Zevachim 49b (מט:) — the Talmud in English

But if you derive the general rule from it, that works:

you are correct that it would have been possible to derive the general rule—that is, the other guilt offerings—from the guilt offering of a leper.

Rather, if we maintain that it is not derived from the general rule, nor is the general rule derived from it,

the following difficulty arises:

this

verse concerning the other guilt offerings

is necessary for its own purpose,

to teach that slaughter must be performed on the north side as a mitzva; but from where do we know that this is indispensable?

And we answer: In fact, it is as we initially stated: we derive the requirement that it is indispensable from the guilt offering of a leper. And the fact that the verse is needed in order to restore it to the general rule poses no difficulty,

as, once it restored it

to the general rule at the end of the verse, where it states: “For it is like the sin offering,” in every respect,

it restored it

both with regard to the placement of the blood and the burning of the sacrificial parts, and with regard to slaughter on the north side. And the verse “And he shall slaughter the lamb” concerning the guilt offering of a leper must necessarily be coming to teach that this is indispensable.

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: Say that when the verse restored it

to the general rule, it did so only

with regard to the placement of the blood and the sacrificial parts, which require priesthood,

as it is written: “For it is like the sin offering; it is the priest’s”—which indicates that only with regard to those rites performed by a priest was the guilt offering compared to the sin offering, thereby restoring it to the general rule.

But slaughter, which does not require priesthood,

was not restored with regard to this matter; and certainly it was not restored with regard to slaughter on the north side. Consequently, the verse “And he shall slaughter the lamb” is still needed to restore it to the general rule?

And we answer:

If so,

if it was not restored with regard to slaughter on the north side,

the verse should have stated: “For it is like the sin offering.”

What

is the meaning of “like the sin offering, the guilt offering”? Rather, it comes to tell you:

It shall be like the other guilt offerings

in every respect, including slaughter on the north side.

It therefore remains established that the verse “And he shall slaughter the lamb” comes to teach that slaughter on the north side is indispensable even in the case of the guilt offering of a leper, and from it we derive the same law for the other guilt offerings.

The Gemara now proceeds to explain the verse concerning the guilt offering of a leper, which states: “And he shall slaughter the lamb in the place where he shall slaughter the sin offering and the burnt offering.”

We raise a question concerning this:

Why do I need the verse to compare it to a sin offering? Why do I need it to compare it to a burnt offering?

That is, why was it necessary to compare it to both of them, to the burnt offering as well as to the sin offering?

And we answer:

Ravina said: It is necessary.

For

if it had compared it to the sin offering

—that is, if it had been compared only to the sin offering—

and had not compared it to the burnt offering, I would have said: From where did the sin offering itself learn

that slaughter must be performed on the north side? It learned it by comparison

from the burnt offering,

as it is stated concerning the sin offering that it is to be slaughtered in the place of the burnt offering. And the guilt offering is then derived by comparison from the sin offering. Consequently, we would have

a matter learned by comparison

—the sin offering, which was compared to the burnt offering—

returning and teaching by comparison

—that the guilt offering is derived from the sin offering. And this is not how matters are derived in the sphere of sacrificial offerings.

Therefore, the guilt offering of a leper was compared directly to the burnt offering as well, concerning which the north-side requirement is stated explicitly. This teaches us that the guilt offering is not to be derived from the sin offering, since a matter learned by comparison does not return and teach by comparison.

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina:

There is still a difficulty:

let the verse compare it to the burnt offering

alone

and not compare it to the sin offering?

Ravina answered him: Had the verse not compared it both to the burnt offering and to the sin offering, we would not have derived the principle that a matter learned by comparison does not return and teach by comparison. Rather,

I would have said

that

a matter learned by comparison always returns and teaches by comparison.

And if you would say

that, since a matter learned by comparison returns and teaches by comparison,

let us compare one comparison to another:

let us compare the guilt offering

to the sin offering

alone—you should answer that the reason it was not compared only to the sin offering is that

it is preferable to compare it to the primary matter,

the burnt offering,

rather than to compare it to the secondary matter,

the sin offering, which itself was learned from the burnt offering.

Ravina concludes:

For this reason, it was compared to the sin offering

and then

compared to the burnt offering—

to say

that

a matter learned by comparison does not return and teach by comparison.

Rava said: The principle may be derived from here:

that a matter learned by comparison does not return and teach by comparison:

as it is written

concerning the sacrificial parts of the bull of the anointed priest: “

As it is removed from the ox of the peace offering,

and the priest shall burn them on the altar of the burnt offering.”

Rava infers:

For what halakhic purpose

did the verse compare the sacrificial parts of the bull of the anointed priest to those of the peace offering?

If

it was for the burning of

the diaphragm of the liver and the two kidneys,

that is difficult, for

in its own context

—the passage concerning the bull of the anointed priest—

is it not written?

Rather, the comparison is necessary

because it is needed to derive the law of the burning of the diaphragm of the liver and the two kidneys from the bull for an unwitting communal transgression

for the goats for idolatry

of the community. For the goats for idolatry, the law of burning the sacrificial parts is not written; rather, it is derived by comparison from the bull for an unwitting communal transgression, which is compared to the communal goat for idolatry. And the bull for an unwitting communal transgression

in its own context

also

does not have written

in it the law of burning the diaphragm of the liver and the two kidneys. Rather,

it is from the bull of the anointed priest that it is derived

by comparison.

For this reason, it is necessary

to write concerning the bull of the anointed priest the comparison to the peace offering: “

As it is removed

from the ox of the peace offering.” This teaches us that, where the matter is not needed for the anointed priest himself, it is to be applied to the bull for an unwitting communal transgression,

so that it is considered as though it were written

that the diaphragm of the liver and the two kidneys are to be burned

in its own context

—in the passage concerning the bull for an unwitting communal transgression. Consequently, when the law is derived from the bull for an unwitting communal transgression to the goats for idolatry,

the burning

of the sacrificial parts of the bull for an unwitting communal transgression

will not be a matter learned by comparison that returns and teaches by comparison,

since it is regarded as though the law of burning the diaphragm of the liver and the two kidneys had been written explicitly concerning the bull for an unwitting communal transgression.

And we raise an objection:

Rav Pappa said to Rava: Let the verse write it

—the law of burning the diaphragm of the liver and the two kidneys—

in its own context

of the bull for an unwitting communal transgression explicitly,

and not compare

the bull for an unwitting communal transgression to the bull of the anointed priest.

Rava said to him:

If it had written it in its own context

of the bull for an unwitting communal transgression

and had not compared it, I would have said

that

a matter learned by comparison

always returns

and teaches by comparison.

Rather, for this reason it was written concerning the bull of the anointed priest, and from it the matter is learned through an additional, special comparison. It teaches by means of the principle “if it is not needed for this matter, apply it to another matter,” as explained above, on page 41, that this additional comparison is not considered a comparison with regard to the principle that “a matter learned by comparison does not return and teach by comparison.” We thus learn that it is only in this manner that the bull for an unwitting communal transgression can be derived from the bull of the anointed priest, and from there the goats for idolatry can be derived, since it is as though the matter had been written in the context of the bull for an unwitting communal transgression. Without this, we would have said that a matter learned by comparison does not return and teach by comparison.

And if you would say

that a matter learned by comparison returns and teaches by comparison, the following difficulty would arise: Why was it necessary to write the law of burning the sacrificial parts explicitly concerning the bull for an unwitting communal transgression, and why did the verse not

compare one comparison to another

to the bull of the anointed priest?

We could then derive the law from the bull for an unwitting communal transgression to the goats for idolatry, since you have said that a matter learned by comparison returns and teaches by comparison. I would answer you:

It is preferable to write it in its own context rather than to compare it through another comparison.

Rather,

for this reason it wrote it

in the phrase “As it is removed,”

and compared

the bull of the anointed priest to the bull for an unwitting communal transgression: to teach by the principle “if it is not needed for this matter, apply it to another matter” that the phrase, although not needed for the bull of the anointed priest, is to be applied to the bull for an unwitting communal transgression. From here we learn that the bull for an unwitting communal transgression can teach the goats for idolatry only by means of “As it is removed,” which is considered as though it had been written in its own context.

To say

that

a matter learned by comparison does not return and teach by comparison.

Comparison, gzera shava, kal va-chomer, and binyan av—a mnemonic

And the conclusion of this discussion is:

A matter learned by comparison does not return and teach by comparison,

as we learned above,

whether from Rava or from Ravina.

From this point, one must examine the other hermeneutical principles through which the Torah is expounded, to determine whether the same principle applies to them: that a matter learned by one method does not return and teach by that method. There are four such principles: comparison, gzera shava, kal va-chomer, and binyan av. With regard to each one, four questions must be asked. For example: Can a matter learned by comparison teach through comparison, through gzera shava, through kal va-chomer, and through binyan av? And likewise, can a matter learned through gzera shava teach through comparison, through kal va-chomer, and through binyan av? And so with all of them.

The Gemara first discusses:

A matter learned by comparison—can it teach through gzera shava?

Come and hear: Rabbi Natan ben Avtulmos says: From where is it derived concerning the spreading of a leprous affliction over garments,

that is, if the affliction spread over the entire garment,

that the garment is pure?

For we find this law only with regard to afflictions affecting a person,

as it is stated, “baldness and a bald forehead,”

with regard to afflictions affecting

garments, and it is stated, “baldness and a bald forehead,”

with regard to afflictions affecting

a person.

And we derive it by means of a gzera shava:

Just as there,

with regard to afflictions affecting a person, if the affliction

spread

over

the entire body, it is pure, so too here,

with regard to afflictions affecting garments, if the affliction

spread

over

the entire garment, it is pure.

The Gemara proves from here:

And

behold,

there,

with regard to afflictions affecting the hair of a person, in which “baldness and a bald forehead” is written, and from which we derive the law concerning garments,

from where do we know

that if the affliction spreads over the entire body it is pure? The law “if it spreads over the entire body, it is pure” was stated only with regard to afflictions on the skin of a person’s flesh, and not with regard to afflictions on the hair, whose laws differ from one another.

As it is written, “from his head to his foot,” and his head was compared to his foot,

to teach you:

Just as there,

on the foot—that is, with regard to afflictions on the skin of the flesh—

, if it spreads over the entire body, it is pure, so too here,

with regard to afflictions on the hair of his head,

if it spreads over the entire body, it is pure.

It is therefore proven from here that a matter learned by comparison—that is, the law concerning afflictions on the head, which was learned by comparison from afflictions on the skin of the flesh—returns and teaches through a gzera shava concerning afflictions on garments.

Rabbi Yohanan said:

There is no proof here with regard to the laws of sacrificial offerings, since the laws of afflictions are not laws of sacrificial offerings.

And throughout the Torah, one may derive a matter learned from another learned matter,

so that even a matter learned by comparison returns and teaches by comparison,

except in the sphere of sacrificial offerings, where one does not derive

from

a learned matter to teach another learned matter.

Therefore, it is possible to say that, with regard to sacrificial offerings, a matter learned by comparison does not return and teach even through a gzera shava.

Rabbi Yohanan offers proof that this is so:

For if

you might

say

that even with regard to sacrificial offerings a matter learned by comparison returns and teaches through a gzera shava,

the phrase “on its north side” would not have had to be stated concerning a guilt offering, and the requirement of the north side could have been derived

for a guilt offering

by a gzera shava based on the phrase “most holy offerings,” from sin offerings,

as the phrase “most holy” is stated with regard to both of them.

And since the verse had to state the north-side requirement concerning a guilt offering,

no,

did the verse not intend

to say that a matter learned by comparison does not return and teach through a gzera shava?

Therefore, it is impossible to derive the north-side requirement for a guilt offering from a sin offering, since the north-side requirement for the sin offering itself was learned by comparison from the burnt offering.

We raise a question concerning this:

Perhaps

that is not the reason; rather, the reason we do not derive a guilt offering from a sin offering through a gzera shava is

because one can refute the comparison: What is distinctive about a sin offering? It atones for those liable to karet,

which is not the case with a guilt offering.

And we answer: The phrase

“most holy offerings” is written superfluously

with regard to both of them, making this a gzera shava that is open on both sides, which may not be refuted. Necessarily, then, the reason the verse had to state the north-side requirement concerning a guilt offering is that a matter learned by comparison does not return and teach through a gzera shava.

The Gemara now explains another principle among the principles governing whether “a matter learned returns and teaches” in the sphere of sacrificial offerings:

A matter learned by comparison returns and teaches by means of a kal va-chomer.