractate Niddah, does not apply to it [unclear: the source sentence is incomplete].

If so, why did the Torah equate the impurity of a domesticated animal and a bird?!

Rather,

the Torah equated the domesticated animal with the bird for this purpose,

to teach you:

Just as with a domesticated animal,

its slaughter is

that which renders it fit for consumption,

through it the animal becomes permitted for consumption, and it is also what

purifies

its

tereifa from its impurity, so too, in the case of a bird, that which renders it fit for consumption,

namely, melika in the case of consecrated offerings, and all the more so slaughter in the case of non-sacred animals,

purifies its tereifa from its impurity!

The Gemara comes to explain Rabbi Yehuda’s position in our Mishna:

And Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds that neither slaughter in the case of non-sacred animals nor melika in the case of consecrated offerings purifies a tereifa,

what is his reason?

And we explain:

Rabba said:

Rabbi Yehuda found

another

verse

concerning the carcass of a kosher bird

and expounded it,

as it is written: “And the person who eats

a neveila or a tereifa—

he shall launder his garments, bathe in water, remain impure until evening, and become pure.”

Rabbi Yehuda said: “

Tereifa,”

which is written in this verse,

why was it stated?

In any event:

If a tereifa

is considered

alive [the matter is subject to a dispute as to whether a tereifa is considered to retain the status of “alive” or is regarded as though it were dead], then when it dies it becomes a neveila, like every carcass of a kosher bird. Thus, the difficulty arises:

—and there is a dispute whether a tereifa retains the status of a living creature or is considered as though it were dead—then when it dies, it becomes an animal carcass, like every carcass of a kosher bird. If so, the question arises:

The neveila

is already

stated

in that verse, so why was it necessary to add “tereifa”?

And

if

we accept the opinion of the one who says that

a tereifa does not live, then

already during its lifetime

it is included in the category of a neveila,

from the moment it became a tereifa, and from then it is impure. How, then, can its impurity as a neveila now be removed?

Rather,

Rabbi Yehuda expounded that the verse comes

to include a tereifa that was slaughtered, which renders one impure!

For in fact, even if a tereifa is alive and is not included in the category of a neveila, the Torah innovates that the status of tereifa brings impurity upon it during its lifetime, at the moment it becomes a tereifa, and slaughter does not purify it from this impurity. Slaughter is no more effective than a ritual bath for purifying an impurity that had already descended upon it! [Based on Rashi’s manuscript commentary; see Rashi and Tosafot carefully!].

After Rabba explained why “tereifa” was written after “neveila,” the Gemara raises a difficulty from another place where these terms are written together:

Rav Shizebi said to Rabba: If that is so, as it is written

concerning a domesticated animal, “

And the fat of a neveila and the fat of a tereifa

may be used for any manner of labor”—from this we learn that the fat of a neveila does not become impure like the neveila—

there too, let us say:

“Tereifa”

why was it stated,

after neveila had already been stated? For in any event:

If a tereifa

is considered

alive,

it is obvious that when it dies it becomes a neveila, and

neveila

is already

stated

in that verse. And

if a tereifa does not live, then it is included in the category of a neveila

already during its lifetime; why was it necessary to write it, after neveila had already been explicitly written?

Rather,

what can you say, according to your approach above, that the verse comes

to include

a case of

a tereifa that was slaughtered, whose fat is pure, indicating that it

itself, its flesh,

renders one impure?

But is it possible to say this, when

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said—and some say

that this law

was taught in a baraita

—the following: “

When one of the domesticated animals dies”—the word “of” in the verse precisely indicates

that

some of the domesticated animals render one impure,

while

some of the domesticated animals do not render one impure! And which is this?

The portion of domesticated animals that does not render one impure is

this

domesticated animal,

a tereifa that was slaughtered,

for although it was a tereifa, its slaughter was effective in purifying it. Yet according to Rabba’s approach, we have learned that it is impure?!

Rav Shizebi continues to challenge:

Rather,

necessarily,

this

“tereifa”

is necessary

for another derivation,

to exclude

a

non-kosher

domesticated animal, whose fat is not pure but impure like its flesh [only the fat of a neveila from a kosher domesticated animal is pure]. This is how we derive and expound it: “Tereifa”—

one whose species includes a tereifa,

that is, a domesticated animal that is kosher and becomes forbidden only because it became a tereifa;

this one is excluded,

a non-kosher domesticated animal,

whose species does not include a tereifa,

since its prohibition is due to its being a non-kosher domesticated animal, and not due to its being a tereifa.

And if this is how you expound the verse there, concerning fat,

here too,

concerning the carcass of a kosher bird, you should expound “whose species includes”

to exclude a non-kosher bird, whose species does not include a tereifa.

Therefore its carcass does not render one impure with the impurity of the mouth like a kosher bird. If so, Rabba’s position is difficult: From where does he derive from this verse, in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, that the slaughter of a kosher tereifa bird does not purify it?

We answer on behalf of Rabba:

A non-kosher bird,

whose carcass does not render one impure,

according to Rabbi Yehuda,

is derived from

“neveila”

itself!

As it was taught: Rabbi Yehuda says: One might have thought that the carcass of a non-kosher bird renders garments impure in the mouth.

The verse states: “A neveila or a tereifa he shall not eat

—to render him impure through it!” And we expound:

The one whose prohibition is due to the prohibition, “You shall not eat a neveila,”

is what renders the person who eats it impure with the impurity of garments in the mouth.

This one is excluded,

a non-kosher bird,

whose prohibition is not due to “You shall not eat a neveila,” but rather due to “You shall not eat what is non-kosher,”

and it does not render the person who eats it impure.

And we challenge the earlier interpretation, according to which the word “tereifa” in the verse concerning the fat of a neveila and the fat of a tereifa comes to teach that the fat of a non-kosher domesticated animal renders one impure like its flesh: This can be learned from the implication of the word “neveila” itself: