Zevachim 28b — the Talmud in English

Rather, we must say:

if

this verse in the section of Kedoshim

has no bearing on

the thought of

outside its time

, whose law has already been stated in the section of Tzav,

assign it to the matter of

the thought of

outside its place

. And one cannot say that the verse came to invalidate the notar itself, exactly as is the plain meaning of the verse, for there is no reason that after the offering has been rendered fit it should again become invalid; and necessarily, the verse comes to invalidate one who thought [this] at the time of the service.

And it follows that the verse in the section of Tzav comes entirely to teach concerning the thought of “outside its time,” on account of which one who eats from the offering that was invalidated because of it is liable for karet. Whereas the verse in the section of Kedoshim comes to teach concerning invalidation on account of the thought of “outside its place,” and for this there is no liability for karet.

And indeed, also in the section of Shemini it is stated: “And those who eat it shall bear their iniquity, and that soul shall be cut off from among its people.” However, this was written concerning one who eats actual notar, and not concerning one who eats flesh that was invalidated by the thought of “outside its place.” And in order that you should not say that the meaning of the verse is both concerning actual notar and concerning flesh invalidated on account of thought, therefore

the Merciful One excluded

from the punishment of karet

with regard to notar

one who eats flesh invalidated by thought, by saying

“and those who eat it shall bear their iniquity,”

and it did not write, “one who eats it shall bear his iniquity,” to make known to you that only one of these two matters written in the section entails liability for karet,

to exclude

“outside its place.”

And we ask:

But perhaps

the opposite:

“and those who eat it shall bear their iniquity,”

this is

one who eats an offering invalidated by the thought of

“outside its place,”

who is punished by karet.

And

that which was stated “those who eat it,” and not “one who eats it,” teaching that only one is punished by karet and not both, comes

to exclude

one who eats flesh

of notar from karet!?

And we answer:

It is reasonable that notar should have been established as subject to karet,

in order

to derive

from it by a gezeira shava

“iniquity”—

“iniquity” concerning

“outside its time,”

stated in the section of Tzav, in which karet is not stated, but only “he shall bear his iniquity.” And this teaches us: Just as the bearing of iniquity stated in the section of Kedoshim means the punishment of karet, for here it is explicitly stated, “and that soul shall be cut off,” so the bearing of iniquity stated in the section of Tzav means the punishment of karet.

And this gezeira shava applies only if we say that the punishment of karet stated in the section of Kedoshim was said concerning the eating of notar, since

it resembles

an offering invalidated by the thought of “outside its time”

to it

as notar

in “

z”

b.”

That is,

z

aman, for both of them were invalidated through “time”: notar was invalidated through actual time, because its time passed, while “outside its time” was invalidated through the thought of time.

B

That is,

b

amah: these two invalidations, of notar and of “outside its time,” applied also to offerings sacrificed on a private altar; whereas an offering invalidated by the thought of “outside its place” is not similar to notar in “z-b,” since it does not apply on a private altar and its matter is not dependent on time.

Therefore, had we established the verse “and that soul shall be cut off,” stated in the section of Kedoshim, as referring to “outside its place,” we would not have been able to learn karet from there concerning “outside its time,” for we would have had to learn “outside its time” by another gezeira shava of “iniquity”—“iniquity” from “impurity of flesh,” which too was stated with the expression “iniquity,” as it is stated in the section of the tzitz: “And Aaron shall bear the iniquity of the sacred things,” teaching that the tzitz atones for a pure person who ate impure sacred flesh. And this iniquity does not involve punishment of karet, but only violation of a prohibition. And had we learned from there, then also with regard to “outside its time” the law would be that one is not punished by karet, but only by a prohibition. And in order that we should prefer to learn “outside its time” from the section of Kedoshim, specifically to teach that it involves karet, we must establish the verse there as referring to notar, which is similar to “outside its time” in “z-b.” Then it will be preferable to learn “outside its time” from notar, which is similar to it, and not from “impurity of flesh,” which is not similar to it at all.

And we ask: If the reason to establish the karet in the section of Kedoshim as referring to notar is in order to learn “outside its time” from this section and not from “impurity of flesh,” then

on the contrary, “outside its place” should have been established as subject to karet,

and

to derive

from it by the gezeira shava of

“iniquity”—

“iniquity”

for “outside its time,” which resembles it

in “outside its place”

in “m-k-d

sh.”

M

ahshava, meaning that both are invalidated through thought;

K

tzat, meaning that in both of them, if he invalidated part of it through thought, all of it becomes invalid;

D

am, meaning that both are invalidated through thoughts made during the service of the blood;

S

hlishi, meaning that in both of them “third” is stated superfluously.

But this is not so with “impurity of flesh,” which is not an invalidation of thought; impurity of part does not invalidate all of it; and this invalidation exists even after the services of the blood have been completed, and “third” is not stated in it superfluously. And since “outside its time” resembles “outside its place” in these matters, it is preferable to learn it from there, and not from “impurity of flesh,” which does not resemble it.

Rather, Rabbi Yohanan said:

The reason we established the karet in the section of Kedoshim as referring to notar, and not to “outside its place,” is because

Tani Zavdi bar Levi: It comes

by a gezeira shava

“sacred”—

“sacred”

to teach us that what is stated there, “and those who eat it shall bear their iniquity,” was said concerning notar. And thus they expound:

It is written here

in the section of Kedoshim, “and those who eat it shall bear their iniquity,

for he has profaned the sacred things of

the Lord, and that soul shall be cut off

from among its people”;

and it is written there,

“and you shall burn the notar with fire;

it shall not be eaten, for it is sacred.”

Just as there

it speaks of sacred flesh that is

notar, so here

it speaks of sacred flesh that is

notar. Thus we have learned that the sacred thing mentioned in the section of Kedoshim with regard to karet speaks of notar.

And do not say that the verse in the section of Kedoshim deals both with “outside its place” and with notar, for

the Merciful One excluded in that same verse

with regard to notar, by writing

“and those who eat it shall bear their iniquity”

and not writing “and one who eats it,”

to exclude “outside its place” from karet.

And we ask:

And what have you seen that the long verse

in the section of Tzav should be established

as “outside its time,”

to say that “outside its time” involves karet because of the gezeira shava of “iniquity”—“iniquity,”

and that had you established the verse “and if he eats it on the

third day, it is piggul, and those who eat it shall bear their iniquity,” which is the short verse

of the section “You shall be holy,”

as referring to

“outside its place,”

to say that “outside its place” does not involve karet because of the exclusion of “and those who eat it”?

I should reverse it,

and establish the verse in the section of Tzav as referring to “outside its place,” and the verse in the section of Kedoshim as referring to “outside its time” ,

so that the law would be that with regard to “outside its place” one is liable for karet for eating it because of the gezeira shava of “iniquity”—“iniquity,” while with regard to “outside its time” one would not be liable for karet for eating it because of the exclusion of “and those who eat it”!?

And we answer: It is reasonable to establish the long verse

to say that “outside its designated place” does not carry karet because of the exclusion from “those who eat it”?

Perhaps we should reverse the matters:

let us establish the verse in the passage of Tzav as referring to “outside its designated place,” and the verse in the passage of Kedoshim as referring to “outside its designated time,” so that the law would be that eating meat disqualified through “outside its designated place” carries karet because of the derivation “iniquity”—“iniquity,” whereas eating meat disqualified through “outside its designated time” would not carry karet because of the exclusion from “those who eat it”?

in the section of Tzav

as “outside its time,”

since in this verse karet is not stated, but we seek to learn karet through

deriving

the gezeira shava of

“iniquity”—

“iniquity”

from notar,

and since

“outside its time” resembles it

in “z-b,” it is preferable to establish this as “outside its time,” and not as “outside its place,” which does not resemble notar in this matter.

And we ask: Since “outside its time” resembles notar more than “outside its place,”

on the contrary,

the

long

verse in the section of Tzav

should be established

as “outside its place,”

and the short verse of

“third”

of “You shall be holy,” in which the law of notar is also stated,

as “outside its time,”

because

since “outside its time” resembles it

—“outside its time” resembles notar in “z-b”—and there was room for error and for learning them from one another, saying that just as notar is subject to karet, so too the law of “outside its time” should be subject to karet,” therefore

the Torah placed

the two of them next to one another,

and specifically excluded it

by “and those who eat it,” and not “and one who eats it,” to say that even though they resemble one another, they may not be learned from one another; rather, specifically notar is subject to karet, but not “outside its time”!?

Rather, Rava said:

Both the invalidation of “outside its place” and its exemption from karet, and the invalidation of “outside its time” and its liability for karet,

all of them—

from the long verse

in the section of

Tzav, come.

And this is how this verse is to be expounded:

For it is written,

“and if

he eats

it shall be eaten”—

the verse speaks of two eatings.

That is, two invalidating thoughts, and not actual eating:

one

who thought concerning

the eating of a person

that it would be tomorrow,

and one

who thought concerning

the eating of the altar, that is, the burning of the sacrificial portions, that it would be tomorrow. And in both of them the offering becomes piggul.

“From the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace-offerings”—the verse likened sacrifices to peace-offerings, to tell you:

Just as peace-offerings

have

those that cause piggul,

namely, the services of the blood that permit the flesh, during which the thought made is the thought that causes piggul,

and

they have

those that become piggul,

namely, the flesh and the sacrificial portions that became piggul as a result of the invalidating thought made during the service that permits them,

so too everything

that has

those that cause piggul and those that become piggul

is subject to the law of piggul—to exclude such meal-offerings that are burned entirely and are not scooped, which have no remnants that could become piggul because of the invalidating thought made during the scooping that permits them.

and

contain elements that

can become piggul,

namely, the meat and sacrificial portions that become piggul as a result of the disqualifying intention formed during the service that permits them,

so too everything

that contains elements that

“Third”—

this is “outside its time.”

“It shall not be accepted”— its meaning is that the sprinkling, which is the acceptance for every offering, shall not effect acceptance for an offering concerning which he thought a thought of piggul. And this teaches you that until the sprinkling of the blood, piggul is not fixed in the offering, but remains pending: if the blood is sprinkled upon the altar, piggul takes effect; and if it is not sprinkled, but is poured out, piggul is nullified. And we derived this from what is stated, “it shall not be accepted,” that as the acceptance of a valid offering, so is the acceptance of an invalid offering—

and what is the acceptance

of a

valid offering? It is only

until all its permitting elements have been offered, and it effects acceptance for its owner only after the four services of the blood that permit it, of which the sprinkling is the last. So too the acceptance of an invalid offering:

the fixing of piggul in it is only

until all its permitting elements have been offered, and the offering is not fixed as piggul until after all four services of the blood. [The expressions “its permitting elements” and “the acceptance of an invalid offering,” with regard to an offering that has been invalidated, are merely borrowed expressions, for there is no “acceptance for invalidation,” and likewise there is no “permitting element” for an offering that has been invalidated; rather, the intention is the sprinkling of the blood, which is the acceptance and the permitting element in a valid offering, while in an invalid offering the sprinkling is called “effecting acceptance for its piggul.”]

fit offering, so too the acceptance of a disqualified offering—

and just as the acceptance

of a

fit offering

is only

until all of its permitting rites have been performed,

and it makes the offering acceptable for its owner only after the four blood services have been performed, of which sprinkling is the last,

so too the acceptance of a disqualified offering

does not establish piggul in it until

all of its permitting rites have been performed,

and the offering is not definitively established as piggul until all four blood services have been completed. [The expressions “its permitting rites” and “the acceptance of a disqualified offering” are borrowed expressions when referring to an offering that has been disqualified. There is no “acceptance” that makes a disqualified offering acceptable, nor is there a “permitting element” for a disqualified offering. Rather, the reference is to the sprinkling of the blood, which is the act that makes an offering acceptable and permits it when the offering is fit; with regard to a disqualified offering, the sprinkling is called “making it acceptable for its piggul.”]

The one who offers" -

is disqualified through the offering,

that is: what one thinks about it at the time of the offering—a thought of eating outside its time—is what disqualifies it,

and it is not disqualified

if he did not think this and only

in

practice did he eat it on the

third day,

and thus the verse is expounded: “The one who offers shall not be accepted”: the sprinkling of the blood shall not render it acceptable if he offered it with the thought of eating it outside its time.

Perhaps you might say that what is stated, “the one who offers it,” refers to what follows it, and it should be read: “The one who offers it—it shall not be considered,” to teach that the priest who offers it shall no longer be counted in the priesthood and shall be disqualified from serving as a priest; this cannot be said, for it is stated: “The one who offers

it

shall not be considered,” and we learn:

the verse speaks of the sacrifice,

which is judged by “shall not be considered,”

and it does not speak of the one who offers the sacrifice,

for the priest who offers the sacrifice is not disqualified from serving as a priest, since he is not judged by “shall not be considered”!