Zevachim 48a (מח.) — the Talmud in English

We learned in the Mishna:

the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur

their slaughter is in the north.

And we raised a question about this:

Granted,

the law that slaughter is

in the north is written

at the beginning of the portion of Leviticus: “And he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar northward,” and if so,

let it teach the olah first,

and why does it teach the sin-offering first in the beginning of the Mishna?

And we answer:

Since the sin-offering comes

with its slaughter in the north

by means of a derivation,

from the juxtaposition of the sin-offering to the olah, as it is written: “In the place where the olah is slaughtered, the sin-offering shall be slaughtered,”

it is dear to him

the tanna, and therefore he taught the law of slaughtering the sin-offering in the north first.

And furthermore, we raised a question about this: Why did the tanna teach the law of the bull and goat of Yom Kippur, and the law of the bulls and goats that are burned, which are inner sin-offerings, first,

and let him teach

the law of

the external sin-offerings first!?

And we answer:

Since he taught: “The blood of

the inner sin-offerings

enters within and within

to be sprinkled in the Sanctuary opposite the curtain and on the golden altar,”

it is dear to him,

and he taught it first.

And now the Gemara explains from where we learned that all offerings that are kodshei kodashim are slaughtered in the north:

And “northward” with regard to the olah—

where is it written? “

And if his offering is from the flock,

he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar northward.”

And the beginning of the verse is written with regard to an olah.

We find this stated with regard to an animal of the flock,

which is the subject of the verse.

From where do we derive

that an animal of the herd is also slaughtered in the north?

The verse says: “And if his offering is from the flock

of sheep.” The letter

vav

that is added in the verse, “And if his offering is from the flock,”

adds to the preceding matter,

which is the animal of the herd, as it is written immediately beforehand.

And it teaches

the animal of the herd, which is

above,

written above,

from

the animal of the flock,

below,

written below.

And we raised a question about this:

This works according to the one who says that we derive

by means of the letter vav, which adds to the preceding matter, and we derive

the upper from the lower,

as we properly derive that the animal of the herd is slaughtered in the north from the animal of the flock, which is written afterward.

But according to the one who says that we do not derive

the upper from the lower,

what can be said?

And the Gemara explains where the tannaim disagreed as to whether or not one derives the upper from the lower: The Torah states the portion concerning one who misuses consecrated property, who must bring a guilt-offering for his sin. Afterward, the Torah writes the portion of the provisional guilt-offering, which applies to anyone who is uncertain whether he inadvertently committed a sin for which one is liable to karet if committed intentionally and to a sin-offering if committed unintentionally. Such a person must bring a provisional guilt-offering. The tannaim disagree with regard to one who is uncertain whether or not he misused consecrated property: Is he obligated to bring a provisional guilt-offering, even though if he were certain that he had sinned, he would be obligated not to bring a sin-offering but rather a guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property? Their disagreement is whether it is possible to derive the law of one who misuses consecrated property, which is the upper passage, from the law of the provisional guilt-offering, which is the lower passage.

As it was taught:

It is stated with regard to a provisional guilt-offering: “

And if a person

sins.” This serves

to obligate one who is uncertain whether he misused consecrated property to bring a provisional guilt-offering; these are the words of Rabbi Akiva. And the Rabbis exempt

one who is uncertain whether he misused consecrated property from bringing a provisional guilt-offering.

Is it not that they disagree about this,

Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis:

One says,

Rabbi Akiva

holds that we derive

the upper from the lower by means of the added letter vav, and therefore we derive the upper passage, concerning uncertainty about misuse of consecrated property, from the lower passage, concerning the obligation to bring a provisional guilt-offering?

And the other says

the Rabbis

hold: We do not derive

the upper from the lower.

But according to the Rabbis, it is difficult: From where do we know that the slaughter of an animal of the herd must also be performed in the north? After all, according to their view, we do not derive the upper from the lower!?

And we answer:

Rav Pappa said:

Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis did not disagree as to whether we derive the upper from the lower. Rather,

everyone

agrees

that we derive

the upper from the lower.

And this is the reason for the Rabbis

who exempt one who is uncertain about misuse of consecrated property from a provisional guilt-offering: They derive it by means of a gezeira shava from a sin-offering.

It is stated here,

with regard to a provisional guilt-offering: “And he did one of all the

mitzvot

of the Lord that may not be done,”

and it is stated with regard to a sin-offering for forbidden fat [

this is the designation of an ordinary sin-offering, because inadvertent consumption of forbidden fat is more common than the other inadvertent transgressions]: “When he did one of the

mitzvot

of the Lord that may not be done.” Therefore, we derive by means of the gezeira shava:

Just as there,

with regard to a sin-offering, it is

a matter for which one is liable to karet if committed intentionally and for which, if committed unintentionally,

one is liable to

a sin-offering,

so too here,

with regard to a provisional guilt-offering, it applies only to a matter

for which one is liable to karet if committed intentionally and to a sin-offering if committed unintentionally; this excludes misuse of consecrated property, for which one is not liable to karet when committed intentionally and is not liable to a sin-offering when committed unintentionally.

And Rabbi Akiva,

who obligates one who is uncertain about misuse of consecrated property to bring a provisional guilt-offering, holds that the purpose of this gezeira shava is to teach:

Just as there,

with regard to a sin-offering, the verse speaks

of

a

fixed sin-offering,

for which the poor and the wealthy are equal,

so too here,

with regard to a provisional guilt-offering, one is liable when uncertain whether he sinned only for a matter for which, if he certainly committed it, he would be liable to bring a

fixed sin-offering. This excludes

one who, when certainly liable for his sin, brings

a sin-offering for impurity of the Temple or its sacred offerings,

for the sin-offering brought by one who entered the Temple while impure or ate consecrated meat is

an “ascending and descending offering” [

as the wealthy bring a female sheep or goat, the poor bring two turtledoves or two young pigeons, and the poorest bring a meal-offering].

And since this gezeira shava is needed to exempt one who is uncertain about impurity of the Temple or its sacred offerings from a provisional guilt-offering, it is once again possible to derive the obligation to bring a provisional guilt-offering in a case of uncertainty about misuse of consecrated property by deriving the upper from the lower. The gezeira shava does not interfere, since, as stated, it is required for a different matter.

And the Rabbis

hold

that a gezeira shava cannot be applied partially,

and therefore we must derive from the gezeira shava between a provisional guilt-offering and a sin-offering that one brings a provisional guilt-offering only for a matter for which one is liable to karet if committed intentionally, and not for misuse of consecrated property, for which intentional violation does not entail liability to karet.

And we raised a question about this:

But Rabbi Akiva as well,

what does he hold? After all,

a gezeira shava cannot be applied partially!?

And we answer:

Indeed, it is so,

that a gezeira shava cannot be applied partially.

But here, they disagree about this:

Rabbi Akiva holds that “And if a person” is written at the beginning of the portion of the provisional guilt-offering, and the juxtaposition of

“the vav adds to the preceding matter”

reveals to us that, with regard to uncertainty about misuse of consecrated property, one should not derive by means of the gezeira shava from a sin-offering to a provisional guilt-offering in order to exempt one who is uncertain about misuse of consecrated property from a provisional guilt-offering. Rather, misuse of consecrated property should be juxtaposed to a provisional guilt-offering in order to obligate him. And the gezeira shava between a provisional guilt-offering and a sin-offering is to be applied with regard to impurity of the Temple or its sacred offerings: One is liable to a provisional guilt-offering only for a matter for which, if committed unintentionally, the offering is a fixed one.

And furthermore, we raised a question about this:

But the Rabbis also, is it not written

the juxtaposition of

“And if a person”?

Let us say that they disagree about this: One says,

Rabbi Akiva,

holds that a juxtaposition is superior

to the derivation by means of a gezeira shava.

And the other,

the Rabbis,

holds that a gezeira shava is superior!?

And we reject this:

No. Everyone

holds

that a juxtaposition is superior,

and therefore we must say that the derivation by means of the gezeira shava applies only partially, so that the derivation by juxtaposition will not be nullified.

Rather,

the Rabbis could say to you:

This juxtaposition, based on the vav that adds to the preceding matter, did not come to obligate one who is uncertain about misuse of consecrated property to bring a provisional guilt-offering. Rather, it came to teach that the

lower [

the provisional guilt-offering]

is derived from the upper [

the guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property], teaching you that one must purchase the

guilt-offering

at a price whose value is

in silver [

two]

shekels,

just as one is obligated to purchase the guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property at a price of no less than two shekels, as it is explicitly written with regard to it: “According to your valuation, silver shekels.”

And it was necessary to derive this law from this juxtaposition, and it was not possible to derive the law of a provisional guilt-offering from the guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property by means of an analogy based on what is found in one case, because logically one might have said that one may bring a provisional guilt-offering of any value whatsoever.

Lest you say: The uncertainty

regarding a sin

should not be more stringent than certainty; just as certainty

regarding a sin obligates one to bring a

sin-offering worth a dinar [

with a value of a danka, which is a low value, one-sixth of a silver dinar. It does not specifically mean a value of a danka, but any value whatsoever; a danka is mentioned as an example of a low value],

so too uncertainty

should obligate one to bring only

a guilt-offering worth a dinar,

therefore the juxtaposition comes to teach that the lower is derived from the upper, that a provisional guilt-offering is more stringent than a definite sin-offering and must be purchased at a value of two silver shekels.

And Rabbi Akiva,

who derives the upper from the lower,

this rationale

that a provisional guilt-offering must be purchased for two silver shekels

from where does he derive it?

He derives it from “This is the law of the guilt-offering”—

one law for all guilt-offerings.

Just as the guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property is governed by the law of two silver shekels, so too all guilt-offerings.

According to Rabbi Akiva, the juxtaposition based on the vav that adds to the preceding matter necessarily comes to teach that the upper is derived from the lower. Therefore, he derives that one is liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering in a case of uncertainty about misuse of consecrated property, and the gezeira shava from a provisional guilt-offering to a sin-offering must necessarily be applied only partially, teaching only with regard to uncertainty about impurity of the Temple or its sacred offerings that one is not liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering for it, because its offering is an ascending and descending one.

And we raised a question about this:

This works according to the one who accepts

the derivation

from “law.”

But

the one who does not accept

the derivation

from “law,” from where does he derive it?

And we answer:

He derives it by means of a gezeira shava:

“

according to your valuation” and “according to your valuation.”

“According to your valuation” is written with regard to the guilt-offering for robbery and the provisional guilt-offering, and likewise with regard to the guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property.

And we challenge this:

This works wherever “according to your valuation” is written.

But

with regard to the guilt-offering for a betrothed maidservant, in which “

according to your valuation” is not written,

what can be said?

From where will we know that it is governed by the law of “two silver shekels”?

And we answer:

He derives

the guilt-offering for a betrothed maidservant from the guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property by means of a gezeira shava: “

with a ram” and “with a ram,”

as “with the ram of the guilt-offering” is stated with regard to both. [With regard to the requirement of two silver shekels for the guilt-offering of a nazirite and the guilt-offering of a leper, see Rashi and Tosafot.]

We learned in our chapter that the slaughter of a sin-offering is in the north.

And we raised a question about this:

A sin-offering—

from where do we know that it requires the north?

And we answer:

As it is written: “And he shall slaughter the sin-offering in the place of the olah.”

And with regard to the olah, the north is explicitly written.

And furthermore, we raised a question about this:

We find this stated with regard to slaughter,

which is in the north.

With regard to receiving

which must be performed in the north,

from where do we know it?

And we answer:

As it is written

after the verse “And he shall slaughter”: “

And the koen shall take some of the blood of the sin-offering.”

And it indicates that the taking, too, must be performed in the place of the olah, and this taking means receiving.

And furthermore, we raised a question about this:

From where do we know that the one who receives the blood himself

must stand in the north, and that if he stood in the south of the Temple courtyard, near its center, extended his hand to the north, and received the blood there, his receiving is invalid?

And we answer:

The verse says: “And he shall take”;

rearrange and expound the letters vav and lamed as though it were written, “

He shall take himself,”

that is, he shall take himself to the place where the blood is received.

But we still raised a question about this:

We find this stated as a mitzva; from where do we know that it is essential?

That if he did not perform it in the north, the offering is disqualified?

And we answer:

Another verse is written

to teach that it is essential. It is stated with regard to the sin-offering of the ruler: “

And he shall slaughter it in the place where the olah is slaughtered.”

And it was taught: Where is the olah slaughtered? In the north.

Just as the olah is in the north,

so too this is in the north.