Zevachim 45b (מה:) — the Talmud in English

But if this was

intentional, it did not effect acceptance

of the offering. This is merely a rabbinic penalty, that the meat may not be eaten. But the owners have achieved atonement and do not need to bring another offering, because a court does not have the power to uproot a matter of Torah law, invalidate the offering, and obligate him to bring another offering, as that would be ḥullin in the Temple courtyard.

When is this statement

that there is a distinction between inadvertence and intent applicable?

With regard to

an offering

of an individual.

But

with regard to

a

communal offering, whether the impurity was inadvertent or intentional, it effects acceptance.

As the Sages did not impose a penalty in the case of a communal offering.

And with regard to

an offering

of gentiles, whether the impurity was inadvertent or intentional, it does not effect acceptance.

The Sages stated

this halakha—that with regard to an offering of a gentile, blood that became impure does not effect acceptance, even if the sprinkling of the impure blood was performed inadvertently—

before Rav Pappa,

and they added:

This

beraita

is in accordance with whose opinion? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.

For if he holds

in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, he says: “In all of them,

in all these laws,

I see reason to be stringent,”

as there is no distinction between offerings of Jews and offerings of gentiles. Yet the beraita distinguishes between them and says that with regard to gentiles, impure blood does not effect acceptance whether the impurity was inadvertent or intentional.

Rav Pappa said to them: Even if you say

that it is possible to say that this beraita follows the opinion of

Rabbi Yosei,

it is still consistent with his view.

Because

there it is different,

with regard to the acceptance of impure blood, as we have a scriptural indication concerning this,

as the verse says

in the passage concerning the tzitz: “And it shall be on his forehead always, for acceptance for them before the Lord.” And we expound: Only

for them,

for the Children of Israel, will the tzitz effect acceptance, atoning for the impurity of the blood, but not for gentiles, as the tzitz does not effect acceptance for gentiles.

Accordingly, what the beraita says—that with regard to gentiles, whether the impurity was inadvertent or intentional, the offering did not effect acceptance—means that it does not effect acceptance by Torah law.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said to Rav Pappa:

According to your statement, that you expound this exclusion in accordance with Rabbi Yosei,

if that is so,

with regard to that which is written in the passage concerning impurity: “They shall separate themselves from the sacred offerings of the Children of Israel, and they shall not profane My holy Name

which they sanctify to Me,”

shall

likewise

we expound

“they,”

the Children of Israel,

but not gentiles,

just as you excluded gentiles with regard to acceptance by the tzitz, and say that according to Rabbi Yosei they are not liable for eating offerings of gentiles in a state of impurity? But did Rabbi Yosei not say: “In all of them [including impurity] I see reason to be stringent with offerings of gentiles as with those of Jews”?

Rather, Rav Ashi said: The verse says

with regard to acceptance by the tzitz for impure blood that was sprinkled:

“For acceptance for them

before the Lord,”

and gentiles are not subject to acceptance.

As the Holy One, blessed be He, is not appeased through them. This is a specific exclusion stated only with regard to acceptance by the tzitz. But with regard to the other laws, Rabbi Yosei holds that gentiles were included along with Jews.

Mishna:

Even

items for which one is not liable

for

piggul,

such as the handful and the incense [which were mentioned in the previous Mishna], nevertheless

one is liable for them on account of notar, and on account of impurity.

If he ate them inadvertently, he is liable to bring a sin offering; and if he ate them intentionally, he is liable to karet.

Except for the blood,

for which one is liable neither on account of piggul, nor on account of notar, nor on account of impurity, as the Gemara explains.

Rabbi Shimon renders one liable

on account of impurity only

for an item that is ordinarily eaten,

such as the handful and the offering of the priests. Although they are designated to be burned on the altar and not to be eaten by a person, since they are fit to be eaten, one is liable for eating them in a state of impurity.

But with regard to the wood, the frankincense, and the incense,

which are not fit to be eaten,

one is not liable

for eating them

on account of impurity.

And the Rabbis disagree with him and render one liable in all these cases.

Gemara:

We learned in the previous Mishna the principle that one is liable for piggul only if it is an item that has something permitting it, either for a person or for the altar. The Gemara now cites a beraita that discusses this matter:

The Sages taught: One might have thought that one is not liable

—that there is no obligation to bring a sin offering for eating impure sacred offerings

on account of impurity, except for an item that has something permitting it, either for a person or for the altar.

And it is a logical deduction

that this matter should be learned by means of a kal va-chomer [in the reverse form, from the more stringent case to the less stringent one]:

Just as piggul,

which is stringent because

it involves a fixed offering,

a fixed offering, for which the Torah did not ease the requirement, but both a poor person and a wealthy person bring a female sheep or goat as a sin offering,

and with one awareness,

as in order to make him liable to bring a sin offering, it is not necessary for him to have been aware of the piggul before he ate it; it is sufficient that he inadvertently ate the piggul and afterward became aware that he had eaten it in order to make him liable for a sin offering,

and was not permitted in any exceptional circumstance

in the community [whereas with regard to impurity we find that impurity was permitted in the community], nevertheless

one is liable for it only in the case of an item that has something permitting it, either for a person or for the altar.

A kal va-chomer applies to

impurity,

which is less stringent than piggul, in that:

a.

It

does not entail a fixed offering; rather, its offering varies according to one’s means,

an offering of varying value [

a wealthy person brings an animal, a poor person brings two turtledoves or two young doves, and the poorest person brings a meal offering].

b.

And with two awarenesses,

as in order to become liable for eating sacred food while impure in body, one must first know that he became impure; afterward this awareness of impurity must have escaped him, and he must eat the sacred food inadvertently; and after he has eaten, he must become aware of his impurity. But if he has only one awareness at the end—that he ate sacred food while impure in body—without having had prior awareness that he had become impure, he is not liable for an offering for eating the sacred food while he was impure.

c.

And it was permitted

in an exceptional circumstance, as impurity of the body was permitted in the community, as we find that the Paschal offering, which was brought in a state of communal impurity, was also eaten in that state of impurity.

And if so, is it not

a logical conclusion that one is not liable

for impurity

except in the case of an item that has something permitting it, either for a person or for the altar!?

The verse states

in the passage concerning impurity: “They shall separate themselves from the sacred offerings of the Children of Israel, and they shall not profane My holy Name

which they sanctify

to Me.” This indicates that all consecrated offerings are included, whether or not they have something permitting them.

One might have thought immediately,

from the moment they consecrated the offering, that one who eats it would become liable on account of impurity.

The verse states

in the passage concerning impurity: “Any person who

approaches

any of the sacred offerings from your offspring,” as the Gemara proceeds to explain: one is liable for eating sacred meat while impure in body only if the sacred item has become fit to be offered on the altar, after the sprinkling of the blood.

The Gemara explains the derivation: It cannot be that the verse stating, “Any person who approaches,” is meant literally, so that approaching—that is, touching the sacred meat while the person is impure—would make him liable to bring a sin offering. Thus

Rabbi Elazar said

[rhetorically]:

Is there anyone who touches

sacred offerings

who is liable

for touching them while he is still impure!? It is written: “Any man of the offspring of Aaron who is afflicted with leprosy or has a discharge shall not eat of the sacred offerings until he becomes pure.” This indicates that he is liable only for eating.

Rather,

if so,

what is the verse teaching by stating “who approaches”?

The verse is speaking of meat that has become fit to be offered.

And the verse is speaking of sacred offerings, and this is its meaning: Any person who offers sacred offerings and afterward eats them while his impurity is upon him, that soul shall be cut off.

How is it,

then, that he becomes liable for eating while impure?

If

it has something permitting it,

such as the sacrificial portions and the meat, which the blood permits, then he becomes liable only

once the permitting factors have been offered,

that is, after the sprinkling of the blood.

And if

it has nothing permitting it,

such as a priest’s meal offering and libations, then he becomes liable

once they are sanctified

in

a vessel,

since sanctification in a vessel makes them fit to be offered.

And we raised a question concerning this:

We have found

that there is liability for impurity even in the case of an item that has nothing permitting it.

With regard to notar—

from where do we derive

that there is liability in a similar case?

And we answer:

It is derived

from impurity by means of the gzera shava

“profanation—profanation.”

With regard to impurity it is written: “And they shall not profane,” and with regard to notar it is written: “He has profaned the sacred offering of the Lord.”

And we challenge this:

Let us derive

notar by means of the gzera shava

“iniquity—iniquity” from piggul,

which would teach that one is liable only for an item that has something permitting it for a person and for the altar, as it is written with regard to piggul: “He shall bear his iniquity,” and with regard to notar: “He shall bear his iniquity.”

And we answer:

It is more reasonable that it should be derived from impurity

by means of a gzera shava, and not from piggul,

as they share the mnemonic G-Z-L.

Notar resembles impurity in three respects, whose mnemonic is G-Z-L.

G

— bodily disqualification:

Notar and impurity are disqualifications in the body of the impure person who eats, or in the body of the meat that remained beyond its allotted time. This is not so with piggul, which is a disqualification caused by thought.

Z

— sprinkling:

With regard to notar and impurity, the sprinkling of the blood does not cause them to become disqualified. This is not so with piggul, for the sprinkling of the blood establishes it as disqualified.

L

— profanation:

With regard to notar and impurity, the term profanation is stated. This is not so with piggul, with regard to which profanation is not stated.

And we challenge this:

On the contrary, it should have been derived from piggul

with regard to notar, as they resemble each other in more respects, as follows:

a.

Permitted:

Notar and piggul resemble each other in that neither was permitted in any exceptional circumstance anywhere. This is not so with impurity, which was permitted in an exceptional circumstance in the community.

b.

The tzitz:

The tzitz does not effect acceptance for notar or piggul. This is not so with impurity, for the tzitz effects acceptance in the case of impurity: if one sprinkled blood that had become impure, the offering was accepted through the acceptance of the tzitz.

c.

Pure:

Both notar and piggul are pure. This is not so with impurity.

d.

Time:

Notar and piggul become disqualified through time [notar becomes disqualified after the allotted time, and piggul becomes disqualified through the thought of performing the relevant act beyond its allotted time]. This is not so with impurity, which does not depend on time.

e.

Offering:

With regard to both notar and piggul, the disqualification applies to an item that is offered. This is not so with impurity of the body, whose disqualification applies to the person performing the offering.

And if so, the difficulty remains, for

these,

the five characteristics shared by notar and piggul,

are more numerous,

as they are more than the three characteristics shared by impurity and notar. Accordingly, it is more reasonable to derive notar from piggul and not from impurity.

And we answer:

Rather,

what we said—that there is liability for notar even in the case of an item that has nothing permitting it—we learn

from that which Levi taught.

Levi taught:

From where do we know to say, with regard to the verse in the passage prohibiting the eating of sacred offerings in a state of impurity of the body, “They shall separate themselves from the sacred offerings of the Children of Israel,”

that the verse is also speaking

namely, notar

of disqualification due to time [i.e., notar]?

The verse states: “And they shall not profane My holy Name, which they sanctify

to Me.” The fact that it is written “and they shall not profane,” and not “and they shall not begin.”