Zevachim 45b — the Talmud in English

But if this was

deliberate, it was not accepted

the offering. And this matter is only a rabbinic penalty, that the meat may not be eaten. But the owners attained atonement, and they do not need to bring another offering, because a court does not have the power to uproot a matter of Torah and invalidate the offering and obligate him to bring another offering, since it would be non-sacred in the Temple courtyard.

In what matter

does there exist a distinction between inadvertence and deliberateness?

With regard to a

individual offering

.

But

with regard to a

communal offering,

whether through inadvertence or deliberately, it is accepted.

For the Sages did not impose a penalty in its case.

And with regard to

an offering

of gentiles, whether through inadvertence or deliberately, it is not accepted.

The Sages said

this halakha—that with regard to an offering of a gentile, blood that became impure is not accepted even if the sprinkling of the impure blood was performed inadvertently—

before Rav Pappa,

and they added:

This

beraita

is in accordance with whom? Not in accordance with Rabbi Yosei.

For if he holds

in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, he says: “In all of them,”

in all these laws,

“I see reason to be stringent,”

that there is no distinction between offerings of Israelites and offerings of gentiles. Whereas the beraita distinguishes between them and says that, with regard to gentiles, impure blood is not accepted whether through inadvertence or deliberately.

Rav Pappa said to them: Even if you say

that this beraita is in the method of

Rabbi Yosei,

it is possible to say so.

For

there it is different,

with regard to acceptance of impure blood, since we have a revelation from the Torah concerning it,

as the verse says

in the section of the tzitz: “And it shall be upon his forehead always, for acceptance for them before the Lord.” And we expound: only

for them,

for the Israelites, will the tzitz be for acceptance, to atone for them for the impurity of the blood, but not for gentiles, for the tzitz does not effect acceptance for gentiles.

And accordingly, what the beraita said—that with regard to gentiles, whether through inadvertence or deliberately it was not accepted—is by Torah law.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said to Rav Pappa:

According to your words, that you expound this exclusion according to Rabbi Yosei,

but from now on,

concerning that which is written in the section of impurity: “They shall separate themselves from the sacred things of the children of Israel, and they shall not profane the Name of My holiness

which they sanctify to Me,”

shall

likewise

we expound

“they,”

the children of Israel,

but not gentiles,

just as you excluded them concerning acceptance by the tzitz, and say that according to Rabbi Yosei they are not liable for eating offerings of gentiles in impurity? But Rabbi Yosei said: “In all of them [also in impurity] I see reason to be stringent with offerings of gentiles as with those of an Israelite.”

Rather, Rav Ashi said: The verse says

concerning acceptance by the tzitz of impure blood that was sprinkled:

“For acceptance for them

before the Lord,”

and gentiles are not subject to acceptance.

For the Holy One, blessed is He, is not appeased for them. And this is a special exclusion stated only concerning acceptance by the tzitz; but concerning the other laws, Rabbi Yosei holds that gentiles were included like Israelites.

Mishna:

Even

things for which one is not liable

on account of

piggul,

such as a handful and incense [which were mentioned in the Mishna above], nevertheless,

one is liable for them on account of notar, and on account of impurity.

If he ate inadvertently, he is liable to bring a sin offering; and if he ate deliberately, he is liable to karet.

Except for the blood,

for one is liable for it neither on account of piggul, nor on account of notar, nor on account of impurity, as the Gemara explains.

Rabbi Shimon holds one liable

on account of impurity only

for something whose usual manner is to be eaten,

such as a handful and the offering of a priest, which, although they are designated to be burned upon the altar and are not designated for human consumption, since they are fit to be eaten, one is liable for eating them in impurity.

But the wood, the frankincense, and the incense,

which are not fit to be eaten,

one is not liable

for eating them

on account of impurity.

And the Sages disagree with him and hold one liable in all of them.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna above the principle that one is liable for piggul only if it is something that has what permits it, both for a person and for the altar. And now the Gemara brings a beraita that discusses the matter:

The Sages taught: One might have thought that one would not be liable

that there would be no liability to bring a sin offering for eating sacred items in impurity

on account of impurity, except for something “that has what permits it,” both for a person and for the altar.

And it is a logical inference

that this matter should be learned by a kal va-chomer [and in the reverse form, from the stringent to the lenient]:

And if piggul,

which is stringent, because

it involves a fixed offering,

a fixed offering, for which the Torah did not make leniency, but both a poor person and a wealthy person bring a female sheep or female goat as a sin offering,

and with one awareness,

that in order to make him liable to bring a sin offering, it is not necessary that he have awareness of the piggul before he ate it; rather, it is sufficient that he was unwitting in eating the piggul and afterward became aware that he had eaten it, in order to make him liable for a sin offering,

and was not permitted in its general category

in the community [whereas concerning impurity we find that impurity was permitted in the community], nevertheless,

one is liable for it only for something that has what permits it, both for a person and for the altar.

A kal va-chomer applies to

impurity,

which is more lenient than piggul, in that:

a.

It

does not require a fixed offering; rather, its liability is

according to the means

[a wealthy person brings an animal, a poor person brings two turtledoves or two young pigeons, and the poorest of all brings a meal offering].

b.

And with two awarenesses,

for in order to become liable for eating sacred items in bodily impurity, he must first know that he became impure; afterward this awareness of impurity must escape him, and he must eat the sacred item inadvertently; and after he ate, his impurity must become known to him. But with only one awareness at the end—that he ate sacred items in bodily impurity—without his having prior awareness that he became impure, he is not liable for an offering for eating the sacred items while he was impure.

c.

And impurity was permitted

in its general category, for bodily impurity was permitted in the community, as we find that the Paschal offering, which was brought in communal impurity, was also eaten in this impurity.

And if so, is it not

a logical inference that one is not liable

for impurity

except for something that has what permits it, both for a person and for the altar!?

The verse states

in the section of impurity: “They shall separate themselves from the sacred things of the children of Israel, and they shall not profane the Name of My holiness

which they sanctify

to Me.” It implies that all consecrated things were included, whether they have permitting factors or not.

One might have thought immediately,

from the time they consecrated the offering, the one who eats it would become liable on account of impurity?

The verse states

in the section of impurity: “Any man who

approaches

from all your offspring to the sacred things,” as it explains below: one is liable for eating sacred meat in bodily impurity only if the sacred item has been made fit to be offered upon the altar, after the sprinkling of the blood.

And the Gemara explains the derivation: It is impossible that the verse stating “any man who approaches” is to be understood literally, that approaching—that is, touching the sacred meat while the person is impure—would obligate him to bring a sin offering, and thus

Rabbi Elazar said

[rhetorically]:

Is there one who touches

sacred items

who is liable

for touching them while he is still impure!? Is it not stated: “Any man, any man, of the offspring of Aaron, who is afflicted with a skin disease or has a discharge, shall not eat of the sacred things until he becomes pure.” And it implies that he is liable only for eating.

Rather,

if so,

what does the verse mean by saying “which approaches”?

It is speaking of meat that has been made fit to be offered.

And the verse is speaking of sacred items, and this is the meaning of the verse: Any man who offers sacred items, and afterward eats them while his impurity is upon him, that soul shall be cut off.

How is this

that he becomes liable for eating in impurity?

If

it has what permits it,

such as the portions and the meat, which the blood permits, then he becomes liable only

once the permitting factors have been offered,

that is, after the sprinkling of the blood.

And if

it has no permitting factor,

such as the meal offering of a priest and libations, then he becomes liable

once they are sanctified

in

a vessel,

because sanctification in a vessel makes them fit to be offered.

And we raised a difficulty concerning this:

We have found impurity

for which one is liable even for something that has no permitting factor.

Notar—

from where do we know

that one is liable in such a case?

And we answer:

It comes

notar through a gzera shava of

“profanation, profanation” from impurity.

With regard to impurity it is written: “And they shall not profane,” and with regard to notar it is written: “The sacred thing of the Lord he has profaned.”

And we challenge this:

Let us derive

notar through the gzera shava

“iniquity, iniquity” from piggul,

that one is liable only for something that has what permits it for a person and for the altar, for with regard to piggul it is written: “Its iniquity he shall bear,” and with regard to notar it is written: “Its iniquity he shall bear.”

And we answer:

It is reasonable that it should be learned from impurity

through a gzera shava, and not from piggul,

for the acronym G-Z-L is a sign.

Notar resembles impurity in three matters, whose sign is G-Z-L.

G—

bodily disqualification:

notar and impurity are a disqualification in the body of the impure person who eats, or in the body of the meat that remained. This is not so with piggul, which is a disqualification of thought.

Z—

sprinkling:

notar and impurity are not brought to their disqualification by the sprinkling of the blood. This is not so with piggul, for the sprinkling of the blood establishes it as disqualified.

L—

profanation:

concerning notar and impurity, profanation is stated. This is not so with piggul, concerning which profanation is not stated.

And we challenge this:

On the contrary, notar should have been learned from piggul,

for they resemble one another in more ways, and these are they:

a.

Permitted:

notar and piggul resemble one another in that neither of them was permitted in its general category anywhere; this is not so with impurity, which was permitted in its general category in the community.

b.

The tzitz:

with regard to notar and piggul, the tzitz does not effect acceptance for them; this is not so with impurity, for the tzitz effects acceptance for it in a case of impurity, since if he sprinkled blood that had become impure, the offering is accepted through the acceptance of the tzitz.

c.

Pure:

notar and piggul are both pure; this is not so with impurity.

d.

Time:

notar and piggul become disqualified through time [notar becomes disqualified after the time, and piggul becomes disqualified through a thought concerning beyond the time]; this is not so with impurity, which does not depend upon time.

e.

Offered:

with regard to notar and piggul, in both of them the disqualification is in something that is offered. This is not so with bodily impurity, whose disqualification is in the one offering.

And if so, this is difficult, for

these

five matters that notar and piggul share

are more numerous,

they are more numerous than the three matters that impurity and notar share; and if so, it is more reasonable to learn notar from piggul and not from impurity.

And we answer:

Rather,

what we said—that there is liability for notar even for something that has no permitting factor—we learn

from what Levi taught.

For Levi taught:

From where do we say, concerning the verse in the section of the prohibition against eating sacred items in bodily impurity, “They shall separate themselves from the sacred things of the children of Israel,”

that also concerning disqualification through time

[that is, notar]

the verse is speaking?

The verse states: “And they shall not profane the Name of My holiness, which they sanctify

to Me.” From the fact that it is written “and they shall not profane,” and it is not written “and they shall not begin.”