Zevachim 49b — the Talmud in English

But they completed the derivation from it, properly:

you have correctly said that it would have been possible to derive the rule of the other guilt-offerings from the guilt-offering of a leper.

However, if we hold that it is not so—that he did not derive the rule from the general category, and the general category was not derived from it—

it will be difficult, for

this

verse concerning the other guilt-offerings

is needed for itself,

for the mitzva of slaughtering on the north, but from where do we know that it is indispensable?

And we answer: Really, as we initially said, that we derive indispensability from the guilt-offering of a leper; and let it not be difficult for you that it is needed in order to restore it to its general category,

since he restored it

to its general category at the end of the verse, where it is written, “for it is like the sin-offering, the guilt-offering”—for every matter

he restored it

both with regard to the placing of the blood and the sacrificial portions and with regard to slaughtering on the north. And the verse, “And he shall slaughter the lamb,” concerning the guilt-offering of a leper, must necessarily be coming to say that it is indispensable.

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: Say that when the verse restored it

to its general category, it did so specifically

with regard to the placing of the blood and the sacrificial portions, which require priesthood,

for it is written, “for as the sin-offering, so is the guilt-offering; it is for the priest”—and it implies that specifically with regard to the services performed by a priest was the guilt-offering compared to the sin-offering, to restore it to its general category.

But slaughter, which does not require priesthood,

he did not restore it with regard to this matter, and it is not necessary to say with regard to the north; and the verse, “And he shall slaughter the lamb,” is still needed to restore it to its general category?

And we answer:

If so,

that he did not restore it with regard to slaughtering on the north,

let the verse say: “for it is like the sin-offering.”

What is the meaning of “like the sin-offering, the guilt-offering

is it”? Rather, it comes to teach you:

It shall be like the other guilt-offerings

with regard to every matter, including slaughtering on the north.

And with this it remains that the verse, “And he shall slaughter the lamb,” comes to teach us the indispensability of the north even in the guilt-offering of a leper, and from it we derive the rule for the other guilt-offerings.

And now the Gemara comes to explain the verse concerning the guilt-offering of a leper, in which it is stated: “And he shall slaughter the lamb in the place where he shall slaughter the sin-offering and the burnt-offering.”

And we raise an objection concerning it:

Why do I need it to be compared to the sin-offering; why do I need it to be compared to the burnt-offering?

That is to say: Why were we required to compare it to both of them, to the burnt-offering as well as to the sin-offering?

And we answer:

Ravina said: It is necessary.

For

if he had compared it to the sin-offering

—that is, if it had been compared only to the sin-offering—

and he had not compared it to the burnt-offering, I would have said: From where did the sin-offering learn

the rule of slaughtering on the north? After all, it learned it by a hekesh

from the burnt-offering,

as it is stated concerning the sin-offering that it shall be slaughtered in the place of the burnt-offering; and the guilt-offering is learned by a hekesh from the sin-offering. If so, it follows that

a matter learned by a hekesh

—the sin-offering, which was compared to the burnt-offering—

returns and teaches by a hekesh

—that the guilt-offering is learned by a hekesh from the sin-offering—and we do not learn in this manner in the sacrificial laws.

Therefore, the guilt-offering of a leper was compared also directly to the burnt-offering, concerning which the north is explicitly stated, to teach us that the guilt-offering is not to be learned from the sin-offering, because a matter learned by a hekesh does not return and teach by a hekesh.

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina:

It is still difficult:

Let him compare it to the burnt-offering

alone

and not compare it to the sin-offering?

Ravina answered him: If the verse had not compared it both to the burnt-offering and to the sin-offering, we would not have had the inference that a matter learned by a hekesh does not return and teach by a hekesh; rather,

I would have said

that always

a matter learned by a hekesh returns and teaches by a hekesh.

And if you would say

that, if so, a matter learned by a hekesh returns and teaches by a hekesh,

let us compare by comparison: Let us compare the guilt-offering

let us equate the guilt offering

to the sin-offering

alone. I will say to you: The reason that it was not compared only to the sin-offering is that

it is preferable to him to compare it to the principal,

the burnt-offering,

and not to compare it to the secondary,

the sin-offering, which was learned from the burnt-offering.

And Ravina concludes:

For this reason he compared it to the sin-offering

and then

compared it to the burnt-offering—

to say

that always

a matter learned by a hekesh does not return and teach by a hekesh.

Rava said: From here

the rule that a matter learned by a hekesh does not return and teach by a hekesh is learned:

as it is written

concerning the sacrificial portions of the bull of an anointed priest: “

As the sacrificial portions are removed from the ox of the peace-offering,

and the priest shall burn them upon the altar of the burnt-offering.”

And Rava infers:

For what halakhic purpose

did the verse compare the sacrificial portions of the bull of an anointed priest to the peace-offerings?

If

it is for the burning of

the diaphragm of the liver and the two kidneys,

this

in itself

of the bull of an anointed priest

is written?

Rather,

because it is necessary to teach the diaphragm of the liver and the two kidneys from the bull for an unwitting matter of the community

to the goats of idolatry

of the community. For concerning the goats of idolatry the rule of burning the sacrificial portions was not written; rather, it is learned by a hekesh from the bull for an unwitting matter of the community, since the bull for an unwitting matter of the community was compared to the goat of idolatry of the community, and the bull for an unwitting matter of the community

in itself

also

does not have written

in it the burning of the diaphragm of the liver and the two kidneys. Rather,

it is from the bull of an anointed priest that it derives

by a hekesh.

For this reason it is necessary

to write in the case of the bull of an anointed priest a comparison to the peace-offerings: “

As the sacrificial portions are removed

from the ox of the peace-offerings,” to teach us that where it is not needed for the anointed priest himself, apply it to the bull for an unwitting matter of the community,

so that it should be as though it were written

that the burning of the diaphragm of the liver and the two kidneys is

in itself

of the bull for an unwitting matter of the community. And from now, when it is learned from the bull for an unwitting matter of the community to the goats of idolatry,

it will not be

the burning of the sacrificial portions of the bull for an unwitting matter of the community

a matter learned by a hekesh that returns and teaches by a hekesh,

for it is considered as though the rule of burning the diaphragm of the liver and the two kidneys in the bull for an unwitting matter of the community had been written explicitly.

And we object:

Rav Pappa said to Rava: Let him write it

with regard to the burning of the diaphragm of the liver and the two kidneys

in itself

of the bull for an unwitting matter of the community explicitly,

and let him not compare

the bull for an unwitting matter of the community to the bull of an anointed priest.

Rava said to him:

If he had written it in itself

of the bull for an unwitting matter of the community

and had not compared it, I would have said

that always

a matter learned by a hekesh

returns

and teaches by a hekesh.

Rather, for this reason it was written in the bull of an anointed priest, and we learn from it by an additional, special hekesh, which teaches through “where it is not needed, apply it,” as explained above on page 41, that this additional hekesh is not considered a hekesh with regard to the rule that “a matter learned by a hekesh does not return and teach by a hekesh.” And we have learned that only in this manner is it possible to learn the bull for an unwitting matter of the community from the bull of an anointed priest, and from there to the goats of idolatry, since it is as though it had been written in the body of the bull for an unwitting matter of the community. Were it not for this, we would have said that a matter learned by a hekesh does not return and teach by a hekesh.

And if you would say

that a matter learned by a hekesh returns and teaches by a hekesh, it will be difficult for you: Why is it necessary to write the burning of the sacrificial portions explicitly in the bull for an unwitting matter of the community, and why not

compare by comparison

to the bull of an anointed priest?

And again we could learn from the bull for an unwitting matter of the community to the goats of idolatry, since you said that a matter learned by a hekesh returns and teaches by a hekesh. I would say to you:

It is preferable to him that he wrote it in itself rather than compared it by comparison.

Rather,

for this reason he wrote it

“as the sacrificial portions are removed,”

and compared it

the bull of an anointed priest to the bull for an unwitting matter of the community, to teach us: through “where it is not needed” for the bull of an anointed priest, apply it to the bull for an unwitting matter of the community. And from here we learn that the bull for an unwitting matter of the community can teach the goats of idolatry only by means of “as the sacrificial portions are removed,” which is as though it were written in itself.

To say

that always

a matter learned by a hekesh does not return and teach by a hekesh.

Hekesh and gzera shava, kal va-chomer and the principal-source: a mnemonic

And the conclusion of our discussion is:

A matter learned by a hekesh does not return and teach by a hekesh

as we learned above,

whether from Rava or whether from Ravina.

From now it is necessary to consider the other methods by which the Torah is expounded, whether the same rule applies to them—that a matter learned does not return and teach. And there are four methods: hekesh, gzera shava, kal va-chomer, and a principal-source. And with each of them four questions must be asked. For example: Can a hekesh teach by a hekesh, by a gzera shava, by a kal va-chomer, and by a principal-source? And likewise, can a gzera shava teach by a hekesh, by a kal va-chomer, and by a principal-source? And likewise with all of them.

And at first the Gemara discusses:

A matter learned by a hekesh: can it teach by a gzera shava?

Come and hear: Rabbi Natan ben Avtulmos says: From where is it derived concerning the spreading on garments,

if the leprosy spread throughout the entire garment,

that it is pure?

For we find this rule only with regard to afflictions of a person,

as it is stated, “baldness and baldness of the forehead”

concerning afflictions of

garments, and it is stated, “baldness and baldness of the forehead”

concerning afflictions of

a person.

And they learn a gzera shava:

Just as there,

with regard to afflictions of a person, if the affliction

spread

throughout the lesion,

over all of it, it is pure; so too here,

with regard to afflictions of garments, if the affliction

spread

throughout the lesion,

over all of it, it is pure.

And the Gemara proves from here:

And

behold,

there

with regard to the afflictions of the hair of a person, in which “baldness and baldness of the forehead” is written, and from it we learn concerning garments,

from where do we know

that if it spread over all of it, it is pure? After all, the rule “if it spread over all of it, it is pure” was stated only with regard to afflictions of the skin of the flesh of a person, and their laws differ from one another?

As it is written, “from his head to his feet,” and his head was compared to his foot,

to teach you:

Just as there,

with regard to the foot, that is, with regard to afflictions of the skin of the flesh,

, if it spread over all of it, it is pure; so too here,

with regard to afflictions of the hair of his head,

if it spread over all of it, it is pure.

And it is proved from here that a matter learned by a hekesh—that is, the afflictions of the head, which were learned by a hekesh from the afflictions of the skin of the flesh—returns and teaches by a gzera shava with regard to afflictions of garments.

Rabbi Yohanan said:

There is no proof from here for the laws of sacrifices, for the laws of afflictions are not the laws of sacrifices;

and throughout the entire Torah they do learn a matter learned from a matter that was learned,

so that even a matter learned by a hekesh returns and teaches by a hekesh,

except for sacrifices, where they do not expound

a matter learned from a matter that was

learned,

and therefore one must say that with regard to sacrifices, a matter learned by a hekesh does not return and teach even by a gzera shava.

And Rabbi Yohanan proves: Know that this is so,

for if

you should arrive at the conclusion

that

even with regard to sacrifices a matter learned by a hekesh returns and teaches by a gzera shava,

the word “north” would not have been stated concerning the guilt-offering, and let it come

to the rule of north concerning the guilt-offering

by a gzera shava of “most holy sacrifices” from the sin-offerings,

since “most holy” is stated concerning both of them?

And since the verse needed to state “north” concerning the guilt-offering,

is it not so

that the verse intended

to say that a matter learned by a hekesh does not return and teach by a gzera shava?

And therefore it is impossible to learn the north concerning the guilt-offering from the sin-offering, since the north concerning the sin-offering itself is learned by a hekesh from the burnt-offering.

And we raise an objection concerning it:

Perhaps

this is not the reason; rather, the reason that we do not learn the guilt-offering from the sin-offering by a gzera shava is

because there is room to refute: What is distinctive about the sin-offering? For it atones for those liable for excision,

which is not so with a guilt-offering.

And we answer: “

Most holy sacrifices” is written superfluously

in both of them, and it is a gzera shava that is free on both sides, and one does not refute it. And necessarily, the reason that the verse needed to write “north” concerning the guilt-offering is because a matter learned by a hekesh does not return and teach by a gzera shava.

The Gemara now explains another rule among the rules of whether “a matter learned” returns and teaches in the sacrificial laws:

A matter learned from a hekesh returns and teaches by a kal va-chomer,