Zevachim 31b (לא:) — the Talmud in English

And this indicates:

that

if he considered

eating

half an olive-bulk

and eating

half an olive-bulk in a manner that is

analogous to eating and burning, and what are the circumstances?

For example, he considered that he would eat

in two people; they combine

the two acts of eating, even though each one contains less than an olive-bulk, and this is piggul. This proves that we follow the thought involving an olive-bulk, rather than the eaters.

And the Gemara concludes: Indeed,

learn from it.

Rava raised a question: If he considered eating an olive-bulk in

a manner in which he would prolong his eating from beginning to end

for longer than the time required to eat a half-loaf,

which is longer than the prescribed measure of eating, since throughout the Torah the measure of eating is the time required to eat a half-loaf,

what is the halakha?

And the sides of the dilemma are:

Is it that

with regard to the eating of the Most High—

that is, burning—

we compare it

to the thought of human eating, since these two acts of eating were equated with regard to the thought of piggul? And just as the eating of the Most High can take longer than the time required to eat a half-loaf, since at times the fire is slow to burn the sacrificial fats, so too, in the case of the thought of human eating, need it not be within the time required to eat a half-loaf; even if it takes longer than that, it is piggul.

Or do we compare it to the eating of an ordinary person,

which is within the time required to eat a half-loaf,

and compare it to that,

and this is not piggul?

Abaye said: Come and hear

from what we learned in our Mishna: If he considered

eating half an olive-bulk and burning half an olive-bulk, it is valid.

Eating and burning do not combine

for purposes of piggul.

And this indicates that

the reason

they do not combine is that he considered

eating and burning.

But

if he considers

eating

half an olive-bulk

and eating

half an olive-bulk in a manner that is

analogous to burning, they combine

for purposes of piggul.

But burning—

takes longer than the time required to eat a half-loaf.

If so, the same applies to eating that resembles burning: it concerns a case in which he considered eating half an olive-bulk, waiting longer than the time required to eat a half-loaf, and then eating another half an olive-bulk. How, then, is this piggul? Rather, it must be that even a thought of eating over a period longer than the time required to eat a half-loaf renders the offering piggul.

And the Gemara rejects this:

Perhaps

the phrase in the Mishna “and burning” refers to burning

with a large fire,

which consumes it in less than the time required to eat a half-loaf. In such a case, when he considered eating and eating, they combine; but if he considered the two acts of eating over a period longer than the time required to eat a half-loaf, this is not piggul. We learned in the Mishna: If he considered

eating half an olive-bulk and burning half an olive-bulk,

it is

valid.

Sefat Emet wondered about this, since it is certainly a complete rejection: the ordinary fire of the arrangement of wood on the altar certainly consumes an olive-bulk in less than the time required to eat half a loaf. This is the precise implication of the Mishna: an olive-bulk and another olive-bulk resembling burning on the altar combine because ordinary burning on the altar takes less than the time required to eat half a loaf. He therefore wrote that Maimonides did not have at all in his version of the Gemara the phrase, “But burning on the altar takes longer than the time required to eat half a loaf.” He understood Abaye’s proof as deriving from the Mishna’s statement that two acts of eating combine, referring to eating through two people, as the Gemara earlier resolved regarding one who intended that two people eat an olive-bulk. If so, all the more so an individual’s eating over a period longer than the time required to eat half a loaf combines. Rava raised his question because he did not know of Rav Ashi’s question concerning two people; therefore, he raised the question concerning the longer period, and the same applies to two people.

And the Gemara infers:

The reason

that he considered

eating and burning

is that only in this case is it valid, because eating and burning do not combine.

But

if he considered

eating and eating,

even

something that is not customarily eaten,

such as the sacrificial fats, since it is concerning them that the Mishna spoke in the case of “burning,”

they combine.

If so, this is difficult:

But the first clause teaches

that if he considered

eating something that is customarily eaten,

it is piggul. This indicates that only

that which is customarily eaten, and not

if he considered eating something

that is not customarily

eaten,

it is not.

This is because one does not transfer a thought concerning food of the altar to the eating of a person!?

And we answer:

Rabbi Yirmeya said: This

latter clause,

whose opinion is it?—

It is Rabbi Eliezer, who says that one may transfer a thought from

something fit for

human consumption

to make it

food of the altar.

That is, to burn it outside its proper time or outside its proper place, and it is thereby disqualified;

and

likewise one may transfer a thought

from

something fit for

consumption on the altar,

which is something fit to be burned,

to human consumption,

so that he will eat it outside its proper time or outside its proper place, and it is thereby disqualified.

As we learned: If one slaughters the offering

with the thought

of eating

outside its proper time or outside its proper place

something that is not customarily eaten,

or if he considered

burning

outside its proper time or outside its proper place

something that is not customarily burned—

it is valid!

Since he considered eating or burning something that is not designated for eating or burning, this is not a disqualifying thought.

But Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies,

and even in this case it is considered a disqualifying thought.

Abaye said:

There is no necessity to establish the latter clause as the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. Rather,

even if you say it is the Sages,

it is so;

and do not say

that the latter clause indicates

“if he considered eating and eating something that is not customarily eaten,”

that they combine, in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer.

Rather, say

that the inference is this: specifically, eating and burning do not combine;

but if he considered eating and eating something that is customarily eaten,

they combine, even though he considered them as two halves.

And should you say: If the latter clause follows the opinion of the Sages,

what does it teach us

that we had not heard previously? For

if it teaches us that something customarily eaten

is subject to thoughts concerning two halves combining, this has already been

learned from the first clause:

For it states there:

half an olive-bulk outside its proper time and half an olive-bulk tomorrow—it is disqualified.

And

if

the latter clause comes to teach us that when he considered

eating and burning,

thoughts of eating and burning do not combine, this has already been

learned from the inference of the first clause.

For one can infer from the first clause that specifically

eating something that is customarily eaten, and not

is it a thought if he considered something

that is not customarily eaten; it is not.

This is not a thought. Thus, if he considered eating half an olive-bulk of meat and half an olive-bulk of sacrificial fats, the two thoughts do not combine. If so,

now, if concerning eating and eating something that is not customarily eaten

we learned in the first clause that it

does not combine, then concerning eating and burning, it is surely necessary

to teach that it does not combine. Consequently, it is impossible to say that the latter clause comes to teach us this; rather, it necessarily comes to teach us this inference: if he considered eating and eating something that is not customarily eaten, they combine, in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer.

The answer is:

It was necessary for the latter clause to teach us about eating and burning,

and we would not have inferred this from the first clause, because

it might have entered your mind that there,

in the first clause, where he considered eating something that is not customarily eaten,

he is considering it in a manner unlike the usual manner;

therefore, this is not a thought.

But here,

in the latter clause, where he considered eating and burning,

in this

thought of eating,

in the usual manner,

he considered something customarily eaten,

and in this

thought of burning,

in the usual manner,

he considered something customarily burned.

Say that they should combine

and this should be piggul;

it teaches us

the latter clause that even in this case they do not combine.

We have completed the chapter “All offerings whose blood was received.”

The first Mishna of the chapter explains that in each of the four rites involving the blood—slaughter, receiving, carrying, and sprinkling—that were performed disqualifiably, or that were performed by people disqualified from performing the Temple service, there is sometimes an aspect of validity, and sometimes there is a possibility of rectifying the matter.

The first part

of the Mishna concerns the rite of

slaughter,

in which there is an aspect of validity when it is performed by people disqualified from the service:

Mishna:

All

people

disqualified

for the sacrificial rites,

who slaughtered

the offering,

their slaughter is valid,

because

slaughter is valid

even

by non-priests,

by women,

by slaves, and by impure persons.

And

it is not only with regard to lesser sanctity-offerings that the slaughter of those disqualified from the service is valid, but

even with regard to most holy offerings. Provided that impure persons do not touch the flesh

of the offering during slaughter, so that they do not render it impure and disqualify it. Therefore, the impure person must slaughter with a long knife, in order to prevent him from touching the offering.

And since all those disqualified are fit to slaughter,

therefore,

they

render the offering disqualified

through

a thought

of pigul [if they intended to eat the offering beyond its allotted time or outside its designated place], and the status of pigul takes effect upon the offering. Since they are fit to perform the rite, their thought is a “service thought.” But with the other rites, for which those disqualified are not fit, if they performed them and entertained a disqualifying thought during the rite, the offering does not thereby become pigul, because only a validly performed service renders an offering pigul.