Zevachim 110a — the Talmud in English

And in this manner

Master,

Rabbi Elazar

held that establishment by a vessel is a matter.

Since he placed two half-p⁠ras in the vessel of the incense, of the Sanctuary, he established it as a vessel; therefore, if even anything at all was lacking, it becomes disqualified. Accordingly, even outside, he is not liable until he offers all of it.

And

the first tanna

held

that establishment by a vessel

is not a matter,

and even if some was lacking, he is liable for offering it outside.

Rava adds to explain that there is a practical difference concerning the libations according to his explanation of the view of the first tanna: [when a burnt offering of an animal or a peace offering is offered, libations of fine flour and wine must be brought with it. The measure of the libations for a lamb is one-quarter of a hin, which is three log of wine; for a ram, one-third of a hin, which is four log; for a bull or calf, one-half of a hin, which is six log].

Rava said: Now that we say, according to the one who says

[for the first tanna]

that establishment by a vessel is nothing,

if he

established

in a vessel

six

log

for

the libations of a bull,

and drew four of them and offered them outside, he is liable, for they are fit

inside

for a ram.

And he is liable only for that reason. And the same law applies if he

established

in a vessel

four

log

for a ram, and drew three of them and offered them outside, he is liable, for they are fit

inside

for a lamb.

But if he

lacked anything at all

of the three log,

and offered them outside, he is exempt,

for they are fit for nothing inside.

Rav Ashi said:

The distinction between the Mishna and the beraita is as Abaye explained: they disputed the offering of that which is for within and withinmost outside, and their dispute is whether that which is for within is derived from that which is outside. And concerning Rava’s objection, “Now, if the Sages do not derive outside from outside, and so on,”

the Sages do not derive libation from offering,

because they are not similar to one another,

even though

both are

outside from outside.

But

offering

of that which is for within

from offering

of the Sanctuary

they do derive, even though

it was

within from outside.

For the two offerings are alike in that they have the designation of offering.

We learned in the Mishna:

And all of them that he offered

inside and left an olive-sized portion of them and offered it outside, he is liable.

They raised a dilemma: The deficiency of outside,

if he brought them outside whole and they became deficient outside,

is it called a deficiency,

and if he elevated the remainder outside, he is exempt?

Or is it not called a deficiency

and he is liable, according to the Sages, as though all of it still existed?

And the sides of the question are:

Do we say: Since it went out,

it has

become disqualified

with the disqualification of “going outside its place,” and nevertheless he is liable for elevating it. If so,

what difference is there between the disqualification of going out and the disqualification

because of

a deficiency?

Or perhaps,

specifically “going out,”

which is present as it is,

and nothing was lacking from the offering,

yes,

indeed he is liable; but when it is deficient,

which is not present as it is

in its entirety, for it became deficient,

no 115.

Abaye said: Come and hear

from our Mishna:

Rabbi Elazar exempts until he offers all of them!

And it is demonstrated that any deficiency exempts.

Rabba bar Rav Hanan said to Abaye: Do you resolve it from Rabbi Elazar!?

But Rabbi Elazar exempts even if the entire offering exists, if he offered only an olive-sized portion of it; and the entire discussion is according to the Sages, who made one liable for an olive-sized portion when all of it exists, but agree that when it became deficient inside he is exempt for it, whereas the question concerns when it became deficient outside?!

He said to him

Abaye: I am not learning from Rabbi Elazar’s own words, but

I heard explicitly from Master

[Rabba, Abaye’s teacher]:

The Sages do not disagree with Rabbi Elazar up to this point

and make one liable for an olive-sized portion

but

in a situation

that it is present as it is. But in a deficiency, they agree with him

that he is exempt.

What

is it not

Rabba’s innovation that they agree in a situation

where it became deficient outside?

And it is demonstrated that according to the Sages as well, he is exempt when it became deficient outside!

And we reject this:

No,

Rabba’s words concern a situation

where it became deficient inside,

and there is no proof for our question concerning a deficiency outside.

Come and hear

from the final clause:

And all of them that became deficient by anything at all and he offered them outside, he is exempt.

What

is it not

speaking here of a situation

where it became deficient outside

and he is exempt because of the deficiency?

And we reject this:

No. It became deficient inside!

And this question remains unresolved!

We learned in the Mishna:

One who offers consecrated offerings

and their sacrificial portions outside is liable.

And we ask:

Why

is he liable?

But there is an interposition!?

For since the flesh is not fit for offering, it interposes between the sacrificial portions and the arrangement of wood, and in such a case even inside it is not an elevation. For the Torah said: “And the sons of Aaron, the priests, shall arrange them on the wood that is upon the fire, which is upon the altar,” implying that the offering must be directly upon the fire. And it now occurs to us that the Mishna is Rabbi Yosei, who says that one is not liable outside until he elevates it to the top of the altar itself, as with the offering inside.

And we answer:

Shmuel said:

In what are we speaking here?

When he turned them over,

when he placed the fats below, upon the fire!

And Rabbi Yohanan said: Even you may say that he did not turn them over;

even so, it is not an interposition.

And whose view is this? It is Rabbi Shimon’s, who says

above in the Mishna [108a]:

Even if he elevated them upon a rock or upon a stone, he is liable,

and we do not require specifically upon the altar; in any event, there is no interposition here.

Rav said:

Here there is no interposition, because

one kind does not interpose with respect to its own kind,

and the flesh and the sacrificial portions are one kind.

Mishna:

A meal offering from which the handful was not taken,

and he offered it outside, he is exempt.

Because it is not fit inside.

But if he

took the handful

in accordance with its law,

and

afterward

his handful returned into it,

and became mixed with the remainder,

and he offered it

thus

outside, he is liable.

Because a comparable case inside is valid. As we learned in Menahot [23a]: if his handful became mixed with its remainder, he may not offer it; but if he offered it, it is acceptable for the owners. Since inside it is considered an offering after the fact, he is liable for it outside.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: A meal offering whose handful became mixed within it—he is liable for offering it outside.

And the Gemara wonders:

Let the remainder become nullified

—why should the remainder of the meal offering that remained after the taking of the handful, which is the majority of the meal offering, not nullify

the handful

that was returned into the remainder of the meal offering, since the handful is the minority, so that it would be considered as though the handful does not exist, and he would be exempt for offering it outside?!

And we answer:

Rabbi Zeira said: “The offering of the handful is stated with regard to the handful,”

“And he shall take a handful and burn it,”

“and the offering is stated with regard to the remainder,”

“You shall not burn any fire-offering of it to the Lord” [and we expound: anything from which there is a fire-offering, namely, the remainder from which the handful was taken for the fire, is subject to “You shall not burn”].

Just as with regard to the offering stated with regard to the handful,

if he offered two handfuls at once,

no handful

one

nullifies

the

other,

even if it is greater than the other, as we expound from a verse in Tractate Menahot [22a] that all those which ascend upon the altar do not nullify one another; therefore,

so too with regard to the offering stated with regard to the remainder,

together with the handful,

the remainder does not nullify the handful.

Mishna:

The handful and the frankincense

of a voluntary meal-offering, both of which permit the remainder to be eaten through their offering,

if he offered one of them outside, he is liable.

Rabbi Elazar exempts him until he offers

also

the second,

because the liability is only for offering all that which permits outside, and not when he offered only part of it.

But if he offered

one inside

first

and one outside

afterward,

he is liable.

For through this the offering was completed, and everything depends upon it.

And likewise,

the two bowls of frankincense,

which are offered on Shabbat to permit the showbread for the priests to eat,

if he offered one of them

of the bowls

outside, he is liable. And Rabbi Elazar exempts him

here as well

until he offers

also

the second.

But if he offered

one

of the bowls

inside

according to its law,

and one

of them

outside,

this is

liable,

as above, for through it the offering was completed outside.

Gemara:

Rabbi Yitzhak Nappaha raised a question: A handful

that was offered by itself, without frankincense,

what is the law: does it permit opposite it in the remainder,

namely, the half of the remainder opposite the handful, to eat it, while the half of the remainder opposite the frankincense is not permitted to be eaten? And this is speaking of a case in which he separated part of the remainder opposite the handful and part opposite the frankincense?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Does offering the handful without the frankincense

fully permit

the portion opposite the handful, so that it is completely permitted through it?

Or

does offering the handful by itself only

lessen

the prohibition against eating the remainder, because the handful and the frankincense permit all the remainder to be eaten only when he has offered both of them. But if he offered only one of them, not even part of the remainder is completely permitted; rather, the prohibition upon it is only lessened.

And we raise an objection:

According to whom

was Rabbi Yitzhak uncertain?

If according to Rabbi Meir, who says [A0092] [above, on 16a]

above, on 16a ]

one establishes piggul with half of a permitting element

[if he established piggul with the handful alone or with the frankincense alone, meaning that at the time of offering one of them he intended to eat an olive-bulk of the remainder outside, he established piggul], then when he offered the handful without the frankincense, certainly

it fully permits,

for he offered half of the permitting element. If it did not permit that which is opposite it, the thought would not have been effective in it.

If according to the Sages, who say [A0100] [there]

there ]

one does not establish piggul with half of a permitting element,

then it is possible that offering the handful by itself

neither fully permits nor lessens.

Why, then, was it clear to Rabbi Yitzhak Nappaha that the handful by itself either lessens or permits?

And we explain:

Rather,

Rabbi Yitzhak Nappaha’s uncertainty is

according to Rabbi Elazar

in our Mishna, who does not make him liable when he offered one of them outside until he offers the second.

And we object: The reason of

Rabbi Elazar

that one is not liable for bringing outside until he offers all the permitting elements is that

he holds like the Sages, who say: One does not establish piggul with half of a permitting element.

If so, it is obvious that the handful by itself does not even lessen the prohibition.

And we answer:

Rather,

his uncertainty is

according to the Sages here,

who made him liable in our Mishna for offering the handful or the frankincense outside, and the uncertainty is:

Here, what is the law? Does it fully permit

for it is proven that it is considered an offering?

Or does it lessen,

and an offering that is effective only to lessen a prohibition is also considered an offering, so that one is liable for it on account of an offering outside?

And we conclude:

Teyku!