Zevachim 31b — the Talmud in English

And it implies:

this

if he calculated

to eat

about half an olive-bulk

and to eat

about half an olive-bulk in a manner that is

analogous to eating and burning, and what are the circumstances?

For example, he calculated that he would eat

by two people, they combine

the two acts of eating, even though in each one there is less than an olive-bulk, and this is pigul. And it is proven that one follows the thought in which there is an olive-bulk, and not the eaters.

And the Gemara concludes: Indeed,

learn from it.

Rava raised a question: If he calculated to eat an olive-bulk in

a manner in which he would delay in eating it from its beginning until its end

longer than the time of eating a peras,

which is more than the measure of eating, for throughout the entire Torah the measure of eating is within the time of eating a peras,

what is the law?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Does

the eating of the Most High,

that is, burning,

do we compare it

to the thought of human eating, since these two eatings were equated with regard to the thought of pigul? And just as the eating of the Most High is longer than the time of eating a peras, since at times the fire does not hurry to burn the sacrificial parts, so too, the thought of human eating need not be within the measure of eating a peras, and even if it is less than this, it is pigul.

Or

do we compare it

to the eating of an ordinary person, which is within the time of eating a peras,

and this is not pigul.

Abaye said: Come and hear

from what we learned in our Mishna: He calculated

to eat about half an olive-bulk and to burn about half an olive-bulk, it is valid.

For eating and burning do not combine

for pigul.

And it implies that

the reason

they do not combine is that he calculated

to eat and to burn.

This

if he calculates

to eat

about half an olive-bulk

and to eat

about half an olive-bulk in a manner that is

analogous to burning, they combine

for pigul.

But burning—

is over more than the time of eating a peras.

And if so, the same applies to eating that is analogous to burning: it refers to a case in which he calculated to eat about half an olive-bulk, to wait more than the time of eating a peras, and to eat another half olive-bulk. How, then, is this pigul? Rather, necessarily, even a thought of eating over more than the time of eating a peras renders the offering pigul.

And the Gemara rejects this:

perhaps

what was stated in the Mishna, “to burn,” refers to burning

with a great fire,

which burns in less than the time of eating a peras. And in this manner, when he calculated to eat and to eat, they combine; but if he calculates upon the two eatings over more than the time of eating a peras, this is not pigul. We learned in the Mishna: He calculated

to eat about half an olive-bulk and to burn about half an olive-bulk,

it is

valid.

Sefat Emet wondered about this, since it is certainly a complete rejection: the ordinary fire of the arrangement of wood on the altar certainly consumes an olive-bulk in less than the time required to eat half a loaf. This is the precise implication of the Mishna: an olive-bulk and another olive-bulk resembling burning on the altar combine because ordinary burning on the altar takes less than the time required to eat half a loaf. He therefore wrote that Maimonides did not have at all in his version of the Gemara the phrase, “But burning on the altar takes longer than the time required to eat half a loaf.” He understood Abaye’s proof as deriving from the Mishna’s statement that two acts of eating combine, referring to eating through two people, as the Gemara earlier resolved regarding one who intended that two people eat an olive-bulk. If so, all the more so an individual’s eating over a period longer than the time required to eat half a loaf combines. Rava raised his question because he did not know of Rav Ashi’s question concerning two people; therefore, he raised the question concerning the longer period, and the same applies to two people.

And the Gemara infers:

the reason

that he calculated

to eat and to burn

—only in this manner is it valid, because eating and burning do not combine.

This

if he calculated

to eat and to eat

even

something whose manner is not to be eaten,

such as the sacrificial parts, for concerning them the Mishna spoke in the law of “to burn,”

they combine.

If so, this is difficult:

but it teaches in the first clause

that if he calculated

to eat something whose manner is to be eaten,

it is pigul. And it implies that only

that whose manner is to be eaten, not

specifically in this manner is it pigul; but if he calculated to eat something

whose manner is not

to be eaten,

not.

This is because one does not calculate from the eating of the altar to the eating of a person!?

And we answer:

Rabbi Yirmeya said: This

later clause—

whose is it?—

It is Rabbi Eliezer, who says that one calculates from

something fit for

human eating

to make it

the eating of the altar.

That is, to burn it outside its time or outside its place, and it is thereby disqualified,

and

one also calculates

from

something fit for

the eating of the altar,

which is something fit to be burned,

to human eating,

so that he would eat it outside its time or outside its place, and it is thereby disqualified.

For we learned: One who slaughters the offering

with the thought

to eat

outside its time or outside its place

something whose manner is not to be eaten,

or who calculated

to burn

outside its time or outside its place

something whose manner is not to be burned—

valid!

Since he calculated to eat or to burn something that is not designated for eating or burning, this is not a disqualifying thought.

And Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies,

and even in this manner it is considered a disqualifying thought.

Abaye said:

There is no necessity to establish the later clause as Rabbi Eliezer; rather,

even if you say it is the Rabbis,

it is,

and do not say

to infer from the later clause

“if he calculated to eat and to eat something whose manner is not to be eaten,”

that it combines, as Rabbi Eliezer holds;

rather, say

that the inference is this: specifically eating and burning do not combine,

but if he calculated to eat and to eat something whose manner is to be eaten,

it combines, even though he calculated upon halves.

And lest you say: If the later clause follows the Rabbis,

what does it teach us

that we had not previously heard? For

if it is something whose manner is to be eaten that it teaches us,

that thoughts upon halves combine, we have already

heard it from the first clause,

for it says there:

half an olive-bulk outside, half an olive-bulk tomorrow—it is disqualified.

And

if

the later clause comes to teach us that when he calculated

to eat and to burn,

the thoughts of eating and burning do not combine, we have

heard this from the inference from the first clause,

for one can infer from the first clause that specifically

to eat something whose manner is to be eaten, not,

this is a thought; but if he thought about something

whose manner is not to be eaten, not,

this is not a thought. It follows that if he calculated to eat half an olive-bulk of meat and half an olive-bulk of sacrificial parts, the two thoughts do not combine. If so,

now, and all the more so, “to eat and to eat something whose manner is not to be eaten,”

we learned in the first clause that it

does not combine; “to eat and to burn,” is it necessary

to teach that it does not combine? It is therefore impossible to say that this is what the later clause comes to teach us. Necessarily, it comes to teach this inference: if he calculated to eat and to eat something whose manner is not to be eaten, it combines, in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer.

Your answer is:

“To eat and to burn” was necessary

for the later clause to teach us, and we would not infer this from the first clause, because

it might have entered your mind that there,

in the first clause, where he calculated to eat something whose manner is not to be eaten,

he calculates not in its customary manner,

and therefore this is not a thought.

But here,

in the later clause, where he calculated to eat and to burn,

in this

thought of eating,

in its customary manner,

for he calculated concerning something whose manner is to be eaten,

and in this

thought of burning,

in its customary manner,

for he calculated concerning something whose manner is to be burned,

let it combine

and this would be pigul;

it teaches us

the later clause that even in this case it does not combine.

We shall return to you, chapter “All the offerings whose blood they received.”

In the first Mishna of the chapter it is explained that in all four services of the blood [slaughtering, receiving, conveying, and sprinkling] that were performed disqualifiably, or that were performed by people disqualified for the service, there is sometimes an aspect of validity, and sometimes there is a possibility of rectification.

The first section

of the Mishna deals with the service of

slaughtering,

which has an aspect of validity when performed by people disqualified for the service:

Mishna:

All

the people

disqualified

for the services of the offering,

who slaughtered

the sacrifice,

their slaughtering is valid,

because

the slaughtering is valid

even

by non-priests,

and by women,

and by slaves, and by impure persons.

And

not only with regard to lesser sanctity is the slaughtering of those disqualified for service valid, but

even with regard to most holy offerings. Provided that the impure persons do not touch the flesh

of the sacrifice at the time of slaughtering, so that they do not render it impure and disqualify it. And for this reason the impure person must slaughter with a long knife, in order to prevent his touching the sacrifice.

And since all the disqualified are fit for slaughtering,

therefore,

they

disqualify

the sacrifice

through a thought

of pigul [if they thought with it to eat the sacrifice outside its time or outside its place], and the law of pigul takes effect upon the sacrifice. For since they are fit for the service, their thought is a “service thought.” But in the other services, for which the disqualified are not fit to perform them, if they performed them and thought a disqualifying thought during the service, the sacrifice did not become pigul through this, because only a service performed validly causes pigul.