Zevachim 69a — the Talmud in English

And we challenge it:

But according to your reasoning,

that our Mishna is satisfactory according to Rabbi Yohanan, what is the purpose of what it teaches at the end: “Everyone

whose disqualification was not in the sacred domain”

imparts impurity in the throat?

What does this come to include?

And we answer:

Rather, the first clause

which teaches: Everyone whose disqualification was in the sacred domain does not impart impurity

comes to include the slaughtering of sacrificial birds inside

for sacrificial birds that were slaughtered in the Temple became disqualified because they are rendered fit only through melika, but they do not impart impurity in the throat; this law was not taught explicitly in the Mishna, but is derived from the first clause, which says “everyone” whose disqualification was in the sacred domain. Whereas the

final clause

which teaches: Everyone whose disqualification was not in the sacred domain imparts impurity in the throat

comes to include the melika of non-sacred birds outside

which are rendered fit only through slaughtering, and melika is not considered to purify them from the status of an unslaughtered carcass.

It was taught in a beraita in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan: If a non-kohen performs melika

or

if he performs melika

a kohen

it is disqualified,

and likewise

the piggul, the leftover, and the impure

in sacrificial birds, although they are forbidden in eating and in offering

do not impart impurity in the throat.

Rabbi Yitzhak said: I heard two

two traditions:

one

concerning

the taking of the handful

of a meal-offering by a

non-kohen,

and one concerning

the melika

of a bird by a

non-kohen.

And in these two traditions two laws were stated. In

one

tradition it was said that even if it ascended upon the altar,

it shall descend

from it, and in

one

tradition it was said: If it ascended,

it shall not descend!

And I do not know

with regard to which of them it shall descend and with regard to which it shall not descend.

Hezekiah said: It is reasonable

to say that

the taking of the handful

performed by a non-kohen

shall descend, whereas

the

melika

performed by a non-kohen

shall not descend.

We raise an objection:

What is different

about the melika of a non-kohen from the taking of the handful by a non-kohen?

And if you would say:

The melika

is preferable because

the

melika of a non-kohen

exists at a private altar,

for the melika of a non-kohen is valid there, and therefore it is also considered [valid] in the Temple, so that if it ascended it shall not descend—and after all,

the taking of the handful also exists at a private altar

by a non-kohen—why, then, if it ascended, shall it descend?

And if you would say: There is no

sacrifice of a

meal-offering at a private altar,

and consequently there is no taking of the handful there either, then, after all,

there are no birds either at a private altar

and there is no melika there.

For Rav Sheshet said: According to the one who says that there is a meal-offering at a private altar

there are birds at a private altar.

Whereas

according to the one who says that there is no meal-offering

at a private altar,

there are no birds

at a private altar!

And we explain:

What is the reason

of the one who says that there are no meal-offerings and birds at a private altar?

Because with regard to the sacrifices offered at a private altar at Mount Sinai it is stated: “And they offered peace-offerings,” and we expound:

“Sacrifices”

but not meal-offerings! “Sacrifices”

but not birds!

Thus meal-offerings and birds were excluded from a private altar.

And we return to the difficulty: What is different about the melika of a non-kohen, that if it ascended it shall not descend, from the taking of the handful by a non-kohen, that if it ascended it shall descend?

And we answer:

Rather, say

that this is why the melika of a non-kohen is preferable, so that if it ascended it shall not descend, whereas the taking of the handful by a non-kohen shall descend:

there is no sanctification by a service vessel for a meal-offering at a private altar,

therefore we do not derive the taking of the handful by a non-kohen in the Temple from the taking of the handful by a non-kohen at a private altar. For the taking of the handful at a private altar differs from the taking of the handful in the Temple in that at a private altar it is possible to take the handful even from a meal-offering that was not sanctified in a service vessel, and therefore a non-kohen is valid for it; whereas in the Temple the meal-offering is sanctified in a service vessel and is disqualified when performed by a non-kohen. But with regard to melika, where there is no distinction between the Temple and a private altar, for in both places it is the same melika, once we find that a non-kohen is fit to perform melika at a private altar, we derive from it concerning a non-kohen who performed melika in the Temple that, if it ascended upon the altar, it shall not descend.

We learned in the Mishna:

“If he performed melika with the left hand or at night, etc.”

The melika is effective to purify [the bird] from the impurity of the carcass of a kosher bird.

The Sages taught: Could it be that melika

in sacrificial birds,

which

is performed

inside

the courtyard,

imparts impurity to garments in the throat? The verse states

with regard to the impurity of a kosher bird:

“carcass,”

for only the carcass of a kosher bird imparts impurity, but not a sacrificial bird that underwent melika. And we raise an objection: From where do we know that the sacrificial bird that underwent melika is excluded by this verse? Perhaps

this too is a carcass,

except that the melika of the bird sin-offering was permitted for eating by the priests by a decree of the verse; but perhaps a bird burnt-offering that underwent melika, whose eating was not permitted, for it is entirely burned on the altar, also imparts impurity according to the law of the carcass of a kosher bird?

And we answer:

Rather,

we derive it from here:

The verse states

in that passage concerning the eating of the carcass of a kosher bird: “And every person who eats a carcass or

a torn animal

shall launder his garments, wash in water, and remain impure until evening, and become pure.”

The word “torn animal” is an extra verse, for in either case: If a torn animal is considered alive, it does not impart impurity; and if it is considered dead, it is included within “carcass.” Rather, the verse came to compare the carcass of a kosher bird to a torn animal, teaching you that the carcass of a kosher bird imparts impurity in the throat only if it became a carcass in the same manner that a “torn animal” was torn

What is a torn animal, whose

act of tearing it

does not permit the prohibition, so too every

carcass of a kosher bird refers to one

whose becoming a carcass does not permit

through its becoming a carcass

the prohibition; excluded

is becoming a carcass through

melika

in a sacrificial bird,

which

is performed

inside

the courtyard,

since it

[the melika that renders it a carcass]

permits the prohibition

for even the melika of a bird burnt-offering, which does not permit eating for the priests, permits it to be offered upon the altar, for while alive it is not fit to be offered. Therefore

the

bird burnt-offering that underwent melika inside

does not impart impurity to garments in the throat.

And the beraita concludes:

I will include sacrificial birds that underwent melika outside

for melika outside does not permit the prohibition,

and

so too one who performs melika on

non-sacred birds, whether inside or outside, since nothing permits

through their melika

the prohibition,

they

impart impurity to garments in the throat.

Another beraita was taught: Could it be that the slaughtering of

non-sacred

birds inside,

and likewise the slaughtering of

sacrificial birds, whether inside or outside, imparts impurity in the throat?

The verse states

“carcass.”

A carcass imparts impurity, but not the slaughtering of non-sacred birds inside, and not the slaughtering of sacrificial birds, whether inside or outside! And we raise an objection: Who says that it is not a carcass? Why should we not say the opposite:

“This too is a carcass!”

For there is no [valid] slaughtering of non-sacred birds inside, and there is no [valid] slaughtering of sacrificial birds either inside or outside, so let it be a carcass?

And we answer:

Rather,

this is how the tanna of the beraita expounds:

The verse states

“a torn animal”:

Just as a torn animal

its prohibition

is the same inside as outside, so too every

impurity of the carcasses of kosher birds applies only in a place where they are

the same inside as outside. The slaughtering of non-sacred birds inside is excluded,

for its prohibition applies inside but not outside,

and

the slaughtering of

sacrificial birds, whether inside or outside, is excluded

since they are not the same inside as outside. Therefore

therefore

they do not impart impurity to garments in the throat.

And we wonder:

Granted

with regard to the slaughtering of

non-sacred birds, they are not the same:

the slaughtering of non-sacred birds

inside,

which is forbidden, is not the same as the slaughtering of non-sacred birds

outside,

which is permitted.

But

the slaughtering of

sacrificial birds,

why are inside and outside not the same? After all,

both this and that are disqualified,

for only melika permits sacrificial birds as offerings, and not slaughtering?

And we answer:

Rava said:

The derivation teaches only concerning the slaughtering of non-sacred birds inside. But concerning the slaughtering of sacrificial birds, we do not require this derivation to teach us that it does not impart impurity, because

if the slaughtering outside helped it

of the bird

to make him liable for karet

for slaughtering outside, as the Gemara will later derive from the verse “or that he slaughter,” which comes to include the slaughtering of a bird for liability to karet, then we see that even the slaughtering of a bird is called slaughtering. And if so,

should this slaughtering not help

it

to purify it from the status of a carcass?

[That is: Anything for which slaughtering is effective as slaughtering cannot be called a “carcass.”]

And we challenge:

We have found

the slaughtering of

outside

with regard to sacrificial birds, which purifies

because the slaughtering outside helped it to make him liable for karet,

but with regard to the slaughtering of sacrificial birds

inside, from where

do we know that it purifies from the impurity of a carcass?

And we answer: From the derivation that we expounded above from “a torn animal”: Although both are forbidden in eating, with regard to impurity,

since they are not the same,

the slaughtering

inside,

for which one is not liable for karet, is not the same

as

slaughtering

outside,

for which one is liable for karet; therefore it does not involve the impurity of a carcass.

And we challenge:

If so, sacrificial birds that underwent melika outside,

which the beraita taught above impart impurity, why do they impart impurity? There too

they are not the same,

their melika

inside,

which is performed validly, is not the same

as

their melika

outside,

which is not performed validly!?

And we answer:

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: We derive

the slaughtering of sacrificial birds, which is

an act not performed in its valid manner, from the slaughtering of sacrificial animals outside, which is also

an act not performed in its valid manner. And just as there the slaughtering purifies from the impurity of a carcass because the slaughtering outside helped to make him liable for karet, so too inside the slaughtering of the bird purifies from the impurity of a carcass.

an act not performed in its valid manner.

Just as there the slaughter removes the impurity of a carcass because slaughter outside was effective in making him liable to karet, so too inside, the slaughter of the bird removes the impurity of a carcass.

But

we do not derive

the melika of sacrificial birds outside, which is

an act not performed in its valid manner, from

the melika of sacrificial birds inside, which is

an act performed in its valid manner.

And we challenge:

And

if

not, do we not derive an act not performed in its valid manner from an act performed in its valid manner?

we do not derive an act not performed in its valid manner from an act performed in its valid manner?

And it was taught: From where do we derive for

the sacrificial portions or the flesh of a burnt-offering that left outside the courtyard and became disqualified through

leaving, that if it ascended

upon the altar

it shall not descend

for

“leaving”

is valid at a private altar.

And it is proven that we derive concerning the disqualification of leaving, which is an act not performed in its valid manner, that it shall not descend from the altar, from “leaving” at a private altar, which is an act performed in its valid manner, for at a private altar there are no curtains to define leaving!?

And we answer: The

tanna

who said that the disqualification of leaving, if it ascended, shall not descend, does not base the principal derivation on the fact that leaving is valid at a private altar, but on

“

This is the law of the burnt-offering,”

for this verse

included

the disqualified offerings that, if they ascended, shall not descend;

it is adjacent to it.

Mishna:

Our Mishna discusses a sacrificial bird on which melika was performed properly, but the bird itself was found to have the disqualification of a torn animal:

One performed melika on a sacrificial bird

and it was found to be a torn animal—

Rabbi Meir says: It does not impart impurity in the throat,

for the melika removed it from the impurity of a bird carcass, as will be explained below, for he derives this through a kal va-chomer.