Zevachim 18a (יח.) — the Talmud in English

The verse therefore says: “

a statute, a statute”

for a gzera shava.

With regard to those who drank wine, the verse says “a statute” (Leviticus 10:9), and likewise the verse says “a statute” with regard to one who is lacking the garments (Exodus 29:9) and with regard to washing the hands and feet (ibid. 30:21) [the reference in all three cases is to “an eternal statute”], to teach by means of a gzera shava: Just as one who drank wine invalidates the Temple service, so too one who is lacking the garments, or one who has not washed his hands and feet, invalidates the service.

Once we have learned by means of the gzera shava from one who drank wine that one who is lacking the garments invalidates the service, why was it necessary for the verse to say, “And it shall be for them a priesthood of eternal statute”?

And we answer:

If

we were to derive it

from there,

from a gzera shava from one who drank wine alone,

I would have said, this applies only

when one who is lacking the garments invalidates his service if he performed

a service for which a non-priest is liable to death

—such as sprinkling, offering on the altar, or pouring the wine or water.

But as for a service for which a non-priest is not liable to death, perhaps he does not

invalidate it when lacking the garments, since with regard to one who drank wine, who is the source of the derivation, it says, “and they shall not die.” One might have said that only those services concerning which death is mentioned are derived by the gzera shava from one who drank wine.

The verse therefore teaches us

that the verse “And it shall be for them a priesthood of eternal statute” teaches that in every service that a priest performs while lacking the garments, he thereby invalidates the service, because one who is lacking the garments is like a non-priest; and with regard to a non-priest there is no distinction between a service for which there is liability to death and one for which there is no liability to death, but in all of them he disqualifies the service.

We have found

that one who is lacking the garments invalidates all services.

As for those who drank wine,

for whom the law of death is stated,

from where do we know

that they invalidate the service even in those services for which a non-priest is not liable to death?

It is derived

It is derived

by a gzera shava, “

a statute, a statute,”

from one who is lacking the garments!

But the tanna

in the beraita

takes it from “

and to distinguish between

the sacred and the profane,” which is stated with regard to those who drank wine.

He derives it from there.

And he does not require a gzera shava for this purpose. How, then, can we disagree with this and derive a gzera shava on our own?

And we answer: The tanna in the beraita learned from “and to distinguish between the sacred and the profane” only

before the gzera shava of

“a statute, a statute” from one who is lacking the garments was established for him. That is, at first the tanna of the beraita did not remember this gzera shava of “a statute, a statute.” But afterward, once he remembered it, he abandoned the derivation from “and to distinguish between the sacred and the profane,” and his conclusion was that the teaching that those who drank wine invalidate the service is a gzera shava from one who is lacking the garments.

And we ask:

But the tanna,

even according to the conclusion,

derives the law of one who is lacking the garments from one who drank wine,

and not as we have just said, that he learned the law of one who drank wine by a gzera shava from one who is lacking the garments!?

And we answer: In truth, according to the conclusion, the tanna learns the law that one who drank wine invalidates the service by a gzera shava from one who is lacking the garments. As for the fact that we find that the gzera shava teaches the opposite,

this is what he is saying,

the tanna in the beraita:

The derivation from “to distinguish between the sacred and the profane,” which is stated with regard to those who drank wine, teaches only about invalidating services for which there is liability to death, since with regard to those who drank wine it says, “and you shall not die.”

But

from where do we know that we should not distinguish between one who is lacking the garments and

between

one who drank wine and

between a priest who served

without having washed his hands and feet,

but rather equate one who is lacking the garments, for whom all services are disqualified, even those for which there is no liability to death, with one who drank wine and one who has not washed his hands and feet, so that all their services are disqualified? —

The verse therefore says “

a statute” — “

a statute”

for a gzera shava!

And we inquire: According to the conclusion, in which the tanna retracted and learned the law of those who drank wine by a gzera shava from one who is lacking the garments,

but “

to distinguish” —

why do I need it?

And we answer:

For that which Rav taught.

Rav

would refrain from expounding halakhic teachings while he had been drinking wine. Therefore,

he would not appoint an amora over him;

he would not appoint the “amora,” whose role was to proclaim Rav’s words aloud to the public,

from one festival day

onward—from the time he ate, drank, and celebrated the festival, he would not issue rulings or expound halakhic teachings publicly—until

the following day,

the day of his companion, i.e., the next day,

because of intoxication. For it is stated: “Do not drink wine or strong drink when you enter the Tent of Meeting ... and to distinguish between the sacred and the profane.” That is, when one comes to distinguish and instruct concerning a sacred matter and a profane matter, he must not be intoxicated.

But still

we inquire: Is it indeed

from here,

from the verse “And it shall be for them a priesthood of eternal statute,” that the law of one who is lacking the garments

is derived

?

But

it is derived from there,

as it is stated: “

And the sons of Aaron the priest shall place

fire upon the altar.” And we expound from the superfluous word “the priest” that when is he called “Aaron the priest”? Only when he is

in his priestly attire,

wearing the garments of the High Priest, but not when he is wearing the garments of an ordinary priest. This

teaches

that the verse

concerns a High Priest who wore the garments of an ordinary priest and served,

whose

service is invalid,

because he is lacking the garments of a High Priest. This is seemingly difficult: Why was it necessary to say “Aaron the priest,” given that we already have the derivation from the verse “And it shall be for them a priesthood of eternal statute”?

And we answer:

If it were derived from there,

if only “And it shall be for them” had been stated,

I would have said, this applies only

when one who is lacking the garments disqualifies only

a service that prevents atonement.

But

the placing of fire upon the altar, which is

a service that does not prevent atonement,

but is merely a mitzva, since there was already fire upon the altar that had descended from Heaven, although there is a mitzva to bring fire from an ordinary person as well—had it not been explicitly stated with regard to it, “And the sons of Aaron the priest shall place,” one might have said that this service

does not

need to be performed in priestly garments. The verse therefore teaches us that even a service that does not prevent atonement must be performed in priestly garments!

But still

there is a difficulty: Is it really

derived from here?

But

it is derived from there,

as it is stated: “

And the sons of Aaron the priests shall arrange the limbs,” and we expound from the superfluous word “the priests” that their service is valid only if

the priests are in their priestly attire. This

teaches that an ordinary priest who wore the garments of a High Priest and served

has a

service that is invalid,

because he is wearing garments inappropriate for the priesthood of an ordinary priest. This is seemingly difficult: Why are both this exposition and the exposition from “And it shall be for them a priesthood of eternal statute” necessary, both teaching that their service is valid only when they wear the garments of their priesthood?

his service is disqualified,

because he is wearing garments that are not appropriate for the priesthood of an ordinary priest. This is seemingly difficult: Why are both this interpretation and the interpretation from “And it shall be for them an eternal priesthood” needed, both teaching that their service is valid only when they wear the garments of their priesthood?

And we answer:

If it were derived from there:

from “And they shall have the priesthood as an eternal statute,”

I would have said that this applies only

to a deficiency that disqualifies the service,

a lack

of garments.

But an excess

of garments—where a regular kohen wore the garments of the kohen gadol, which include within them the garments of the regular kohen — I might say

does not

invalidate his service. Therefore,

it teaches us

the verse, “And the sons of Aaron, the priests, shall arrange the pieces,” that even an excess of garments disqualifies his service, because those garments are not fit for his priesthood as a regular kohen!

The Sages taught in a baraita: If the garments

that the kohen wore while performing his service were

dragging,

trailing on the ground, or

raised

above the ground because they were higher than the ground on account of being short, or if they were

worn out,

old, and he

performed the service—

his service is valid!

The requirement that the garments be precisely the kohen’s size is only an ideal requirement and does not invalidate the service.

If he wore

the kohen

two pairs of trousers

or

two belts,

or

omitted one

of any of the garments, or wore one garment

in excess

or had a bandage on his flesh beneath his garment, and that bandage formed an interposition between his flesh and the priestly garment,