Zevachim 110a (קי.) — the Talmud in English

In this manner,

Mar,

Rabbi Elazar

holds that designation by means of a vessel is significant.

Since he placed two half-pars in the vessel designated for the incense of the Sanctuary, the vessel designated it; therefore, if even the slightest amount is lacking, it is disqualified. Accordingly, even outside the Temple he is not liable until he offers all of it.

And

the first tanna

holds that

designation by means of a vessel

is not significant,

and even if some is lacking, he is liable for offering it outside the Temple.

Rava adds that, according to his explanation of the first tanna’s opinion, there is a practical difference with regard to the libations. [When a burnt-offering of an animal or a peace-offering is offered, libations of fine flour and wine must be brought with it. The measure of the libations for a lamb is one-quarter of a hin, which is three log of wine; for a ram, one-third of a hin, which is four log; and for a bull or calf, half a hin, which is six log.]

Rava said: Now that we have said that, according to the one who says [the first tanna,]

[the first tanna]

designation by means of a vessel is entirely insignificant,

if he

designated

in a vessel

six

log

for

the libations of a bull,

and drew four of them and offered them outside, he is liable, since they are fit

inside

for a ram.

And he is liable only for this reason. The same applies if he

designated

in a vessel

four

log

for a ram, and drew three of them and offered them outside, he is liable, since they are fit

inside

for a lamb.

But if

even the slightest amount was lacking

from the three log,

and he offered them outside, he is exempt,

since they are not fit inside for anything.

Rav Ashi said:

the distinction between the Mishna and the beraita is as Abaye explained: they disagree with regard to offering the incense of the innermost chamber outside the Temple, and their disagreement concerns whether one derives the inner offerings from the outer offerings. As for Rava’s objection, “Now, if the Rabbis do not derive one case of outside from another, etc.,”

the Rabbis do not derive pouring from offering,

because they are not comparable to one another,

even though

both involve

one case of outside derived from another.

But

offering

of the innermost chamber

from offering

of the Sanctuary

they do derive, even though

it was

inner derived from outer.

For the two acts of offering are alike in that both bear the designation of offering.

We learned in the Mishna:

And all of them, if he offered them

inside and a piece of an olive-bulk remained and he offered it outside, he is liable.

They raised a dilemma: A deficiency outside,

if he removed them whole to outside and they became deficient outside,

is it called a deficiency,

so that if he offers what remains outside, he is exempt?

Or is it not called a deficiency

and he is liable, according to the Rabbis, as though it were all intact?

The sides of the dilemma are:

Do we say: Since it went out,

it

became disqualified

with the disqualification of “leaving its proper place,” and nevertheless he is liable for offering it. If so,

what difference is there between the disqualification of leaving, and the disqualification

of

a deficiency?

Or perhaps

specifically in the case of

“leaving,” which is present in its entirety,

and nothing from the offering is lacking,

yes,

he is indeed liable; but when it is deficient,

it is not present in its entirety

since it is lacking,

no 115 .

Abaye said: Come and hear

from our Mishna:

Rabbi Elazar exempts him until he offers all of it!

This proves that any deficiency exempts.

Rabba bar Rav Hanan said to Abaye: Do you resolve it from Rabbi Elazar!?

But Rabbi Elazar exempts even when the entire offering is intact, if he offered only an olive-bulk of it, while the entire discussion is according to the Rabbis, who made one liable for an olive-bulk when it is entirely intact, but agree that when it became deficient inside, he is exempt; the dilemma concerns a case in which it became deficient outside?!

He said to him,

Abaye: I am not deriving it from Rabbi Elazar’s own words. Rather,

I explicitly heard it from my master [Rabba, Abaye’s teacher]:

[Rabba, Abaye’s teacher]:

The Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Elazar only to this extent

and make one liable for an olive-bulk

but

only when it is

present in its entirety. But in the case of a deficiency, they agree with him

that he is exempt. .

What is the meaning of

“but”?

Rabba’s innovation is that they agree in a case

where it became deficient outside.

This proves that even according to the Rabbis, one is exempt for a deficiency that occurred outside!

And we reject this:

No,

Rabba’s statement concerns a case

where it became deficient inside,

and there is no proof concerning our case, in which the deficiency occurred outside.

Come and hear

from the latter clause:

And all of them, if even the slightest amount was lacking and he offered them outside, he is exempt.

What is the meaning of

“but”?

Here it is speaking of a case

where it became deficient outside,

and he is exempt because of the deficiency.

And we reject this:

No. It became deficient inside!

The matter therefore remains unresolved.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who offers sacred offerings

and their sacrificial portions outside is liable.

And we ask:

Why

is he liable?

But there is an interposition!?

Since the flesh is not fit to be offered, it interposes between the sacrificial portions and the arrangement of wood on the altar; in such a case, even inside the Temple it is not considered an act of placing an offering. For the Torah says: “And the sons of Aaron, the priests, shall arrange them on the wood that is upon the fire, which is upon the altar,” implying that the offering must be directly upon the fire. The initial assumption now is that the Mishna is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says that one is not liable outside until he places it ממש בראש המזבח, at the top of the altar itself, as with the offering inside.

And we answer:

Shmuel said:

This is what we are dealing with here:

when he turned them over,

placing the fats below, upon the fire!

And Rabbi Yohanan said: Even if you say that he did not turn them over,

even so, it is not an interposition.

And whose opinion is this? It is Rabbi Shimon, who says

earlier in the Mishna [108a]:

Even if he placed them upon a rock or upon a stone, he is liable,

and it is not necessary that they be specifically upon the altar; in any event, there is no issue of interposition here.

Rav said:

There is no interposition here, because

an object of the same type does not interpose,

and the flesh and the sacrificial portions are of one type.

Mishna:

A meal-offering from which the handful was not taken,

and he offered it outside, he is exempt.

Because it is not fit to be offered inside.

But if he

took the handful

in accordance with its law,

and

afterward

the handful returned into it,

and became mixed with the remainder,

and he offered it

in this state

outside, he is liable.

Because something like this would be valid inside, after the fact. As we learned in Menahot [23a]: If the handful of the meal-offering became mixed with its remainder, one may not offer it; but if he offered it, it satisfies the owners’ obligation. Since inside it is considered an offering valid after the fact, he is liable for offering it outside.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: If the handful of a meal-offering became mixed back into it, one is liable for offering it outside.

The Gemara wonders:

Let the remainder become nullified

—why should the remainder of the meal-offering that remained after the handful was taken, which constitutes the majority of the meal-offering, not nullify

the handful

that was returned into the remainder of the meal-offering? The handful is the minority, so the matter should be considered as though the handful were not present, and he should be exempt for offering it outside?!

And we answer:

Rabbi Zeira said: The term “burning” is stated with regard to the handful,

“And he shall take his handful and burn it,”

and the term “burning” is stated with regard to the remainder

“You shall not burn any of it as a fire-offering to the Lord” [and we derive: Anything from which an offering is burned—that is, the remainder from which the handful was taken for burning—is subject to the prohibition “You shall not burn it”].

Just as with regard to the burning stated with regard to the handful,

if two handfuls were burned simultaneously,

one handful does not

overpower

and nullify

the

other,

even if one is greater than the other, as we derive from a verse in tractate Menahot [22a] that none of the offerings ascending upon the altar nullifies another; therefore,

so too, with regard to the burning stated with regard to the remainder,

together with the handful,

the remainder does not nullify the handful.

Mishna:

The handful and the frankincense

of a voluntary meal-offering, both of which render the remainder permitted for eating by being burned,

if one burned one of them outside, he is liable.

Rabbi Elazar exempts him until he burns

also

the second,

because liability applies only for burning all of the element that renders the remainder permitted outside, and not when he burned only part of it.

But if he offered

one inside

first

and one outside

afterward,

he is liable.

For in this manner the burning is completed, and everything depends upon it.

And likewise,

the two bowls of frankincense,

which are burned on Shabbat in order to render the leḥem ha-panim permitted for the priests to eat ,

if he offered one of them

of the bowls

outside, he is liable. And Rabbi Elazar exempts him

here as well

until he offers

also

the second.

But if he burned

one

of the bowls

inside

in accordance with its law,

and one

of them

outside,

then he is

liable,

as above, since the offering was completed outside through it.

Gemara:

Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa raised a dilemma: A handful

that was burned by itself, without the frankincense,

what is the halakha: Does it render the corresponding portion of the remainder permitted

that is, the half of the remainder corresponding to the handful, so that it may be eaten, whereas the half of the remainder corresponding to the frankincense is not rendered permitted for eating? The case is one in which he set aside one portion of the remainder corresponding to the handful and another portion corresponding to the frankincense?

And the sides of the dilemma are:

Does burning the handful without the frankincense

fully permit

the portion corresponding to the handful, so that it is completely permitted through it?

Or

does burning the handful by itself merely

weaken

the prohibition against eating the remainder, because the handful and the frankincense render all of the remainder permitted for eating only when both have been burned? But if he burned only one of them, not even part of the remainder becomes completely permitted; rather, the prohibition applying to it is only weakened.

And we raise a question:

According to whom

did Rabbi Yitzḥak raise his dilemma?

If it is according to Rabbi Meir, who said [

above, on 16a ]

that one can establish piggul through half of an element that renders the offering permitted,

that is, if he established piggul with regard to the handful alone or the frankincense alone, by intending at the time of burning one of them to eat an olive-bulk of the remainder outside, he established piggul—if so, when he burned the handful without the frankincense, it certainly

fully permits,

since he burned half of the element that renders the remainder permitted. If it did not render the corresponding portion permitted, the intention concerning it would not be effective.

If it is according to the Rabbis, who say [

there ]

that one cannot establish piggul through half of an element that renders the offering permitted,

then it is possible that burning the handful by itself

neither fully permits nor weakens the prohibition.

Why, then, was it obvious to Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa that the handful alone either weakens the prohibition or renders the remainder permitted?

And we explain:

Rather,

Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa’s dilemma is

according to Rabbi Elazar

in our Mishna, who does not hold one liable when he burns one of them outside until he burns the second one.

And we challenge this: The reason for

Rabbi Elazar’s

view—that one is not liable for bringing an offering outside until he burns all the elements that render it permitted—is that

he follows the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that one cannot establish piggul through half of an element that renders the offering permitted.

If so, it is obvious that the handful alone does not even weaken the prohibition.

And we answer:

Rather,

his dilemma is

according to the Rabbis here,

who held one liable in our Mishna for burning a handful or frankincense outside. The question is:

What is the halakha here? Does it fully permit

since it is evident that it is considered burning?

Or does it merely weaken,

and even burning that is effective only in weakening the prohibition is considered burning, for which one is liable because of burning outside?

And we conclude:

Teyku!