Zevachim 28a — the Talmud in English

Gemara:

They assumed

that

the skin

of

the tail ![](pamud.bmp "

exact page location")

is considered like the tail.

And just as with regard to eating the skin of the tail is considered meat, the same applies with regard to burning: its law is like meat. And therefore, in the case of the peace-offerings of a lamb, whose tail has the law that it is offered upon the altar, even the skin of the tail is offered with it. And if so, it is difficult: the Mishna says that one who slaughters the peace-offerings of a lamb with the thought to eat the skin of the tail outside its place or outside its time, his thought invalidates or makes the offering pigul; and why does his thought invalidate it ?

But he is thinking about eating from the altar

, for the law of the skin is that it is to be eaten by the altar,

for

the eating of

a person,

for he thought that a person would eat the skin of the tail. And do we think from eating by the altar to eating by a person, to invalidate the offering through this?

And we answer:

Shmuel said: Whose opinion is this? It is Rabbi Eliezer’s, who says that one thinks from eating by the altar to eating by a person, and from eating by a person to eating by the altar!

As we learned: One who slaughters the offering

with the thought

to eat something whose manner is not to be eaten,

such as the sacrificial portions, whose law is that they are to be burned, outside the time of their eating or outside the place of their eating; and likewise if he thought

to burn

outside its time or outside its place

something whose manner is not to be burned,

such as meat, whose law is that it is to be eaten, the offering is

valid,

because a thought from eating by the altar to eating by a person, or from eating by a person to eating by the altar, does not invalidate.

But Rabbi Eliezer invalidates,

because he holds that even a thought from eating by the altar to eating by a person, and from eating by a person to eating by the altar, is effective to invalidate.

And we object:

In what way did you establish

our Mishna

?

If so,

say the latter clause

of the Mishna:

This is the general rule—

anyone who slaughters, receives, carries, or sprinkles

and thought during one of these rites

to eat something whose manner is to be eaten

[namely, the meat of peace-offerings or other meat of an offering that is eaten], or thought during one of these rites

to burn something whose manner is to be burned

namely, the sacrificial portions—if he thought in all this that the eating or burning would be outside its time, the offering is pigul and one is liable to karet for eating it; and if he thought in this that the eating or burning would be outside its place, it is invalid and there is no liability to karet.

And it is proven from this latter clause that specifically if he thought to eat

something whose manner is to be eaten, there is

but if he thought to eat something

whose manner is not to be eaten, there is not

the offering is invalidated. And it follows that this latter clause

comes to the Rabbis,

who hold that one does not think from one type of eating to another type of eating. And if so, it is difficult: is it possible to establish the

first clause

according to

Rabbi Eliezer, and the latter clause

according to

the Rabbis?

He said to him,

Shmuel:

Yes: the first clause is Rabbi Eliezer, and the latter clause is the Rabbis.

Rav Huna said: The skin of the tail is not considered like the tail

with regard to the mitzva of burning, because Scripture excluded it, as will be explained—

Rabba said: What is Rav Huna’s reason

who holds that the skin of the tail is not considered like the tail with regard to burning?—Because concerning the burning of the tail, the Torah explicitly excluded the skin of the tail, saying, “And he shall offer from the peace-offering altar its

fat, the tail,” and

we expound:

and not the skin of the tail.

And according to Rav Huna, our Mishna is even according to the Rabbis, who do not think from one type of eating to another.

Rav Hisda said: In truth, the skin of the tail is considered like the tail.

And as for a lamb, since its tail is offered, even the skin of the tail is offered with it. And our Mishna can be according to the Rabbis, who do not think from eating by the altar to eating by a person;

but here,

our Mishna, which invalidates one who thinks about eating the skin of the tail,

with what are we dealing? With the tail of a kid,

whose law is not to be burned but to be eaten; and when he thinks about its eating, he is thinking from eating by a person to eating by a person, and therefore it invalidates.

And the Gemara explains that it is obvious to us why

all of them,

Rav Huna and Rav Hisda,

like Shmuel

who established the Mishna according to Rabbi Eliezer,

did not say,

for to establish the Mishna in a manner that

the first clause is Rabbi Eliezer and the latter clause the Rabbis—

they do not establish it!

And likewise the reason is obvious to us why Shmuel and Rav Hisda

did not say like Rav Huna, who holds

that the skin of the tail is not like the tail

,

because

it teaches them that the skin of the tail is considered like the tail.

And it does not seem right to them to expound like Rav Huna, excluding the skin of the tail from “its fat—the tail.”

Rather, what is difficult is that Shmuel and Rav Huna,

like Rav Hisda,

who established the Mishna with the skin of a kid,

what is the reason they did not say so?

For they too agree that the tail of a kid is only eaten!?

And we answer: The reason of Shmuel and Rav Huna, that they did not establish the Mishna in this manner, is that if the Mishna is dealing with the skin of a kid, whose law is that it is to be eaten,

what does it teach us

by this? Does the Mishna come to innovate and say this very law, that the

skin of the tail,

with regard to human eating,

is considered like the tail,

because it is soft like meat, and its law is like meat with regard to invalidating it through a thought of improper eating? But we have already

learned it,

we learned this in a Mishna:

And these are those whose skins are like their flesh

to become impure with the impurity of carrion:

the skin beneath the tail.

Rather, necessarily the Mishna does not come to innovate this, but something else; namely, the Mishna is dealing with the skin of a lamb. According to Shmuel, the innovation is that one thinks from eating by the altar to eating by a person, like Rabbi Eliezer; and according to Rav Huna, the innovation is that the skin of the tail is not considered like the tail with regard to burning.

And Rav Hisda

held that although we already learned that the skin of the tail is included among those whose skins are like their flesh, nevertheless

it was necessary

to inform us here as well that the skin of the tail is considered like the tail.

For

it might enter your mind to say: These words

that the skin is considered like the tail are

with regard to impurity,

to combine with an olive-sized amount for the impurity of carrion or with an egg-sized amount for the impurity of food, because since

your manner

is that it is a soft skin, it

combines

to be considered like meat.

But here,

with regard to eating it according to the law of consecrated things,

say

that since Scripture said [Numbers 18], concerning the priestly gifts, “All the sacred gifts of the children of Israel that I have given you,”

for distinction,

which means

for greatness,

teaching that they should eat them

in the manner that kings eat,

and since

kings do not eat in this manner, say: no

thought of the slaughterer intending to eat the skin of the tail improperly would be a thought of eating, and it would not be invalidated through this,

it teaches us

that even in this case the law of the skin is like meat, and its eating is considered eating meat.

He raised an objection

from that which was taught in the Tosefta:

One who slaughters the burnt-offering

with the thought

to burn an olive-sized amount of the skin beneath the tail outside its place—

it is invalid, and there is no karet for it.

Outside its time—

it is pigul, and one is liable to karet for it!

Elazar ben Yehuda, man of Avelim, says in the name of Rabbi Yaakov, and so Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda, man of Kefar Ikkus, would say in the name of Rabbi Shimon: one is the hide

of the tender one of

the hoofs

in

a small animal, and one is the hide of the head of a tender calf

throughout its first year,

and one is the hide beneath the tail, and

so

everything that the Sages enumerated regarding impurity

of a carcass or foods, "

and these are those whose hides are like their flesh,"

to include,

in addition to all those mentioned above,

the hide of the pudenda,

in all these, if he slaughtered the burnt offering with the intention of burning an olive-sized portion of them

outside its place, it is invalid, and there is no excision for it.

Outside its time—

it is pigul, and one is liable to excision for it!

And it follows that when slaughtering

a burnt offering

specifically,

no,

the thought concerning burning these hides improperly renders it invalid, for the tanna mentioned only a burnt offering,

but

one who slaughters

a sacrifice

other,

does not

his thought render it invalid on this account,

and if so, we ask:

it is understandable according to Rav Huna,

who holds that the Torah explicitly excluded, with regard to peace-offerings, the hide of the tail from burning,

this is why it teaches "

one who slaughters

a burnt offering

with the thought of burning an olive-sized portion of the hide beneath the tail," שדווקא בזה פסול כיון שהעולה לא התמעטה מהקטרת עור האליה אלא שלמים בלבדfor specifically in this case it is invalid, since a burnt offering was not excluded from the burning of the hide of the tail, but only a peace-offering.

But according to Rav Hisda,

who does not hold of the exclusion at all, and even with regard to peace-offerings the hide of the tail is like the tail itself,

why specifically does it teach "

a burnt offering"?

Let it teach “a sacrifice”

without qualification! For with every sacrifice, whether a peace-offering or a burnt offering, its tail is burned!?

And we answer:

Rav Hisda could say to you

two answers:

If you wish, say,

the tanna of the beraita is dealing

with the tail of a kid,

which is not designated for burning at all, but for eating; and therefore he did not teach “a sacrifice” without qualification with regard to a thought of burning, for with a peace-offering the hide of the tail is not fit for burning. And he mentioned specifically a burnt offering, in which even the hide of the kid is burned, since all of it is entirely burned for the Lord; and in this case a thought of burning it improperly renders it invalid.

And if you wish, say: teach

in that same beraita: one who slaughters the

sacrifice

with the thought of burning the hide of the tail improperly. And it is invalid even in the case of a lamb, since according to Rav Hisda the hide of the tail is like the tail itself. And it follows that he is thinking of one consumption of the altar in place of another consumption of the altar.

We learned in the Mishna: one who slaughters the sacrifice in order to sprinkle its blood outside, or to burn its sacrificial portions outside,

it is invalid, and there is no excision for it.

And if he thought to sprinkle its blood tomorrow or to burn its sacrificial portions tomorrow, it is pigul, and one is liable to excision for it.

And the Gemara discusses:

from where are these matters

that distinguish between a thought of outside its place, which, although it renders it invalid, carries no excision for its eating, and invalidity on account of a thought of outside its time, for whose eating there is excision?

And we answer:

Shmuel said: two verses are written.

One concerns outside its time, and excision is stated concerning it; the other concerns outside its place, and excision is not stated concerning it.

And the Gemara discusses:

What is it?

Rabbah said:

it is written in the section of Tzav: “And if eating shall be eaten from the flesh of his peace-offering sacrifice on the third day, it shall not be accepted! The one who offers it shall not have it reckoned to him—it shall be pigul! And the soul that eats from it shall bear its iniquity.”"

And we expound the verse as follows: "

The

third"—

this is

one who thinks, at the time of the sacrificial service, concerning the eating by a person or the eating of the altar, that it will be

outside its time.

For the third day is outside the time for eating the peace-offerings, whose law is that they are eaten for two days. "

Pigul

“shall be,” which is written at the end of the verse, is superfluous. For “it shall not be accepted” has already been stated concerning “outside its time”; rather,

this is

that if he thought, at the time of the service, to eat it as the eating of a person or the eating of the altar

outside its place,

it is invalid. And it is reasonable to include specifically the thought of “outside its place,” and not another thought, such as thinking to pour its blood on the floor, or to mix its blood with the blood of those disqualified, because the thought of “outside its place” is more similar to the thought of “outside its time” than are other thoughts.

And from what is said later in the verse concerning the liability of excision, "

and the soul that eats from it

shall bear its iniquity,” and it does not say, “and the soul that eats shall bear its iniquity,” without the word “from it,” this comes to exclude, so that only if he ate

one

of these two, if he ate, is he punished by excision,

and not

in

both

these.

And which is this?—

this is "

outside its time."

And to exclude outside its place,

for which he is not punished by excision.

And we ask:

But say

the opposite—"

and the soul that eats from it

shall bear its iniquity”

this is outside its place, and to exclude

from the word “from it”

outside its time

for whose eating one is not liable to excision!?

And we answer:

it is reasonable

that "

outside its time"

is preferable

to establish excision in its case, because

the verse opened

the verse

with it

at the beginning: “And if eating shall be eaten on the third day”!

And we ask:

on the contrary,

with regard to "

outside its place"

it is preferable

to establish excision in its case, since

adjacent to it is

the word “from it,” which excludes one of the two from the punishment of excision, adjacent to the word “pigul,” from which the invalidity of “outside its place” is learned!?

And we answer:

Rather, Abaye said: when Rav Yitzhak bar Avdimi came, Rabbah said: rely on what the tanna taught: when it says "

And if eating shall be eaten on the

third

day, it is pigul, it shall not be accepted, and its eaters shall bear their iniquity, for he profaned the sacred thing of the Lord, and that soul shall be cut off from among its people!”

in the section “You shall be holy” [שהוא "קרא זוטא", שקצר הוא ביחס לפסוק שבפרשת צו], which is a “short verse,” for it is shorter in relation to the verse in the section of Tzav,

this verse is therefore superfluous.

For it need not have been stated

it,

for it has already been stated

in the section of Tzav "

and if eating shall be eaten from the flesh of his peace-offering sacrifice on the third day

it shall not be accepted."