Zevachim 28a (כח.) — the Talmud in English

Gemara:

They thought

that

the skin

of

the tail

is considered like the tail.

And just as, with regard to eating, the skin of the tail is considered meat, so too, with regard to burning on the altar, its status is that of meat. Therefore, in the case of the peace-offering of a lamb, whose tail is required to be offered on the altar, even the skin of the tail is offered with it. If so, the statement of the Mishna is difficult: It says that if one slaughters a peace-offering of a lamb with the intention of eating the skin of the tail outside its designated place or outside its designated time, his intention invalidates the offering or renders it pigul. Why, then, does his intention invalidate it ?

But he is having an intention concerning the eating of the altar

since the skin is destined to be eaten by the altar,

not for

the eating of

a person,

for he intended that a person eat the skin of the tail. And can one have an intention concerning the eating of the altar in relation to the eating of a person, thereby invalidating the offering?

And we answer:

Shmuel said: Whose opinion is this? It is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says that one may relate an intention concerning the eating of the altar to the eating of a person, and an intention concerning the eating of a person to the eating of the altar!

As we learned in a Mishna: If one slaughters the offering

with the intention

of eating something that is not normally eaten,

such as the imurim, whose law is that they are burned, outside the time designated for their eating or outside the place designated for their eating; and likewise, if he intended

to burn

something outside its designated time or outside its designated place

that is not normally burned,

such as meat, whose law is that it is eaten, then the offering is

valid,

because an intention concerning the eating of the altar in relation to the eating of a person, or concerning the eating of a person in relation to the eating of the altar, does not invalidate the offering.

But Rabbi Eliezer invalidates it,

because he maintains that even an intention concerning the eating of the altar in relation to the eating of a person, and concerning the eating of a person in relation to the eating of the altar, is effective to invalidate the offering.

And we object:

How did you establish

our Mishna

as the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer?

If so,

say the latter clause

of the Mishna:

This is the general rule:

Anyone who slaughters, receives, carries, or sprinkles,

and has an intention during one of these rites

to eat something that is normally eaten [namely, the meat of a peace-offering or other meat of an offering that is eaten], or who has an intention during one of these rites

to burn something that is normally burned,

namely, the imurim—if he intended in any of these cases that the eating or burning take place outside its designated time, the offering is pigul and one is liable to karet for eating it; and if he intended that the eating or burning take place outside its designated place, it is disqualified, but there is no liability to karet.

It is evident from this latter clause that only if he intended to eat

something that is normally eaten, [is it effective]; not so.

But if he intended to eat something

that is not normally eaten, [it is not effective],

the offering is not invalidated. It follows that this latter clause

comes according to the Rabbis,

who maintain that one may not relate an intention concerning one type of eating to another type of eating. If so, it is difficult: Is it possible to establish the

first clause

according to

Rabbi Eliezer, and the latter clause

according to

the Rabbis?

He said to him,

Shmuel:

Yes; the first clause is Rabbi Eliezer, and the latter clause is the Rabbis.

Rav Huna said: The skin of the tail is not considered like the tail

with regard to the mitzva of burning on the altar. This is because Scripture excluded it, as will be explained—

Rabba said: What is the reason for Rav Huna’s view

that the skin of the tail is not considered like the tail with regard to burning? It is because, concerning the burning of the tail, the Torah explicitly excluded the skin of the tail, saying: “And he shall offer from the sacrifice of the peace-offering its fat, the tail,”

and not the skin of the tail.

And we derive:

“Its fat—the tail,” and not the skin of the tail.

And according to Rav Huna, our Mishna follows even the Rabbis, who maintain that one may not relate an intention concerning one type of eating to another.

Rav Hisda said: In fact, the skin of the tail is considered like the tail.

And in the case of the skin of a lamb, since its tail is offered, the skin of the tail is offered with it. Our Mishna can follow the Rabbis, who maintain that one may not relate an intention concerning the eating of the altar to the eating of a person.

And here,

where our Mishna invalidates an intention concerning eating the skin of the tail,

with what are we dealing? With the tail of a goat,

whose law is that it is not burned but eaten. And when one intends to eat it, he is relating an intention concerning the eating of a person to the eating of a person, and therefore the intention invalidates the offering.

The Gemara explains that it is obvious why

all of them,

Rav Huna and Rav Hisda,

did not say

like Shmuel,

because they do not establish

the Mishna in a manner in which

the first clause is Rabbi Eliezer and the latter clause is the Rabbis—

they do not establish it so!

And it is likewise obvious to us why Shmuel and Rav Hisda

did not say like Rav Huna, who maintains

that the skin of the tail is not considered like the tail:

because they did not say,

that

the skin of the tail is considered like the tail, this is what it teaches them. They do not find it necessary to expound as Rav Huna does, excluding the skin of the tail from “its fat—the tail.”

Rather, what is difficult is that Shmuel and Rav Huna

[did not say] like Rav Hisda,

who established the Mishna as referring to the skin of a goat:

Why did they not say so?

After all, they too agree that the tail of a goat is not offered but eaten!?

And we answer: The reason Shmuel and Rav Huna did not establish the Mishna in this manner is that if the Mishna is dealing with the skin of a goat, whose law is that it is eaten,

what does it teach us

by this? Does the Mishna come to teach this very law—that

the skin of the tail,

with regard to human consumption,

is considered like the tail—and to say that since it is soft like meat, its law is that of meat with regard to invalidating the offering through an improper intention to eat it? We have already

learned

this in a Mishna:

And these are those whose skins are like their flesh

with regard to contracting the impurity of an animal carcass:

the skin beneath the tail. Therefore, it is necessarily not this that the Mishna comes to teach. Rather, it is teaching something else: The Mishna is dealing with the skin of a lamb. According to Shmuel, the novel point is that one may relate an intention concerning the eating of the altar to the eating of a person, in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer; and according to Rav Huna, the novel point is that the skin of the tail is not considered like the tail with regard to burning.

And Rav Hisda

maintains that although we have already learned that the skin of the tail is included among those whose skins are like their flesh, nevertheless

it was necessary

to teach us here as well that the skin of the tail is considered like the tail.

For

it might enter your mind to say: This applies only

when the skin is considered like the tail

with regard to impurity,

so that it joins with an olive-bulk in the impurity of an animal carcass or with an egg-bulk in the impurity of food, because

since it is soft,

being soft skin, it

joins

to be considered like meat.

But here,

with regard to eating it in accordance with the law governing consecrated offerings,

say

that since Scripture states concerning the gifts of the priesthood, “All the sacred offerings of the Children of Israel that they give to you I have given to you,”

for distinction,

which means

for greatness,

teaching that they are to eat them

in the manner in which kings eat,

and since

kings do not eat in this manner, say that it does not

constitute an intention to eat when the slaughterer intends to eat the skin of the tail in a manner not prescribed for it, and the offering should not be invalidated on that account,

this teaches us

that in this respect as well, the law of the skin is like that of meat, and eating it is considered eating meat.

Meytivi

from what was taught in a Tosefta:

If one slaughters a burnt-offering

with the intention

of burning an olive-bulk of the skin beneath the tail outside its designated place—

it is disqualified, but there is no liability to karet.

Outside its designated time—

it is pigul, and one is liable to karet for it!

Elazar ben Yehuda of Ish Evelim says in the name of Rabbi Yaakov, and likewise Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda of Kefar Ikkus said in the name of Rabbi Shimon: Whether the tender hide

of

the hoofs

of

a small animal, or the hide of the head of a tender calf

throughout its first year,

or the hide beneath the tail, and

likewise

everything that the Sages listed with regard to ritual impurity

of a carcass or of foods, “

these are those whose hides are like their flesh,”

to include,

in addition to all those mentioned above,

the hide of the genitals:

in all these cases, if one slaughtered the olah with the intention of burning an olive-bulk of any of them

outside its designated place, it is disqualified, but there is no karet for it.

If he intended to burn it outside its designated time—

it is piggul, and one is liable to karet for it!

This implies that only when one slaughters

an olah

specifically—

no,

a thought concerning the burning of these hides contrary to their prescribed manner disqualifies the offering, since the tanna mentioned only an olah;

but

one who slaughters

a sacrifice

other than an olah,

his thought does not

disqualify it in this regard.

If so, we ask:

Granted, according to Rav Huna,

who maintains that the Torah explicitly excluded the hide beneath the tail from being burned in the case of shelamim,

this is why it teaches “the one who slaughters

an

olah

with the intention of burning an olive-bulk of the hide beneath the tail”—for only in this case is it disqualified, since an olah was not excluded from burning the hide beneath the tail; only shelamim was excluded.

But according to Rav Ḥisda,

who does not maintain this exclusion at all, and even with regard to shelamim the hide beneath the tail is considered like the tail itself,

why specifically does it teach “

olah”?

Let it teach: a sacrifice

without qualification! For every sacrifice, whether shelamim or olah, has its tail burned on the altar!?

The Gemara answers:

Rav Ḥisda can say

two answers:

If you wish, say:

The tanna of the beraita is speaking about

the tail of a kid,

which is not destined to be burned at all, but only to be eaten. Therefore, he did not teach “a sacrifice” without qualification with regard to a thought of burning, because in the case of shelamim the hide of the tail is not fit to be burned. Rather, he specifically mentioned an olah, in which even the hide of the kid is burned, since the entire offering is burned for the sake of the Lord; in this case, a thought to burn it contrary to its prescribed manner disqualifies it.

And if you wish, say: Teach

in that same beraita: One who slaughters the

sacrifice

with the intention of burning the hide of the tail contrary to its prescribed manner. It is disqualified even in the case of a lamb, since according to Rav Ḥisda the hide of the tail is considered like the tail itself. Thus, he is thinking of transferring it from one category of altar consumption to another category of altar consumption.

We learned in the Mishna: One who slaughters the sacrifice with the intention of sprinkling its blood outside or burning its sacrificial portions outside,

it is disqualified, but there is no karet for it.

If he intended to sprinkle its blood tomorrow or to burn its sacrificial portions tomorrow, it is piggul, and one is liable to karet for it.

The Gemara discusses this:

From where are these matters derived

that a distinction is made between a thought concerning outside its designated place, which disqualifies the offering but does not entail karet for eating it, and disqualification resulting from a thought concerning outside its designated time, for eating which one is liable to karet?

The Gemara answers:

Shmuel said: Two verses are written.

One concerns outside its designated time, and karet is stated with regard to it; the other concerns outside its designated place, and karet is not stated with regard to it.

The Gemara discusses this:

What is it?

Rabba said:

It is written in the passage of Tzav: “If any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his shelamim is eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted; it shall not be accounted to him who offers it—it is piggul; and the person who eats of it shall bear his iniquity.”

And they expound the verse as follows: “

The

third”—

this is

one who, at the time of performing the sacrificial service, thinks that the offering will be eaten by a person or consumed on the altar

outside its designated time.

For the third day is outside the time allotted for eating shelamim, whose prescribed period is two days. “

Piggul

will be,” which is written at the end of the verse, is superfluous. For with regard to “outside its designated time,” it has already been stated, “it shall not be accepted.” Rather,

this is

that if, at the time of performing the service, he thought that it would be eaten by a person or consumed on the altar

outside its designated place,

it is disqualified. And it is reasonable to include specifically the thought of “outside its designated place,” rather than another thought, such as intending to pour its blood onto the floor, or to mix its blood with the blood of disqualified offerings, because the thought of “outside its designated place” more closely resembles the thought of “outside its designated time” than do the other thoughts.

And from what is stated later in the verse concerning liability to karet, “

And the person who eats of it

shall bear his iniquity,” rather than “the person who eats shall bear his iniquity,” without the word “of it,” this comes to exclude one of the two, teaching that only if he ate

one

of these two is he liable to karet,

but not

if he ate

both

of them.

And which is it?—

This is “

outside its designated time.”

And to exclude outside its designated place,

for one is not liable to karet for it.

The Gemara raises an objection:

But perhaps say

the reverse: “

And the person who eats of it

shall bear his iniquity”—

this is outside its designated place, and to exclude

through the word “of it”

outside its designated time,

for one is not liable to karet for eating it!?

The Gemara answers:

It is reasonable

that “

outside its designated time”

is preferable

as the category to which karet should apply, because

the verse begins

with it

at the outset: “If any is eaten on the third day”!

The Gemara raises an objection:

On the contrary,

“

outside its designated place”

is preferable

as the category to which karet should apply, since

the word

“of it,” which excludes one of the two from the punishment of karet, is adjacent to the word “piggul,” from which the disqualification of “outside its designated place” is derived!?

The Gemara answers:

Rather, Abaye said: When Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi came, Rabba said: Rely on what the tanna taught: When it says

“If any is eaten on the

third

day, it is piggul; it shall not be accepted, and those who eat it shall bear their iniquity, because he has profaned a sacred thing of the Lord, and that person shall be cut off from his people,”

in the passage of Kedoshim Tehiu [which is a “minor verse,” as it is shorter than the verse in the passage of Tzav], this verse is superfluous.

There is no need to state

it,

since it has already been stated

in the passage of Tzav,

“If any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his shelamim is eaten on the third day

it shall not be accepted.”